[Dialogue] In his dreams

KroegerD at aol.com KroegerD at aol.com
Thu Apr 20 11:31:07 EDT 2006


 
RUMSFELD'S TRIUMPH 
Three years later, Iraq’s success confounds critics, wins praise. 
Stable,  prosperous Iraq affirms new DOD strategy. 
By Michael Gordon
News Analysis 
WASHINGTON, April 19, 2006 – A little more than three years after the  
invasion of Iraq, which went forward amid a chorus of criticism, Secretary of  
Defense Donald Rumsfeld is riding a new wave of respect and praise from both  
inside and outside the Pentagon. As the retired Mideast commander, Marine Corps  
Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, the former head of the United States Central Command,  
said on Meet the Press recently, “You’ve got to admire him for sticking to his  
guns. Rumsfeld ignored the nay-sayers who said it couldn’t be done his way, 
and  he turned out to be right.” 
In Baghdad, Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi presides over a national unity  
government where the once-fractious Sunni, Shia and Kurdish religious groups are  
working together in a prosperous post-Saddam Iraq, with oil production soaring 
 more than 300% over pre-war levels. In fact, the war and reconstruction 
effort,  which the then-White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsay famously 
speculated  might cost as much as an astounding $200 billion, has largely been 
self-financed  through Iraqi oil revenues since the bulk of U.S troops left in 
September, 2003.  “There’s a lot of money to pay for this that doesn’t have to 
be U.S. taxpayer  money,” Mr. Rumsfeld’s then-deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, the 
World Bank president who  won last year’s Nobel Peace Prize for his work 
promoting democracy in the  Mideast, presciently told Congress in 2003. And to the 
surprise of some  Congressional critics who direly forecasted a Vietnam-style “
quagmire,” under  Mr. Rumsfeld’s direction the departing U.S. military left 
behind only a token  force to offer support and technical assistance to a 
well-regarded 400,000-man  Iraqi Army. 
The role of the highly disciplined Iraqi army, beaten down by years of  
tyrannical rule under Hussein, has been perhaps the biggest success story of  
Mr.Rumsfeld’s strategic plan. Surprisingly supportive of U.S. goals, many Iraqi  
field-level soldiers eventually returned to their posts following the initial  
demobilization of the entire Iraqi army and its Baathist leadership, a 
strategic  move approved by Mr. Rumsfeld to show the populace that the U.S. was 
dedicated  to ending torture and oppression practiced by the old Iraqi Army. (This 
only  added to the sometimes boisterous adulation of the U.S. troops in Iraq 
displayed  in street demonstrations.) The enthusiastic new and returning troops 
that made  up the rebuilt Iraq Army were then offered short but effective “
refresher  courses” by U.S. military advisors. 
The result of all this reform? The Iraqi soldiers have quelled virtually all  
remaining resistance from a relative handful of “dead-enders,” as Mr. 
Rumsfeld  calls them, in the once-notorious “Sunni Triangle,” which served as 
Hussein’s  stronghold. The strength of the U.S.-backed Iraqi forces and the growing 
popular  support for the democratically-elected Chalabi regime also 
effectively deterred  efforts by Al-Qaeda and its allies, including the now-isolated 
Jordanian  fugitive Musab Al-Zarqawi, to gain a foothold in Iraq. Bin Laden’s 
capture in  Afghanistan in December 2002, of course, was a propaganda coup that 
undermined  terrorist recruiting and the spread of Islamist ideology 
worldwide. 
In a wide-ranging interview in his flag-draped corner office at the Pentagon, 
 Mr. Rumsfeld, once known for his testy relationship with the media, was  
unusually open and relaxed, crediting both the military brass he pushed to  
modernize the military and the U.S. troops who implemented his blitzkrieg  
strategy. “As you know, you have to go to war with the military you have, and if  you’
re lucky enough, you get the military you want. The results are  self-evident,
” he said with his trademarked grin. So far, U.S. military  fatalities have 
been kept to fewer than 150, confirming Mr. Rumsfeld’s  now-accepted view that 
with a nimble invading force of 140,000 U.S. ground  troops, far less than the 
500,000 allied troops deployed in the Gulf War, the  nation could meet its 
military objectives in Iraq while sharply reducing  casualties. (By comparison, 
293 troops died in the 1991 Gulf War, mostly due to  a SCUD missile attack on 
a barracks and “friendly fire;” 50,000 soldiers died in  Vietnam.) 
Yet even following the Special Forces-led toppling of the Taliban regime in  
Afghanistan and the capture of Osama Bin Laden in Tora Bora by pro-U.S. tribal 
 leaders, there were still doubters among top military leaders that a 
relatively  small force could succeed in Iraq. (Most have since gone along with Mr.  
Rumsfeld’s advocacy of a slimmer, faster, high-tech U.S. military, quickly 
able  to be deployed to hotspots or, if needed, overthrow threatening rogue 
regimes.  “Success speaks for itself,” one high-ranking general says.) Yet in the 
run-up  to war, the most public dissenter was the Army chief of staff, Gen. 
Eric  Shinseki, who estimated that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be 
needed  to occupy Iraq. His projections turned out to be wildly off the mark 
after  Saddam’s regime fell, military analysts say. “He became a 
laughingstock in the  Pentagon and lost all his influence,” says one high-ranking 
commander close to  Mr. Rumsfeld “He’s a man who was left in the dustbin of history,” 
the officer  says. Despite Shinseki’s fate, Mr. Rumsfeld, though a tough 
manager, regularly  impressed senior military officers with his hands-on approach 
to planning and  open-ended debate. 
Within a few weeks of the invasion, U.S. forces moved quickly to capture  
Baghdad in the wake of a “shock and awe” air campaign. Saddam’s statute was  
toppled in central Baghdad to the cheers of grateful residents on April 9th. For  
weeks afterwards, U.S. troops were offered sweets, figs and flowers as they 
were  positioned in a few strategic locations around a city—and a country—
returning to  normality after the short-lived terrors of war. 
With Iraqi police maintaining order on the streets of major cities, U.S.  
soldiers were freed up to undertake the mundane but vital work of cataloging and  
destroying the mammoth stockpiles of WMDs found throughout Iraq. These ranged 
 from the mobile weapons labs in the northern town of Baji to chemical 
weapons in  below-ground bunkers to huge hangars near the Baghdad airport containing 
 aluminum-based centrifuges used to enrich the uranium needed for nuclear  
weapons. 
Today, a wave of visitors and former war skeptics, such as Sen. Edward  
Kennedy (D-MA), have been amazed at the flowering of the new Iraq. “I once  called 
this a `war of choice,’ Mr. Kennedy admitted in a mea culpa floor  speech 
after returning from a recent fact-finding mission to Iraq. “It was, in  fact, a 
war of necessity that has made life better for people throughout the  region.” 
Even tourists have returned to Baghdad to visit the priceless  antiquities on 
display at the National Museum, while businesses are flourishing  and the 
engine of government—its bureaucracy—is back at work, but this time in a  
peaceful democracy that administration officials believe is a beacon for the  rest of 
the Mideast. At the same time, the invasion has sent a clear message to  
terrorists and the regimes that support them. As Mr. Rumsfeld testified after  the 
invasion: “The only course is to stop terrorists before they terrorize.” By  
that yardstick, the invasion had its desired impact, although sporadic 
outbursts  of terrorism still continue in vulnerable Third World countries. 
Working with Pentagon aide Douglas Feith and a “brain trust” of  
neoconservative allies throughout the Bush administration, his tough-minded  strategy has 
also changed the Mideast landscape forever. Like President Ronald  Reagan's 
during the Cold War, Mr. Rumsfeld’s approach, so his supporters  contend, has 
led to the much-praised free elections in Egypt and Saudi Arabia,  deterred 
Iran from pursuing a nuclear program, and spurred the Palestinian  Authority to 
take a more conciliatory stance towards Israel, with the chances  for an 
equitable two-state agreement greater now than ever. And little has been  heard from 
Al Qaeda since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions—despite objections  to the 
war on Iraq from such terrorist experts as former White House advisor  Richard 
Clarke, who predicted the U.S. invasion would spawn a generation of  
terrorists and divert resources away from the war on terror, Mr. Rumsfeld and  his 
supporters note that the U.S. has remained free from terrorist attack. 
For Mr. Rumsfeld, though, perhaps the sweetest victory is the reversal of  
longstanding hostility to him and the Iraq war in the capitals of the “Old  
Europe” he once famously derided. With the war’s success and the new Iraq’s role  
as a key oil supplier to Europe, Mr. Rumsfeld’s standing has soared. In fact, 
 the U.S. Defense Secretary has become so popular in France that when, last  
October, President Jaques Chirac rejected the French Senate’s resolution that  
Rumsfeld be awarded the Legion of Honor, a wave of youth riots broke out in  
France protesting the French leader's decision. The boom in trade with Iraq 
has  boosted France’s economy, and led to a hiring wave of once-alienated young  
people, native-born and Muslim alike. Chanting “Vive Le Rumsfeld!” and “
Chirac  est merde,” their political protests weakened Chirac and led to calls for 
a new  election. 
It has come as little surprise to Washington insiders that President Bush has 
 publicly joined the growing chorus of worldwide praise for Mr. Rumsfeld. 
Just  last week, he said, “Secretary Rumsfeld’s energetic and steady leadership 
is  exactly what is needed at this critical period,” referring to the secretary
’s  leadership in the global war on terror. 
As for Mr. Rumsfeld himself, the Pentagon’s success in Iraq against long odds 
 and harsh criticism has given him new confidence in fighting Washington’s  
bureaucratic wars, softened by a newfound modesty. He credits not only the  
Pentagon’s sound strategy for victory but good fortune as well. “Stuff happens,” 
 he said.
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