[Dialogue] A dispassionate look at US foreign policy

[KroegerD@aol.com]

Mr Freidman has given some thought to our dilemma.
Dick Kroeger
Idealism, Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy
By George  Friedman

Iran says it has enriched uranium. Hosni Mubarak is claiming  that Shia in 
Sunni states are traitors to their countries. The French are in  political and 
economic gridlock. With all these urgent things going on, it seems  to us that 
it is time to talk of something important, something that has driven  and 
divided American politics for centuries and will continue to do so: the  argument 
between those who have been called idealists and those who have been  labeled 
realists in U.S. foreign policy. 

When the United States was in  its infancy, France experienced a revolution 
that was in many ways similar to  the American Revolution. Some Americans 
wanted to support the French  revolutionaries, arguing that the United States had 
to pursue its moral ideals  and stand by its moral partner. Others pointed out 
that the American economy was  heavily dependent on Britain, the major market 
for American goods. Moreover, the  young country relied on its ability to send 
exports to Europe, and the waters  were controlled by Britain. Whatever moral 
inclinations the Americans might have  had toward France, prudence required 
that they not take on Britain. The  idealists tried to frame their arguments 
strategically and the realists tried to  create a moral cast for their argument, 
but the problem, in the end, was simple:  America's survival depended on not 
alienating a country that was everything the  colonists had fought against. 

This argument has constantly torn apart  American thinking about foreign 
policy. Consider this example from the more  recent past: In World War II, the 
United States was allied with the Soviet  Union, which was ruled by a genocidal 
maniac, Josef Stalin. At the time that the  United States allied with Stalin, 
Adolf Hitler was only beginning to climb into  Stalin's class of killer. There 
were those who argued that the alliance with  Stalin was a betrayal of every 
principle Americans stood for. Others, like  Franklin Roosevelt, recognized 
that unless the United States allied with Stalin,  Hitler likely would win the 
war. Those who opposed an alliance with Stalin based  on moral ideals certainly 
had an excellent point -- but those who argued that,  apart from an alliance 
with the devil, the Republic might not survive, also had  an excellent point.

Consider a final example. In 1972, the United States  appeared to be a 
declining power. It was losing the war in Vietnam, and its  position globally 
appeared to be deteriorating. The Soviet Union had split from  China years before, 
and their confrontation along their frontier had, on  occasion, been bloody. 
War was possible. Richard Nixon created an entente with  the Chinese that was 
designed to encircle the Soviet Union. In retrospect, the  strategy worked. 
However, in establishing relations with Mao's China, the United  States once again 
aligned itself with a murderous regime. The alternative was an  unstoppable 
Soviet regime. 

In each of these cases, the United States  confronted this dilemma. On one 
side was the argument that unless the United  States stood for its moral ideals, 
it would survive but lose its soul. Siding  with Britain, Stalin or Mao might 
have been prudent, but it was a shallow  prudence that would eliminate the 
raison d'etre for the American regime. On the  other side was the argument that 
there could be no moral regime unless there was  a regime. The United States 
did not have the strength to resist, on its own,  Britain, Nazi Germany or the 
Soviet Union. Without such questionable allies, the  moral project would be 
impossible because the United States either would not  survive, or would survive 
as a spent force. 

It is important to note that  these arguments cut across political and even 
ideological grounds. In 1972,  people on the left celebrated Nixon's alliance 
with Mao, and it was the right  wing that raised moral doubts. Of course, many 
on the right supported Nixon and  some on the left, not taken by the romance 
of Maoism, were appalled at the  alignment. Similarly, it was the left in World 
War II that wanted an alliance  with the Soviets, and Winston Churchill -- 
far from a leftist -- stood with  them. In other words, the debate has never 
been an ideologically coherent  argument. It has been all over the place.

The current incarnation of this  argument concerns the U.S.-jihadist war, and 
the ideological complexity shows  itself quickly. 

There are two flavors of idealists here. First, there  are those who argue 
that in waging its war against the jihadists, the United  States should never do 
anything that would violate basic principles of human  rights -- and that it 
should avoid alliances with states that are themselves  oppressive. So, for 
example, some argue that working closely with Saudi Arabia,  a kingdom they 
regard as antithetical to American moral standards, is  unacceptable. 

There are also those who argue that the primary reason for  going to war in 
the Middle East is to create democracies there. There are two  sorts of 
idealists here. There are the neoconservatives -- some of whom  sincerely believe the 
prodemocracy argument, and others who have adopted it as a  justification for 
military campaigns they supported for other reasons. But  alongside the 
neoconservatives, there are liberals who argue that the protection  of "human 
rights" -- often used interchangeably with "democracy" -- should be  the primary 
justification for any war. Recall liberal support for the Kosovo war  as an 
example. 

On the other side of the rhetorical divide are those who  make two arguments. 
The first is that -- as in the historical cases involving  Britain, the 
Soviet Union and China -- the practical reality is that the United  States must 
always work with allies when fighting in the Eastern Hemisphere, and  that those 
allies frequently will be morally repugnant to Americans. In other  words, 
whatever you may think of the Saudis' view of women, an alliance with  Saudi 
Arabia has been indispensable for fighting the war against al Qaeda,  regardless 
of whether the later Iraq campaign was justified. In other words, the  argument 
for alliance in the past remains valid today.

This is extended  to the argument that the United States should have as its 
goal the creation of  democracy in the Middle East. The counterargument goes 
like this: Democracy in  the Middle East may be, in some moral sense, a good 
idea, but American power --  though enormous -- is not infinite. The jihadists in 
Iraq and elsewhere have not  been crushed, and the United States needs 
regional allies. The Americans, the  logic goes, cannot simultaneously seek alliance 
and try to overthrow regimes.  

The idealist argument -- that a country that pursues only its physical  and 
economic security will lose its moral foundation -- is not a frivolous  
argument. At a certain point, the pursuit of security requires the pursuit of  power, 
and the pursuit of power is corrupting. At the same time, pursuing  justice 
without a sufficiently large sword will get you whipped. And staying out  of 
the fight does not mean that the fight won't come to you. The American moral  
project can be lost in two ways: through opportunistic corruption or through  
annihilation.

Politicians do not have the luxury of contemplating the  paradox of being. 
They must make decisions, and inaction is very much a  decision. George 
Washington decided that safety trumped political principle and  broadly steered clear 
of the French revolutionary regime. Franklin Roosevelt saw  the path to 
preserving democracy through alliance with Stalin. Nixon swallowed  political 
principle by flying to Beijing. In retrospect, it is very difficult to  see how any 
of them could have chosen differently. A doctrine emerges in looking  at these 
three examples: the pursuit of political principles is possible only  when 
one is willing to look at the long term; the near term requires ruthless  and 
unsentimental compromise.

Had the idealist demand that the United  States never work with oppressive 
nations been honored, Hitler well might have  won World War II. The pursuit of 
democracy that forces the United States beyond  its military and political 
resources ultimately will weaken democracy. Moral  demands that are not rooted in 
political and military reality achieve the  opposite of the desired end. But 
the realist position also has its weakness.  Sometimes being ruthless becomes 
an end in itself. Sometimes the defense of the  national interest becomes a 
justification for defending one's own interest.  

These are not simple matters but, as noted, politicians do not have time  to 
contemplate them for very long. Their natural inclination is to act, and the  
action they gravitate toward is the pursuit of power. It is interesting to 
note  that the president most often associated with the pursuit of human rights,  
Abraham Lincoln, was -- in the course of its pursuit -- a ruthless violator 
of  those rights. No one violated constitutional protections more 
systematically  than Lincoln, and no one was more dedicated to those protections. The 
paradox,  however, is simply solved: The path from Point A to Point B is almost 
never a  straight line. Anyone who heads in a straight line will fail. This is a 
lesson  that is equally applicable to the neoconservatives and Amnesty  
International.

This discussion becomes important now because the United  States is 
pirouetting between factions in the Islamic world. The United States  won World War II 
by pragmatically taking advantage of the totalitarian states  and allying with 
Stalin. The United States won the Cold War by taking advantage  of a split 
between Communist states and allying with China. And viewed from a  high level, 
the United States is in the process of trying to win the jihadist  war by 
taking advantage of the split between Sunnis and Shia and allying with  Iran.

There are excellent moral arguments in favor of fighting a war to  bring 
democracy to Iraq. There are excellent moral arguments for never having  gotten 
involved in Iraq in the first place. There are excellent moral arguments  for 
not having gotten into Desert Storm -- against having based troops in Saudi  
Arabia and getting al Qaeda furious at the United States in the first place.  
>From all directions, the world is filled with outstanding moral arguments, and  
they have their place.

But first there is the reality that exists now.  The United States has too 
many enemies and too few forces through which to  impose its will. As in World 
War II and the Cold War, splitting the enemy is a  practical imperative that 
precedes all moral imperatives. In this case, that  means playing off the 
various factions within the Muslim world and making the  best deal possible with one 
power or another. In any deal, the United States  will wind up allied with 
someone that the Americans disapprove of, much as their  future ally will 
disapprove of them. 

The United States may well wind up  making a deal with Iran over Iraq. 
Alternatively, a Sunni coalition led by Saudi  Arabia might give Washington the 
opportunity to negotiate with the Baathist  guerrillas in the Sunni Triangle. 
Whichever path is followed, it will be  condemned by both left and right for 
dozens of excellent moral reasons.  

Bush has been pursuing the path of pragmatism, however clumsily or  adroitly, 
for months now. He will make a deal with someone because going it  alone is 
not an option. The current situation in Iraq cannot be sustained, and  all 
presidents ultimately respond to reality. Bush might have to eat some words  about 
democracy and the United States' commitment thereto, but if Roosevelt  could 
speak of the Four Freedoms while working with Josef Stalin, all things are  
possible.
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