[Dialogue] Iraq: Rapid Withdrawal Is Only Solution: US General
George Holcombe
geowanda at earthlink.net
Thu Apr 3 20:57:09 EDT 2008
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General William Odom Tells Senate
Rapid Withdrawal Is Only Solution
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON IRAQ
By William E. Odom, LT General, USA, Ret.
2 April 2008
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor
to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007,
when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has
worked. Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy.
Rather, I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old
strategic aim, political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects
for success.
I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging
instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the president
claims.
Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military
solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the
level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to
strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but
today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far
more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and
Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant
inseveral other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the
notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar Province.
More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action
and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his
Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political
solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic.
No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and
the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown
over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea
that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes
me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish realities.
Also disturbing is Turkey’s military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK
groups in the border region. That confronted the US government with a
choice: either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its
commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the
former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States
will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey.
Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other
Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be.
Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to
cooperate with US forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full
credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are
their motives? First, anger at al Qaeda operatives and second, their
financial plight.
Their break with al Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis
welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al
Qaeda. The concern we hear the president and his aides express about a
residual base left for al Qaeda if we withdraw is utter nonsense. The
Sunnis will soon destroy al Qaeda if we leave Iraq. The Kurds do not
allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, detest
al Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take note of the al Qaeda
public diplomacy campaign over the past year or so on internet blogs.
They implore the United States to bomb and invade Iran and destroy
this apostate Shiite regime. As an aside, it gives me pause to learn
that our vice president and some members of the Senate are aligned
with al Qaeda on spreading the war to Iran.
Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for
their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the
cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day.
And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are
increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals
forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and
they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We
merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the
same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the
government’s troops and police, hardly a sign of political
reconciliation.
Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals with
the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves. Some
remain with al Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden
to no one. Thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power
to dozens of local strong men who distrust the government and
occasionally fight among themselves. Thus the basic military situation
is far worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under local
military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses.
This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less
progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that
needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At
the same time, Prime Minister Maliki’s military actions in Basra and
Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. We
are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the
Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being
asked by the president to believe that this shift of so much power and
finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political
centralization. He describes the process as building the state from
the bottom up.
I challenge you to press the administration’s witnesses this week to
explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case
where power has been aggregated successfully from local strong men to
a central government except through bloody violence leading to a
single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of
feudal Europe’s transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is
the story of the American colonization of the west and our Civil War.
It took England 800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the
English-Scottish border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia
and Kosovo.
How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective
state building? More accurately described, it has placed the United
States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to
consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the US
expense.
To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an over
extended army. When the administration’s witnesses appear before you,
you should make them clarify how long the army and marines can
sustain this band-aid strategy.
The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order.
Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping US strategy in the
region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional stability, not
a meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that goal requires
revising our policy toward Iran. If the president merely renounced his
threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran to lessen its
support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests the Taliban and
supports them only because they will kill more Americans in
Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a US attack on Iran. Iran’s
policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as we withdraw.
It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, and they
know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them has its
limits.
No quick reconciliation between the US and Iran is likely, but US
steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable than
a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The president’s policy
has reinforced Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons, the
very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.
Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It must
include a realignment and reassertion of US forces and diplomacy that
give us a better chance to achieve our aim.
A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely.
I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a
cat. Let try again me explain why they don’t make
sense.
First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training
element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at
all. The idea that US military trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe
and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior officers I
have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover, training
foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to
command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is not short
on military skills.
Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We heard
that argument as the “domino theory” in Vietnam. Even so, the path to
political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we withdraw
or not. The idea that the United States has a moral responsibility to
prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to blame for it,
but we do not have the physical means to prevent it. American leaders
who insist that it is in our power to do so are misleading both the
public and themselves if they believe it. The real moral question is
whether to risk the lives of more Americans. Unlike preventing chaos,
we have the physical means to stop sending more troops where many will
be killed or wounded. That is the moral responsibility to our country
which no American leaders seems willing to assume.
Third, nay sayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional
instability. This confuses cause with effect. Our forces in Iraq and
our threat to change Iran’s regime are making the region unstable.
Those who link instability with a US withdrawal have it exactly
backwards. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the
sands of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies’ interest.
I implore you to reject these fallacious excuses for prolonging the
commitment of US forces to war in Iraq.
Thanks for this opportunity to testify today.
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