[Dialogue] What isn't being talked about
george
geowanda at earthlink.net
Thu Jan 20 18:14:33 EST 2005
While we may decry Lam's speech or wish for a different future, here's
something else to think about. That economic side of the triangle.
For more go to:http://207.44.245.159/article7778.htm
George Holcombe
Part 1: Why the emperor has no clothes
By Andre Gunder Frank
01/20/05 "Asia Times" -- Uncle Sam has reneged and defaulted on up to
40% of its trillion-dollar foreign debt, and nobody has said a word
except for a line in The Economist. In plain English that means Uncle
Sam runs a worldwide confidence racket with his self-made dollar based
on the confidence that he has elicited and received from others around
the world, and he is a also a deadbeat in that he does not honor and
return the money he has received.
How much of our dollar stake we have lost depends on how much we
originally paid for it. Uncle Sam let his dollar fall, or rather
through his deliberate political economic policies drove it down, by
40%, from 80 cents to the euro to 133 cents. The dollar is down by a
similar factor against the yen, yuan and other currencies. And it is
still declining, indeed is apt to plummet altogether.
There was also a spate of competitive devaluations in the 1930s,
called the "beggar thy neighbor policy" of shifting the costs for the
neighbors to bear. True, as the dollar has declined, so has the real
value that foreigners pay to service their debt to Uncle Sam. But that
works only if they can themselves earn in currencies that have
increased in value against the dollar. Otherwise, foreigners earn and
pay in the same devalued dollars, and even then with some loss from
devaluation between the time they got their dollars and the time they
repay them to Uncle Sam. China and other East Asian nations do earn in
dollars, to which they have pegged their currencies, so they have
already lost a substantial portion of their dollar stake, by far the
world's largest.
And they, like all others, will also lose the rest. For Uncle Sam's
debt to the rest of the world already amounts to more than a third of
his annual domestic production and is still growing. That alone
already makes his debt economically and politically never repayable,
even if he wanted to, which he does not. Uncle Sam's domestic, eg
credit-card, debt is almost 100% of gross domestic product (GDP) and
consumption, including that from China. Uncle Sam's federal debt is
now US$7.5 trillion, of which all but $1 trillion was built up in the
past three decades, the last $2 trillion in the past eight years, and
the last $1 trillion in the past two years. Alas, that costs more than
$300 billion a year in interest, compared with, for example, the $15
billion spent annually on the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). But no worries: Congress just raised the debt
ceiling to $8.2 trillion. To help us visualize, $1 trillion tightly
packed up in $1,000 bills would create a pile 100km high.
But nearly half is owed to foreigners. All Uncle Sam's debt,
including private household consumer credit-card, mortgage etc debt of
about $10 trillion, plus corporate and financial, with options,
derivatives and the like, and state and local government debt comes to
an unvisualizable, indeed unimaginable, $37 trillion, which is nearly
four times Uncle Sam's GDP. Only some of that can be managed
domestically, but with dangerous limitations for Uncle Sam noted
below. That is only one reason I want you to meet Uncle Sam, the
deadbeat confidence man, who may remind you of the film Meet Joe
Black; for as we get to know him better below, we will find that he is
also a Shylock, and a corrupt one at that.
The United States is the world's most privileged nation for having
the monopoly privilege of printing the world's reserve currency at
will and at a cost of nothing but the paper and ink it is printed on.
Moreover, by doing so, Uncle Sam can export abroad the inflation he
generates by the extra dollars he prints, of which there are already
at least three times as many floating around the world as at Uncle
Sam's home. Additionally, his is also the only country whose "foreign"
debt is mostly denominated in his own world-currency dollars that he
can print at will; while most foreigners' debt is also denominated in
the same dollar, but they have to buy it from Uncle Sam with their own
currency and real goods. So he simply pays the Chinese and others in
essence with these dollars that already to begin with have no real
worth beyond their paper and ink. So especially poor China gives away
for nothing at all to rich Uncle Sam hundreds of billions of dollars'
worth of real goods produced at home and consumed by Uncle Sam. Then
China turns around and trades these same paper dollar bills in for
more of Uncle Sam's paper called Treasury Certificate bonds, which are
even more worthless, except that they pay a percent of interest. For
as we already noted, they will never be able to be cashed in and
redeemed in full or even in part, and anyway have the lost much of
their value to Uncle Sam already.
In an earlier essay, I argued that Uncle Sam's power rests on two
pillars only, the paper dollar and the Pentagon. Each supports the
other, but the vulnerability of each is also an Achilles' heel that
threatens the viability of the other. Since then, Iraq, not to mention
Afghanistan, has shown confidence in the Pentagon not to be what it
was cracked up to be; and with the in-part-consequent decline in the
dollar, so has confidence in it and Uncle Sam's ability to use it to
finance his Pentagon's foreign adventures (See Coup d'Etat and Paper
Tiger in Washington, Fiery Dragon in the Pacific, which also conjures
up the productive growth of China). Additionally we must realize that
Uncle Sam's numbers above and below are also all literally relative.
So far relations with other countries, in particular with China, still
favor Uncle Sam, but they also help maintain an image that is
deceptive. Consider the following:
A $2 toy leaving a US-owned factory in China is a $3 shipment
arriving at San Diego. By the time a US consumer buys it for $10 at
Wal-Mart, the US economy registers $10 in final sales, less $3 import
cost, for a $7 addition to the US GDP. (Blaming 'undervalued' yuan wins
votes, Asia Times Online, February 26, 2004)
Moreover, ever-clever Uncle Sam has arranged matters so as to earn 9%
from his economic and financial holdings abroad, while foreigners earn
only 3% on theirs, and among them on their Treasury Certificates only
1% real return. Note that this difference of 6 percentage points is
already double what Uncle Sam pays out, and his total 9% take is
triple the 3% he gives back. Therefore, although foreign holdings and
Uncle Sam's are now about equal, Uncle Sam is still the big net
interested winner, just like any Shylock, but no other ever did so
grand a business.
But Uncle Sam also earns quite well, thank you, from other holdings
abroad, eg from service payments by mostly poor foreign debtors. The
sums involved are not peanuts or even small potatoes. For from his
direct investments in foreign property alone, Uncle Sam's profits now
equal 50%, and including his receipts from other holdings abroad now
are a full 100% of profits derived from all of his own domestic
activities combined. These foreign receipts add more than 4% to Uncle
Sam's national domestic product. That helps nicely to compensate for
the failure of domestic profits as yet to recover even their 1972
level, because Uncle Sam has failed to boost productivity sufficiently
at home.
The productivity hype of president Bill Clinton's "new economy" in
the 1990s was limited to computers and information technology (IT),
and even that proved to be a sham when the dot-com bubble burst. Also,
not only the apparent increase in "profits" but also that of
"productivity" were, at the bottom, on the backs of shop-floor, office
and sales-floor workers working harder and longer hours and, at the
top, the result of innovative accounting shams by Enron and the like.
Such factors still compensate for and permit much of Uncle Sam's
$600-billion-and-still-rising trade deficit from excess home
consumption over what he himself produces. That is what has resulted
in the multitrillion-dollar debt. Exactly how large that debt is Uncle
Sam is reluctant to reveal, but what is sure is that it is by far the
world's largest, even as net debt to foreigners, after their debt to
him is deducted.
How has all this come about?
The simple answer is that Uncle Sam, who is increasingly hooked on
consumption, not to mention harder drugs, saves no more than 0.2% of
his own income. The Federal Reserve's guru and now you see it, now you
don't doctor of magic, Alan Greenspan, recently observed that this is
so because the richest 20% of Americans, who are the only ones who do
save, have reduced their savings to 2%. Yet even these measly savings
(other, poorer countries save and even invest 20%, 30%, even 40% of
their income) are more than counterbalanced by the 6% deficit spending
of the government. That is what brings the average saving rate to
0.2%. To maintain that $400-plus-billion budget deficit (more than 3%
of national domestic product), which is really more the $600 billion
if we count, as we should, the more than $200 billion Uncle Sam
"borrows" from the temporary surplus in his own Federal Social
Security fund, which he is also bankrupting. (But never mind,
President George W Bush just promised to privatize much of that and
let people buy their own old-age "security" in the ever-insecure
market).
So with this $600-billion-plus budget deficit and the above-mentioned
related $600-billion-plus deficit, rich Uncle Sam, and primarily his
highest earners and biggest consumers, as well as of course the Big
Uncle himself, live off the fat of the rest of the world's land. Uncle
Sam absorbs the savings of others who themselves are often much
poorer, particularly when their central banks put many of their
reserves in world-currency dollars and hence into the hands of Uncle
Sam in Washington, and some also in dollars at home. Their private
investors send dollars to or buy dollar assets on Wall Street, all
with the confidence that they are putting their wherewithal in the
world's safest haven (and that, of course, is part of the
above-mentioned confidence racket). From the central banks alone, we
are looking at yearly sums of more than $100 billion from Europe, more
than $100 billion from poor China, $140 billion from super-saver
Japan, and many 10s of billions from many others around the globe,
including the Third World. But in addition, Uncle Sam obliges them,
through the good offices of their own states, to send their thus
literally forced savings to Uncle Sam as well in the form of their
"service" of their predominantly dollar debt to him.
His treasury secretary and his International Monetary Fund (IMF)
handmaiden blithely continue to strut around the world insisting that
the Third - and ex-Second, now also Third - World of course continue
to service their foreign debts, especially to him. No matter that with
interest rates multiplied several times over by Uncle Sam himself
after the Fed's Paul Volcker's coup in October 1979, most have already
paid off their original borrowings three to five times over. For to
pay at all at interest rates that Volcker boosted to 20%, they had to
borrow still more at still higher rates until thereby their
outstanding foreign debt doubled and tripled, not to mention their
domestic debt from which part of the foreign payments were raised,
particularly in Brazil. Privatization is the name of the game there
and elsewhere, except for the debt. The debt was socialized after it
had been incurred mostly by private business, but only the state had
enough power to squeeze the greatest bulk of back payments out of the
hides of its poor and middle-class people and transfer them as
"invisible service payments" to Uncle Sam.
When Mexicans were told to tighten their belts still further, they
answered that they couldn't because they had already had to eat their
belts. Only Argentina and for a while Russia declared an effective
moratorium on debt "service", and that only after political economic
policies had destroyed their societies, thanks to Uncle Sam's advisers
and his IMF strong arm. Since then, Uncle Sam himself has been
blithely defaulting on his own foreign debt, as he already had several
times before in the 19th century.
Speaking of that, it may be well to recall at least two pieces of
advice from that time: Lord Cromer, who administered Egypt for
then-dominant British imperial interests, said his most important
instrument for doing so was Egypt's debts to Britain. These had just
multiplied when Egypt was obliged to sell its Suez Canal shares to
Britain in order to pay off earlier debts and British prime minister
Benjamin Disraeli explained and justified his purchase of the same on
the grounds that it would strengthen British imperial interests.
Today, that is called "debt-for-equity swaps", which is one of Uncle
Sam's latter-day favorite policies to use the debt to acquire
profitable and/or strategically important real resources, as of course
also was the canal as the way to the jewel of the British Empire,
India.
Another piece of practical advice came from the premier military
strategist Carl von Clausewitz: make the lands you conquer pay for
their own conquest and administration. That is of course exactly what
Britain did in and with India through the infamous "Home Charges"
remitted to London in payment for Britain administering India, which
even the British themselves recognized as "tribute" and responsible
for much of "The Drain" from India to Britain. How much more efficient
yet to let foreign countries' own states administer themselves but by
rules set and imposed by Uncle Sam's IMF and then effect a drain of
debt service anyway. Actually, the British therein also set the
19th-century precedent of relying on the "imperialism of free trade"
with "independent" states as far and as long as possible, using
gunboat diplomacy to make it work (which Uncle Sam had already learned
to copy by early in the 20th century); and if that was not enough,
simply to invade, and if necessary to occupy - and then rely on the
Clausewitz rule.
We shall note several recent instances thereof, and especially the
Iraqi one, in the second article in this series.
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