[Dialogue] State Department Struggles To Oversee Private Army

[Harry Wainwright]

 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/?nav=pf> washingtonpost.com

State Department Struggles To Oversee Private Army
The State Department Turned to Contractors Such as Blackwater Amid a Fight
With the Pentagon Over Personal Security in Iraq

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, October 21, 2007; A01

Last Christmas Day in Baghdad, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad received a
furious phone call from Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi. An American
-- drunk, armed, wandering through the Green
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Baghdad+Green+Zone?tid=info
rmline>  Zone after a party -- had shot and killed one of his personal
bodyguards the night before, Mahdi said. He wanted to see Khalilzad right
away.

At the vice president's home, Khalilzad found the slain guard's family
assembled. Mahdi demanded the names of the American and his employer. And he
wanted the man turned over to the Iraqi government.

After consulting with the embassy's legal officer, Khalilzad identified the
shooter as Andrew J. Moonen, an employee of Blackwater
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Blackwater+USA?tid=informli
ne>  USA, the company that provides security for U.S. diplomats in Baghdad
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Baghdad?tid=informline> .
But he would not deliver Moonen himself. Within 36 hours of the shooting,
Blackwater and the embassy had shipped him out of the country.

"As you can imagine," the embassy's Diplomatic Security office said in an
e-mail to its Washington headquarters the day of Moonen's departure, "this
has serious implications."

But as with previous killings by contractors, the case was handled with
apologies and a payoff. Blackwater fired Moonen and fined him $14,697 -- the
total of his back pay, a scheduled bonus and the cost of his plane ticket
home, according to Blackwater documents. The amount nearly equaled the
$15,000 the company agreed to give the Iraqi guard's family.

Ten months later, however -- after Blackwater guards shot and killed 17
Iraqi civilians in a Baghdad traffic circle on Sept. 16 -- the State
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Department+of+State?ti
d=informline>  Department can no longer quietly manage the consequences of
having its own private army in Iraq
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el> .
The FBI
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Federal+Bureau+of+Investiga
tion?tid=informline>  is investigating the incident, Baghdad has vowed to
overturn a law shielding contractors from prosecution, and congressional
critics have charged State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security with failing to
supervise Blackwater and other security companies under its authority.

The shootings have also reopened long-standing, bitter arguments between the
State Department and the
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+Pentagon?tid=informline
>  Pentagon, which over the years have feuded over policies including the
decision to invade Iraq and the treatment of detainees. Such broad
disagreements have frequently played out over a narrow question: Who is
responsible for the safety of U.S. civilians serving in Iraq?

With State Department and FBI investigations underway, the military leaked
its own report on the Sept. 16 shootings, finding no evidence that the
Blackwater guards fired in self-defense, as the company has maintained. U.S.
officers have publicly criticized the security contractors as out-of-control
"cowboys" who alienate the same Iraqis the military is trying to cultivate.

Defense
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Robert+Gates?tid=informline
>  Secretary Robert M. Gates said last week that the contractors are at
"cross purposes" with military goals, and he has suggested they be put under
his authority. Many at State see this as a power grab by a Defense
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Department+of+Defense?
tid=informline>  Department that has long refused to supply protection for
diplomats. Since last month's shootings, one diplomat said, the Pentagon
"has spared no expense to excoriate Blackwater and the State Department."

At its headquarters in a Rosslyn
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Rosslyn?tid=informline>
high-rise, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is in crisis mode.
Already, the service has more than doubled its three dozen agents in
Baghdad, dispatching at least a third of the elite, 100-agent mobile SWAT
force it keeps for emergencies around the world. Secretary of State
Condoleezza
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Condoleezza+Rice?tid=inform
line>  Rice has ordered that at least one DS agent accompany every
Blackwater-guarded convoy leaving the Green Zone -- an average of six or
seven each day -- and has directed DS to monitor and archive radio and video
transmissions from Blackwater vehicles to be used as evidence in any future
incident.

An examination of State Department security contractor operations awaits
Rice's review. Some officials speculated that Rice will have no choice but
to remove Blackwater's approximately 900 personal-security personnel from
Iraq; others said they think the company will be allowed to stay through the
end of its current contract in May.

Replacing Blackwater -- by far the largest and most visible of three private
security companies under State Department contract in Iraq -- would be
difficult and expensive. DS officials fear that their bureau may be
permanently tasked with guarding the hundreds of U.S. civilian officials now
under Blackwater protection in Iraq. The service has only 1,400 trained
agents worldwide, spread among the State Department building in Washington,
25 domestic U.S. offices and 285 U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas.

In the short term, taking over in Iraq would require pulling agents from
other assignments. Training new agents "would take anywhere from 18 months
to two years to identify them, do all the backgrounds, do the clearance
work, seven months of basic training [and] follow-up training for high
threats," said Richard Griffin, the assistant secretary of state for
Diplomatic Security, in recent testimony.

A new, $112 million contract signed last month with Blackwater may also be
in jeopardy, according to a senior DS official who, like other current and
former administration officials and military officers interviewed for this
article, discussed the contractor issue on the condition of anonymity. The
new contract -- adding 241 Blackwater personnel and increasing its
helicopter fleet in Iraq from eight to 24 -- will provide a quick-reaction
air component for diplomatic transport, medical evacuation and rescue, the
senior official said, something for which the military has declined to
dedicate resources.

The need for the helicopters, the official maintained, was underscored when
a convoy carrying Poland
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Poland?tid=informline> 's
ambassador in Baghdad was ambushed early this month. "Our technical ops
center [in Baghdad] heard the radio chatter" between the ambassador's guards
and the U.S.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Armed+Forces?tid=infor
mline>  military, the official said. When the military said a rescue would
take an hour, DS contacted Blackwater. Its helicopter extricated the dead
and wounded -- including the badly burned ambassador -- in seven minutes.

But as criticism of State's security operations grows, the downside of
having a contractor army at its disposal -- and under its responsibility --
has become more apparent, the official said. "With perfect 20/20 hindsight,"
he said, "maybe four years ago we should have seen this coming."

A Low-Key History

Before Iraq and Blackwater landed it in congressional hearing rooms, DS
preferred to stay in the diplomatic shadows. Its duties include
investigating visa and passport fraud, providing courier services, and
managing technical and physical security for State's domestic and overseas
facilities and personnel. Most visibly, its agents provide around-the-clock
protection for the secretary of state and visiting foreign dignitaries.

Each U.S. embassy is assigned a DS agent as regional security officer.
Trained, local hires have long provided protection around buildings, but it
was not until 1994 that DS contracted with a U.S. firm for personal
protection services, hiring Virginia
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Virginia?tid=informline>
-based DynCorp
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/DynCorp+International+LLC?t
id=informline>  to accompany exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide back to
Haiti <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Haiti?tid=informline>
after the U.S. military restored him to power.

Later, other U.S. contractors were hired temporarily to protect U.S.
officials in trouble spots including Bosnia
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Bosnia+and+Herzegovina?tid=
informline>  and the Palestinian territories. But for the most part, U.S.
diplomats venturing outside their embassies are lightly guarded with local
protection or are on their own.

Marc Grossman, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Turkey?tid=informline>  in
the mid-1990s, recalled telling his staff to take their own security
precautions. After losing embassy employees to attacks, he advised staffers
to keep a six-sided die in their glove compartments; to thwart ambushes,
they should assign a different route to work to each number, he said, and
toss the die as they left home each morning.

DS operations grew after the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Kenya?tid=informline>  and
Tanzania
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Tanzania?tid=informline> ,
but it was not until after the administration declared war on the Taliban
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+Taliban?tid=informline>
and al-Qaeda
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda?tid=informline>
in Afghanistan
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/afghanistan.html?nav=e
l>  in the fall of 2001 that security contractors became a permanent fixture
on the State Department's payroll.

North
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/North+Carolina?tid=informli
ne>  Carolina-based Blackwater was hired to protect Hamid
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Hamid+Karzai?tid=informline
>  Karzai, first installed as head of a transitional government in Kabul
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Kabul?tid=informline>  and
later elected president. Karzai was reluctant to accept the guards, said a
U.S. diplomat posted to Afghanistan. "He was concerned about how it would
look to have blonde or African-American guards, even women." Karzai asked
why he couldn't have Italian Americans who could blend in more easily.

Afghan-born Zalmay
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Zalmay+Khalilzad?tid=inform
line>  Khalilzad, who arrived in Kabul in December 2001 as President
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+W.+Bush?tid=informli
ne>  Bush's special envoy, later serving as ambassador there before moving
to Iraq in 2005, received complaints about the contractors from Karzai.
Tribal elders were insulted when they were refused access to him; some were
even pushed to the ground if they approached too aggressively, the U.S.
diplomat recalled.

Blackwater also guarded Khalilzad, whose gratitude was mixed with worry that
the guards' speeding convoys would hit an Afghan child darting from a side
street.

But Afghanistan, in security terms, was child's play compared with what
would lie ahead in Iraq.

A Convenient Choice

When the U.S. military invaded and occupied Iraq in early 2003, there was no
question who would be in charge of security for the official civilians
pouring in to remake the country. Under an executive order signed by Bush,
the Coalition
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Coalition+Provisional+Autho
rity?tid=informline>  Provisional Authority and its head, L. Paul Bremer,
reported directly to then-Defense Secretary Donald
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Donald+H.+Rumsfeld?tid=info
rmline>  H. Rumsfeld. But as U.S. troops became preoccupied with a growing
insurgency, the Pentagon hired Blackwater to provide protection for Bremer
and other civilians.

The next year, as the United States prepared to return sovereignty to the
Iraqis and the State Department began planning an embassy in Baghdad,
Rumsfeld lost a bid to retain control over the full U.S. effort, including
billions of dollars in reconstruction funds. A new executive order, signed
in January 2004, gave State authority over all but military operations.
Rumsfeld's revenge, at least in the view of many State officials, was to
withdraw all but minimal assistance for diplomatic security.

"It was the view of Donald Rumsfeld and [then-Deputy Defense Secretary] Paul
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Paul+Wolfowitz?tid=informli
ne>  Wolfowitz that this wasn't their problem," said a former senior State
Department official. Meetings to negotiate an official memorandum of
understanding between State and Defense during the spring of 2004 broke up
in shouting matches over issues such as their respective levels of
patriotism and whether the military would provide mortuary services for
slain diplomats.

Despite the tension, many at State acknowledged the Pentagon's point that
soldiers were not trained as personal protectors. Others worried that
surrounding civilian officials with helmets and Humvees
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/AM+General+Humvee?tid=infor
mline>  would undermine the message of friendly democracy they were trying
to instill in Iraq.

"It was a question of, 'Do you want uniforms?' " the senior DS official
said. " 'Should the military be doing that kind of work?' "

It was clear that the mission was beyond DS capabilities, and as the
mid-2004 embassy opening approached, "we had to decide what we were going to
do," the former State Department official said. "We had to get jobs done,
and to do that we had to have some protection."

State chose the most expedient solution: Take over the Pentagon's personal
security contract with Blackwater and extend it for a year. "Yes, it was a
sole-source contract" justified by "urgent and compelling reasons," said
William Moser, the deputy assistant secretary of state for logistics
management, in recent congressional testimony. Midway through the contract,
Moser said, an independent audit forced Blackwater's $140 million proposal
down to $106 million.

The senior DS official rejected congressional suggestions that Blackwater's
Republican political contacts and campaign contributions influenced its
selection. "I'll stack our procurement office against anybody else's," he
said. "Particularly DOD's." State officials "could care less whether
[Blackwater head Erik] Prince gave money to anybody." Blackwater was the
only contractor in Iraq with helicopters, and it already had personnel and
facilities in place.

When the sole-source contract expired in the summer of 2005, State invited
bids on a massive "worldwide personal protection services" contract to put
its operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere under one umbrella.
Blackwater formed a consortium with U.S. firms DynCorp and Triple Canopy,
and the group won a multiyear, $1.2 billion agreement.

Under the individual task orders that only the three are eligible to bid on,
DynCorp provides personal security in northern Iraq, and Triple Canopy in
the south. Blackwater covers Baghdad and Hilla, and has by far the largest
share of the $520 million that State spends annually on contract security in
Iraq.

Both Blackwater and State say the firm provides good value. The cost of
sending a U.S. diplomat or DS agent overseas "ranges from around $400,000
for a regular mission around the world to around $1 million for an American
diplomatic position in Iraq," Moser, the State logistics official, told
Congress. "So when we talk about using contract employees, I think that we
have to be very careful to consider what the fully loaded costs would be of
direct hires."

DS provides contractors a 1,000-page list of rules and procedures and says
all security personnel meet rigid requirements -- including military or
police experience -- and undergo security vetting. Contractors are highly
paid for security duties: Blackwater charges State $1,221.62 a day for a
"protective security specialist," according to a 2005 invoice released by
the House
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+House+Committee+on+Ove
rsight+and+Government+Reform?tid=informline>  Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform.

But that is an all-inclusive cost, Blackwater head Prince argued during a
recent interview on the "Charlie
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Charlie+Rose?tid=informline
>  Rose" show. "They get paid well, but they get paid only for every day
they are at work in a hot zone. They pay significant taxes right off the top
of that, state and federal. They have to cover their own insurance, their
own housing allowance -- all those benefits that a soldier gets wrapped in."

In any case, Prince said, "I know it would be hard for the State Department
to recruit other people to come over and do reconstruction work . . . if
some of them are going home in coffins."

U.S. diplomats who have served in Iraq are uniform in their defense of
Blackwater and the other security firms that protect them. Blackwater, they
point out, has lost about 30 of its own personnel in Iraq -- and not one
diplomat.

But just as diplomats receive only rudimentary training to protect
themselves, DS had little preparation and established no comprehensive
guidelines for running a thousands-strong private army. In particular, the
senior DS official said, little thought was given to how contractors would
be held legally accountable for incidents such as the Sept. 16 shootings.

Oversight, the official acknowledged, has "perhaps not been as good as it
could be."

C 2007 The Washington Post Company

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