[Dialogue] The dilemma of democracy

[Harry Wainwright]

Colleagues, a very thoughtful read. Peace, Harry 
  _____  


The dilemma of democracy

That true democracy in the Middle East would threaten US strategic and
economic interests explains why it won't be happening soon, according to
Ayman El-Amir* <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/777/op8.htm#1>  

The US presented Arab regimes with a poisoned chalice they could not refuse:
transform yourselves into working democracies. As a starting point, the
brash Greater Middle East Initiative, formulated by the US two years ago,
was further refined and articulated by the G8 in June 2004 as a Partnership
for Progress and a Common Future. With the "no reform imposed from outside"
proviso voiced by Arab governments accepted by the G8 and included in their
final declaration, the regional stage was set for dramatic democratic
change. Or so it seemed. There was no roadmap to follow, however: US foreign
policy for the last 50 years rewarded loyal autocracies rather than
independent democracies, leaving most Arab regimes with no democratic
tradition to build on and little incentive to develop one, the cost of
forging a democratic model in Iraq less than appealing for other candidate
regimes. As might have been expected, pseudo-democratic alterations that
followed were half-hearted attempts to placate the US on the one hand, and
to contain rising local demands on the other.

Efforts made in 2005 to undertake democratic change without rocking the boat
resulted in political chaos and social discontent. One referendum and two
elections in Egypt were marred by thuggery, bloodshed and charges of
outright fraud. Media coverage was fervently biased and the fundamental
standards of free and fair elections left unattained. In Iraq, there was a
US-sponsored constitutional referendum and contested parliamentary
elections. To the extent they were freed from daily suicide massacres,
Iraqis were allowed to vote freely, at least along sectarian lines.
Allegations of fraud, mass protests and a resurgence of violence left Iraq
more divided and more violent than it had ever been before. Like
sectarian-sown Lebanon, Iraqis looked out of the same national window but
saw a different political landscape.

In Washington, the Iraqi elections were celebrated as a victory of the US
strategy of creating a free, democratic and stable Iraq -- a condition that
would warrant the beginning of US troops' withdrawal. Many in Washington
took President George W Bush's statements with a pinch of salt while Arab
peoples and candidate regimes for democratic change everywhere cringed. Then
Syria and Lebanon heated up, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict roared on and
a battle over Iran's nuclear ambitions erupted. Except for the periods of
the Arab-Israeli wars, the region has never been more unstable.

In the last half-century, US-Arab relations coalesced around defined common
interests, not shared values. These were best exemplified by the historic
meeting, on 20 February 1945, between US President Franklin D Roosevelt and
King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud aboard the cruiser USS Quincy at the Great Bitter
Lake in Egypt's Suez Canal. The upshot of the congenial meeting was very
simple: an exchange of guarantees ensuring free flow of oil to US and
Western markets in return for securing the continuation of the Saudi ruling
family. With the exception of few, short-lived revolutionary-brand regimes
in the Arab world, this served as the model for US-Arab relations from then
on. 

Hence, these relations were unperturbed by the Arab-Israeli conflict or
threatened by the brief and measured Arab oil embargo during the 1973
October War. Vital strategic interests dictated that no party would question
or strike a comparison with the system of government or the code of values
of the other. As long as oil flowed freely at reasonable prices, the US
never had any qualms about the human rights record or the quality of the
political practices of its loyal allies. Common interests ruled supreme;
democratic ideals and human rights standards were relegated to the
background.

The drama of 11 September changed the paradigm. The neo-conservative think
tanks of the Bush administration drew the lesson that without shared common
ideals of participatory democracy those oil-pumping monarchies -- what the
late intellectual Tahseen Bashir used to call "tribes with flags" -- were
unsustainable. In the estimates of US national security agencies Iraq, in
particular, was unviable as a state and a threat to its oil-rich neighbours.
This was demonstrated by the war with Iran (1980) and the invasion of Kuwait
(1990). Autocratic governance, political oppression and economic exclusion
were also breeding terrorism. That was a challenge to the vital strategic
interests of the US and Western allies 9,000 miles away.

For the US, the challenge was how to maintain and further strengthen its oil
interests based on an unsustainable paradigm. For US allies in the region,
it was how to undertake measured reform to remain essentially the same. A
compromise would have been possible had the local nationalist forces passed
the opportunity to propel democratic change. They did not. Awakened by
long-suppressed aspirations and a wind of change, these forces asserted
their right to participate in shaping their political life and in freely
choosing their representative government. A genie has popped out of the
bottle and it will be next to impossible to put it back. Another challenge
has thus emerged in that the democratic forces' demands far exceed what
governments are willing to concede, and survive. These new forces are
suspicious of US designs, are strongly opposed to the Iraqi model, hostile
to US policies of unconditional support of Israel and are eager to clean up
the domestic scene of the decades-old malaise of one-party rule, corruption
and incompetence. 

The US's dilemma in Iraq has, for the time being, overshadowed all other
priorities. When it started off, the neo-con strategy saw the compelling
case for democratic change as the best guarantor of US interests.
Unfortunately, Iraq proved to be a distasteful recipe for democratic change;
Arab local forces were not bowing to the US line, fundamentalists lurked in
the background and ruling oligarchies were apprehensive. It would seem that
the US is now beginning to perceive the dichotomy of popular democracy
posited against guaranteed strategic interests the old-fashioned way. So,
which way will it go?

>From the pragmatic point of view, the US has little interest to undercut its
traditional allies for the sake of democratic ideals. Its sustained
political, military and economic interests are becoming increasingly
assured. Gulf Arab countries are as much aghast as the US over the rising
power of Iran. They support its action in Iraq, distance themselves from the
politics of the Israeli-Palestinian problem and are offering good examples
of free market economic development. Each one of them shares a common dread
of fundamentalist Islam or renewed Shia- Sunni rivalry. A new paradigm,
therefore, will have to develop. Its elements will probably consist of a
regional alliance against terrorism as a security threat, heavy US military
presence in the region to deter Iran and guarantee the uninterrupted flow of
oil, and soft-pedalling on the ambitious agenda of democratic reform. This
may not be much to the liking of grassroots forces clamouring for democratic
change, the rule of law and full respect for human rights. If they should
rebel, armies of security forces will be at hand to control them, with an
iron fist in a silk glove. What will be the US reaction? It will not be the
first time the US will have abandoned the nationalist forces it once
encouraged. In the meantime, autocratic regimes throughout the Arab world
will bide their time and wait for Bush to pass too.

* The writer is former Al-Ahram correspondent in Washington, DC. He also
served as director of the United Nations Radio and Television in New York. 

C Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved

Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at:
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/777/op8.htm 

 

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