[Dialogue] Awaiting Petraeus

Harry Wainwright h-wainwright at charter.net
Mon Sep 3 20:12:32 EDT 2007


Awaiting Petraeus


Though the US wants to blame Nuri Al-Maliki for failure in Iraq, doing so is
not fair, writes James Zogby*
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2007/860/op13.htm#1#1>  

  _____  

Right now Washington is gearing up for the appearance before congress of
Gen. David Petraeus and Ryan Crocker, US ambassador to Iraq. They are to
testify on 11 September on the progress (or lack thereof) in Iraq since
President George W Bush implemented his "surge" plan to promote political
stability and military security in Iraq. The content of their reports can
largely be discerned from recent briefings and the National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq released this week.

It all sounds straightforward, but it is not. There is gamesmanship at work.

The "surge", while having a questionable impact in Iraq, has already shaken
up politics at home. No matter how the administration spins the situation in
post-"surge" Iraq, it remains bleak. The killing continues as US and Iraqi
casualties mount. At one point, the Bush administration sought some
advantage, pointing to lower American casualty figures in July as evidence
of success. But that was immediately countered by the fact that in the past
several years, July casualty figures for US troops in Iraq have always been
lower -- and this year's July casualty figures were actually higher than
those of the past. And while Iraqi deaths are down in areas where there has
been an increase in US troop presence, as predicted, violence moved to other
parts of the country.

At the same time, too many Iraqis remain without power, water and basic
security. More than four million Iraqis are either refugees or internally
displaced, and the internal political dynamic of the country remains as
volatile as ever.

Nevertheless, the introduction of an additional 30,000 troops in targeted
areas and new tactics used in others (cooperating with some Sunni tribes
against Al-Qaeda elements) has had some impact. But progress here comes with
the potential risk of further weakening the central government. In any case,
the White House has been able to spin this limited progress to their
advantage. While two-thirds of Americans still think that the war was a
mistake and as many want the US to withdraw, there is now an increase in the
number of Americans who think the "surge" is "making the situation better in
Iraq." This month's polling numbers show 29 per cent of Americans feel this
way, as opposed to only 19 per cent last month.

In playing their hand, the administration holds two trump cards. For one,
most Americans are loathe to criticise the military or to suggest that those
who have made the ultimate sacrifice have done so in vain. The second is
that as bad as the situation in Iraq may be, it is clear that a precipitous
US withdrawal will only make things worse.

Responsible Democrats have always understood this. Senator Barack Obama, who
alone among his party's leading candidates for president stood in opposition
to the war, has consistently cautioned that "we cannot leave as
irresponsibly as we entered." But others in the party have gone too far out
on a limb, calling for an immediate and total withdrawal -- a position that
is both irresponsible and unsustainable.

It is this view, with its inherent vulnerabilities, that the administration
has targeted, and with some effect. A few Democratic members of congress who
had opposed the war and the "surge" appear to have had a change of heart
following recent trips to Iraq. Democratic Congressman Brian Baird of
Washington state noted, "people may be upset. I wish I didn't have to say
this. I know it's going to cost hundreds of Americans lives and hundreds of
billions of dollars." And he added, "One, I think we're making real
progress. Second, I think the consequences of pulling back precipitously
would be potentially catastrophic for the Iraqi people themselves, to whom
we have a responsibility ... and in the long run chaotic for the region as a
whole, and for our own security."

But while support for the US military's effort may be growing and a concern
for the consequences of a withdrawal may buy the administration some limited
time to continue the "surge", trouble is brewing on another front.

With the military inoculated against criticism, congressional and White
House wrath appears to now be focussed on Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri
Al-Maliki. The chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee,
Carl Levin (D-MI), returned from Iraq last week calling for Al-Maliki's
ouster. He was joined by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY), who said, "I
share Senator Levin's hope that the Iraqi parliament will replace Prime
Minister Al-Maliki with a less divisive and more unifying figure when it
returns in a few weeks."

Even the White House, in a sign of frustration, sent a deliberately mixed
message to the prime minister. On 21 August, Bush warned: "the fundamental
question is: Will the government respond to the demands of the people?... If
the government doesn't respond to the demands of the people, they will
replace the government." The next day he almost balanced his assessment of
Al-Maliki by observing, "Prime Minister Al-Maliki's a good guy, a good man
with a difficult job, and I support him," but then quickly added that it
wasn't the job of US politicians to change Iraq's leaders (read: Senator
Clinton) -- that was the job of the Iraqi people.

Making the Iraqi prime minister the scapegoat may buy the administration
more time by diverting attention away from US policy failures, but this is a
risky business and somewhat unfair. Al-Maliki, though clearly a sectarian
figure, has no independent power base, and no real armed force under his
command. He sits astride a fractious government coalition of fiercely
competitive forces, ideologies, and heavily armed militias, each seeking
their own advantage. His recent forays into neighbouring Iran and Syria were
less of an expression of affinity for these neighbours than they were driven
by his need to strengthen his weak domestic position.

Blaming the failure to achieve national reconciliation on Al-Maliki may
score some political points at home, but makes little sense. He is in no
position to force the stronger Kurdish groups to surrender their decision to
expand the Kurdish area further south and secure their independence. Nor is
he in a position to control the armed Shia factions who will give little
ground to once powerful and now disenfranchised Sunni tribes.

In reality, the failures that Petraeus and Crocker will point to belong not
to Al-Maliki but squarely on the doorstep of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and
its occupant. It is the failure of the Bush administration to embrace the
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group to pursue a comprehensive diplomatic
initiative that has contributed to the dysfunctionalities at work in Iraq
today. 

Thirty thousand troops cannot hold Iraq together or end its civil war. Nor
can one-on-one US meetings with Iran or Syria, or limited US cooperation
with Saudi Arabia, bring about national reconciliation in Iraq. Creating a
regional security framework involving all of Iraq's neighbours and ceding
political and eventual military control to the United Nations is a way
forward to national dialogue, and a way out of the current quagmire.

This will not be discussed on 11 September. Instead, there will be
gamesmanship, with moves countering other moves, buying time for a failed
policy in a war that will only continue.

* The writer is president of the Arab American Institute. 

C Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved

Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at:
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/860/op13.htm 

 

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