A STUDY OF LOVE AND FAITH
IN THE
THOUGHT OF JOHN WESLEY

by

Joseph Wesley Mathews

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INTRODUCTION

John Wesley was, first and last, throughout his long life, consumed with concern for the Christian revolution in the heart and life of men. But he thought and preached about it as a man of his times, as indeed every man must if he is to make this revolution relevant. Every age has certain clusters of ideas and currents of taste, which provide a universe of meaning by, through and in which they attempt to understand themselves and their world and endeavor to comprehend what they are doing and what is being done to them. These controlling images and primordial concepts are simply self-evident to the times, and form the body of common sense knowledge. They are not radically questioned for there is no reason for questioning them. They are just there, taken for granted, and form the basis for the questions which are raised as well as the kind of answers formulated out of the debates and disputes.

Wesley shared in the practical and intellectual struggles of his Century and in the common notions and assumptions. With the majority of folk he accepted without Question such images of meaning, to mention but a few, as the two-world theory of life, the great chain of being idea, the Cartesian boy-soul dualism, and the concept of the perfectibility of man. He was involved in all the various currents and schools of thought; the revival of Platonism, the renewed interest in the Stoics and the Epicureans, the

continuing influence of Aristotle and the Scholastics, the new Cartesian Philosophy and the rising new world of Modern Science. The perplexing questions in almost every area of life-metaphysics, physics, physiology, psychology and ethics --both interested him and determined the manner in which he understood the Christian faith and tried to articulate it to himself and to others.

Three very basic concerns of the 17th and 18th centuries gave to Wesley the backdrop for his thinking, namely the problem of certainty, the problem of the moral life, and the problem of personal happiness. The founder of Methodism lived and died in the midst of the long and vital struggle for certain knowledge initiated by Descartes. He breathed an atmosphere which Hobbes had charged with an almost fanatical concern with ethics and individual happiness. Wesley over and over again asserts that these three issues lie at the words knowledge, virtue and happiness appear together and in this order. Wesley's interest in these matters was never simply or primarily theoretical. He was from beginning to end a practical thinker. Abstract ideas did not really concern him, indeed he tended to fear them. The basic problems of life were to him intensely practical. In brief he was an ethical and religious wrestler. His sights were fixed on personal relationships, upon man's modes of being present to life, to reality, to God. For him, as for most people in 18th Century England, the existence of the spiritual and eternal world, the reality of' God, and the validity of the natural moral law and the Scriptures were no problem. His attention was focused upon the way in which realities become vital controlling forces in our lives. He found very few, if any,

theoretical atheists in his age but practical atheism was discovered on all sides. How can men participate personally and practically in the genuine religious and moral realities? This is the kind of question he found it necessary to ask. How can one become practically what he subscribes to theoretically? }ends practical involvement with life as Wesley observed them did not correspond to what these men believed about life. He says that he found in his world ignorance, vice and misery and that his mission was to bring about wisdom, virtue and happiness. his emphasis was upon this practical or moral or spiritual revolution which is the core of the Christian Faith. His long life was spent in reflecting upon, describing and proclaiming this transformation in mind and heart.

Wesley, then, dealt with these perplexities of certitude, the meaning of Virtue and the nature of happiness as a practical and as a religious or Christian man. Genuine or final knowledge was faith in God or a practical and personal relation to God. Virtue was in its essence a love for God and mankind for his sake which flows from right faith and issues in every kind of inner and outer goodness. Happiness is the joy and peace and hope which are the necessary accompaniment of this faith which worketh this virtue. The analysis of these concepts and their inter-relation is the task of this treatise. All students of Wesley agree that he was not a systematic thinker. The contradictions and gaps in his thinking are bewildering in their complexity. But every man has some unity in his thought; some central ideas or skeleton upon which he hangs, however loosely, the mass of his insights. Most writers have either

not tried to deal with the unity and have simply dealt with some one or another important issue or seen that unity in such prominent theological concepts as justification and sanctification. The attempt of this dissertation is to use Wesley's formula. of knowledge, virtue and happiness as a basis for understanding the way in which he thought about life and the Christian faith. It is hoped-that such an effort will shed further light upon the Wholeness of Wesley's thinking, further illuminate some specifically 'Wesleyan problems, and perhaps open up some new vistas for further exploration in the study of this great churchman.

The task to which we turn, then, is to describe the meaning and relationship of faith, love and happiness according to John Wesley. Or to put it another way it is to examine the Christian revolution as he saw it: the change in the life of man from folly to wisdom, vice to virtue, and misery to joy. This means that we are venturing into a study of that aspect of Wesley's thought which has been called moral psychology or the psychology of conduct. The dissertation will be divided into three sections, the first of which will spell out, as far as possible, Wesley's view of the powers and faculties found in the natural constitution of man which are presupposed whenever he deals with matters concerning faith and virtue. The second section will deal with the moral life of the Christian man. It will include an examination of the virtue of the love of God and mankind and of the joy and hope and peace which are inseparably united with such virtue. Section three of the

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CHAPTER ONE

THE HUMAN CONSTITUTION

"There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated," wrote Bishop Butler in the preface to his "Sermons on the Moral Life". "One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature." The latter approach was that of Butler himself. It was also the method employed by John Wesley. In dealing with the problem of morals, he began with man, his proper nature and economy.

It is necessary then to attempt to analyze Wesley's view of the nature of man as well as what may be called his moral psychology before his conception of virtue can be intelligently delineated. Such an analysis forms the subject matter of this chapter.

I. The Hybrid Being

John Wesley, with most of his contemporaries, began his thinking with the Cartesian presupposition that the universe is completely filled with two types of substance: matter or material, extended substance; and spirit or immaterial, thinking substance. The first is composed of the four basic elements - earth, water, air and fire - and is entirely passive. The second, on the other hand, is active substance, the only source of any and all motion, "this being the proper distinguishing difference between spirit and matter, which is totally and essentially passive and inactive".[1] In terms of this dualism, there are only three general classes of being of which we have any conception: (1) "pure spirits, immaterial and extended substances"; (2) material bodies, "extensive and solid substances"; and (3) "mixed beings formed by the union of an immaterial substance and a corporeal".[2]

Such a classification of beings is, of course, an abstraction. Actually, the universe is literally filled with being, so that there are "no gaps or chasms in the creation of God".[3] These views Wesley also shared with most men of the 18th century. "There was", he says, "a 'golden chain', to use the expression of Plato, let down from the throne of God; an exactly connected series of beings, from the highest to the lowest".[4] Only "one soul is out of this chain, and that is he that made it".[5] In between the extremes of created beings, "from an unorganized particle of earth or water to Michael, the archangel",[6] lies literally an infinite gradation of existence.

. . . the scale of creatures does not advance <u>per</u>

> saltum, by leaps, but by smooth and gentle degrees; . . . frequently imperceptible to our imperfect faculties. We cannot, accurately, trace many of the intermediate links of this amazing chain, which are abundantly too fine to be discerned either by our senses or understanding.[7]

On the other hand, it is possible for man to "observe, in a gross and general manner, rising one above another; first, inorganic earth; then minerals and vegetables, in their several orders; afterwards, insects, reptiles, fishes, beasts, men and angels".[8]

In this grand hierarchy, "every being has an excellence peculiar to it, determined by the rank appointed for it in the universe".[9] Each class of existence has its own proper end, perfection, happiness, according to its rung on the ladder; but no being is unto itself. Each is related to the other; all have intercourse with all; and "In the assemblage of all the orders of relative perfections, consists the absolute perfection of this whole, concerning which God said 'that it is good' ".[10]

Man is seen, of course, as the middle link in this great chain of being. Since the "transitions from one species to another are almost insensible",[11] he is very intimately related to the creatures beneath and the creatures above. Yet he is neither beast nor angel; he is man with an activity and an excellence uniquely his own. In terms of the two substances in the universe, he is a hybrid being, a union of two entirely different substances. "A substance that thinks and which has a principle of action within it, is united to a substance void of thought and purely passive." [12] Yet between these separate entities with their distinctive qualities, a wonderful harmony and an intimate connection exists.

> The union of souls to organized bodies, is the source of the most abundant and wonderful harmony that exists in nature. A substance without extension, solidity and form, is united to an extended, solid and formed substance . . . from this surprising connection there springs a reciprocal commerce between the two substances; a kind of action and reaction which constitutes the life of organized and animated beings.[13]

Wesley was particularly interested in, and rather widely read in, the fields of metaphysics, physiology and psychology of his day which dealt with the problems of the nature and relations of mind and body. He had no contributions to make here; but he wrestled with these matters and had opinions upon them which influenced the way he understood the Christian message and the way he articulated it to others. In his general reflections at the end of his volumes on natural philosophy, where he is dealing with the limits of natural reason, he gives evidence of his acquaintance with some of the perplexities of the times.

> . . . do we truly know ourselves? do we know the most excellent part of ourselves, our own soul? . . . where is the soul lodged? in the pineal gland? the whole brain? in the heart? the blood? in any single part of the body? or, is it (if anyone can understand those terms) all in all, and all in every part? How is it united to the body? as to the body . . . what is flesh? . . . How does a muscle act? If you say, by being inflated, and consequently shortened: I ask again, But what is it inflated with? If, with blood, how and whence comes that blood? . . . What is blood? . . . By what force is the circulation of the blood performed? . . . Are the nerves pervious or solid? How do they act? By vibration or transmission of animal spirits? What are animal spirits? If they have any beings, are they of the nature of blood or ether?[14]

Descartes had played the primary role in setting the stage for the way in which the 17th and 18th centuries approached these issues when he divided his world into two entirely distinct and absolute substances: spirit, the essence of which was mind or thought; and matter, the distinctive characteristic of which was

solidity or extension. He cast into his times the complex metaphysical, psychological and physiological problem of how such radically different entities could be so intimately united in the same being as they appeared to be in man.

At least three solutions were offered to the metaphysical aspects of this perplexity of the union of the body and the soul. Spinoza held to a parallelism or a pre-established harmony. "The soul and matter are like two separate clocks wound up by God to go in perfect correspondence." [15] The followers of Malebranche ascribed to occasionalism or providentialism, which sees no natural causal connection between body and mind. Activity in one is merely the occasion for activity in the other. God alone through immediate action can effect the relationship. His constant intervention explains the apparent union of the two. Interactionism is the third explanation and was, perhaps, held by Descartes. According to this view, the separate substances are in vital union. By "laws of vital union", established by the original dictates of the Creator, the body and soul are continually acting and reacting upon each other.

In explaining this interaction physiologically, Descartes made use of the ancient concept of animal spirits[16], which remained, in one form or another, a cardinal point of physiology and psychology through the 18th century. These animal spirits were thought to consist of the finest parts of the blood, and to be "very like a very subtle wind, or rather a very pure and vivid flame".[17] This ethereal fire is the most rarefied type of matter and hence was

admirably fitted, in the imagination of the times, to mediate between matter and spirit. These spirits, manufactured by the blood and filling the nerve fibers, were the agents of sensation mediating between the external world and the mind, on the one hand, and agents carrying out the behests of the mind, on the other hand, thereby accounting for intentional or voluntary bodily movements.

Another discussion provoked anew by Descartes, which concerns us, had to do with organic motion in the human being. From the time of the Greeks, bodily motion was accounted for by some part or power of the soul. "In opposition to earlier views, Descartes removes from the concept of the soul every part of the concept of physical life." [18] The term "soul" was reserved for the rational powers of man. It is an immaterial, thinking substance. Motion in man is accounted for solely on the basis of mechanism. The human body is a wonderful machine. Animals[19] do not reason, have no soul, and are nothing other than machines. According to Descartes, the various spirits, propelled by an innate heat in the heart put there by God, account for all bodily movements.[20] There was no longer need for the ancient view that a part of the soul is the principle of bodily locomotion.[21]

Wesley absorbed much of this Cartesian thinking which so largely determined the mental climate of 18th century men. He describes the human body as a portion of organized matter; a curious, wonderfully complex machine composed of the four basic elements - earth, air, fire and water, duly proportioned and mixed together.[22] United to this material body is "an immaterial principle, a

spiritual nature, endued with understanding, and affections, and a degree of liberty, or a self-moving, yea, self-governing power".[23] There exists a remarkable and finally mysterious interaction between these two substances which is to be explained by "the natural laws of vital union".[24]

> How two such substances of so widely different natures, can be joined . . . we know not. Allwe can tell is this: God has ordained that certain perceptions in the soul should constantly follow certain motions in the body, and certain motions in the body such perceptions in the soul.[25]

In spite of the mystery of the relationship, the soul is united to a "flesh and blood body" and is, in every way, dependent upon this physical machine. As a matter of fact, "The soul, during its vital union with the body, cannot exert any of its operations, any otherwise than in union with the body, with its bodily organs." [26] This is true of all the powers of both the understanding and the will. Sometimes it seems that Wesley held that each mental operation had its particular physical counterpart. This is to say that there are "bodily organs" upon which "the imagination, the understanding and every other faculty of the mind more immediately depends".[27] The dependence of the soul upon the body accounts for, in part, the imperfection of our higher principles; for the body "very frequently hinders the soul in its operations, and at best serves it very imperfectly. Yet the soul cannot dispense with its service, imperfect as it is . . ." [28]

Wesley also accepted the idea that the animal spirits [29] mediate between the body and the mind. These spirits are the most rarefied of matter, called ethereal or vital fire. Because they were the most

rarefied kind of matter and the closest that matter can come to spirit, they were thought to be the proper mediums [30] in the continual process of interaction between the body and soul.

In accounting for physical motion, in nature at large or in the body, Wesley believed that the rarest of the four elements, fire, (perhaps it is the same as electricity) was the immediate cause. In the body, fire constitutes the vital flame from whence flows the animal heat.[31] It is this animal heat which permeates the whole machine and causes motion. Man comes by this fire through breathing the atmosphere about him. The lungs, "an engine fitted for that very purpose" [32], take in air, which has connected with it bits of fire, and bring the air into the blood. The blood separates the fire from the air which moves the body in every respect.

> Without this spring of life, this vital fire, there could be no circulation of the blood: consequently, no motion of any of the fluids, any of the nervous fluid in particular: (if it be not rather, as is highly probable, this very fire we are speaking of). Therefore, there could not be any sensation; nor any muscular motion. I say there could be no circulation; for the cause usually assigned for this, mainly, the force of the heart is altogether inadequate to this supposed effect.[33]

In spite of all this mechanical talk, Wesley is thoroughly persuaded that matter, though ever so ethereal, is matter still and cannot finally account for motion. By Wesley's time, it was not the animal alone which was conceived of as simply a machine; many were insisting that materialistic and mechanistic principles were adequate to explain man. This was the same as atheism and Wesley fought it with a vengeance. Matter cannot move matter. Fire moves the lever but something has to move the fire. Spirit, and spirit alone, can do this. It is either the action of God Himself, "the

only true primus mobile", or created spirits to whom God "imparts a spark of his active, self moving nature".[34] The vital fire is a necessary factor in motion, but it cannot move itself. None of the four elements has

> the least power of self-motion; none of them can move itself. "But" says Watts "does not that ship move?" Yes, but not of itself; it is moved by the water on which it swims. "But then the water moves." True, but the water is moved by the wind, the current of air. "But the air moves." It is moved by the ethereal fire, which is attached to every particle of it; and this fire itself is moved by the almighty spirit, the source of all motion in the universe. But my soul has from him an inward visible motion whereby it governs at pleasure every part of the body.[35]

Wesley held that the spirit in man governs every motion of the body except involuntary motions or reflex actions. The body apparently operates mechanically, but the machine is finally energized by the spirit of God. This "is a marvelous instance of the wise and gracious providence of the great Creator . . . were it otherwise, grievous inconveniences might follow".[36] So, although the body of man is a machine, a portion of organized matter, "fearfully and wonderfully made", the motivating force, the generator, is always spirit and, finally, the universal spirit of God.

Wesley was completely fascinated by this "creature full of wonder", man. What is man? he asked over and again. In this section we have begun the attempt to give his answer. Man is the "great amphibian" standing halfway between heaven and earth. Man is a material substance, "a curious machine", linked to a thinking substance with a principle of motion. "In my present state of existence" says Wesley "I undoubtedly consist both of soul and body".[37] The soul is the thinking substance. Sometimes Wesley

refers to it as the mind, the higher or inner principle, the intelligent nature, the spirit. It has a variety of unique faculties, that is, powers or functions, the understanding of which are of signal importance in answering the question: What is man? ". . . every spirit in the universe, as such is endued with understanding and, in consequence, with a will, and with a measure of liberty; and these are inseparably united in every intelligent nature."[38] Even now the question has not been answered. There is one more element in the human constitution and that the most significant of all; for God

> made us sensible, rational creatures; and, above all, creatures capable of God. It is this, and this alone, which puts the essential difference between men and the beasts.[39]

Such is the general structure of the human soul. In the following sections of this chapter, each part will be discussed in some detail - the understanding, the will, the principle of liberty and the capacity of God. Our concern with these various powers, and the same is true for Wesley, will be entirely practical. We are only interested in them as an introduction to his moral views and will only consider those aspects of each faculty which have direct bearing upon those views. Throughout all that lies ahead, we will be aiming at the nature of the unique excellence of man according to his place in the great chain of being.

II. The Human Understanding

To the first of the "higher principles" in man which constitute the soul, Wesley usually applied the name "understanding" rather than reason "because the word understanding is less equivocal".[40] Of course, the term "reason" did have widely varying meanings in his day. Wesley himself sometimes uses it to refer to the eternal relations in the universe or the eternal fitness of things. Other times he meant by it rational argument or the purely discursive faculty in man. For the most part, however, he uses "reason" to indicate the higher cognitive powers in general, that is, the understanding.

> Reason is much the same with understanding; it means the faculty of the human souls; that faculty which exerts itself in three ways, by simple apprehension, by judgment, and by discourse . . . The faculty of the soul, which includes these operations, I here mean by the term reason.[41]

For this division of the rational powers, Wesley is indebted to the peripatetic Scholastics in whom he was thoroughly saturated. After reading the Essay on Human Understanding, he observed that "The operations of the mind are more accurately divided by Aristotle than by Mr. Locke. They are three, and no more: simple apprehension, judgment and discourse."[42]

There are, however, other functions of the soul and body which, if not properly a part of these "higher powers" of the understanding, are yet so closely related that neither apprehension, nor judgment, nor discourse can be comprehended without them. These other functions are sensation, imagination and memory. They may be "lower" because of their more intimate connection with the body. Wesley

mentions all six of these faculties together in one discussion where he is attempting to distinguish the mental powers from those which are purely physical. He says,

> I find something in me that thinks . . . something which sees, and hears, and smells, and tastes, and feels: all of which are so many modes of thinking: It goes further. Having perceived objects by any of these senses, it forms inward ideas of them; it judges concerning them; it sees whether they agree or disagree with each other; it reasons concerning them, that is, infers one proposition from another; it reflects on its own operations; it is endued with imagination and memory; and any of its operations, judgment in particular, may be subdivided into many others.[43]

It is obvious that Wesley thought in the framework of the faculty psychology of the day, which associated with every distinguishable operation of the mind a corresponding power or faculty. Each term employed refers both to the capacity itself and to the particular activity of the capacity.[44] Furthermore, each general power, as for instance the imagination or judgment, has perhaps several functions which can be discerned. As Wesley said above, any of the mind's operations "may be subdivided into many others".

Anyone who wishes to comprehend the mind of the founder of "the people called Methodists", or understand the way he viewed Christian thought and practice, must have some grasp of his conception of these various operations of the human understanding. It is our intention now to attempt at least a preliminary comprehension of Wesley's conceptions of the functional nature and interrelations of these six major mental powers: discourse, judgment, apprehension, memory, imagination and sensation.

A. Simple Apprehension

The natural place to begin our scrutiny of the intellectual

powers is with simple apprehension. As a matter of fact, for our special purposes, this is perhaps the most important of the mind's faculties and will remain the focal issue in this whole discussion on the rational part of the soul. Before we begin, it might be of help to point out that this consideration of Wesley's ideas on sensation and perception will not only make it further obvious that he was greatly influenced by the new Cartesian philosophy, but it will also clearly indicate that he had absorbed much of the sensational psychology of the century. Locke particularly affected him, directly as well as indirectly.[45] One might add that his schooling in the systems of the Aristotelians, and his rather intimate acquaintance with the Stoics, had well prepared him for these developments.

Wesley used the terms "simple apprehension" and "perception" synonymously. "It seems", he said, "that Mr. Locke only gives a new name to simple apprehension, terming it perception."[46] "Simple apprehension is barely conceiving a thing in the mind, the first and most simple act of the understanding."[47] It is the capacity of the mind to be conscious of or to perceive whatever object is presented to it from whatever source and, theoretically, without any judgment entering in. Or again, simple apprehension refers to the elementary intellectual act of awareness.

Wesley held to a representational view of knowledge. "Objects do not strike immediately on the soul . . . She only receives impressions by interposed mediums." From the impressions given, the apprehending power forms ideas[48] or mental images which are the

proper objects of the mind. Furthermore, all these ideas in their uncomplex form originate in sensation.[49] The understanding "can give us no information of anything, but what is first presented to the senses".[50] Wesley throughout intended (whether he succeeded or not is another matter) to reject the theory of innate ideas. To repeat this important conception: "All the knowledge which we naturally have is originally derived from the senses."[51] "Our ideas are not innate", he says. The mind at birth is an empty cabinet. Man does not even naturally possess an idea of the Creator.

> After all that has been so plausibly written concerning "the innate idea of God"; after all that has been said of its being common to all men, in all ages and nations: it does not appear, that man has naturally any more idea of God, than any of the beasts of the field: . . ."[52]

Over and again, Wesley reiterated the words: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu",[53] which he claimed was an ancient view "now universally allowed".[54] All knowledge for Wesley finally rests in experience, and experience is sensation. This is the basis for one of his controlling ideas, "experimental faith", by which we have a "living knowledge" of God.

The core of what has been said is: Through one or another of the sense avenues originally flowed that which is the basis of every idea we apprehend of any object related to this world or any other, having to do with either our external or internal environment.

> . . . those who want any sense, cannot have the least knowledge or idea of the objects of that sense: as they that never had sight, have not the least knowledge or conception of light or colours.[55]

This, of course, means that "there is a great difference between our senses, considered as avenues of knowledge"[56] and that these senses are manifold.

B. External Sensation

The source of all sensation through which we know the external material world are the five common physical senses which Wesley understands and orders after Aristotle, beginning with the lowest and grossest, touch, and moving up through smell, taste and hearing to sight, the highest, most extensive and refined of all the outer "inlets of knowledge". As we have said, these senses mediate to the mind all objects of the material world. The external object acts upon the outer sense organ causing a disturbance which is transmitted, by the flow of animal spirits, along the nerves to the sensorium[57], which is the physical seat of the soul residing in the brain.

> . . . in every sensation there is, one; an outward object; two, its action on the organ of sense; three, a perception of it in the mind. The action of the object on the organ, is by means of the nerves communicated to the brain. And then, not otherwise, the perception follows.[58]

This movement of the nerves produces an impression on the brain which, by the laws of vital union and reciprocal action, produces a like impression on the soul stimulating the apprehending power to produce an idea. " . . . the nerves being variously agitated by the objects, communicate their motions to the brain, and to these impulses the perceptions of the soul correspond . . ."[59]

There is a double operation in the formation of all simple ideas; the bodily act of sensation and the mental act of appre-

hension. They are two separate functions knit together in one process;

> God having so closely connected the soul and the body that on certain motions of the body, (if conveyed to the brain by means of the nerves) certain perceptions of the mind always follow.[60]

Furthermore, the mind is both passive and active in her role in perception - that is, in this operation by which simple ideas are received. It is passive in that it is wholly dependent upon sensation which produces the imprint, so to speak, on the soul. As a matter of fact, there are really two sides to the activity of sensation: the physical impression and the spiritual impression received by it. The mind is passive in all of this. Every sensation, of whatever sort, is a pure given. It is just there; encountered, if you will. And this is extremely important to Wesley's thought. At this point, at least, he represents an old and typical British empiricism and would have understood the empirical premise of Hume's epistemology.

Yet the mind is "not altogether" passive in perception. Indeed, it plays a very active role. It looks down upon the impression apprehending it, forming ideas of what is presented. "In many cases", Wesley goes so far as to say, a man "may or may not receive the impression; in most he may vary it greatly."[61] Another activity of the mind in the perceiving operation, which is even more significant for Wesley's thought, is the "principle of assent."[62] In the mind's perceiving, there is a kind of affirmation or acceptance of the presentation. A part of what is meant by this is that we assent to the reality or truth of the

object presented. It is an expressed confidence that there is a reasonable correspondence between the image in the mind and the object represented by it. Along with Descartes, Wesley spoke of "clear and distinct ideas" as being the ground for such assent.[63] All representational systems in which one does not directly apprehend the external object, are faced with the problem of the existence of such objects. Wesley is convinced, however, that any object, clearly and distinctly apprehended, faithfully represents the object which occasioned the idea.[64] A conviction of the existence of the object appears to be given with the apprehension of it. We simply trust our senses, so Wesley claims, and, if we do not or cannot, we "must necessarily sink into universal skepticism."[65]

This "principle of assent" has another characteristic, which is in some way related to perception, that ought to be noted at this point. It is an element which, in some, if not all, acts of apprehension, might be described as a gearing in of the soul. This ought to be no surprise, for to separate out any one operation from the rest is an abstraction. None of the mental powers function in sheer isolation as we shall have occasion to note time and again. Assent, in this sense, connotes the idea of a determination of the self relative to the object apprehended.

This, of course, introduces the actions of judgment, will and liberty into simple apprehension making it not quite so simple after all.

To return to the main issue one moment longer: Wesley's fundamental understanding of the nature of faith, as we shall see more clearly later, definitely presupposes both an active and passive side to apprehension. Faith for him is sense perception defined as the "evidence and conviction" of a certain class of objects. The word "evidence" points to the passive role of the apprehension; that is, to the naked givenness of the impression. Conviction, on the other hand, indicates the active role of the mind in the three senses listed above.

Although the detailed study of faith must wait for another chapter, the mention of it here, since it is an inner sense of the soul, serves to introduce us to the next class of senses through which the soul receives its ideas. It is to be noted that what has been said in this section about the function of the apprehension relative to external sensation, is also true in the case of internal sensation.

C. Internal Sensation

The views of the Scottish Moral Sense School made a deep impression upon Wesley's mind. He read both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. The latter's ideas, especially, can easily be recognized in many of Wesley's writings. Certainly Wesley accepted Hutcheson's disposition to refer "every determination of our mind to receive ideas independent of our wills" to a particular sense. If one is clearly and distinctly aware of impressions which are not mediated

by some one of the external "inlets", he must account for them by other senses. We have, Wesley believed, vivid impressions of ideal and spiritual beings; of inner states of our own being; and of interpersonal relationships, the reality of which we cannot doubt. Obviously, these impressions did not originate in the physical senses; so "seeing that all our ideas...originally come from our senses, it is certainly necessary that...[we] have senses capable of discerning objects of this kind..."[66] Such senses, according to Wesley, we do have. The activity of those faculties is what he meant by internal sensation. "Seeing, feeling, joy, grief, pleasure, pain are ideas", says Wesley,[67] even as sticks and stones which are perceived by the mind are ideas. Both are rooted in sensation, outer or inner. In the operation of internal sensation, the soul or mind, by inward powers, impresses upon itself (not perhaps without the aid of the body) certain images, which it then perceives and forms ideas of by the apprehending power.

There are various kinds or classes of these inward senses as there are various kinds of external senses. Whatever the exact number matters little; Hutcheson sometimes listed twelve and sometimes five. Almost any operation of the soul, including the lower appetites, might be considered, according to this view, a sense. Locke's conception of reflection, the power of the mind to reflect upon or to be aware of its own operations, is certainly an inner sense for Wesley, because it is an avenue of knowledge of what goes on in the mind. Again, there are in the human constitution certain innate modes of feeling or natural desires which are unique capacities of the soul to "relish and distinguish" particular objects appropriate to them. These also are the source of ideas. For instance, the

self has the natural capacity to distinguish, desire and enjoy the approval of other personal beings. This is a sense of honor or praise. Perhaps man has an innate disposition of sympathy for fellow creatures; if so, this too is an internal sense.

A whole cluster of internal senses are closely connected with the imaginative power. These were, by many writers in Wesley's age, discussed under the idea of taste. He joined in the discussion himself with a little essay called Thoughts on Taste, published in 1780. In this work, he includes among the inner senses, a sense of beauty, a sense of the sublime, a sense of curiosity, and a sense of abstraction. He also speaks here, as he does in a few other places, of the moral sentiments; that is, of a public sense and a sense of benevolence by which we distinguish and delight in genuine virtue and the well-being of our fellows.

It has not seemed necessary to do more than list these various faculties because they will all be dealt with again in another context.[67b] It might be illuminating at this point, however, to allow Wesley to speak somewhat at length for himself out of his essay referred to above.

> Taste is that...internal sense, which relishes and distinguishes its proper object. By relishes, I mean, perceives with pleasure...and as various as those objects are, so various are the species of taste. Some of these are objects of the understanding. Such are all speculative truths; particularly those of a metaphysical or mathematical nature. So we say, a man has a taste for metaphysics; which is more than to say, He has judgment therein. It implies over and above, that he has a relish for them; that he finds a sweetness in the study of them;...Another species of Taste, is that which relates to the objects that gratify the imagination. Thus we are accustomed to say, a man has a taste for grandeur, for novelty, or for beauty: meaning thereby, that he takes pleasure in grand, in new, or in beautiful objects, whether they are such by nature

> or by art...But is there not likewise a kind of internal sense, whereby we relish the happiness of our fellow-creatures, even without any reflection on our own interest, without any preference to ourselves...May we not likewise observe, that there is a beauty in virtue, in gratitude, and disinterested benevolence? And have not many at least a taste for this? Do they not discern and relish it, wherever they find it?...[68]

Finally, Wesley believed that there is another class of inner senses in the soul of man through which he has knowledge of "God and the things of God". Here he went beyond Mr. Hutcheson. Wesley was convinced that we have or can have simple ideas or impressions of objects relating to "another world". These "images" are given, as all experience rests on the given. Since the given is in sensation, however, it is "necessary" to have

> senses capable of discerning objects of this kind: not those only which are called natural senses...but spiritual senses... a new class of senses...not depending on organs of the flesh and blood, "to be the evidence of things not seen", as your bodily senses are of visible things; to be avenues to the invisible world, to discern spiritual objects, and to furnish you with ideas of what the outward "eye hath not seen, neither the ear heard."[69]

The external senses can only mediate objects of the temporal order. They are not capable of directly furnishing the mind with ideas of things of the spiritual world. Some understanding of that world can be gained indirectly from the outer senses by inference. But it is both so meager and uncertain, so imperfect and obscure that "it is all a mere enigma still".[70] Consequently, where the spiritual senses are not functioning, there is

> scarce any knowledge of the invisible world...scarce any intercourse with it. Not hat it is afar off: No:...it encompasses him round about. The other world, as we usually term it, is not far from every one of us. It is above, and beneath, and on every side.[71]

Yet the man whose special "faculties suited to things invisible"[72] are asleep, discerneth it not. Wesley, as noted earlier at times, used the term "faith" to designate both the faculty and operation of "spiritual sensation". "It is with regard to the spiritual world what sense is with regard to the natural. It is the spiritual sensation of every soul which is born of God."[73] Wesley is saying that as all genuine knowledge of the natural world is derived from sensation so all genuine knowledge of the "supernatural" realm comes from sensation. Furthermore, we can be just as sure of the existence or reality of the object in one case as in the other.

Since this very important part of Wesley's thought will be the special object of attention in a whole chapter later on, these few remarks suffice for the present. The essence of what Wesley is saying in this whole matter of inner sensation is that we have other kinds of experience than that associated with the outer senses and which is just as given. Through such experience, the mind is furnished with classes of ideas, the reality of which we have no more reason to doubt than we have to doubt the reality of any idea in our minds. Call these experiences intuitions, immediate awareness or by any other name, the reality is there. Wesley spoke of it in various ways himself but generally in the manner described above.

Simple apprehension for him was both a passive and active power which perceives, forms ideas of impressions made on the soul by internal sensation as well as by the outer senses. Furthermore, when these impressions, of whatever source, are clear and distinct, it gives to them the assent of our being. There are, however, capacities other than sensation that play a part in simple

apprehension; namely, imagination and memory. These call for a brief consideration.

D. Imagination and Memory

The imagination and memory along with sensation we have called the lower powers because of their more direct relation to the body, which distinguishes them from the purely mental activities of perceiving, judging and reasoning. All three of the lower faculties seem to be, in part at least, physical phenomena. This is likely more true of sensation and imagination than it is of memory in that it alone of the three, so Wesley thought, will survive the separation of soul and body at death.[74] Regardless of what their exact nature may be, neither the one nor the other can function without the aid of some one or more of the bodily organs. It is probably that both imagination and memory result "from the motion of animal spirits, through those traces which were made in the brain, while the outward objects were present".[75] Perhaps both are involved in presenting objects to the apprehension, although it might be more accurate to say that they represent objects to the mind, since that presentation is indirect rather than direct.

Any attempt to discover the fine discriminations Wesley may have made between these powers, if he made any, would be of little value to the ends of this discussion. As a matter of fact, he speaks of the memory as being "nearly allied to the imagination".[76] The important thing is that the two of them account for at least four different operations related to apprehension: first, the preserving before the perceiving faculty sense impressions after the objects which occasioned them have ceased to exist in sensation[77];

second, the "treasuring up" of ideas of all kinds from whatever source by which is built "a fund of knowledge which increases in richness every day"[78]; third, the returning of ideas or images, after once having been stored in the memory, to the apprehension by idly remembering, in which the mind is more passive, or intentional "recollection", in which the mind is wholly active[79]; fourth, the operation of mixing and combining together images once presented by sensation in a thousand ways to form new images which may or may not correspond to something in reality.[80] The second and third of these functions belong more to the memory, which is primarily a conserving faculty; while the first and last are proper to the imagination.

Wesley shared with his contemporaries a special interest in the last of these four operations; that is, the picture-making capacity of the imagination. It was observed earlier that the aesthetic senses of man are associated directly with this particular faculty. Wesley at times calls this class of interior feelings and desires the imagination.[81] Whether associated or synonymous, the aesthetic senses and the combining power work together in manufacturing images of all kinds and types which play a major role in the operation of the soul. An important distinction, however, was drawn between what was termed "creative imagination" and "idle fancy". The first is the positive, constructive, deliberate use of this power of mixing sense impressions, which is the fundamental ingredient in every kind of creative activity. It forms the basis for all genuine philosophizing, oratory, poetry, music and all the arts. All genius of whatever kind depends upon "an unusually extensive and lively

imagination."[82]

The term "idle fancy" has to do with the same capacity but was employed when "the imagination, without leave, starts to and fro, and carries us away hither and thither, whether we will or no; and all this from the merely natural motion of the spirits or vibration of the nerves".[83] Without any guide or direction, the fancy drifts from one delightful scene to another, detracting, deceiving and overriding the mind; "painting vain images" which arouse all kinds of "foolish and hurtful desires".[84] The imagination was suspect for many in the 17th and 18th centuries, and Wesley shared this suspicion. It was for him a shadowy, vague, potentially dangerous power of the mind, because it was particularly susceptible to bodily influences; because it was capable of persuasively presenting to the mind as real objects which in fact had no correspondence in reality, because there was no end to the "proud and vain and wicked imaginations" it could hold before the passions of the soul, enticing and enslaving them.

Nevertheless, imagination is a God-given faculty and, if used as He intended [85], performs a useful purpose along with memory, the five outer senses and the various kinds of internal sensation in mediating the world within us, without us and "the world all around us" to the apprehending power of the mind where simple ideas are formed. From these simple ideas comes every object of the mind which makes possible the activity of judgment and discourse. "To be without ideas", says Wesley, "is not to think."[86]

E. Judgment and Discourse

Thus far the first power of the understanding has been considered in its relation to simple ideas derived from sensation. In turning to the other two major powers of the intellect, judgment and discourse, we will still be dealing with apprehension, but this time with its relation to those complex ideas which are created by the mind itself out of the material supplied in sensation. It might be advisable, however, before we move on, to review the major emphases of what has thus far been said: First, Wesley thought of an idea as a mental object either present to the apprehension or stored in the memory. The only way we have of knowing the natural and spiritual or inner and outer worlds is through these ideas. Second, these ideas of the mind are, in their elemental form, occasioned by either internal or external sensation and this is their only source. Third, the mind is both passive and active in this process of sensation. The impression upon the soul is brute given; the mind's perception of the impression is its own act. Fourth, if the given impressions are vivid and lively, the mind readily accepts them as faithfully representing the occasioning object although deception is possible here through faulty sense organs or a capricious imagination. Fifth, there is connected with the apprehending act an assent of being to the object, a determination of the soul relative to it.

All of this has to do with sensing, but the apprehension is also involved in the thinking process of the mind. There is an assent to complex as well as simple ideas. Complex ideas are the products of the judging and reasoning faculties of the mind and are both "compounded...out of" and "ultimately reducible into"

simple ideas. Indeed, thinking can only take place where "ideas of sensation" are first present. Since there are non"innate ideas", the products of the senses are "the foundation and raw materials" of all thought and, therefore, of all our notions and abstract knowledge.

If knowledge be defined as the apprehension of clear and distinct ideas, then man has two kinds: sense knowledge and rational knowledge. The first is direct and immediate; it is the perception of elemental and original ideas. The second is mediate and indirect knowledge. It is the apprehension of complex ideas which are created out of the "ideas of sensation" by the other operations of the mind. These operations, as indicated above, are judgment and discourse. Although they are purely mental powers, the highest and most abstract, they nonetheless operate only with "the concurrence of material organs". Thought can only take place in conjunction with the brain and, if it is injured, "we think poorly, of at all."[87] Indeed, "thinking is the property of an embodied spirit"; "a pure spirit, if we speak strictly, does not think at all."[88]

The first of these two faculties to operate after simple apprehension is judgment. "Judgment", Wesley says, "is the determining that the things before conceived either agree with, or differ from each other."[89] It is the power by which we form propositions out of simple ideas or, in the language of logic, form "compounded terms" out of simple terms.[90] It is the power that, with the assistance of memory, "judges concerning"[91] ideas of sensation, separating and comparing them, enlarging or diminishing them, dividing and compounding them.[92] There is both

a practical and theoretical side to this activity. Judgments of good and evil are made along with judgments of truth and falsity. The practical function of the judgment is of major significance in Wesley's moral psychology. It is intimately related to, or perhaps a part of, what Wesley means by conscience and, at the proper time[92b], the two will be considered together. The important point, at the moment, is that this discerning, comparing, compounding, abstracting power - the judgment - is one of the ways in which the mind is "furnished with a new set of ideas",[93] widely varied in nature and, of course, complex.

Complex ideas are also born of the discursive faculty, which Wesley frequently calls reason or discourse. "Discourse is the progress of the mind from one judgment to another."[94] It is the inferring of one thing from another; it is the power of creating a "syllogism...which is a discourse expressed in propositions".[95] From this source is presented to the apprehension, notions or what Wesley calls "dicomplex or twice compounded" ideas.[96] In very brief, there are several kinds of such ideas which, in terms of the degree of validity and the substance with which they deal, are designated "infallible, scientifical, certain, probable and doubtful".[97] These can actually be reduced, so Wesley says, to two kinds of discursive knowledge: First, science or demonstrative knowledge which includes the first two categories above. In this case the concluding proposition of the reasoning process is "an evident one, which extorts assent as soon as it is understood".[98] Second, opinion or dialectical knowledge which has respect to

propositions that are, to one degree or another, simply probable.

This raises again the problem of certainty which was a lifelong concern for Wesley and is of the utmost significance to understanding his view of faith. It is now clear that there are both two sources and two kinds of ideas which the mind apprehends: simple ideas, which have their rise in the senses, and complex ideas, which are the product of the higher powers in the mind itself working upon the elemental ones. The apprehension is active in both processes in that assent must be given in each instance to the presented idea. It has already been noted that the clearness and distinctness of the sense image induces assent. The same principle operates relative to complex ideas. Sensitive knowledge, as against discursive knowledge, however, always "carries in it the highest certainty."[99] This is equally true of all kinds of sensation: internal as well as external, spiritual as well as natural. According to this system, the question is not "whether the evidence of sense be true, but whether it be truly the evidence of sense."[100] Moreover, since sense knowledge "is the foundation of all knowledge", it is "highly necessary. . .that this evidence of sense should be so immediate, clear, and undoubted."[101] And "if. . .the truth of this admitted of any doubt. . .we should wander about in endless skepticism, without the least certainty in anything."[102]

Clearness and distinctness are likewise the criteria of assent in the other kinds of apprehension. When the judgment intuits the relationship between two terms clearly and distinctly, the apprehension assents to this judgment. When the mind is clear

and distinct in each of the steps in discursive reasoning, it readily assents to the conclusion. Or, again, when one remembers or recollects clearly and distinctly some idea stored in the memory, the mind quickly gives its assent. The imagination, as noted earlier, is the outlaw in this process, just because it can and does deceive the apprehending power at this point.

This is not to suggest that perversion in the mental processes is simply or primarily due to the imagination. All our powers are liable of going wrong. Wesley says "our apprehension is apt to be indistinct, our judgment false and our discourse inconclusive."[103] The word "therefore" could be inserted between each of those phrases in that remark. "Reasoning justly", he says, and this is extremely important in his thinking,

> on any subject whatsoever presupposes a true judgment already formed, whereon to ground your argumentation. Else, you know, you will stumble at every step: because ex falso non sequitur verum. It is impossible, if your premises are false, to infer from the true conclusions. You know likewise, that before it be possible for you to form a true judgment of them, it is absolutely necessary to have a clear apprehension."[104]

This suggests one of the reasons why Wesley is so extremely critical of natural reason. It can so easily go wrong. It is not only subject to faultiness along the way in the reasoning process itself where mistakes of many kinds can be made, but also it can go wrong at the root. Either certain senses are not functioning at all or very poorly or the man does his reasoning from the wrong set of sense data or the sensations he does use are short of clarity and distinctness. In such ways the total activity of ratiocination may be falsified; although, of course, the individual may not be at all aware of it.

There is yet a deeper reason why our final confidence cannot be placed in reason. Wesley remarked, quoting Hobbes, "It is the true remark of an eminent man, who made many observations on human nature; 'If reason be against a man he will always be against reason.' "[105] This is to say that man can manipulate his reasoning. Indeed, there is a radical bias in the mind which permeates every power. There is a very real sense in which a man attends to and apprehends what he determines to direct his attention to. He imagines and stores in his memory what he decides to image and store. The judging faculty is also conditioned, which becomes especially clear in its practical activity. It does not operate impartially, so to speak, but relative to what our hearts are set upon. In brief, the mind is permeated thoroughly by will. What a man loves determines his whole nature. Several other capacities of the soul must be understood in order to grasp what Wesley meant by this bent of the mind. Some light will be thrown upon it in the discussion immediately following on the appetitive powers of men.

III. Will or Affections

The soul of man is, in the second place, endued with a will which to Wesley was all he understood the Scriptures to mean by the word "heart".[106] Sometimes he spoke of the "elective faculty" or "the principle of liberty" as the will, but, for the most part, he applied this term to what he called the "train of affections". The will and the affections "are indeed the same things", he said over and again, "as the affections are only the will exerting itself in various ways."[107]

The will is the active principle of the soul, "the only spring of action in that inward principle."[108] It encompasses the whole appetitive nature. "We find in ourselves various appetities for good things and aversions to evil things."[109] We are conscious in ourselves of manifold sensibilities: inclinations, propensities, appetites, desires, feelings, affections, passions. All of these together comprise the will, whatever moves us toward or away from an object. Without this faculty, man does not and cannot act at all. The mind alone is hopelessly paralyzed; it initiates no movement. Had it not been conjoined with the will, man's "understanding would have been to no purpose".[110] Of course, the will, on the other hand, is dependent upon the various powers of the understanding both for objects and judgments to excite it to action and for general guidance and control. Without such assistance, it is blind, capricious thrust.

Like all spiritual principles, the appetitive power is dependent on "animal frame". ". . .the soul can no more love than it can think, any otherwise than by the help of bodily organs."[111]

Although mental and physical feelings are not the same, it is impossible to have one without the other. In the great debate between the materialists and spiritualists as to whether the sensibilities primarily reside in the body or the mind, Wesley, of course, sided with the spiritualists. Nevertheless, these sensibilities, as well as most if not all the functions of the "higher principle" in man, were for Wesley of a "mixed nature". One might say that he almost thought of a series of corresponding and parallel capacities in the "material substance" and the "thinking substance". At any rate, no part of the will can presently operate independent of the bodily machine. Although the body "very frequently hinders the soul in its operations, and, at best serves it very imperfectly. Yet the soul cannot dispense with its service, imperfect as it is. . ."[112]

In speaking of the will, Wesley most frequently uses three terms: affections, desires, passions. Often these are used interchangeably. Any one of them, particularly the affections, can refer to all the active powers, as for instance in the above statement, "The various affections are simply the will exerting itself in various ways."[113] Actually, there is just a twofold major division in the will as Wesley understands it: the desires and the affections. The first are the innate propensities which prompt action without reference to the mind's determination of good or evil. The second are disturbances of both body and soul which result from a judgment of good or evil relative to objects represented to the apprehension. The passions, as Wesley used the term, do not constitute a separate division in themselves but are rather

the affections and desires raised to a high or undue degree.

For a complete view of the springs of action of the soul, one would have to include such powers as temperament, dispositions, habits and the like, which are also sources of movement. But these will have to wait. Our present task is to attempt to indicate what Wesley may have meant by the desires and affections and passions, which are the basic raw materials of the will.

A. The Natural Desires

The first special class of sensibilities in the will is the natural desires. These may be defined as innate capacities or propensities of the soul to suffer and to act, prior to all reflection and any previous experience, relative to particular objects and for the sake of the well-being of both body and soul.

Man is so constituted by nature that he experiences some quality of pain or pleasure along with perception of sensation. To put it another way, at least some apprehensions of the mind, originating in either external or internal sensations, are accompanied by perceptions of feeling, and these feelings directly initiate movement in the soul. These various capacities for particular agreeable or disagreeable feeling and their corresponding movements toward or away from the object with which they are associated are innate to the soul and are called the natural desires. There are various kinds of such propensities in man. The external and internal senses listed earlier form the basis for their classification. There are first the desires associated with the "pleasures of the external senses, whether of the taste,

smell or touch"[114] with which the physical appetites are closely related. The second are those connected with the "pleasures of the imagination. . .that internal sense whereby we relish whatever is grand, new or beautiful."[115] Finally, there are that class of desires which might be called intellectual or, better, the personal senses of "honor, glory, renown." The question as to how the moral senses and that class of internal senses which Wesley called spiritual, may, in his thought, fit into this scheme will be discussed later in connection with the meaning of conscience.

It has already been noted that the desiring process has both a passive and active side. It is, on the one hand, a suffering of the soul and, on the other hand, an activity of the soul. In most instances, it begins with an object present to the mind. Exceptions are the cases where some uneasiness, more or less periodically, arises before any object of desire is apprehended, blindly initiating movement toward elimination of the restlessness. This is true, by nature, of certain physical appetites and, by habit, of certain acquired cravings. In most instances, however, an object is first present to the understanding which causes or occasions the soul to suffer feelings. It is important to note that these feelings differ in kind and quality according to the capacities with which they are connected. One can speak of higher and lower pleasures; some, for example the delights of beauty, are "infinitely more delicate than others."[117] The third step in this operation is desire. From the suffering or affection or feeling, action proceeds. The agreeable or disagreeable sensations raise desire to hold in view, to possess, to unite with an object,

which agitates the soul to movement.

> Things which are perceived by our sense, or represented by our imagination, so necessarily affect us, that we can by no means hinder ourselves from having an appetite for some and an aversion to others.[118]

It scarcely needs to be pointed out again that all such powers as the desires, although never divorced from bodily functions, are primarily mental phenomena. Furthermore, they are not simply the creations of repeated experiences of physical pain and pleasure but special, innate faculties or powers. Here, as in other instances, one and the same term, "desire", is used to refer to both a faculty and the operation of that faculty. The desires are natural capacities, as Wesley says, to "relish and distinguish"[119] particular objects. "By relishes", says Wesley, " I mean, perceives with pleasure."[120] Man has, for instance, a faculty for recognizing and delighting in beautiful objects which prompts desire for them.

If the question is raised as to whether we seek by these senses the object or the pleasure which accompanies the object, Wesley would say both, although one can be so perverted that the securing of pleasure and the avoidance of pain of all and any kind tend to become the only spring of action. Wesley points to this two-in-one movement by continually linking the ideas of "loving the creature" and "loving pleasure"[121], or the desire of "things" and the desire of "pleasures".[122]

Wesley very frequently depreciated these "pleasures of sense", as shall become very clear in time, but the "natural desires" were not for him evil in themselves. They are natural

and anything truly natural is good, although at times, to repeat, Wesley can and does let flow such remarks as "All these desires are not from God, but from the prince of this world."[123] He always viewed them as dangerous sirens wooing the careless soul to destruction. "Every sense is a snare to us,"[124] he says. This is, of course, true for Wesley of any capacity closely tied to the body which "constantly tempts us to evil."[125] Nevertheless, these powers are implanted in man by the good God, for the well-being of both body and soul and, when kept under the check and authority of a higher, "hidden and sublime appetite"[126], they do just that. This in no wise excludes physical delight "as some ha
have strangely imagined."[127] God "has inseparably annexed pleasure to the use of those creatures which are necessary to sustain the life He has given us."[128]

To sum up what has been said: The desires are powers or propensities of our nature closely tied to the senses and to sensitivities which, when aroused, move the soul, prior to all judgment of good and evil and previous to all experience of physical pain and pleasure, relative to particular objects, which are "necessary to sustain the life. . .given us."[129]

In almost every sermon, Wesley discusses these springs of action, consistently classifying them, as we have seen, with the aid of what he calls "the exact and beautiful enumeration of St. John"[130]; that is, "the desire of the flesh, the desires of the eyes, and the pride of life."[131] These correspond, he feels, to the physical appetites associated with the "outward senses"; the

aesthetic desires connected with the "internal sense", the imagination; and the personal propensity or the "pride of life" - "nearly the same with what the world terms 'the sense of honor'."[132] Since the natural desires play such a vital part in the moral economy of man, some further word of explanation will be given in the following pages to each of the three classes.

1. The Physical Appetites

The first class of desires are those connected with the physical senses. These Wesley refers to as the lusts of the flesh, or desires for "objects of sense"[133] and of the pleasures of the "outward senses."[134] Although Wesley includes all of the five common senses when he uses ther term "desire of the flesh", he is speaking "more particularly of the three lower senses; tasting, smelling, and feeling."[135] These have a "more immediate reference to the body and are chiefly, if not wholly, intended for the preservation of it."[136]

> Indeed it is probable that these lower senses will cease when at death the "organs" of sense will be destroyed; their having no further usefulness.[137]

The two higher external senses of sight and hearing play more direct roles in the next classification of desires, those associated with the imagination, as we shall see. Although they do, of course, share in mediating to the mind certain objects which arouse the physical urges.

Wesley rather consistently lists the bodily appetites as hunger, thirst, sex and the urge for bodily ease. These appetites

especially depend upon the three lower, outer senses noted above. While the two are not synonymous, the appetites operate through the capacities of physical feeling, tasting, smelling. The pleasures of these external senses are related to the lower cravings, either sex, or hunger, or thirst or the craving for rest. These appetites are in several ways different from other kinds of desire. First, they are innate cravings in the soul fixed in our very nature and naturally propelling us toward their gratification. This is to say that they are periodically, at least, aroused without the mediation of an object. In such moments, a physical uneasiness appears and continues until they are satisfied by their proper objects, leaving a pleasurable sensation. The delight connected with these urges is a feeling of the soul, of course, as is true of all affections; but it is referred to as sense or physical pleasure to distinguish it from the pleasures connected with other functions of man such as the imagination. This kind of emotional sensation is, as mentioned above, mediated to the soul through the external senses, especially touch, taste and smell.

The physical appetites are among the most powerful driving forces of the soul. When increased by repeated indulgence, they tend to take over the whole will. Yet, since they are amenable to habit, they can be moderated under the control of a higher principle and made to serve the proper ends of life.

2. The Desires of the Imagination

The second cluster of desires is distinguished from the

lower appetites in several ways. First, they are connected with a class of internal senses; second, they are not naturally aroused in the absence of an object; third, their appropriate objects are entirely different; and, fourth, they involve a higher and finer quality of feeling or pleasure. The "desires of the imagination", as they are called, are really the aesthetic powers of man. Wesley usually makes a threefold division in them: the sense of beauty; the sense of the sublime; and the sense of the novel. Man, he says, "takes pleasure in grand, new or beautiful objects, whether they are such by nature or by art. And herein there is an unbounded variety."[138]

Although these internal senses "are as natural to man as either sight or hearing"[139] they are "dependent" powers. They are what Hutcheson called reflex or secondary senses because, while they are distinct and original powers of sensibility with their own unique functions, they are dependent upon external senses, especially sight and hearing, to present objects to the mind before they can operate. It is within these primary images that the reflex sense, then, perceives its appropriate object. For instance, it is not until, say, the sense of sight holds before the mind a certain figure or scene that the reflex sense, the sense of beauty, perceives in this figure or scene its unique object, that is, the forms of beauty.

These powers are called "desires of the imagination" because of their close alliance to the "picture-making" faculty. The imagination holds the sense object in the mind after the object has ceased to exist as was indicated. It may also be that the imagination is the power which recovers sense impressions from

the memory. The most important role of the imagining faculty, in regard to these senses, is its capacity to create new objects of all kinds and description in which the secondary desires may perceive and delight in their objects.

Wesley's essay on Taste has already been referred to and quoted at some length.[140] The desires of the imagination are listed there, as well as in a score of other places in his works, as the sense of beauty, a sense of the sublime and the sense of the novel. The first of these three senses is the capacity to distinguish and enjoy grandeur, stupendousness, sublimity in objects of nature, such as the ocean, the sky, the stars, the night or in objects which are man-made as the pyramids[141] or, again, in the fantastic creations of the imagination which have no basis in reality but which raise in us emotions of awe, wonder, terror, reverence and the like. The sense of beauty is the innate faculty by which forms of beauty are recognized. These are to be found, Wesley says, in "the works of nature in particular" but also in those works which are additions of "art to nature; as in gardens" and in those which are "more works of art . . .representations of nature, whether in statues or paintings" or music.[142] The sense of the novel is more difficult to describe, but man has delight in what is new, different, strange, curious. Anything frequently repeated tends to become "utterly flat and insipid."[143] For the same reason, it would appear that this sense is a necessary addition to the other senses in this class at least, if not in every class. It "must be added to beauty as well as grandeur", says Wesley, "or it soon palls upon the sense."

Although there are but three primary desires of the imagination, there are many others which are more of a "mixed nature"; that is, those that are formed out of some combination of the originals. Wesley thinks this is true in the case of music and poetry.[145] Thirst for learning also belongs in the category of mixed or complex aesthetic desires. The study of "languages", "history", "experimental and natural philosophy", as well as "mathematical and meta_physical studies" have their source in the natural desires for the beautiful, the grand and the curious.[146] This does not mean that, because these desires are complex, they are not natural. The desire for knowledge, Wesley says, is a "universal principle"[147].

There are, however, artificial aesthetic desires, Wesley believes, such as whims for one thing or another which delight us. These can become so fixed in our nature by habit that they operate as cravings very much like the physical appetites and when full-grown warp or stifle every other power of the soul.

Although subject to such disorders, as are all other faculties, the desires of the imagination are in no wise to be despised; neither the powers themselves nor their objects nor their particular pleasures. On the contrary, when under proper regulation, "they are much to be desired: and that on many accounts. It greatly increases those pleasures of life, which are not only innocent but useful."[148]

3. The Personal Propensity

The third and last class of natural desires is pointed to

in "that uncommon expression. . .the pride of life"[149] also termed "the sense of honor" or "the thirst for praise". This sense or desire is a capacity to recognize certain attitudes taken toward the self by other personal beings that arouse corresponding pleasurable sensations and propel one to seek such attitudes and to shun their contraries. In one place he defines it as "a desire and love of praise; and, which is always joined with it, a proportionable fear of dispraise."[150] It is that whereby we are determined to delight in the love, esteem, and good opinion of others and to be disturbed and uneasy when we are despised and thought ill of.

Such a "sense of honor is as natural to man as the sense of tasting or feeling."[151] It is, Wesley thought, perhaps the highest and undoubtedly the most powerful of all the natural desires in the human constitution. He says in one place that the thing

> which men of the most elevated spirits have preferred before all the pleasures of sense and imagination put together; . . .is honor, glory, renown. . .It seems that hardly any principle of the human mind is of greater force than this. It triumphs over the strongest propensities of nature, over all our appetites and affections.[152]

Apparently man is so constructed that he can scarcely exist without the appreciation of others. He innately desires the approval of his fellow creatures, and he has pleasurable sensations of a most desirable kind when he possesses such. On the other hand, he fears the disapproval of man and is acutely pained when such an object of consciousness is present. This propensity, says Wesley, "in plain words, is the seeking the honor, the 'applause', 'admiration', 'glory' which comes of men."

"When this is pursued in a more pompous way, by kings, or illustrious men, we call it 'thirst for glory'; when it is sought in a lower way, by ordinary men, it is styled, 'taking care of our reputation'."[153]

The object of this desire, honor bestowed upon the self by another, raises two issues; first, the self's idea of the kind of a self that is worthy of honor; second, the matter of what constitutes the basis of honor in the eyes of the other before whom we live. Since this propensity, as such, is not interested (if we may speak in such a fashion) in anything but the approval of the other, the first problem isn't an immediate concern. Ultimately, it is, of course, as will be seen when matters pertaining to the proper organization of the moral life are discussed. The second issue, on the other hand, is of immediate significance. For, in order to attract the honor and praise of men, the self must embody or possess those qualities or objects which the men before whom it lives deem worthy of such attitudes. This gives rise to the many secondary desires associated with the "pride of life." What men regard as worthy of honor varies greatly in detail according to time and place, but they all may be summed up in such ideas as "grandeur, pomp and power."[154] These men desire and strive after for the sake of praise, forming in themselves derived desires which directly move the soul. Thirsts are developed for "clothes, houses, furniture, equipage, manner of living", anything at all "which generally procure honor from the bulk of mankind."[155] There is literally nothing, Wesley is persuaded, that a man will not strive after - possessions, learning, authority, even a show

of virtue - in order to satisfy his unquenchable "thirst for praise." Perhaps no one thing so absorbs the natural man as wealth. Wesley wrote time and again on the craving for riches which was the source of so much ignorance, vice and misery in the world, tracing it back to the innate desire for acceptance or esteem.

It is obvious, even to a casual reader, that Wesley saw this propensity as perhaps the most dangerous of all the powers of the soul. Frequently he talks as if the capacity itself is evil and, therefore, is to be literally torn from the soul.[156] Yet Wesley always speaks to situations and in each one he tends to overstate himself. In other contexts, Wesley saw the desire for esteem as good, providing such desire for and delight in the honor and approval of others was based upon the prior approval of God. This, however, carries far beyond our present concerns.

4. Mixed or Acquired Desires

There are other fundamental propensities of the human soul which are termed desires such as the desire for happiness, the desire for virtue, the desire for the well-being of others, and the desire for God. These are, however, in one way or another, distinct from the sensibilities here being discussed, as will become clear shortly. Excepting these "higher" thrusts, all of the natural desires of man may be subsumed under one or the other of the classes outlined above: physical appetites, aesthetic desires, personal propensity. It remains only to enlarge a little on two matters which have already been suggested several times before. First, the root desires may be and are, in each individual,

mixed together in a thousand combinations. Second, these combinations, through repetition, become desires in themselves. These are called secondary, derived, acquired, unnatural, artificial desires. When they become fixed in our nature, they are termed "habits" and are about as permanent and maybe more powerful than their originals. They become as second nature to us. It appears that these artificial desires arise when we become conscious that some particular object is a means to the gratification of one or another of our natural desires. Through repeated experience, the object itself is associated with certain feelings and hence becomes an end in itself, an object directly sought for its own sake.

Such desires can emerge out of any one of the natural desires, as the craving for tea out of the physical appetites, or the madness of collecting butterflies out of the desires of the imagination, or the thirst for fame compounded from the personal propensity. Or, again, certain secondary desires may be the product of all the classes of natural desires at once. Although many examples of such a complex disposition could be cited, the acquired desire for money, already mentioned, is perhaps the best illustration of these tendencies in the desires. It arises from the desires as a means to their gratification; it is a mixture of all classes of desires; and it becomes a powerful and independent end in itself, capable of upsetting the whole inner constitution of man. Wesley asks, after having discussed all of the various human drives,

> To which . . . is the <u>love of money</u> to be referred? Perhaps sometimes to one, and sometimes to another; as it is a means of procuring gratifications, either for "the desire

> of the flesh", for "the desire of the eyes", or for "the pride of life". In any of these cases money is only pursued in order to further an end. But it is sometimes pursued for its own sake, without any farther view. One who is properly a miser, loves and seeks money for its own sake. He looks no farther, but places his happiness in the acquiring or the possessing of it. And this is a species of idolatry... .indeed the lowest, basest idolatry of which the human soul is capable.[157]

The last sentence, in which idolatry is mentioned, is a significant note upon which to bring to a close this discussion of the first class of the sensibilities of the soul which comprise the will. For it is the natural desires which, according to Wesley, above all else among the internal powers, tempt or propel men to forsake their proper end. These innate urges are good and necessary for the well-being of soul and body. Yet they also play very major roles in that over-all perversion and destruction of man that Wesley terms "love of the world". Never satisfied, never at rest, they appear to be the chief activating powers of the will, more basic and dynamic than the next class of sensibilities to which they are closely related, the human affections.

B. The Affections and the Passions

It is difficult to draw a sharp line between the desires and the affections for they are both functions of the general inclining power or will. The term "affections", defined as anything which affects and propels the soul toward or away from an object, includes, of course, all of the motive powers. There are, however, so Wesley believed, affective states and springs of action distinguishable from the natural desires, which are more properly termed the affections.

. The affections or passions (these words are often used synonymously by Wesley) may be described as perturbations or feelings of the soul, closely associated with bodily functions, which arise from a judgment of the understanding relative to an apprehended object and issue in the movement of the soul toward or away from that object.[158]

Although the affections are innate tendencies by which "we incline to good and have an aversion to evil",[159] they are not propensities which are directed toward particular objects as is the case with the desires. They are, rather, movements of the will which depend upon the practical reasons determinations of good or evil. Potentially any object present to the mind through any external or internal sense, is an object of the affections. Yet bare apprehension of an object does not arouse them. The perception must be accompained by a judgment of good or evil, profitable or injurious, agreeable or disagreeable, according to some principle of the mind, before these feelings and movements occur in the sensitive nature. This is to say that the affections naturally have three elements: judgment, feeling, and impulse; while the desires, by nature, have only the last two elements.

Like the natural desires, the affections have a passive

side and an active side; both emotional states or feelings and impulses or desires are involved. In their operation, there is first an impression upon the soul. The soul is said to suffer, to be modified or perturbed. Feelings are aroused. Secondly, from this suffering, desires are raised which initiate movement toward or away from, as the case may be, the object of value or disvalue in the mind.

All that has been said thus far implies that these powers have their seat in the soul. This is true but, as usual, something further must be said. The affections, like the other faculties, are of a mixed nature. Every alteration of the soul, due to the laws of vital union, produces a change in the spirits and fluids of the body. These bodily functions, in turn, influence the soul. Wesley was opposed to any mechanistic-materialistic view which made the passions wholly or primarily commotions of the body. Although he understood that the role of the physical in the affections is particularly significant, the mind, the judgment, initiates this movement. The soul is first modified (modifies itself, if you like), which then modifies the body, and is, in turn, modified further by these physical modifications. In this way, the body can and does influence the soul; and, once these material counterparts of the affections are aroused, they are never wholly under the control of the soul; indeed, by habit or sudden awakening, they may get completely out of hand. So bodily states always attend upon states

of the soul,[160] but the latter are not reduced into the former. There is little doubt but that he would subscribe to Beattie's view at this point.

> Joy and sorrow belong properly to the mind while pain and pleasure belong to the body. There may be bodily pain without sorrow and bodily pleasure without joy and there may be sorrow without pain and joy without pleasure. Only when the soul chooses bodily pain and pleasure as the criterion of good and evil does joy and pleasure, pain and sorrow amount to the same thing.[161]

It is only when the rule of judging is "worldly pleasure" that the physical side becomes the determinant of the mental. Regardless of the rule of judgment employed, the affections will always be, even unto death, "clogged with flesh and blood", as Wesley puts it.[162]

If it be objected that it still hasn't been exactly indicated just what Wesley understood these powers of the soul to be, the objection must be accepted. Wesley himself couldn't say exactly what the affections are any more than he could say exactly what the natural desires are. We are conscious that they are unique changes in the soul just as we are conscious of reasoning. Beyond this, it is difficult to go. The affections are, in brief, elemental capacities of the spiritual nature as pain and pleasure may be elemental in the body.

The exact number of these feelings and impulses is a problem perhaps beyond resolution. We are aware of a great variety. Efforts have frequently been made in history to reduce the many and complex to a relatively few cardinal passions from which all the rest take their rise. Men have differed widely, however, as to the exact number of these originals and as to schemes of classifying them. Some, as the Stoics, have held that there are four cardinal affections: delight and desire, grief and fear. Others have believed that there are five, six, seven, eight or eleven primitive ones.

Sometimes Wesley lists together eight passions or affections: love and hatred, joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, hope and fear.[163] He further divides these in terms of the present and the future: "love and hatred, joy and sorrow, respecting present good and evil; desire and aversion, hope and fear, respecting that which is to come."[164] On other occasions, he lists only six parent affections: desires and aversions, joy and sorrow, hope and fear.[165] Wesley has here dropped love and hatred which

is understandable since he consistently breaks down love into desire for and delight in an object. Hatred, according to this division, would be a mixture also - that is, sorrow in and aversion to something. One might be justified by using Wesley's "present and future" categories in reducing the total number of root affections to four. Love would be a mixture of desire and joy, hatred of aversion and sorrow, respecting present good or evil; while hope and fear would be respectively mixtures of joy and desire, sorrow and aversion relative to anticipated good or evil. This would leave desire and aversion, delight and sorrow as the four elemental passions beyond which one cannot go and out of which all the affective states originate.

This perhaps makes it appear that behind all our affectional character are two basic mental principles or powers, delight-desire and sorrow-aversion, which are love and hatred, respectively. Both of these are forms of appetite which is the essence of will. They might be defined as follows, taking our departure from a definition given by Wesley. ". . .the very nature of grief. . .", he says, "is an uneasiness in the mind on the apprehension of some present evil."[166] Joy would then be an easiness, a pleasurable or grateful sensation in the mind on the apprehension of some present good. Aversion and desire would be the movement attendant upon these feelings of sorrow and delight. This fits in with Wesley's views, expressed in his remarks on Locke's essay, that the will is moved by our "desire to enjoy pleasure, as much as to avoid pain."[167]

Actually, whether the primitive affections be eight, four or six matters little. Whatever the original number, they combine to form basic secondary affections which become like the primary ones in strength and aptness. Furthermore, this mixing and combining seems never to end until the derivitive feelings and impulsions are almost beyond enumeration and complex beyond all hope of disentanglement. Many such powers that we are at least vaguely aware of do not even have a name. These secondary affections were usually termed "tempers" or "dispositions" in Wesley's day. When fixed by repetition, they become habits in their bodily as well as mental aspects. They are then independent powers capable of overriding all other guiding and impelling principles. Example of such secondary affections would include: gratitude, pity, resentment, malice, confidence, envy, contempt, and so on ad infinitum. We will have occasion in another chapter to deal with these tempers more in detail.

Perhaps it would be illuminating, as well as serving as a summary of what has been said thus far, to look at the whole affective process involved in one of the tempers. It has hitherto been observed that there are three main elements in an affection: judgment, feeling and impulse. By oversimplifying and slowing down the process in, say, the disposition of gratitude, these three elements will become clearer. First, an object is present in the apprehension, an act of another being in which something has been freely given to the self. This is a very complex awareness, to be sure, but let us center our attention, as far as possible,

on the gift itself. Secondly, the judging faculty makes some determination relative to this object; that it is good, beneficial, valuable or agreeable, according to some standard in the mind. Thirdly, this apprehended judgment modifies the physical organism affecting the fibers or grooves of the brain, which releases the vital fluids of the body and produces agreeable sensations. These sensations, in turn, modify the soul, affecting some quality of feeling relative to the valued object, which we call grateful. Such feelings are some complex mixture of the primitive affections, but they are unique in that they are directly related to this kind of an apprehension. If the object were altered, there would be different kinds or shades of feeling. For instance, feelings would vary according to whether the benefactor were God, man or beast. Finally, the consequence of such "sufferings" of the soul, that is to say of the grateful feelings aroused, is an impulse, an urge, a desire to reciprocate, which then complete the process by tending to issue in appropriate actions intended to please the benefactor.

Gratitude may then be defined, as Wesley defines it, as delight in benefits received with a desire to reciprocate. It is obvious that had the mind judged the object to be evil, quite another process would have been initiated which could not bear the name "gratitude" but rather some such label as "anger" or "resentment." To hold on to our example a moment longer, it is important to realize that the feelings described in the illustration, although derived, are positive entities which can be recognized and given the name "grateful." They are just there in themselves as much as any originals. This is true also of the impulses which cannot be

separated from the feelings. Again, these feelings and desires can become fixed habits of the soul which are designated by the same term, gratitude; or their opposite tendencies, ungrateful feelings, can become set habit in the will which is called "ingratitude."

The subject of the human affections occupied the attention of Wesley for three-quarters of a century. Although he wrote no specific treatise upon them, he dealt with them, in one way or another, in almost everything he wrote. It is difficult to know exactly how he may have thought on many of the details of this subject. The preceding discussion, however, draws the main lines. More can and will be said about this class of sensibilities, especially about the various ways Wesley characterizes them: such as, rational and irrational; virtuous and vicious; natural and unnatural; harmful or beneficial; malevolent or benevolent; holy or unholy; easy or uneasy; calm or violent. A discussion of what is involved in these distinctions must, for the most part, wait for another context. Some light, however, will be thrown upon them in the following brief observations on what Wesley meant by the passions.

C. The Passions

It was suggested in the introduction to this section on the appetitive operations of the soul that the passions are not a separate power of the will. They are such a manifest characteristic of the root powers that they can almost be treated as a distinct class of sensibilities. A passion is actually any affection and

perhaps also any desire which is raised to a high or "undue" agree. The general distinction, in Wesley's time, between affection and passion was just this matter of degree.[168] The one was calm and easy; the other, turbulent and uneasy. "Pathos", says Wesley, "means a violent or impetuous affection."[169]

The passions are strong and sudden commotions of the mind which are accompanied with similar commotions in the body. Sudden and powerful flows of the vital fluids are released in the body, which are prone to take over the total functioning of the "higher principle" in man. The passions are, for this reason, less under the control of the soul than any other motive tendency. Because they are more turbulent, more capricious, more unbridled than the affections, Wesley often refers to them as irrational, vicious, brutal, harmful, unholy and unnatural. In an early letter, Wesley speaks of "vicious and foolish passions" as against "virtuous and rational affections."[170] This does not mean, however, as is clear in the letter, that any strong feelings are evil in themselves. Wesley confesses that he was, at one time, influenced by the Stoics on this matter, but that he came to the place where he had either to give up these "brute philosophers" or give up the Bible. Jesus himself was a man of strong feelings. His passions were always proper, but passions nonetheless. The important thing is that we become passionate about the right things — angry at sin, for example. Both the more violent feelings and desires and the more calm and sedate emotions and impulses, are quite capable of perversion. Both must be placed on their "proper objects and duly regulated." This is especially

true, of course, of the "brutal passions", yet even these are not to be rooted out as such. We are to be masters of ourselves, to possess our souls, says Wesley, to be "calm and serene . . . superior to all irrational and disquieting passions."[171] The main point here is that we rule and not be ruled by our affectionate nature. This matter of the proper economy of the soul will be the subject of subsequent chapters. The important fact, at this stage, is to understand when the affectionate powers - all of them, including the passions - flow from their proper source and toward their proper end. They are "intrinsically and essentially good and acceptable to God."[172] This is the way He made us, and all that He created He called good. It is clear in all this that, in Wesley's mind, the peripatetic view of the regulation of the passions won out over the Stoics' disposition to eliminate them entirely.

One further word on the passions. Wesley sometimes appears to understand these strong commotions as having primarily to do with apprehensions of real or supposed evils of a particularly difficult nature. Such ideas of adversity excite what the Scholastics called the irascible affections or the passions, for instance, "fear, horrow, rage" [173] to use a list from Wesley. In another place, he terms "anger and sorrow and fear"[174] as the passions. Although this view influenced Wesley as we shall see more clearly later in the examination of the tempers in man, this is not the usual distinction he made between affections and passions. The concupiscible affections themselves can be raised to an irrational degree of excess which is quite capable of driving us out of our

minds. In considering the Scripture passage, "I rejoice greatly," Wesley comments "St. Paul was no Stoic. He had strong passions, but all devoted to God."[175]

We return to Wesley's definition of a passion as a "violent and impetuous affection". He believed that this was applicable to the natural desires as well.[176] Wesley's paramount concern, if not anxiety, about these particular operations of the soul, as well as all the powers of the will, was that they be brought under the guidance and regulation of the understanding; not under mere "natural reason", however, but under a reason which itself was submitted to the rule of God.

> We are to love and hate, to rejoice and grieve, to desire and shun, to hope and fear, according to the rule which He (God) prescribes, whose we are, and whom we are to serve in all things.[177]

Before these matters of the proper orientation and interrelations of the powers of the soul can be considered in any detail, however, one must possess some understanding of what Wesley meant by freedom or the principle of liberty which is the next faculty of the mind to command our attention.

IV. The Principle of Liberty

"I am conscious to myself," says Wesley, "of one more property, commonly called liberty".[178] This third property of the soul, usually called the "principle of liberty", introduces one of the most crucial and yet one of the most opaque aspects of Wesley's thought. Perhaps the chief difficulty is that he raised and thought about the problem of freedom in quite different contexts and was

not always, at least, conscious of this fact. Part of the time he considered it in a presuppositional fashion; that is, as a power or principle which man now, in some measure at least, possesses and uses in the formation of character. At other times he thought about liberty not as a present possession but as a future goal to be obtained or as a value to be realized. In this sense, freedom is a state of being resulting from the formation of character which enables one to choose the good because he knows and wills the good. These two approaches, with all the complexities existing in each, are bewilderingly mixed together in Wesley's thinking. The attempt to untangle them must be postponed until a later chapter where the second context of freedom will be considered. The present discussion will be limited, as far as possible, to the first of the two understandings of freedom: that is, freedom considered as a "distinct property of the soul".[179]

A. The Free Will Debate

Man, for Wesley, was neither simply a material machine nor a passive puppet. The human being was spirit and not "mere matter", a self-moving spirit and not just a mechanism. Again men are moral selves, responsible to some degree for their perceiving, judging, reasoning, desiring, feeling and acting; they are never merely pawns in the hands of some exterior force, be that some cosmic power or the living God. All of this is involved in what Wesley was insisting upon with his stand for freedom, sometimes termed the power of self-determination, sometimes the principle of liberty or the electing faculty, sometimes

free will. Whatever it is called or however it is to be finally understood, it was for him a reality found in every human soul, given in "some measure" with life itself.

This stand, of course, cast Wesley into the midst of what was perhaps the most contentious controversy of the 18th century, that between the Neccesarians and Libertarians over free will. In the debate, he was anxious, as were most defenders of "liberty", to preserve, on the one hand, his belief in the reality and goodness of God and, on the other hand, his belief in the moral accountability of man and the possibility of human virtue. All types of determinism - philosophical, theological, psychological or physiological - were to him ultimate threats to these beliefs which were for him essential values. He therefore opposed with vehemence any and all who held to the "melancholy doctrine of necessity".

Those whom Wesley saw as enemies in this issue were, concretely, the mechano-materialists and the predestinarian-calvinists. Although great differences separated these positions, Wesley tended to hump them all together when he wrestled with the problem of freedom. All determinists were one in being modern exponents of an "exceeding ancient opinion, yea near as old as the foundation of the world"[180] designed to excuse man from responsibility and which was based on a logical contradiction and involved in an inadequate metaphysic, which, if permitted to stand, would issue in the collapse of all religion and morals and which finally was utterly opposed to the inward reflection of all mankind. In maintaining his case for freedom, Wesley had

no creative contribution to make but employed all of these metaphysical, theological, moral and psychological arguments which were common to the 18th century and represented the common sense of by far the most people who lived in it.

Wesley felt that all necessarians, past and present, accepted as a fundamental axiom "that man is not a free but a necessary agent, being absolutely determined in all his actions by a principle exterior to himself."[181] Such a view for him was logically untenable and preposterous. The term "agent", as will be seen in a moment, meant for him, at the very least, the liberty of self-locomotion. It would hence violate the laws of reason to speak of a determined agent. "Liberty necessitated, or overruled, is really no liberty at all. It is a contradiction in terms. It is the same as unfree freedom: that is downright nonsense."[182]

The basis for this logical criticism is found in the metaphysical reasons Wesley advanced in behalf of the doctrine of freedom. These have primarily to do with his views of motion discussed earlier. He held to the ancient view that motion is explained only by spirit and that self-motion is an essential power of the soul. Matter is entirely passive; even in its most rarified form "fire", which mediates between spirit and matter. Mechanical arrangements are to be found in nature, human and otherwise, but the force, the energy, the power which moves these, is spirit. Although God, who is the infinite spirit, is the one final source of all movement, He has given to certain beings a limited capacity to move themselves and to intitiate motion. Man, as a finite spirit, has this limited freedom. In this sense at least, man is a free being, is an agent.

Far more important for rejecting the idea of necessity were the moral and religious grounds. First of all, determinism in its materialistic and mechanistic forms, tended to rule God out of this universe and hence fostered naked atheism. All forms of necessity were attacks on the character of God. They all reduced Him to something less than the one perfect good and finally made Him the author of evil, "the proper cause of all sin in the universe".[183] Although this might not be theoretical atheism, it could not help but be a source of practical atheism.

Again, the Scriptures which, according to the Libertarians, undeniably teach the fact of human freedom, would be shown to be false by the hypothesis of necessity and therefore not "of divine original".[184] Such a thought could scarcely be entertained by most people in the 18th century who possessed an unshakable conviction that the Bible was the revelation of God and hence the truth of very truth. To question its veracity was to challenge the common sense assumptions of the age without which life, in their imagination, would be hardly worthwhile or possible.

Secondly, Wesley believed, along with most people of the times, including many who would not subscribe to the religious views above, that without the idea of freedom, moral and social chaos would rule for both virtue and order, temporal and eternal, would be impossibilities. "If all the passions, the tempers, the actions of men, are wholly independent on their own choice", says Wesley, "then there can be no moral good or evil."[185] Nothing is then "rewardable or punishable".[186] He goes on to insist in the same work that without freedom

> there can be nothing good or evil, rewardable or punishable . . . the doctrine of necessity . . . destroys both, leaves not a shadow of either, in any soul of man: consequently it destroys all the morality of human actions . . .; and leaves no room for any judgment to come, or for either rewards or punishment.[187]

The final and most significant argument for freedom, the one which the Libertarians ultimately fell back upon, was the appeal to consciousness. It is this psychological argument that concerns us most in dealing with the faculties of the mind, for it is by the same consciousness that we know any of our inner powers. One is conscious to himself, Wesley thought, of a power of deciding and choosing even as he is aware of a power of desiring or thinking.

> I am fully as certain as this, that I am free, with respect to these, to speak or not to speak, to act or not to act, or to do this or the contrary, as I am of my own existence . . . to deny this would be to deny the constant experience of all human kind. Everyone feels that he has an inherent power, to move this or that part of his body, to move it or not, or to move it this way or the contrary, just as he pleases. I can as I choose, (and so can everyone that is born of woman) shut or open my eyes, speak or be silent, rise or sit down, stretch out my hand, or to draw it in, and to use any of my limbs according to my pleasure, as well as my whole body.[188]

The idea of this power of the soul is presented to our minds by internal sensation, even as an outward reality is mediated by the outward senses. If we cannot trust our senses, all of them, (and we have no more reason to trust the external than the internal senses) nothing is certain and "universal skepticism" reigns.

> For I have the testimony of all my outward and inward senses, that I am a free agent. If therefore I cannot trust them in this, I can trust them in

> nothing. Do not tell me there are sun, moon, and stars, or that there are men, beasts, or birds in the world. I cannot believe one tittle of it, if I cannot believe what I feel in myself, namely, that it depends on me, and no other being, whether I shall now open or shut my eyes . . . If I am necessitated to do all this, contrary to the whole both of my inward and outward senses, I can believe nothing else, but must necessarily sink into universal skepticism.[190]

When we have a clear and distinct idea presented to the mind by sensation, whether it originates by the outer or inner outlets, we must assent to it. "The God of Truth" has not "given up all mankind 'to a strong delusion', to believe a lie."[191]

More light is thrown on the overall backdrop for Wesley's thinking upon presuppositional freedom in his two essays, "Thoughts on Necessity" and "Further Thoughts on Necessity", than is to be found in his writings against the predestinarians. In both of these essays, Wesley picks out three opponents: Lord Kames, David Hartley and Jonathan Edwards. These three men represent, respectively, cosmic, physiological and psychological determinism. The manner in which he interprets and dismisses these systems well illustrates the above discussion upon what Wesley understood himself to be and how and why he became a defender of human freedom.

Kames, according to Wesley, saw the universe as "one immense machine, one amazing piece of clockwork, consisting of innumberable wheels fitly framed and indissolubly linked together. Man is one of these wheels, fixed in the middle of this vast automaton". Although man imagines he is free, "inevitable necessity governs all things and man has no more liberty, than stones".[192] It is such an obvious fact to Wesley, as has already been observed, that only "spirit" can initiate motion that he quickly dismisses this view

as the idle fancies of a "poor infidel", who by his own system "must plunge on in the fatal whirlpool! . . . without hope! without help!"[193]

Hartley, the exponent of associationalism, "now adopted by almost all who doubt the Christian system"[194] says Wesley, believed that

> as long as the soul is vitally united to the body, all its operations depend on the body; that in particular all our thoughts depend upon the vibrations of the fibers of the brain; . . . In that expression, "our thoughts", he comprises all our sensations, all our reflections and passions; yea, and all our volitions, and consequently our actions, which he supposes, unavoidably follow those vibrations.[195]

The inference of this is "the total necessity of all human actions". From what has been said earlier about Wesley's own views of the relations of the soul and body, it is manifest that he had to take the ideas of Hartley seriously. He readily admits that this conception "certainly contains a great deal of truth, as will appear to any that calmly considers it".[196] Still this is determinism; the body rules the spirit. There is a "knot" here relative to freedom. Wesley is sure, however, that he can "cut the knot". This he does, not perhaps without a certain discomfort, by simply asserting the reality of freedom on the grounds of consciousness of freedom, of defending the character of God, and preserving virtue in the world.

The third advocate of "the melancholy hypothesis of necessity" dealt with in this tract is Edwards from whom he quotes directly. "Actions necessarily arise from their several motives: therefore, all human actions are necessary."

> In all cases the choice must be determined by that motive which appears best on the whole. But motives are not under our power. Man is passive in receiving impressions of things, according to which the last judgment is necessarily formed. This the will necessarily obeys, and outward action necessarily follows the will.[197]

This is psychological determinism. Although Wesley was very close to this view himself, as we shall see, he criticizes it here by insisting that the principle of liberty is a separate power of the soul and that this freedom operates in every internal as well as external action. Man is not entirely passive in any of the activities of the soul - apprehending, judging, feeling, desiring. Freedom operates at each step. If it were otherwise, sinful man would either be trapped in his evil character or be simply a pawn in the hands of God. Wesley would accept neither alternative. His answer here as elsewhere, was that man was free. Nevertheless, it was perhaps this position more than any other which forced Wesley to deepen his understanding of freedom. Indeed in these very essays he almost reversed his whole position as we will have occasion to note presently.

In this setting, delineated by men like Kames, Hartley and Edwards and the counter-arguments of the secular and religious advocates of free will, Wesley took his stand for human liberty, wrestles with what it meant to be free or how such a stand fitted the events of life, particularly life in the Christian faith.

B. Empirical Freedom

For Wesley the thinking substance is a unity composed of several powers or capable of exercising itself in various ways, in thinking, desiring and electing. "It seems . . . that every spirit

in the universe, as such, is endued with understanding, and, in consequence, with a will, and with a measure of liberty: and that these three are inseparably united in every intelligent nature."[198] These powers are both inseparable and interdependent. None would be of any purpose by itself. The understanding is impotent without the will and the will is blind without the understanding. Without liberty, "a power distinct from both",[199] "capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the motions of the body"[200] "both will and understanding would have been utterly useless".[201] With this view of freedom as a "distinct property of the soul";[202] Wesley placed himself in the historical stream of voluntarism.[203] Whatever freedom may be, it can never be reduced into or finally determined by any of the other functions of the mind. Wesley is opposed to both intellectual and sensitive determinism. Freedom, he thinks, "is very frequently confounded with the will, but it is of a very different nature."[204]

> . . . they who divide the faculties of the human soul into the understanding, will, and affections, unless they make the will and affections the same thing; (and then how inaccurate is the division!) must mean by affections, the will, properly speaking, and by the term will, neither more nor less than liberty.[205]

But what is the nature of this faculty or power? Of course one cannot define it any more than he can define the understanding or the will except by pointing to its unique functions. The principle of liberty may be said to have two closely related but separate, functions, that of volition or execution and that of election or choice. Wesley spoke of these powers, using the language of the Scholastics, as the freedom of spontaneity or contradiction and

the freedom of contrariety or choice.

1. The Freedom of Contradiction.

The freedom of contradiction points to the voluntary or executive power of the soul. "By a single act of my will, I put my head, eyes, hand or any part of my body in motion."[206] This is the act of volition or the action of the voluntary power. Volition is a separate and distinct function of the principle of liberty in the same way as apprehension is in the understanding and desire is in the will. Volition may be defined as the last operation of the soul preceding activity of any kind. If one thinks of all action as depending upon force or energy, volition is that which releases energy executing the act. To change the figure: volition is the meshing of gears which issues in activity. One is conscious to himself, Wesley believes, of such a triggering operation; of a "power" to do or not do; to act or not act.

> I am as full certain of this, that I am free, with respect to these, to speak or not to speak, to act or not to act, to do this or the contrary, as I am of my own existence.[207]

However, the freedom of volition is involved in more than just external actions. Wesley conceives of action as being both internal and external. External has to do with relation to the world through the body, these which involve muscle and other organs. Internal acts have to do with the various operations and interrelations of the powers of the soul. In relation to all external activity, volition stands between the mind, plus the will, and the outer act. Whatever role the other powers of the soul may play in deliberate external actions, actions of the soul upon the body, they are the

immediate fruit of a volition. Although I have no comprehension of how I do it, says Wesley, "By a single act of my will I put my head, eyes, hands or any part of my body in motion." In the interactionism existing between soul and body, due to the laws of vital union, volition is the last mental operation as the soul moves the body. Without it, action does not take place. The freedom of contradiction means the power to open the valve and also to cut off, in any given instance, the influence of the soul upon the body. This is also true of the reverse procedure. It was suggested in an earlier context that volition entered into apprehension. The mind has the power to attend to or cut off a sensation presented by the physical organs.

Again, this voluntary power is capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the motions of the body.[208] The freedom here may be infinitesimal but it seems that some measure of it is present. Volition operates in theory at least wherever activity of any kind goes on and such mental phenomena as apprehensions, judgments, feelings and desires are activities. In refuting the psychological determinism of Edwards, Wesley speaks of the power "to cut off the connection" (to do or not do) "between these various internal events."[209] In the gap between, the transition from one operation to another, the principle of liberty or volition functions. Man as agent is here disclosed. Between the sensation and the apprehension, between the perception and the judgment, lies at least the shadow of freedom. Between the judgment and the emotion, between the feeling and the desire, lies the shadow of freedom. And, finally, between all of these betweens

and the external act, again, lies the freedom of volition. This is a part of Wesley's word to all who suppose "vibrations, perceptions, judgments, passions, tempers, actions, ever so naturally follow each other",[210] that the freedom of contradiction or volition is operative in all activity, internal as well as external.

2. The Freedom of Contrariety

The second function of the principle of liberty in man, according to Wesley, is that of choosing between good and evil, between the higher and the lower. This aspect of freedom cannot be separated from volition but they are not the same operation. Wesley distinguishes them in this fashion. Freedom of contradiction is "the power of choosing either to do or not do"[211] while freedom of contrariety is the power of choosing "to do this or the contrary, good or evil".[212]

There is a certain element of indeterminism in this view but it is never sheer indifference. This choice does not operate in the absence of all designs or motives. It does not function entirely in vacuity, wholly uninfluenced by present dispositions or past happenings as if a completely new beginning could be made with every exercise of choice. Quite the contrary is true. It is always a choice among alternatives. Furthermore, this liberty is not a freedom from inclination as if it operates only where there is "an equal balance of good and evil".[213] There is perhaps always a bias in the will, a greater urge in one direction than in another. In sum, man is not free to be without motives and not free to have unequal motives. There is neither sheer indifference nor sheer equalibrium.

Again the liberty of contrariety is present in the other operations of the soul as is the freedom of contradiction. It is present in apprehension that is, in choosing to attend to one object rather than another. It is present in the activity of judging. So also is such choice active in feelings, in maintaining one set rather than another. In one, wherever volition is there is choice of good and evil and volition is present in every internal and external action.

The interdependence of the various powers of the soul has already been mentioned. All are active in every event. As will is present in the actions of the understanding and vice versa, so election is present in both the will and understanding and both are present in every activity of choice.

It has been indicated several times that the elements of assent or gearing in, is present in every internal act. There is a conscious adoption of feelings, of judgments, of desires, and of apprehensions. This assent points to freedom. According to Wesley, every act, internal or external, is mixed with the activity of these three higher powers: understanding, will, and liberty. But none of these are autonomous. None can be reduced into the other. One does not elect save where there is judgment and desire. Freedom is a selecting power between two possibilities - and these possibilities are presented by the mind and the will together. Freedom cannot manufacture its own motives. There is, to repeat, no absolute freedom: we cannot move every part of the body at will.[214] Neither can we change our views at will. "It does not depend upon my choice: I can no more, think, than I can see or hear, as I will."[215]

C. Freedom of Spirit.

Thus far, the capacity of freedom has been dealt with on only one level, like the other powers of the soul. But these capacities, and especially freedom, point beyond themselves to something which possesses or is endued with a mind and a will and a principle of liberty. This is to anticipate just a little but it seems impossible to obtain any real understanding of what Wesley meant by freedom if it is not seen that he raised, or was forced to raise, the issue of freedom on a deeper level. The spiritual substance is not for Wesley synonymous with the activities of thinking, feeling and choosing, which have been described. There is a trans-empirical reality here. Behind, beyond, beneath, and above these processes of thought, will, and election is an "I", a self, a spirit, a core of being which manifests itself in all the powers and activities of the soul. Wesley points to this self by the term "capacity for God" which will be discussed presently at some length.

The question of freedom raised on this deeper level is this: Is the spirit of man which transcends the powers of the soul free? It appears that Wesley gives to his question a Yes and No answer. Man is free but this freedom is "bound", is "wounded", is sick. The self is essentially free but actually in bondage. This is to say that man at the core is a thrust of being or a relationship or a capacity for a fundamental relationship or thrust of being, which concretizes itself in all the empirical aspects of the soul. And when a man comes to consciousness of himself, his self is set; a thrust of the spirit has already taken place. As he discerns himself,

he discovers a relatedness which expresses itself in "every power, in every faculty of the soul."[216] Furthermore, this bent of the self, according to Wesley, is toward that which is not man's proper end. It is toward some god and not God, toward the evil and not the good. And, therefore, all that a man thinks and desires and chooses in this thrust is toward evil. Wesley insists over and over that "no child of man has a natural power to choose anything that is truly good," though in this same place he goes on to add, "And yet I know (and who does not) that man has still freedom of will in things of an indifferent nature."[217]

Man may and does choose but it is a choosing of relative goods in the context of and determined by the thrust of the self. But he cannot choose the final good. He cannot by choices of relative goods, by devices which flow out of a radical perversion, alter the core of his being, that is, choose the truly good. To put this in Aristotelian language, man can choose among means but not among ends, for the ends are what determine the choices of means. All choices are finally for Wesley indifferent besides those in which the self and God, or our final good are involved. Relative or indifferent elections are possible, ultimate and radical determinations are not for man as we know him. So it is that man's freedom is in bondage, that man's spontaneity is not spontaneous, that man's indeterminacy is determined, that man's liberty is choked off.

Wesley was far more Augustinian than Pelagian at this point. He was much closer to Jonathan Edwards than to many of the religious and secular humanists who opposed Edwards. At times, to be sure, Wesley could speak as we have seen, in a most optimistic fashion

about the freedom of man; nonetheless, he well understood and took seriously what the advocates of necessity in his day were pointing to. All his life he agonized over the issues they raised and this just because he so deeply grasped the enslavement of the soul. He disagreed with the heart of what they were saying, for reasons discussed previously, and used all the arguments of the libertarians against them. But he appreciated much of the force of their reasoning and he could and did use their doctrine of necessity against naive professions of free will.[218] Wesley's view of sin was too deep not to take the Necessarians seriously. The will of man, he says, "is free only to do evil; free to 'drink in iniquity like water'; to wander farther and farther from the living God."[219] To think otherwise is to think in an unchristian way.[220] Wesley heaped naked scorn on the self-styled learned individual who talked

> at large of his rational faculties, of the freedom of his will, and the absolute necessity of such freedom, in order to constitute man a moral agent. He reads, and argues, and proves to a demonstration, that every man may do as he will; may dispose his own heart to evil or good, as it seems best in his own eyes. Thus, the God of this world spreads a double veil of blindness over his heart, lest by any means, 'the light of the glorious gospel of Christ should shine upon it.'[221]

Man might be free but his freedom was ultimately bound by a thrust of the self deeper than his understanding, deeper than his will, deeper than his volitions and choosings, as we shall have occasion to see shortly. About this sickness in the care of the self, sickness in the freedom in this core, Wesley had entertained no doubts; in fact his whole understanding of man, as we find him, and of the Gospel as given, was based on this view of the perversion of man.

Freedom on this deeper level is present in a warfare between opposing intentions and inclinations which increases the closer the truly free act approaches. The following quotation, in which he speaks of the state of the man thus wakened to his danger, offers an example:

> Here ends his pleasing dream, his delusive rest, his false peace . . . The shadows of happiness flee away, and sink into oblivion: so that he is stripped of all, and wanders to and fro, seeking rest, but finding none.
>
> The fumes of those opiates being now dispelled, he feels the anguish of a wounded spirit . . . Sometimes it may approach to the very brink of despair. . .
>
> Now he truly desires to break loose . . . and begins to struggle . . . He would fain escape; but he is . . . fast in prison . . . He resolves against sin, but yet sins: he sees the snare, and abhors and runs into it. So much does his boasted reason avail . . . Such is the freedom of his will; free only to evil . . .
>
> The more he strives, wishes, labours to be free, the more does he feel his chains . . . the more he frets against it the more it prevails; he may bite, but cannot break his chain. Thus he toils without end . . . till at length the poor . . . helpless wretch is even at his wit's end, and can barely groan, 'O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?'[222]

The sum of the contention being made is this: man according to Wesley is essentially a free being. A radical, metaphysical, transcendental freedom is at the core of his being. But this capacity to thrust himself or relate himself ultimately is already exercised when he becomes aware of himself, in terms of which his thinking, desiring, and choosing operates.

In summary, three things can be said at this time about this freedom. (1) It is a phenomenon which touches the core of what it

means to be a self and to have a God. (2) It manifests itself only in the midst of inner crises which finally reach volcanic proportions. (3) It cannot operate save as a response to God's prior activity.

V. The Human Conscience.

Wesley adds to the several natural powers of the soul, which have been discussed, still another faculty that for him is quite distinct from any other capacity in man; namely, the conscience. In the sermon "The Heavenly Treasure in Earthern Vessels", it is listed with, but set apart from, all the other powers. Actual man has, or is, an "immaterial principle, spiritual nature", Wesley writes, which is first, "endued with understanding, and affections, and . . . liberty; . . . and, secondly, all that is vulgarly [popularly] called natural conscience."[223]

> Some late writers indeed have given a new name to this, and have chosen to style it, a moral sense. But the old word seems preferable to the new, were it only on this account, that it is more common and familiar among men, and therefore easier to be understood. And to Christians, it is undeniably preferable, on another count also; namely, because it is scriptural; because it is the word which the wisdom of God hath chosen to use in the inspired writings.[224]

It may be that it is more difficult to unravel his thought concerning this power than any previously considered, for many winds of thought relative to the nature and meaning of the conscience played on Wesley's mind as he thought about this capacity in the soul of man. For instance, the Stoics' concern for awareness of the moral worth of inner states and actions; the Scholastics' and Anglicans' interest in the reality and manner of knowing the moral law; the Puritans' view of the conception of an inner tribunal of judgment which makes for an easy or uneasy state of mind; the aesthetic schools' idea of an unique sense that is affected by the moral qualities of actions; and Butler's wrestling with the problem of the authority and power of the conscience.

Wesley's thinking was perhaps more directly shaped by the current ethical reaction to the egoism and conventionalism of Hobbes. Both the rational intuitionists, who were manifestations of the revival of Platonism, and the aesthetic intuitionists, who worked with the Lockean psychology, were opposing Hobbes on both counts. Although different in some respects, these two schools equally stressed direct experience as the basis of moral knowledge and equally insisted that the principle of benevolence was at least as much a part of virtue as the principle of egoism. Wesley took his stand at this point with both the Cambridge Platonists and the moral sense school.

The combination of all these influences, ancient and contemporary, raised issues with which Wesley consciously or otherwise had to grapple. Is the conscience natural or superadded by grace? Is it fundamentally an intellectual or sentimental power? Is it an inlet of knowledge for moral ideas or the power of determining concrete actions or a judge-executing sentence upon the moral life? Is it the representative of God in the soul or can it be the voice of one of the gods? Can it be perverted or destroyed? What is its contents? How is it related to the other powers in the soul? And so on.

Of course, Wesley did not resolve these problems. He was not really interested in resolving them; although he was quite capable of boasting that, whereas the "numberless treatises" written on the subject have "rather puzzled . . . than cleared" the issue and since "there is still wanting a discourse upon the subject, short, as well as clear" . . . "I will endeavor to supply" the defect.[225]

The fruit of this endeavor is his sermon "On Conscience" where his mature thought is to be found. The main lines of his ideas can be sketched by describing first the essential operations involved in the faculty of conscience; second, the rule of judgment upon which conscience depends; and, third, the origin and perversion of its functions.

A. The Meaning of the Conscience.

The term conscience seems to be used by Wesley in two ways: in a broad and in a narrow sense. In the broad meaning, the conscience is a complex faculty (if it can be called a faculty at all) in which many of the activities of the soul have a share. In the narrower meaning, conscience refers simply to an inner "monitor" or "tribunal" whose function is to "accuse . . . and excuse" the man relative to internal and external actions. Whichever view is finally preferred matters little for even the narrower view cannot be separated from that which is a very complex experience involving many if not all operations of both mind and will.

Whatever Wesley finally meant by the conscience, it is clear that it was for him a very complex experience. The term indicates several operations which finally involve almost every power of the soul: the internal reflective sense and the memory, the apprehension and judging faculty, a direct intuitive faculty and/or the moral, public sense, the feelings and desires, plus what is perhaps the unique core of it all "a tribunal . . . to accuse . . . and to excuse".[226]

The latin and Greek derivatives of the word conscience imply, Wesley says, "the knowledge of two or more things together"; that is, "the knowledge of our words and actions and, at the same time

of their goodness and badness."[227] This, as is seen from the context, is relative to a rule in the mind. But then he adds, "if it be not rather the faculty whereby we know at once our actions and the quality of them."[228] Whether it is viewed more intellectually or emotionally, more as an operation of various powers or as a separate faculty, certain functions can be pointed to which are included in it.

> Conscience, then, is that faculty, whereby we are once conscious of our own thoughts, words, and actions; and of their merit or demerit, of their being good or bad; and, consequently, deserving either praise or censure. And some pleasure generally attends the former sentence; some uneasiness the latter.[229]

Wesley expresses it in another place as follows:

> God has made us thinking beings, capable of perceiving what is present, and reflecting, or looking back on what is past. In particular, we are capable of perceiving whatsoever passes in our own hearts or lives; of knowing whatsoever we feel or do; and that either while it passes, or when it is past, this we mean when we say, man is a conscious being; he hath a consciousness or inward perception, both of things present and past, relating to himself, of his own tempers and outward behavior. But what we usually term conscience, implies somewhat more than this. It is not barely the knowledge of our present, or the remembrance of our preceding life. To remember, bear witness either of past or present things is only one and the least office of conscience. Its main business is to excuse or accuse, to approve or disapprove, to acquit or condemn.[230]

The conscience for Wesley seems to have several operations: (1) the reflective power by which we know what goes on and notice that this has to do not only with behaviour but with tempers, that is to say, of both internal and external actions. These are both present and past, involving the memory as well as the reflective sense. (2) It involves a judgment or intuition of the rightness or wrongness of an act. The first is in the apprehension and then the judgment

pronounces right or wrong to what is perceived. (3) There is a sense of ought with feelings of approbation or disapprobation. Wesley sums these up by saying of the conscience that

> It appears to have a three-fold office: first, it is a witness, testifying what we have done, in thought, or word, or action; secondly, it is a judge, pasing sentence on what we have done, that it is good or evil; and, thirdly, it, in some sort, executes the sentence by, occasioning a degree of complacency in him that does well, and a degree of uneasiness in him that does evil.[231]

It is clear that the core of the moral faculty or its "main business", as Wesley says, "is to excuse or accuse; to approve or disapprove, to acquit or condemn."[232]

We may understand conscience to be a faculty or power, implanted by God in every soul that comes into the world, to perceive what is right or wrong in his own heart, in his tempers, thoughts, words, and actions.[233] This is not just the moral reason but a separate faculty, the core of which is the accusing.

B. The Rule of Conscience.

"But", asks Wesley, "what is the rule whereby men are to judge of right and wrong, whereby their conscience is to be directed?"[234] It has been shown that the essence of the conscience is a "tribunal in the breast of men, to accuse sinners, and excuse them who do well."[235] It is not usually thought of as an inlet of moral knowledge, but it does not operate except in the presence of moral ideas or a moral rule by which it "is to be directed". The next question is the source of this rule which "is found, at least in some small degree, in every child of man. Something of this is found in every human heart; passing sentence concerning good and evil, not only in

all Christians, but in all Mohammedans, all pagans, yea, the vilest of savages."[236]

Wesley speaks generally of the moral standard as a law written upon the heart of the "natural man". But what does this mean? Do we have innate moral ideas or are such ideas supernaturally infused in the soul? Are they the product of convention or the fruit of discursive reasoning or does man have a special intuitive faculty by which a moral law is perceived? Is such a law mediated by a special class of internal senses? The first two possibilities are not congenial to Wesley's way of thinking. We have seen that he rejected the view of innate ideas, no ideas of any kind are in the mind at birth. Again, these ideas are not supernaturally infused at some time after birth. Time and again Wesley does speak of the "inner monitor" and certain other powers associated with the conscience as supernatural gifts. The ideas themselves, however, are not miraculously impressed upon the mind. That convention and reason have much to do with our moral notions is obvious to Wesley, but such sources do not present clear and certain ideas and, even if it were otherwise, the question remains as to where they originally come from. It appears that man has certain innate powers of perceiving moral concepts which are the genuine and ultimate source of the law in the heart.

Wesley can think of these capacities as being more cognitive in nature or more emotional. It has already been suggested that he tried to incorporate both the intellectual and sensitive views of the conscience which were present in his day. At times, and this will be discussed more fully in the chapter on faith, Wesley thought

of the "eyes of the understanding" or the "eyes of the soul", through which man intuits realities of a certain class, as moral laws. They are not innate, are not the product of discourse but are directly apprehended. Experience of a certain kind calls forth the immediate assent of the mind. Take, for instance, "that royal law, that golden rule of mercy, as well as justice, . . . a rule which many believe to be naturally engraved on the mind of everyone that comes into the world."[237] Although they may be wrong about its innateness, they are right about its being a "common notion". Man has a native capacity by which it is recognized directly as true. "It commends itself", Wesley continues, "as soon as heard, to every man's conscience and understanding; insomuch that no man can knowingly offend against it, without carrying his condemnation in his own breast."[238] The mind of man is so constituted that moral principles have a self-evidencing quality. Do not, asks Wesley, certain moral ideas "appear as soon as the understanding opens? as soon as reason begins to dawn? Does not everyone then begin to know that there is a difference between good and evil, how imperfect so ever, the various circumstances of this sense of good and evil may be?"[239]

In an earlier section, Wesley's tendency, following the Scottish School, to attribute all impressions to some unique sense faculties was discussed in some detail. According to this view, man has certain moral senses by which he immediately discerns and delights in virtue. In his sermon, "On the Conscience", Wesley gives first a more cognitive description of the conscience and then adds:

> Professor Hutcheson, late of Glasgow, places conscience in a different light. In his essay on the passions, he observes, that we have several <u>senses</u>, or natural avenues

> of pleasure or pain, beside the five external senses. One of these he terms, the public sense; whereby we are naturally pained at the misery of a fellow creature, and pleased at his deliverance from it. And every man, says he, has a moral sense; whereby he approves of benevolence and disapproves of cruelty. Yea, he is uneasy when he himself has done a cruel action, and pleased when he has done a generous one.[240]

As has already been noted, Wesley places these senses of virtue and benevolence among the various species of internal taste. They function reflexively. When an action, state of personal conduct, is present as an object to the mind, this sense perceives in it moral qualities; for instance, the sense of beauty perceives in a mental object qualities of beauty and then has feelings appropriate to the moral object perceived. This is what Wesley means when he defined conscience as "the faculty whereby we know at once our actions and the quality of them".[241] Of course, this is referring to the moral sense alone rather than to both the sense of virtue and the public sense which is more properly termed the conscience.

Now whether Wesley thought of the conscience more after the intuitionists or after the aesthetic school matters little. For both were trying to ground the matter of virtue in immediate experience which offered the utmost in certainty. Whether Wesley spoke of the eye of the mind through which we see the moral law or of internal senses of the soul which mediate impressions of virtue, his concern was that all of our ethical notions arise out of simple ideas directly apprehended by the mind. Here the revival of Platonism mediated by the Cambridge men and the Lockean psychology mediated by Hutcheson, met in the mind of Wesley.

A little has been hinted as to the content of the rule of the

moral judgment. Wesley believed, as suggested above, that the "golden rule" is universally known and accepted. Whether from intuition or natural sensation, concern for our fellows of benevolence was close to the heart of the meaning of virtue. This is spelled out, as we shall see later, in terms of justice, mercy, and sincerity or honest dealing with others. There is no question about where Wesley stood in terms of the egoistic-altruistic debate initiated by Hobbes and still very much alive in the 18th century. In his sermon on conscience, the formula of Micah 6:8 is used to indicate the content of the natural conscience. "He hath showed thee, oh man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"[242]

This suggests the final point to be made relative to the source of our judgments of right and wrong. We have been speaking of the conscience as having to do with the sense of virtue and the sense of benevolence. There is another sense with which it is perhaps more intimately connected than any other; namely, the spiritual sense or the immediate awareness of God. "It seems that there can be no conscience, which has not a regard to God. If you say, 'Yes, there certainly may be a consciousness of having done right or wrong, without any reference to him.' I answer, this I cannot grant."[243] How this may be true is something for another chapter. Now the intention is simply to point out three inlets of knowledge which are the basis for the accusing and excusing of the conscience; sense of God; sense of virtue; and the sense by which we manifest concern for others. The rule of life has to do with God, self, and neighbor.

These three higher innate inner senses or desires are placed over against the three lower lusts of the flesh, desire of the eyes and the pride of life. These higher or moral powers or springs of action and the knowledge and rule obtained from them, are the proper concerns of the inner monitor. Together they constitute the basic raw materials of what may be called the moral nature of man.

C. Source and Perversion of the Conscience.

If what has so far been said concerning Wesley's view of the conscience is not to be misleading, several further issues must be raised and commented upon at least briefly. First of all, at the beginning, it was noted that Wesley set the conscience off from the other faculties of the soul, never listing it directly with the understanding, will or the principle of liberty. It is for him a superadded capacity. After giving his definition of the "tribunal within", he says:

> This faculty seems to be what is usually meant by those who speak of natural conscience: an expression frequently found in some of our best authors, but yet not strictly just. For though in one sense it may be termed natural, because it is found in all men; yet, properly speaking, it is not natural, but a supernatural gift of God, above all his natural endowments.[244]

Or again in the same sermon after speaking of the conscience in the light of Hutcheson's views, Wesley makes the following comment:

> All of this, is in some sense, undoubtedly true. But it is not true that either the <u>public</u> or <u>moral sense</u>, (both of which are included in the term conscience) is now natural to man. Whatever may have been the case at first, while man was in the state of innocence, both the one and the other is now a branch of that supernatural gift of God which we usually style, preventing grace.[245]

The conscience in Wesley's day was just beginning to be thought of as a strctly natural power. For the most part, it was rather conceived of as a divine element in man. Such Wesleyan remarks as "all that is vulgarly called natural conscience"[246] would by no means have jarred every ear. Furthermore, Wesley himself felt the tension of the times to this faculty. On several occasions, in talking of the conscience, he dropped the remarks "whether or not this is natural or superadded by the grace of God".[247] Sugden and others have pointed out that the conscience ought not be any more singled out as a gift of grace than any other power of the soul, the mind, or the will.[248] And this is true, but what Wesley is trying to say, it seems, is that certain of our natural powers are more directly the point of contact with the transcendant than others. This is the case with freedom which Wesley also terms a superadded power but not so much so as conscience. It is enough now simply to indicate that at these points Wesley felt that the self-before-God breaks through into the psycho-physical structure of the hybrid creature.

This introduces us to the puzzling problem of the perverted or distorted conscience in Wesley. As hinted above, this is the same perplexity faced in freedom. Perhaps the place to begin is with Wesley's comment: "There is none of all of its faculties that the soul has less in its power than this."[249] He is pointing to the same thing when he says, "Conscience is placed in the middle, under God, and above man."[250] Here is that which is a part of the self yet transcends the self. Least of all the faculties is it capable of manipulation. This is Butler's conscience of "manifest authority"

of which he says, "Had it strength, as it has right . . . it would absolutely govern the world."[251] But Wesley differs with Butler: the conscience can be and is radically distorted. "Both the understanding and the conscience, these leading powers of the soul, are polluted; consequently so is the man and all he does."[252]

The rule by which good and right are determined is faulty. What is involved in this statement is that there is defect in the practical reason, which determines, according to the rule, the act to be done; and the inward monitor which determines whether what is done is according to the rule is faulty. And all of these are faulty because the final thrust in man is false. "Nothing can be clear without true faith." Literally no power of the soul is plumb if the core of the self is out of gear. Wesley more than once suggests that the conscience "varies exceedingly; according to education, and a thousand other circumstances."[253] "In every case, the last appeal must be made to our own conscience. Yet our conscience is far from being an infallible guide, as every wrong temper tends to bribe and blind the judge."[254]

Wesley also speaks of a "hardened conscience". It is possible to do and be precisely opposite to what is right and good "and yet not to be condemned by your own heart", "without any self-condemnation", "without any remorse", even "perhaps glorying in this very hardness of heart!"[255] Indeed, this power meant to mediate God and the will of God can become utterly blind, a wholly false light and not only so but so rooted in man that, when truth breaks in, it erupts like a volcano.

> But there is also a false light in the dark mind, which often 'calls evil good, and good evil!' And such a conscience is like a blind and furious horse, which violently runs down all that comes in his way . . . wakened by the spirit of conviction, it [the false light] will rage and roar, and put the whole man in a consternation. It makes the stiff heart to tremble, and the knees to bow; sets the eyes a weeping, the tongue a confessing. But still it is an evil conscience, which naturally leads only to despair; and will do it effectually, unless either sin prevails over it to lull it asleep, as in the case of Felix, or the blood of Christ prevail over it, sprinkling and purging it from dead works![256]

One wonders if Wesley doesn't have two consciences in man. As with freedom about which he spoke in terms of "some measure or degree", so with conscience, he speaks qualitatively -- "some discernment of good and evil, with an approbation of the one, and disapprobation of the other".[257]

It seems as if the inward monitor becomes a slave of the actual thrust of life. That is, the end a man seeks is pleasure, and - if he sets up a rule concerning the means to that end and makes a concrete judgment relative to it - then the conscience, in service of the thrust, condemns if the judgment is not in accord with the rule or end, or if the feelings and desires or the actions are not in accord with the judgment. This is to say that the conscience becomes simply a tool of society or of the self, which relates itself to the creature, or of worldly prudence, which is worldly ends sought by worldly means with the aid of worldly maxims. If this be true, one can understand how it would rant and rave when another thrust of the self was imminent.

This would suggest that the conscience operates relative to both the final moral principles and to the practical decisions relative

to them. What it comes down to is that the conscience can be manipulated to almost the nth degree, but yet it still points to God, others and virtue -- vaguely, dimly, a faint and lonely cry in a dark and deserted wilderness, but nonetheless a voice. Even though it seems to engage violently in resisting any response to its cry, it cries on. There is always that anxiety and uneasiness of another way, that we are not actually what we are. At times there is some knowledge of God and some desire for Him; this is to say some existential knowledge. This makes explicit the tension. All of this is very remote and dull and feeble. But it is there. It is the faint remnant of the image. The monitor is a faint reminder that man is not what he ought to be. It is a faint but real uneasiness at being falsely related. Here we are face to face with God. This one is not said to be related to God; he neither fears nor loves Him, but this uneasiness is there. This is the point where the transcendental self touches the empirical. Such is the "spirit of contradiction within". Such is the unfathomable nature of man and this we must deal with in the next section.

Let us summarize Wesley's view of the conscience before we move on and try to bring this chapter together. The conscience is a power of accusing or excusing the self, closely associated with pleasing and unpleasing feelings, which follows an awareness of, a correspondence to, or a contradiction between our internal and external actions. It is a moral rule in the mind which is either directly intuited or mediated by special classes of internal senses and it has to do with virtue, God and neighbor.

The practical judgment is the comparative power operating relative to the moral life. This power, like all the powers of the soul, functions in terms of the fundamental orientation of the soul. It judges in the light of what is loved, the end to which we are related. It has to do with the proper means to that end. By experience, or by convention, or from the Bible, a rule or a set of maxims is given by which the moral judgment functions. Reason also shares in this for it makes inferences and draws conclusions. But again this discursive process is under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or some other spirit — what a man loves. The final practical judgment is assented to and actions follow.

The conscience is a power that operates after the judgment, condemning and excusing. It works on two levels: (1) relative to the spirit in man, uneasiness is always present if any other spirit than God's is ruling a man; (2) relative to the concrete judgment made. Perversion enters here. The conscience may be so dull, asleep that it will check simply the judgment against the actual spirit in a man. This gives some peace (false though it is) — still it is never perhaps wholly asleep. Conscience is the least faculty in man's power.

VI. The Capacity for God

The various powers of the human soul which have thus far been discussed from the natural constitution of man. ". . .in the power of self motion, understanding, will, and liberty, the natural image of God consisted."[258] In all of these, man was made "after the likeness of his Creator"[259] and no one of them has priority over the other, neither mind, will nor freedom. There is, however, an element in man not yet discussed which, according to Wesley, is the most fundamental and distinctive and which does have priority over all powers of the soul. This is "the capacity for God". At one place Wesley calls it "the sole characteristic of human nature".[260] The human being is essentially neither a rational nor a volitional animal. Men are certainly "sensible, rational creatures", he says. But "above all man is a creature capable of God."[261] If we can rightly speak of this as one capacity among other capacities, it is "far more valuable than all the rest put together". It is more properly envisioned, not as one among other powers (Wesley never really lists it in this way), but as above and beyond all capacities of the thinking substance. It is man's "highest excellence"[263] It is the core of the soul, the heart of the spirit, the essence of the self which is "endued with mind, will and liberty". The capacity for God is what determines the "state and use of all . . . faculties"; it is the basis of the "perfection of man" and the only ground of genuine happiness.[264]

The whole of what follows in this treatise will be dealing with this capacity in relation to the other powers of the soul but some broad lines need to be sketched at this point. Wesley's

eclecticism particularly shows through in his dealing with this supreme element in man. He talked about it in various ways with the aid of many thinkers such as Aristotle, Plato, Locke, Augustine, Thomas, the Mystics, as well as others. Three conceptions can be easily separated out of Wesley's thinking which illuminate what he was trying to point to with this term "capacity for God:" first, man has a proper perfection determined by his place in the scale of being; second, man has an innate thirst for his own happiness which can only be satisfied by a relation to the final good; and, third, man has certain "divine sensibilities" through which God and the things of God can be known, loved and chosen.

Attention has been given earlier to Wesley's acceptance of the idea of the "great chain of being". There is an infinite gradation of existences in the universe and

> Every being has an activity peculiar to it, determined by the rank appointed for it in the universe."[265]

The unique activity depends upon the unique element in the constitution of the being at the particular level in the scale. The proper activity of man and the excellent functioning of that activity is the proper excellence of man.

To determine this peculiar power in man one must look at his place in this chain of being. Wesley frequently examines man over against the lower animals. "What then is the barrier between men and brutes? the line which they cannot pass?"[266] In opposition to those who see the rational functions of man as his distinctive activity, he answers that "It was not reason. Set aside that ambiguous term: exchange it for the plain word, understanding: and

who can deny that brutes have this? We may as well deny that they have sight or hearing."[267] His answer goes further: it is not any of the"natural" functions of the soul; no more is it will or freedom than it is the powers of understanding. In an earlier section it was noted that Wesley not only rejected the Cartesian view that animals are mere machines but that he attributed to them all the usually recognized higher powers. In speaking of the original creation of the brutes, he says

> . . .these, as well as man, had an innate principle of self motion; and that, at least, in as high a degree as they enjoy it at this day. Again: They were endued with a degree of understanding; not less than they are possessed of now. They had also a will, including various passions which, likewise, they still enjoy; and they had liberty; a power of choice; a degree of which is still found in every living creature.[268]

Animals share in the thinking substance. They possess souls, rational as well as sensitive. In answer to the question "What does distinguish man from beast?", Wesley says

> It is this: man is capable of God; the inferior creatures are not. We have no ground to believe, that they are, in any degree, capable of knowing, loving, or obeying God. This is the specific difference between man and brute; the great gulf which they cannot pass ever.[269]

The capacity for God is ". . .the mark, the only mark which totally separates man from the brute creature".[270]

God is not only the source but also the final end of all created being. Every creature tends toward this end. But whereas the lower beings unconsciously and necessarily move toward God, man does it consciously and by self-determination. Man alone can know, love, choose, serve and enjoy God. This is his proper end. Man is a relational being; he is not synonymous with his proper end; he is separated from himself; he is not who he is; there is a

lack in him to be gilled; he does not possess his true end but stands out from it and hence must relate himself to it. Although he does not determine what his final end is, he determines himself relative to it. A part of his end is to determine himself toward his end.

Wesley talks of the capacity for God in a second way. He begins with a root urge in man to happiness, that is, toward joy and peace. This is the propensity behind all desires and drives. "Happiness is our common aim, and. . .an innate instinct continually urges us to the pursuit of it."[271] This is a natural power of the human soul. "So greatly have they erred who have taught that, in serving God, we ought not have a view to our own happiness!"[272] Man is a restless, thrusting animal, forever seeking his happiness by uniting himself with one object or another but "there is no happiness outside of God".[273] Wesley says,

> . . .as there is but one God in heaven above and in the earth beneath; so there is only one happiness for created spirits, either in heaven or earth. The one god made our heart for himself; and it cannot rest until it resteth in him. It is true, that while we are in the vigor of youth and health; while our blood dances in our veins; while the world smiles upon us, and we have all the conveniences, yea, and superfluities of life, we frequently have pleasing dreams, and enjoy akind of happiness. But it cannot continue; it flies away like a shadow; and even while it does, it is not solid or substantial; it does not satisfy the soul. We still pant after something else, something which we have not. Give a man everything that this world can give,. . .still, amidst our plenty something still,
>
> "to me, to thee, to him, is wanting!"[274]

We were made to be happy in God and nothing else can make us happy.[275] This thirst for happiness is satisfied only when man is realizing his proper activity in the scale of being. "The

great Creator made. . .every creature to be happy in its kind" and every being "answering the end of its creation"[276] is happy. Wesley calls upon mankind to

> know and maintain their rank in the scale of beings. Rest not 'till you enjoy the privilege of humanity; the knowledge and love of God. Lift up your heads, ye creatures capable of God! Lift up your hearts to the source of your being!"[277]

This introduces the third way in which Wesley talked about man being "capable of God". If man is to realize his proper relation to God and hence find happiness, he must have knowledge of "God and the things of God". But since, as we have seen earlier, the "natural" senses are not able to mediate knowledge of the spiritual realm, man must have a special sense or class of senses through which he can understand and love his proper end. Such powers man does possess. Although they may be closed or asleep or dead and hence in need of opening, awakening or resurrection, they are a part of the natural constitution of man. Such faculties Wesley points to with the term capacity for God.

These three ways of dealing with this aspect of man may be brought together in some such fashion as this: There is but one proper objective good for man, namely the God who made him. The subjective good of man is perfection and happiness. He has a proper excellence determined by his place in the scale of being which is to know, love and enjoy this objective good. He also has an innate appetite for happiness which can only be satisfied by the realization of this activity directed toward God. Perfection and happiness, then, are inseparable. Finally, man has the "divine sensibilities" through which the objective good can be known, making

possible the realization of the subjective good of virtue and blessedness.

The "capacity for God" is a part of the natural constitution of man but it is the core of man. It is the spirit of man and this spiritual being is then clothed with understanding, will, freedom and conscience. In the following sections, the nature of this capacity and its relation to the other powers of the soul will become clearer as the problems of faith, love and happiness in the thought of Wesley are considered.

> Man is an immortal spirit, created in the image and for the enjoyment of God. This is the one, the only end of his being; he exists for no other purpose. God is the centre of all spirits; and while they cleave to him, they are wise, holy, and happy; but in the same proportion as they are separated from him, they are foolish, unholy, and unhappy.[278]

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1 John Emory, The Works of the Rev. John Wesley. Third American Complete and Standard Edition. New York: 1826. (Hereafter cited as "Works"). II, p. 50.

2 John Wesley, A Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation: or A Compendium of Natural Philosophy. New York: 1823.(Hereafter cited as "Philosophy") II, p. 189.

3 Works, II, p. 139.

4 Loc. cit.

5 Philosophy, II, p. 192.

6 Works, II, p. 139.

7 Loc. cit.

8 Loc. cit.

9 Philosophy, II, p. 190.

10 Philosophy, II, p. 186.

11 Philosophy, II, p. 184.

12 Philosophy, II, p. 215.

13 Loc. cit.

14 Philosophy, II, pp. 467-68.

15 L. Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 Vols. (London: 1881). I, p. 26.

16 Descartes here, as many before and after him, depended on the classical informulation of this doctrine of natural, vital and animal spirits by Galen, a second century physician. The point is to bridge spirit and matter by an infinitely fine material substance. According to Galen, "venous blood enriched in the liver from the food brought from the alimentary canal and endowed the nutritive quality spoken of as the 'natural spirits', flows from the heart to all parts of the body along the veins, and returns back to the heart along the same channels. Some of the blood passing from the right side of the heart to the left by minute pores in the septum of the vehicles,

invisible to the eye of man, mixes there with the air sucked in through the lungs by action of the heart. This mixture is by the innate beat of the heart, 'concocted' into arterial blood, endowed with 'vital spirits' which flow from the heart along arteries to all parts of the body, returning by the same channels. When it reaches the ventricle of the brain, the arterial blood, by the help of air blown in through the pores of the ethnoid, or sieve-like, bone, gives rise to 'animal spirits', and flowing of the pure spirit along the nerves brings about sensation and motion."

17 Foster, Sir Michael, Lectures on History of Physiology during the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries. Cambridge University Press, 1901, p. 197.

18 Op. cit., p. 199.

19 This whole question of animals being mere machines caused extensive debate in the 17th and 18th centuries which contributed to the understanding of man. A good discussion of this whole matter is found in Rosenfeld's book, From Beast Machine to Man Machine.

20 Man's physical organism functions in a purely involuntary way. It has no principle of movement other than the beat of the heart, which causes the flow of blood and animal spirits through the system. Similarly, the animal body operates without the guidance of any non-corporeal principle. (Rosenfeld, p. 6.)

21 George Sydney Brett, Psychology, Ancient and Modern. New York: 1928. II, p. 187.

22 Works, II, p. 402.

23 Works, II, pp. 464-472.

24 Philosophy, II, p. 251.

25 Philosophy, I, p. 114.

26 Works, II, p. 480.

27 Edward H. Sugden, Wesley's Standard Sermons. London: 1951. (Hereafter cited as "Standard Sermons"). II, p. 185.

28 Works, VI, p. 73.

29 At times Wesley suggests, with later thinkers, that perhaps the understanding of the nerves as solid fibers, which are like cords tightly strung, extending from the brain to the appendages, is the more correct view. Willis for one held this. (See Brett,

Vol. II, 191.) Of course, animal spirits or nerves as solid fibers, they both perform the same function.

30 In 1786, in a little essay entitled Some Thoughts on an Expression of St. Paul in the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, Wesley suggests a view of the soul as the "medium". It is, he says, the immediate clothing of the spirit and that probably it consists of electric fire, the purest of all matter. At death the body perishes but not this material soul. The material soul is the means by which the spirit acts upon the body and the body upon the spirit. Here one can see the idea of the plastic soul of the Cambridge Platonists. This is really important for it is simply another way to understand what Wesley and most others in his day felt could not be understood, and that is how an immaterial substance could act upon a material substance or vice versa. Wesley does not usually employ this division.

31 Works, II, p. 402.

32 Loc. cit.

33 Loc. cit.

34 Works, VI, p. 214.

35 Works, II, p. 403.

36 Works, II, p. 403.

37 Works, II, p. 404.

38 Works, VI, p. 270.

39 Works, VII, pp. 337-338.

40 Works, VII, p. 461.

41 Works, II, p. 127.

42 Works, VII, p. 446.

43 Works, II, pp. 402-03.

44 John Telford, The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M. London: 1931. (Hereafter cited as "Letters"). III, p. 174.

45 See, for instance, Wesley's remarks on Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, Works, VII, pp. 445-451.

46 Works, VII, p. 446.

47 Works, II, p. 127.

48 Works, II, pp. 402, 446.

49 Works, II, p. 377.

50 Works, VII, p. 335.

51 Works, II, p. 51.

52 Works, II, p. 309.

53 Works, II, p. 406.

54 Loc. cit.

55 Loc. cit.

56 Loc. cit.

57 Standard Sermons, II, p. 468.

58 Philosophy, I, p. 94.

59 Philosophy, II, Pt. IV, Ch. 5.

60 Philosophy, I, p. 114.

61 Works, VI, p. 211.

62 Philosophy, I, p. 389.

63 Loc. cit.

64 Loc. cit.

65 Works, VI, p. 211.

66 Works, VIII, pp. 12, 14.

67 Letters, VI, p. 227.

67b See below, p.

68 Works, VII, p. 453. Emphasis mine.

69 Works, VIII, p. 13.

70 Letters, II, pp. 380-383.

71 Standard Sermons, I, p. 302.

72 Letters, II, p. 383.

73 Works, VIII, pp. 4-5.

74 Standard Sermons, II, p. 471.

75 Philosophy, I, p. 114.

76 Works, VII, p. 461.

77 Philosophy, I, p. 114.

78 Philosophy, II, p. 217.

79 Works, VII, p. 461.

80 Philosophy, I, p. 113.

81 Loc. cit.

82 Works, VII, p. 461.

83 Standard Sermons, II, p. 184.

84 Standard Sermons, II, p. 475.

85 Loc. cit.

86 Letters, VI, p. 227.

87 Philosophy, II, p. 433.

88 Loc. cit.

89 Works, II, p. 127.

90 Works, VII, p. 610.

91 Works, VII, p. 232.

92 Philosophy, II, p. 439.

93 Philosophy, II, p. 436.

94 Works, VII, p. 609.

95 Works, VII, p. 614.

96 Works, VII, p. 610.

97 Works, VII, p. 623.

98 Works, VII, p. 621.

99 Philosophy, II, p. 441.

100 Loc. cit.

101 Loc. cit.

102 Philosophy, II, p. 442.

103 Works, VII, p. 609.

104 Works, II, p. 127.

105 Works, II, p. 126.

107 Works, VI, p. 362.

108 Works, II, p. 403.

109 Philosophy, I, p. 4.

110 Works, VI, p. 274.

111 Letters, IV, pp. 3-4.

112 Works, VI, p. 73.

113 Works, VI, p. 274.

114 John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament. Nashville: 1894. (Hereafter cited as "New Testament").

115 Loc. cit.

116 Works, II, p. 225.

117 Works, VII, p. 453.

118 Philosophy, I, p. 113.

119 Works, VII, p. 453.

120 Loc. cit.

121 Works, VII, p. 6.

122 Standard Sermons, II, p. 382.

123 New Testament, p. 633.

124 Works, VI, p. 347.

125 Loc. cit.

126 Philosophy, I, p. 113.

127 Standard Sermons, I, p. 273.

128 Loc. cit.

129 Loc. cit.

130 Works, II, p. 207.

131 Loc. cit.

132 Standard Sermons, II, p. 383.

133 Works, II, p. 431.

134 New Testament, p. 633.

135 Works, II, p. 186.

136 Works, I, p. 452.

137 Loc. cit.

138 Works, VII, p. 453.

139 Works, II, p. 186.

140 See above, p.

141 Works, II, p. 186.

142 Works, II, p. 187.

143 Loc. cit.

144 Loc. cit.

145 Loc. cit.

146 Loc. cit.

147 Works, I, p. 329.

148 Works, VII, pp. 452-55.

149 Works, II, p. 188.

150 Standard Sermons, II, p. 383.

151 Letters, III, pp. 217-18.

152 Works, II, pp. 225-26.

153 Works, II, p. 188.

154 Standard Sermons, I, p. 274.

155 New Testament, p. 633.

156 Letters, III, pp. 217-18.

157 Works, II, p. 188.

158 I have accepted the assistance here of Beattie whom Wesley read. "A passion therefore may be said to be a notion of the soul attended with pleasure or pain, affecting both mind and body and arising from the view of something which is or appears to be good or evil." So also of Hutcheson who, in his Essay on the Passions, page 1, described the affections and the passions as "these modifications of actions of the mind consequent upon the apprehension of certain objects or events, in which the mind generally conceives good or evil."

159 Philosophy, pp. 1-4, etc.

160 At times it almost seems as if Wesley looked upon the affections as seated in the body. He did not quarrel with this view in his Philosophy: "The passions receive nourishment, grow and become strong like the fibers, which are the seat of them." (Philosophy, II, pp. 216-17.) If by passions, violent affections are meant, and Wesley usually meant this, then perhaps he would agree.

161 James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science. Edinburgh: . P. 310.

162 Works, I, p.453.

163 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 464-65.

164 Loc. Cit.

165 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 115, 425.

166 Works, VI, p 333.

167 Works, VII, p 446.

168 Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, p. 26.

169 Works, II, p. 432.

170 Letters, I, p. 73.

171 New Testament, p. 197.

172 Standard Sermons, I, p. 425.

173 Works, II, p 150.

174 Standard Sermons, I, p. 336

175 New Testament, p. 514

176 Works, II, p. 150.

177 Works, I, p. 450.

178 Works, II, p. 404.

179 Loc. cit.

180 Works, VI, p. 200.

181 Works, VI, p. 204.

182 Works, II, p. 69.

183 Works, VI, p. 207.

184 Loc. cit.

185 Works, VI, p. 205.

186 Loc. cit.

187 Works, VI, p. 208.

188 Works, VI, p. 404.

190 Works, VI, pp. 210-11.

191 Works, VI, p. 210.

192 Works, VI, p. 214.

193 Works, VI, p. 216.

194 Works, VI, p. 209.

195 Works, VI, p. 201.

196 Works, VI, p. 209.

197 Works, VI, p. 211.

198 Works, II, p. 69.

199 Works, VI, p. 208.

200 Works, II, p. 404.

201 Works, II, p. 69.

202 Works, II, p. 404.

203 Brett, op.cit. II, p. 107.

204 Works, II, p. 404.

205 Works, VI, p. 208.

206 Works, II, p. 404.

207 Works, II, p. 404.

208 Loc. cit.

209 Works, VI, p. 214.

210 Works, VI, p. 215.

211 Works, VI, p. 208.

212 Loc. cit.

213 Works, V, p. 651.

214 Works, II, p. 404.

215 Standard Sermons, II, p. 139.

216 Standard Sermons, I, p. 155.

217 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 188-89.

218 Works, VI, pp. 200-216.

219 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 188-89.

220 Standard Sermons, II, p. 223.

221 Standard Sermons, I, pp 183-84.

222 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 187-89.

223 Works, II, p.479.

224 Standard Sermons, I, p. 223.

225 Works, II, pp. 376-77.

226 Works, II, p. 377.

227 Loc. cit.

228 Loc. cit.

229 Loc. cit.

231 Works, II, p. 378.

232 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 222-23.

233 Standard Sermons, I, p. 224.

234 Loc. cit.

235 Works, II, 377.

236 Works, II, p. 479.

237 Standard Sermons, I, p. 529.

238 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 529-30.

239 Works, II, p. 377.

240 Works, II, p. 378.

241 Works, II, p. 377.

242 Works, II, p. 378.

243 Works, II, p. 379.

244 Works, II, pp. 377-78.

245 Works, II, p. 378.

246 Works, II, p. 479.

247 Loc. cit.

248 Standard Sermons, I, p. 224.

249 New Testament, p. 366.

250 Works, II, p. 377.

251 Sermon II. Quoted by Sugden, Standard Sermons, I, p. 224.

252 New Testament, p. 557.

253 Works, II, p. 377.

254 Works, VI, p. 781.

255 Works, II, p. 380.

256 Works, V, pp. 664-65.

257 Works, II, p. 479.

258 Works, II, p.50.

259 Loc. cit.

260 Works, II, p. 57.

261 Works, II, p. 50.

262 Loc. cit.

263 Loc. cit.

264 Loc. cit.

265 Philosophy, II, p. 190.

266 Works, II, p. 51.

267 Loc. cit.

268 Loc. cit.

269 Loc. cit.

270 Works, II, p. 57.

271 New Testament, p. 19

272 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 276-77

273 Journal, VI, p. 136.

274 Works, VI, p. 431.

275 Works, II, p. 431.

276 Works, II, p. 183.

277 Works, II, p. 57.

278 Works, VI, p. 581.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LIFE OF LOVE

The intention in the first part of this treatise was simply to describe the raw materials of the natural constitution of man. Human beings, however, are not merely natural animals; they are moral or spiritual creatures as well. This is to say that these powers can and must be oriented and organized in one fashion or another, properly or otherwise. The discussion of this moral and spiritual nature of man is the task of the next two sections.

It has been noted that Wesley believed that man was made for God and that this involves proper faith or knowledge of God, proper virtue or love for God, and proper happiness or joy and peace in God. Any understanding of Wesley's view of moral psychology entails a careful analysis of the nature and inter-relation of these three aspects of his thought. In the present section, virtue and happiness, because they are inseparable, will be considered together.

Virtue, for Wesley, is the proper orientation and excellent functioning of the powers and faculties of the soul. This is perfection, the essence of which is love. This means that love is understood both as the basic attitude of the heart and as the total ordering of soul and life which flows from the central thrust. It is "the glorious spring of all inward and outward holiness".[279] And it is this love alone which issues in permanent and genuine peace and joy.

> This love we believe to be the medicine of life, the never-failing remedy for all the evils of a disordered world, for all the miseries and vices of men. Wherever this is, there are virtue and happiness going hand in hand. There is humbleness of mind, gentleness, long suffering, the whole image of God; and, at the same time, a peace that passeth all understanding, and a joy unspeakable and

> full of glory. Here eternal sunshine of the spotless mind; each prayer accepted, and each wish resigned; desires composed, affections ever even, tears that delight, and sighs that waft to heaven. Long to see established in the world, a religion of love, joy, and peace, having its seed in the inmost soul, but ever showing itself by its fruits, continually springing forth, not only in all innocence, (for love worketh no ill to his neighbor) but likewise in every kind of beneficence, spreading virtue and happiness all around.[280]

The procedure in discussing the life of virtue will be to begin with love as the active principle in the soul and then discuss the life of holiness and righteousness as an expression of love and finally the happiness which is the inseparable consequence of a life of love.

I. Love as the Spring of Action

Man, for Wesley, is an end-seeking animal. He is a desiring, seeking, pursuing being. Behind, above, beyond, underneath all the powers of his being is a primordial thrust which involves all his powers. There is a root lack, a radical incompleteness in him which propels him toward that which completes and satisfies his being. This elemental drive is termed by Wesley, as we have seen, an instinct or appetite or propensity for happiness. To seek our happiness in one object or another is "to unite our soul with" it, to "give our heart to it", to "cleave to it as our only good". It is to seek and enjoy something above all else, to habitually desire and delight in an object for its own sake. This is what Wesley means, in the deepest sense, by love. And to love an object for its own sake is to love it ultimately, that is, with the whole heart, mind, strength and soul. This is the deepest response of the human soul. It is the religious response. To love, desire and delight in an object for its own sake is worship.

Love in this sense is the core or the spirit of a man, which principle and spring of action determines all qualities of character and actions, "regulating all the tempers, and governing all the words and actions".[281] "It is the great moving spring both of. . .desires, designs, words and actions."[282] The way we see and are present to life depends on the fundamental orientation of the soul, upon what we love. Love is both the guide and motivating force of the soul, its "ruling principle" and "spring of action". It is a mistake to understand love in

Wesley simply or primarily as a feeling or an emotion, although it is that, for it involves the whole man. It might better be called a rational propensity in that it has to do with understanding as well as will. Love is at once the cardinal principle by which we rule ourselves and the motivation by which we act. It both illuminates the mind as to ends and means and propels the will toward them. It is the center in relation to which all our powers function. It is the fountainhead from which all our thoughts and feelings, all our tempers and habits and all our words and actions flow. Although we cannot love what we do not know, knowledge which is not mixed with, which does not issue in love is no genuine knowledge at all. We only attend to perceptions and images, judge between good and evil, and reason from one proposition to another according as we love. Love is the desire and disposition which orders all desires and dispositions. It is the enjoyment which gives meaning to all delights and pains as well. It is the affection of the soul which is the parent of every affection. We think, we feel and desire, we choose, we act, as we love. Love is the spiritual dimension, the religious ground upon which, be it "genuine religion" or "damnable idolatry", all the rest of life is founded.

Every man exists, then, in some essential relationship. He is determined, it is his nature to have some object or objects to which he unites his being in desire and delight. The object of such love is a man's good or, as Wesley says, his God. Whatever a man ultimately attaches himself to or seeks his happiness in is properly speaking his god. Men are worshipping beings. The

question of the direction of the final thrust of man or the question of what is his god is the first and last question in Wesley's conception of the moral life of man. The individual may not love the one true God, by whom and for whom he was made, but he must and actually does love some object which, by virtue of that love, is his God. This is to say that, while it is possible not to love God, it is impossible not to have some god. Man is always a committed being; if not to the ultimate good, then the relative; if not the Creator, then some creature.

This does not mean, on the other hand, that one object can serve as our good and our god as well as another. The one true end of man is He who made both man and his little gods. We have already seen that the human constitution is such that no other good

> can satisfy the appetite of an immortal soul. Nay, all of them together cannot give rest, which is the lowest ingredient of happiness, to a never dying spirit, which God created for the enjoyment of himself. The hungry soul, like the busy bee, wanders from flower to flower; but it goes off from each, with an abortive hope, and a deluded expectation. Every creature cries, (some with a loud and others with a secret voice) "happiness is not in me".[283]

> So does all experience prove the justness of that reflection which was made long ago. "Thou hast made us for thyself; and our heart cannot rest, until it resteth in thee."[284]

The task of the moment is, in the first place, to make clear the ruling principles which possess the spirits of men. As has already been noted, the object of man's love is either the Creator or the creature. The drive of life is directed either toward the One or the other. Man seeks his happiness in the world or in God. The spirit in man, then, is either the spirit of the

A. LOVE OF THE WORLD AND LOVE OF GOD

1. The Orientation Toward the World

Although man was made for God, no man as we actually encounter him in our neighbors and in ourselves naturally loves God. By "nature" we are atheists in the world.[285] Again, natural man does not come to self-consciousness in a state of neutrality. He awakens to a heart already given, to a will already committed. There is no choice here; man does not live without some object or objects in which he seeks his happiness. He is a worshipping being and cannot exist without a god. If he does not ultimately desire and delight in the final good, he loves some relative good. If his subjective good is not the Creator, it is then the creature. "He that does not love God, (which is his proper, and his only proper worship) will surely love some of the works of his hands; will love the creature, if not the Creator."[286] Such a one, and this is every man born of woman, is, in his natural state, a lover of the world. Such a manner of life is termed love of the world.

Wesley's idea of love of the world is a dual movement. It has both a positive and negative aspect. It is a turning away from our proper end as well as a turning toward that which was never intended to be our ultimate concern. It is a set against God as well as a set toward the world.[287] Love of the world is both practical atheism & practical idolatry. Negatively, it is a lively indifference to and an active enmity against God. Behind and within man's attraction to the material and temporal realm is human pride, independence of God and self-will. Love of the world is in itself, or at least ultimately associated with, a lack of faith and unbelief issuing

he has a natural desire or taste can "usurp the hearts which are due to God".[291]

Wesley uses his arrangement of the natural desires, described in Chapter One, to classify the various kinds of idols and "species of idolatry" or "kinds of love of the world" common to mankind.

> These idols, these rivals of God, are innumerable: but they may be nearly reduced to three parts. First, objects of sense; such as gratify one or more of our outward senses. . . . Secondly, objects of the imagination; things that gratify our fancy, by their grandeur, beauty, or novelty. All these make us fair promises of happiness, and thereby prevent our seeking it in God. . . . They are, thirdly, what St. John calls, "the pride of life". He seems to mean, hohour, wealth, and whatever directly tends to engender pride.[292]

If we have other natural desires as the social or sympathetic, the objects of these also can "take the place of God" in our lives, Wesley especially warns against idolatrous attachments to those individuals and communities with which we are intimately associated. "How frequently is a husband, a wife, a child in the place of God. How many that are counted good Christians fix their affections on each other so as to. . .not in the Creator. . .Now if this is not flat idolatry, I cannot tell what it is."[279a]

The same is true of the objects of mixed and secondary desires. Knowledge or learning, for instance, although impotant values, become false gods when we "give ourselves wholly to them". In speaking of learning being an idol, Wesley says

> I allow that most of these studies have their use, and that it is possible to use without abusing them. But if we seek our happiness in any of these things, then it commences an <u>idol</u>. And the enjoyment of it, however it may be admired and applauded by the world, is condemned by God as neither better nor worse than damnable <u>idolatry</u>:[280a]

Wesley, as is well know, saw the loving and seeking of "money for its own sake" as perhaps the most "damnable idolatry".

in a fundamental enmity toward God. "As the love of God is inseparable from faith, so is the hatred of God from unbelief."[288] Positively, love of the world is the movement in which we make some relative good our ultimate good. It is desiring and delighting in some created good for its own sake. It is to rest in or enjoy (frui) that which was intended to be used (uti).

Wesley refers to love of the world as "damnable idolatry" of which there are many forms. This love of the world is the spring of action and ruling principle of man's soul. It is the spirit within him; it is the organizing center of his total life — influencing his mind, what he sees and attends to, what he designs and judges; ruling his will, what he is affected by and what he affects in fleeting dispositions or fixed habits; determining his principle of liberty, what and how he chooses. Every power of his soul is directed and interrelated by this inner spirit of the world and, consequently, so is his whole pattern of external activity. Whatever "we seek our happiness in outside of God is our god"[289] or idol, and the enjoyment of it or seeking happiness in it is idolatry and the gods of this world are almost beyond reckoning. "In a word, so many objects as there are in the world, wherein men seek happiness instead of seeking it in God, so many idols they set up in their hearts; so many species of idolatry they practice."[290] Theoretically, any object in man's experience can elicit his worship: natural or artificial objects, ideas, relationships, systems of thought, animals, human beings, societies, religious practices, forms of work, hobbies, and so on without end. Any object that man is naturally capable of knowing and for which

He made the accusation that "the whole city of London uses the words, rich and good, as equivalent terms".[281a] Time and again he expressed his fears that the power of riches to capture the souls of men would destroy the Methodist Revival if not the whole Christian movement.

Finally, it is most interesting to note that religion itself can become an idol.

> If, by the grace of God, we have avoided or forsaken all these idols, there is still one more dangerous than all the rest; that is, religion. It will easily be conceived, I mean false religion; that is, any religion which does not imply, the giving the heart to God. Such is first, a religion of opinions; or what is commonly called, orthodoxy. Into this snare fall thousands of those, who profess to hold "salvation by faith;" indeed all of those who, by faith, mean only a system of Arminian or Calvinian opinions. Such is, secondly, a religion of forms; of barely outward worship, how constantly soever performed; yea, though we attend the church service every day, and the Lord's Supper every Sunday. Such is, thirdly, a religion of works, of seeking the favour of God, by doing good to men. Such is, lastly, a religion of atheism; that is, every religion whereof God is not laid for the foundation. In a word religion wherein "God in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself", is not the alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last point.[282a]

Literally, every object that man was created to know, and constituted to enjoy, is capable of becoming -- yes, threatens to become -- his god, luring him into atheism and idolatry. "We are encompassed on all sides with persons and things that tend to draw us from our centre. Indeed every creature, if we are not continually on our guard, will draw us from our Creator".[283a]

Wesley frequently summarizes this total mode of existence as love of created being. All who do not seek their happiness in God are "lovers of themselves, lovers of the world, lovers of pleasure".[284a] Such an individual, as we have seen, is wholly

concerned with the material, temporal, natural world which is mediated by the natural senses. He does not "think of, relish" things of the spiritual, eternal, divine realm. His thoughts and desires and feelings are consumed by "the things that are seen -- men, money, things of the earth, [rather than] the things that are not seen -- God, grace, heaven."[285a] His concern is for pleasure and the joys of this world. The set of his soul is toward the immediate satisfaction of his many desires, toward the physical, aesthetic and personal thrills of the moment. The voices of conscience, duty, reason are set aside or stifled as pleasure is sought for its own sake.

The idolatrous individual lives a self-centered existence. Wesley is not opposed to proper self-love as we shall see a bit later. In this context he is thinking of selfishness in relation to the neighbor and self-will in relation to God. The man who loves the world places himself in the center of his universe. All idolatry is partiality to the larger or smaller self -- my pleasure, my group, my nation. Genuine disinterested universal benevolence has no place here. The neighbor becomes merely a means to his own ends and delights. And, as indicated earlier, seeking satisfaction outside of God involves rebellion against God, a pride of independence of God, a wild self-will in rebellion against God.

> Indeed it may be said, that every man is by nature, as it were, his own god. He worships himself. He is, in his own conception, absolute Lord of himself. Dryden here speaks only according to nature, when he says, "myself am king of me". He seeks himself in all things. He pleases himself. And why not? Who is Lord over him? His own will is his only law; he does this or that because it is his good pleasure. In the same spirit as the

> "son of the morning" said in old time, "I will sit upon the sides of the North," he says, "I will do thus or thus." And do we not find sensible men on every side who are of the self-same spirit? who is asked, "Why did you do this," will readily answer, "Because I had a mind to it."[286a]

Finally, this mode of existence has consequences as we shall see more clearly later. The love of the world is an unnatural and foolish, a dissipated, disordered, vicious and unhappy way of life. It is against the grain of the universe and man's nature for man was made for God. It brings disunity and strife into his soul. Viewed objectively, this is to say that "natural man" is a polytheist. If we do not worship the one true God, we worship not one but many idols, although one of the many may be the chief among the others.[287a] Subjectively, this is dissipation, and the powers of the soul are pulled in all directions. Wesley used the word "dissipated" to indicate this state. All of our thoughts and desire and passions are "dissipated, when they are unhinged from God, their proper centre, and scattered to and fro among the . . .things of the world".[288a] The love of the world also fills the soul with pride and passion, impurity, and inhumanity. This issues in dissatisfaction and misery. There is always a discontent in the man who is turned toward the temporal realm. "No thing, no person under the sun, no, nor the amassment of all together, can give any solid, satisfactory happiness to any child of man."[289a] To be sure, there is a kind of joy in love of the world, but it is neither permanent nor satisfying. Such a one, says Wesley, "may be merry; but he cannot be happy".[290a]

> It is true, that while we are in the vigor of youth and health; while our blood dances in our veins; while the world smiles upon us, and we have all the conveniences, yea, and superfluities

> of life, we frequently have pleasing dreams, and enjoy a kind of happiness. But it cannot continue; it flies away like a shadow; and even while it does, it is not solid or substantial: it does not satisfy the soul.[291]

Man cannot sustain himself in this manner of life, but is left with a deep spiritual hunger which, sooner or later, drives him to call upon God.

2. The Orientation toward God

The true active principle of man is the soul's orientation toward God. Wesley saw three ways for men to be present to life. Since God is the source and end of all beings, each of these ways involves an attitude toward God; one negative and two positive, only one of which is proper even though the other is nowise to be despised. The love of the world, as we have seen, assumes an attitude of indifference and enmity toward God. The two positive relations are fear of God and love of God. In a later section the fear of God will be dealt with at some length. It needs to be only briefly mentioned here.

The fear of God is an intermediary state between love of the world and love of God. Most men dwell here at some time; indeed, every lover of the world perhaps passes in and out of this state. This is a positive attitude toward God as he can be and is known through reason and tradition outside the Christian revelation. It is a desire for the eternal but a fearful desire, because the object is seen only as the final lawgiver and ultimate judge. Externally he is the frowning providence; internally, he is the stern voice of conscience. Thus, one who lives in fear of God desires and shuns God at the same time. He desires but does not

delight in Him; he fears God. His mode of life is to appease this stern and frowning deity by external obedience in order to avoid his punishment and win his favor. Such an individual delights in the world but his fearful desire of God enables him to struggle against the tug of idolatry. The resulting tension makes this a miserable existence which is relieved only by moments of promise of and hope for relief. The worldly man has a false peace and merriment; this man has none. In the end the battle of the one who fears God is lost, leaving him in despair. This last stage is, for Wesley, repentance where man is left naked before God, guilty, sin-filled and helpless. And this repentance is the final bridge to man's proper manner of life. For in the midst of this experience it is given to men to understand, in and through Christ, that the One they feared is truly their Father. Such an awareness, as we shall see in the next section, enables them to love God, the only true spring of action and ruling principle of the soul.

It is necessary to have an idea of man's bondage to the love of the world, and of the struggle of the man who fears God, in order to understand how Wesley conceived of the love of God. He has two different views of the love of God: the love of complacency and the love of gratitude. One might rightly think that they are so utterly different that they could never be brought into any kind of harmony. Yet for all practical purposes Wesley did bring them together and does not appear to have been consciously aware of any fundamental imcompatibility. By the love of complacency he meant delight in and desire for the excellencies, beauty, perfections of an object which moves the beholder to strive to imitate these perfections and

hence to possess them in himself, which activity, when complete, brings that love to its fruition. The second, the love of gratitude, is thankfulness directed toward a subject for gifts received which impels the receiver out of gratitude to please the giver by striving to fulfill his desire or will. Both of these views have been mixed together in the thought of churchmen ever since the early Christians met the Greek mind.

The love of "delight or complacence" is the more basic view in Wesley. It was his earliest understanding of the love of God which he received, immediately, from the Mystics, and, more remotely, from the whole stream of Greek thought in the church. Although this was radically qualified after his Aldersgate transformation, it remained the backdrop upon which the filial[292], the grateful[293], the thankful[294] love of God was superimposed. Wesley came to this latter view at the time of his 1738 conversion when he indirectly met the thought of the Reformers.

Although we have called the love of complacency the fundamental view in Wesley's thought, there is no doubt that the love of gratitude was the revolutionary principle in his thought and life and was the compelling idea of the revival. In a letter to Dr. Robertson in 1753, Wesley points to these two views and to his change of mind concerning them although he overstates, in a way, his case.

> The doctrine of pure love. . .(the loving God chiefly if not solely for His inherent perfections) I once firmly espoused. But I was at lenth unwillingly convinced that I must give it up or give up the Bible. And for near twenty years I have thought, as I do now, that it is at least unscriptural, if not anti-scriptural; for the Scripture gives not the least intimation, that I can find, of any higher, or indeed any other love, love of God, than that mentioned by St. John -- 'we love

> Him, because He first loved us'. And I desire no higher love of God until my spirit returns to Him."[295]

As long as one thinks primarily of man as an end-seeking animal and of God as an object embodying infinite perfections, he will hold to some idea like the love of complacency.

The problem is that the soul in man, as we find him, is not turned toward the final good. Man's delight is captured by a relative good. He does not naturally love God. He is in bondage to love of the world.

> No man loves God by nature, any more than he does a stone, or the earth he treads upon. What we love we delight in: but no man has naturally any delight in God. In our natural state, we cannot conceive how any one should delight in Him. We take no pleasure in Him at all; He is utterly tasteless to us. To love God is far above, out of our sight. We cannot, naturally, attain unto it.[296]

If help is to come, it must come from outside. Wesley saw that it takes a special act of God to liberate man from his gods and to direct him to his true end. But this demands a different view of God. He is no longer merely an object of infinite perfection who is to be contemplated. He is now an active subject who does mighty acts. Being indebted both to the Greeks and to the Hebrews, Wesley constantly thought of God in both ways, as goodness and as power. This special act of liberation God performed in Christ and performs again as he reproduces it in the individual. "As Satan turned the heart of man from the Creator to the creature; so the Son of God turns his heart back again from the creature to the Creator."[297] This gracious act is the source of the love of gratitude. "The chief ground of this love, as long as we remain in the body, is plainly declared by the apostle, 'We love Him, because He first

loved us.' "[298] This is a central emphasis in Wesley as will be obvious even to the casual reader. God, then, becomes the center of our being because we were loved by Him. Our relation to God is not only one of desire and delight but also of gratitude and thankfulness.

Wesley brought together these two views of love, complacency and gratitude, in the term "grateful love". The meaning is grateful complacency or thankful desire and delight in God. This unites his two views of God and the two corresponsing attitudes toward God. The God who has acted in bestowing benefits upon us and to whom we are grateful, is the final Good who is infinitely delightful in himself, calling forth our complacency. Or, again, the finally perfect object is the subject which acted in our behalf. There are two ways in which grateful delight in God may be understood. First, we delight in God out of gratitude. We aim at Him because He aimed at us. Because He did something which enabled us to delight in Him, our love is ever accompanied with attitudes of thankfulness. Second, the complacency we have is for the loveliness of the One who was in Christ. It is in the loveliness of the mercy of God for us in Christ that we delight. This is to say that man cannot and does not in this life enjoy the infinite perfections of God directly; that is for the world to come. He does enjoy His beauty which He has graciously revealed in Christ, given us as a gift. "I aim at the one end of my being, God; even at 'God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself.' He shall be my God forever and ever, and my guide even unto death!"[299] This is the only love of man for God while he is in the body.

The Mystics, who early influenced Wesley, held that only the pure in heart and life could behold God. Man's task then was to become perfect in himself and benevolent unto others that he might see God. In the 1738 experience, this view was radically altered for Wesley, but not entirely cast aside. He then saw that the gift of the vision of God in Christ Jesus (although not the total unveiling of the essence of God) enabled man to become pure, internally and externally. This given purity, when brought to maturity beyond death, would make possible the pure love of God or the vision of his total perfections. Man may move toward purity and the final vision in the here and now but it is never to be realized this side of death. In this life he is ever dependent on the gift of the vision of God in Christ, of the merciful love of God in Christ. Any delight he now possesses is a gift and is accompanied by gratitude. The relationship of man to God is one of grateful complacency.[300] Pure enjoyment of the infinite perfections of God is reserved for the future life to which we look forward in hope.

The union of these two views of love is seen further in the way Wesley conceives of the life which flows from them. The love of complacency issues in the imitation of the perfections of God in which we delight.

> . . .the most acceptable worship of God is to imitate Him who~~m~~ he worships, so he is continually labouring to transcribe into himself all His imitable perfections; in particular, His justice, mercy, and truth, so eminently displayed in all His creatures.[301]

The love of gratitude, on the other hand, results in the desire to obey the one to whom we are indebted.

> . . .thankfulnes, gratitude, and love for benefits received are almost if not quite the same. Accordingly, in this world

> (whatever be the case of the next), we love Him because He hath first loved us. This love is undoubtedly the spring of all inward and outward obedience. But we delight to do what He has commanded for that very reason, because He has commanded it.[302]

Grateful delight, then, is obedience and imitation. Wesley sees no tension here: to obey God is to perfect the self and love the neighbor and to imitate God is to embody in the self His virtues, the essence of which is His merciful action in Christ. The problem of the relation of man to his neighbor will be discussed some detail immediately after the following paragraph of summary.

The concern of the last few pages has been to analyze the proper ruling principle and spring of action in the soul of man. The task has not been completed but thus far it has been seen to involve a fundamental relationship to God which Wesley defined as grateful delight and which is initiated by God and issues in a total transformation of heart and life. The completeness of this revolution, which will be understood more fully as we progress, is clearly indicated in a passage from Wesley's New Testament Notes.

> . . .'there is a new creation' — Only the power that makes world can make a Christian. And when he is so created, 'the old things are passed away' — Of their own accord, even as snow in spring. Behold! The present, visible, undeniable change! All things are become new — He has new life, new sense, new faculties, new affections, new appetites, new ideas and conceptions. His whole tenor of action, conversation is new, and he lives, as it were, in a new world. God, men, the whole creation, heaven, earth, and all therein, appear in a new light, and stand related to Him in a new manner, since He was created anew in Christ Jesus.[303]

B. The Love of God and Love of Man

Man is not only confronted by the Creator but with the fellow-creature, and he must respond to or take attitudes toward both. We are to love God and we are to love man and, according to Wesley, these relationships cannot be finally separated. Neither of these principles singly, but both together compose the proper "active principle" of the heart and life of man. This is to say that the proper spring of action in the soul is a dual principle. Wesley consistently treats it as such. "It is", he says, "in two words, gratitude and benevolence; gratitude to our creator and supreme benefactor, and benevolence to all our fellow-creatures. In other words, it is the loving God with all our hearts, and our neighbour as ourselves."[304] Therefore it is necessary in understanding man's center of gravity to discuss the love of neighbor in its relation to the love of God.

Wesley made use of the "frui-uti" formula: God alone is to be "enjoyed" in a final sense;all other beings are to be "used". Our love is to be "of God, for His own, and of man for God's sake".[305] To love God for His own sake and man for God's sake means, first of all, that man is not God. The Creator alone is to be worshipped and the human heart must not finally delight in, must not attach itself in absolute devotion to, any other being, man included. To allow any creature whatsoever to be our God or to share our heart equally with God is to be guilty of naked idolatry. Secondly, it means that, although man is not God, he is to be loved in relation to, and only in relation to God, which according to this scheme is to "use" him properly. To value him primarily in relation

to, or on account of, or because of, or for the sake of any other being is to "use" him falsely; that is, "abuse" him.

Our interest now is in the meaning of the word "love" in this phrase, "the love of God for His own sake and the love of man for God's sake". Traditionally, love tends to mean the same thing in each case; that is, delight or enjoyment. Both "frui" and "uti" connote complacency, that delight in perfections. "Frui" is ultimate and final delight; "uti" is relative and instrumental delight, depending upon the nature and degree of beauty in the object toward which the love is directed. From this arises the conception of an ordered love; "delight" is due to and elicited by another being according to his place in the scale of perfection or to the degree of perfection he embodies. Although this view has an important role in the thought of Wesley, as we shall see, it is not the entire story.

The term "love", when applied to our relation to God, finally does not mean the same thing as when it refers to love of man. It is not a matter of one "quality" being directed to various objects in varying degrees of intensity. Love of man is something essentially different from love of God although it is inseparable from it. These two relations are as different as a filial relation between a son and his father and a brotherly relation between children of a common father. The one love is a whole-hearted devotion of the soul to the one God and the other is a ministering unto the needs of fellow creatures. The love of God is grateful delight in God for His own sake; the love of man, disinterested benevolence to man for God's sake. The present

discussion will be divided into an analysis of benevolence and a discussion of the proper grounds and objects of such love.

1. Love as disinterested Benevolence

Wesley is consistent in maintaining that love of neighbor is disinterested benevolence. He insists further that such love is not essentially complacency although the love of delight and esteem does enter the picture, as we shall see, when the question of determining the neighbor is raised. Disinterested benevolence may be defined, in brief, as a non-self-regarding good will toward another.

Benevolence or good will includes both an internal wishing well and an external doing good to another, relative to his total being, body and soul. Benevolence is first and always, for Wesley, an "affection of the soul";[306] but it is not simply a passion. It is also a "disposition of the heart", a habit, a virtue. It is an orientation and a regulation of the various powers of the soul: affections, desires, designs. Benevolence, says Wesley, is a "tender good will",[307] "a most earnest and cordial affection, the most inflamed desire", for the neighbor and his good; it is an "invariable thirst after his happiness in every kind"[308]; it is a set design to do him no harm, on the one hand, and to do him every good on the other. Yet, again, benevolence is not merely an internal temper of affection. It is such a temper, but only as it issues in deeds of beneficence aimed at the temporal and eternal well-being of the other. At least, it is never to be thought of as separated from external act, if, indeed, action

isn't directly included in what is meant by the word benevolence. Wesley intended always to hold the inner and outer aspects of life together and vehemently opposed all who would neglect either side. He saw the root disposition of benevolence necessarily expressing itself in a man's "earnest and steady discharge of all social offices, of whatever is due to relations of every kind; to his friends, to his country, and to any particular community whereof he is a member."[309] Or again, it is an inner attitude toward others which issues in and establishes every kind of "justice, mercy, and honesty" in all social intercourse, in all the natural orders of existence. Benevolence is the fundamental relation which exists or ought to exist, between the self and fellow creatures. It involves the total self, inner temper and outer act. It is aimed at the total good of the other, present and future, material and spiritual.

Furthermore, this good will is genuinely disinterested. The love of the neighbor which issues from a man who loves God "is in itself generous and disinterested; springing from no view of advantage to himself, from no regard to profit or praise, no, nor even the pleasure of loving. This is the daughter, not the parent of his affection."[310] Wesley made wide use of two scripture passages: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" and "As I have loved you, so love ye one another." Wesley did not see any radical difference between these statements; in a way, the second simply underscores the first.

The passage concerning loving others as the self is not used by Wesley to justify love of self. He simply assumes that

the self always loves the self, that every man necessarily seeks his own happiness. It is used rather, in the first instance, to insist upon the claims of the neighbor as against exclusive self-love; secondly, it is used to illuminate the nature of those claims. Wesley, of course, is concerned here with the Christian man for "none can love his neighbor as himself, unless he first love God."[311] Such a man must and does fervently pursue his own good, but he is also to pursue just as vigorously and with no reference to the self, the good of the other. This is to say that the principle of proper self-love or holiness and the principle of other-love or benevolence have equal status on a level subordinate to the love of God. Both flow from God, are the fruit of his love for us, and return to God. They are for His glory and in obedience to His will.

Neither relation is to be reduced into or have preference over the other. In this analysis, disinterested love of man means that, although we love the self, we love also and in the same degree, the other and this not for the sake of any direct or indirect profit to ourselves. Benefits to the self do result, to be sure, but these are the fruit, the consequences, "the daughter and not the parent" of other-love. To love others as yourself is "to desire and pursue their happiness as sincerely and as steadily as our own".[312] Self-love then becomes the measure of love of our neighbor. What we desire for ourselves we are to desire for him. As we seek our own happiness, so we are to seek our neighbor's happiness. The accent falls, however, upon his eternal happiness as it does in the case of the self. For both an

objective and a subjective reason, we are to be concerned for the realization of the final end of his being. Objectively, since God created all beings for "determinate ends",[313] the greatest good we can do another is to aid him in the realization of his proper perfection, which is his greatest happiness. Subjectively, one who enjoys God as his own good "cannot but desire that all mankind should partake of the common blessing".[314] Concern for another's final end, however, is never to exclude concern for his temporal existence. We are to seek "his happiness in every kind"[315] which is true in the case of the self—both "temporal and eternal".[316] The neighbor is to be ministered to in all his needs. We are to care for his substance, his body as well as for his soul.[317] We seek neither more nor less for our own self than we do for the other's, and we seek neither the one nor the other with greater zeal.

This points to a rational balance which is to be preserved in every kind and at every level between the self's good and the good of the neighbor. Wesley makes use of the Golden Rule which, if it is not innate as many think it, at least "commends itself, as soon as heard, to every man's conscience and understanding".[318] This is the practical, reasonable guide in loving others as yourself.[318a] To do to another as you would be done by is to "make his case your own".[319] It is to put ourselves in his situation and do to him what we would desire of him if our fortunes were reversed. Wesley adds the term "reasonably" here: "Whatsoever you could reasonably desire of him, supposing yourself to be in his circumstances, that do, to the uttermost of your power, to

every child of man.[320] Reasonableness means that we are to do (as we expect to be done by) what we can without injury to ourselves.[321] This is explained as keeping a proper equilibrium between self-love and other-love. That is, "our superfluities (must) give way to our neighbor's conveniences;...our conveniences, to (their) necessities; our necessities, to their extremities.[322] Equality is thus to be maintained at every point concerning temporal good. This can be and is carried even further: our temporal extremities, that is our very physical existence, must bow before the eternal welfare of the other. We are to give up everything to the neighbor save our own good conscience or salvation, but we are to care equally for his good conscience and final happiness. This goes beyond the present principle of disinterestedness and brings us to the next step.

The second scripture Wesley used to speak of disinterestedness, was the "new commandment" of Christ: "As I have loved you, so love ye one another." Frequently, the "love thy neighbor as thyself" principle and this "new commandment" occur together as expressing the same idea; the latter simply illuminating and strengthening the former. As Wesley says, by use of the second, Christ put the first "still more strongly".[323] This tends to reduce the one into the other and, without doubt, the first principle was for Wesley the primary one and perhaps he did not feel any critical tension between the two. Nevertheless, this new command did introduce into his view of disinterestedness a certain raidcal quality which was ever a threat to the reasonable balance between self-love and love of other. In this case it is not the love of

self but God's love for us that is the standard by which we are to measure neighbor love, and disinterestedness is carried beyond balance to sacrifice. The actions of both the Father and Jesus serve as guides here. We are to be concerned with others in the same way as the Father was concerned when he surrendered what he valued most for man's sake and as the Son was concerned when he obediently "tasted death for every man".[324] "If God SO loved us, how ought we to love one another."[325] When our love for others is thus determined by God's love rather than by self-love, there is no question about surrendering all temporal advantage, even life itself, for the sake of the eternal welfare of the neighbor, and this not for friend alone but foe as well. "If we feel ourselves ready to do this, then do we truly love our neighbor."[326] Moreover, Wesley can see this kind of disinterestedness carried to the final extreme of total self-forgetfulness where, apparently, self-love, as a conscious principle of action, is wholly set aside. In this case, our "spiritual advantage", as well as our physical, gives way, so to speak, before the eternal welfare of the other whom God loves. One may be so swallowed up by zeal for the "glory of God and the happiness of man" that he will completely forget himself:[327]

> he may almost seem, through an excess of love, to give up himself, both his soul and his body, while he cries out, with Moses, 'Oh, this people have sinned a great sin; yet now, if Thou wilt forgive their sin —; and if not, blot me out of the book which Thou has written'; or, with St. Paul, 'I could wish that my self were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.'[328]

For Wesley, to press this view too far would be tantamount to changing his total outlook. It would mean one could so trust the destiny of the self to the God who loves that one could freely go about the business of concern for the neighbor. It would mean that the moral perfection of the self would be seen as the by-product of serving others and, therefore, need not be a self-conscious principle of action. As a matter of fact, Wesley rarely goes so far toward this "holy nonchalance" but, for the Christian, this is always there in the shadows as a menace to his neat calculations. Such disinterestedness as this in the love of the neighbor "as we love our own soul", is modified by the "new commandment" which adds the immoderate note of laying down one's life for the sake of his neighbor. A balance is to exist between our concern, both for the material and eternal goods of the self and those of the neighbor. The material always gives way to the eternal, even to the physical death of the self. When the eternal goods of the two parties clash, we are to give up all to the other but our own salvation. To summarize: The reasonable thing is love others as self. The sub-rational view is to love only self; the radical view is to give self for the other. The reasonable way is what Wesley held to and this could not be possible except we love God.

The love of man is disinterested benevolence directed toward the neighbor. But who is the neighbor? This is the question which must now engage our thought.

2. Love as Complacency and Compassion.

The second concern in discussing man's love for man is the problem of distinguishing our neighbor. Wesley continually defines the neighbor as the one to whom our disinterested good will is due, but the perplexity remains: to which one is it due? This aspect of the problem is intimately bound up with the question of why another human ought to be loved. This is the question of the grounds of good will, and the answer to this gives the clue for distinguishing the neighbor.

We have already seen that the creature is to be loved in relation to, or for the sake of, God. This, however, can be understood in several ways. It may suggest that the neighbor is to be loved for the sake of the self's love of God. My neighbor is to be valued for the purpose of building up the virtue of love within my self. He is a means to an end, used as a tool. It cannot be denied that such a response is implicitly present in Wesley's whole view but further discussion of it must be temporarily postponed.

Two other interpretations of the "uti" formula are found quite explicitly in Wesley and constitute two different grounds for good will, and hence two different understandings of the identity of the neighbor. First, the neighbor may be seen as the one who also loves God. For the sake of his love for God he becomes our friend, or our brother and merits our benevolence. Good will, in this case, is based on the goodness and loveliness which the other possesses. This is the love of complacency. It is mutual in nature and necessarily limits the conception of the neighbor to those who are virtuous in

nature. Secondly, to love man for the sake of God means, for Wesley, to love him for the sake of God's love for man. The neighbor, in this view, is precisely every man. Our good will is to be directed toward every soul God has made, foe as well as friend, the alien as well as the brother, the unlovely as well as the lovely, the wicked as well as the righteous. This is a love of compassion for those in need. Neither the idea of complacency nor that of reciprocity have any place in this conception of fellow-love.

These two views of good will toward others might be analyzed in this fashion: (1) particular, complacent, reciprocal, disinterested benevolence and (2) universal, pitiful, "one-way", disinterested benevolence. Both of these are forms of good will but, in the one case, this good will is due to and directed toward the brother or friend in Christ while, in the other case, the object of such love is "every man in the world". Our task at the moment is to look more carefully at each view and to examine how they are related in Wesley's thought.

a. The love of Complacency

The first type of human love, which may be called fraternal or friendship love, has to do in this context with the love of fellow Christians for each other. This view occupied a large place in the thought of the Founder of the Methodists. One might say that it threatened to crowd out all other views of creature love. Wesley articulated this particular complacent, reciprocal good will in both Greek and Biblical accents. He, himself, never really distinguished between them and actually tended to use the Greek idea of friendship to illuminate the Hebrew concept of brotherhood.

The Biblical figure for love of the brother is taken from some natural order of relations, such as the home or the political community. The Christian fellowship is like a family; fellow Christians are brothers, all children of the same father and one naturally cares for those of his own household. Love is naturally directed toward those who love God as we love God, our brothers in Christ. "Everyone who loveth God that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him - - Hath a natural affection to all his brethren."[329] Even as there is a natural, tender "good will" which exists in some degree between members of a family or a state or a congregation, so there is such a natural relation between brothers in Christ, fellow citizens of the New Jerusalem, companions in the Kingdom.

This idea of in-group love was, for the most part however, interpreted and spelled out with the aid of Aristotle's conception of friendship; that is, mutual good will between men of virtue. Perhaps this was the controlling image in Wesley's reasoning about love of the brethren. "Friendship is one species of love; and it is, in its proper sense, a disinterested reciprocal love between two persons."[330] These two persons are men of moral excellence for "wicked men" it seems, are "incapable of true friendship".[331] The first time the term "love" occurs in the above quotation about friendship it means benevolence; the second time it means complacence or delight in moral beauty as well as benevolence. Friendship love is distinguished from other kinds of disinterested good will by the elements of complacency and reciprocity.

"Complacence" along with "esteem" were widely used terms in

Wesley's time and meant an enjoyment of moral excellence, and of those who excel in such virtue. Since for Wesley "real, solid virtue" or moral perfection in man is nothing less than the proper relation to God, the object of our complacency in human love is man's love for God along with all that flows from such love. Wesley points to this in warning against a false and perverted "love of complacence or delight" which is found in ungodliness and ungodly men of the world. He insisted that true complacency is directed toward "the saints . . . and in such as excel in virtue."[332] The one loved is the one who is in himself lovely, as he, in one degree or another, loves God.

The other essential property of friendship love is reciprocity. Complacency, of course, is a two-way matter. A person does not delight in another's virtue unless he himself is virtuous, and this means that the other also delights in his virtue. Only he who loves God loves those who love the good. Therefore, he himself is, because of his love for God, an object of complacency to those who love God. From this mutual complacency flows reciprocal good will. In this relation, each party freely gives to and freely receives from the other "all things needful for life and godliness".[333] I place demands upon my friend and accept his demands upon me. "Whatsoever I claim from him, . . . the same I am ready . . . to give him,"[334] and vice versa. One sole restriction limits this love: "Give up everything to your friend, except a good conscience toward God".[335]

It must not be inferred that this mutual love is not truly disinterested. Aristotle says there is a type of friendship which

is based upon the usefulness of another to us or upon the pleasure that friendship gives, but this is not genuine friendship. True friendship is never, in the first instance, a matter either of usefulness or pleasure. We do not simply use the other for our ends, although indeed he is useful to us. Although we may enjoy our friend's delight in us and regard for us (and we have every right to desire this)[336] it is not, according to Wesley, the primary concern. The basic intention is to do for the friend because he is one in whom we delight and not in order to receive his benefits or for the sake of the joy of his approval. Self-love and love of the other are here balanced as we have seen earlier. I am equally concerned for his good and he, for mine in a reciprocal manner.

What has been said here is that the man who loves God (frui) relatively delights (uti) in all who love God. From this complacency, immediately grounded in the beauty in man and only remotely in God, flows disinterested well-wishing and well-doing to the other. In brief, for Wesley "to love man for the sake of God" in the present context means to have good will toward the other because of the other's love for God. The love of benevolence here is based on complacency and the neighbor, in this view, is the one to whom our good will is due, is the one who elicits our delight by his own loveliness.

b. The Love of Compassion.

The second type of human love is compassionate benevolence, which we have referred to as "universal, pitiful, one-way, disinterested good will". The term "universal benevolence", so frequently used by Wesley, refers to this inclusive kind of good will. The same is true

of the word "benevolence", used without any qualifying adjectives, when it is joined with the idea of gratitude toward God. This is, for instance, whenever Wesley sums up the meaning of love or religion or virtue or righteousness as gratitude toward God and benevolence toward man.

The adjective "universal" identifies our neighbor, the one to whom our good will is due, as exactly every man, be he "friend or foe, Christian, Jew, heretic or pagan". "If any man ask," says Wesley, " 'Who is my neighbor?', we reply, 'Every man in the world', every child of His, who is the Father of all the spirits.' "[337] This relationship to others, which flows from the love of God, is termed "universal love" for it is

> not confined to one sect or party, not restrained to those who agree with him in opinions, or in outward modes of worship, or to those who are allied to him by blood, or recommended by nearness of place. Neither does he love those only that love him, or that are endeared to him by intimacy of acquaintance. But his love resembles that of Him whose mercy is over all His works. It soars above all these scanty bounds, embracing neighbours and strangers, friends and enemies; yea, not only the good and gentle, but also the forward, the evil and unthankful. For he loves every soul that God has made; every child of man, of whatever place or nation.[338]

It is this inclusive feature that sets this kind of love off from that of the "natural" man, the one who loves the world. Sometimes Wesley seems to hold that every person, whether he be a lover of God or of the world, has good will toward other man, and that the only real problem is whether the neighbor is to be interpreted in a restricted or all-inclusive sense. Love of the world, however, issues in a "false notion of the neighbor".[339] A restricted God means a restricted view of the one to whom our good will is due;

while the fruit of the love of the universal God is the true recognition of the neighbor -- a universal view. At other times, Wesley turns this around. He holds that there can be no genuinely disinterested benevolence except where all men are seen as our neighbor. If the view of neighbor is restricted, good will then is but some form of "reflected self-love".[340] This is to say that the natural man has a kind of good will toward those that love him, agree with him, do as he does, enjoy what he enjoys. This is, however, not true benevolence but "self-love reflected". These are false views of the neighbor and hence false benevolence. Wesley brings together both of these views in commenting on the Good Samaritan Parable.

> And he said, He that showed mercy on him -- He could not for shame say otherwise, though he thereby condemned himself and overthrew his own false notion of the neighbour to whom our love is due. Go and do thou in like manner -- Let us go and do likewise, regarding every man as our neighbour who needs our assistance. Let us renounce that bigotry and party zeal which would contract our hearts into an insensibility for all the human race, but a small number whose sentiments and practices are so much our own, that our love to them is but self love reflected. With an honest openness of mind let us always remember that kindred between man and man, and cultivate that happy instinct whereby, in the original constitution of our nature, God has strongly bound us to each other.[341]

The ground of this love is not man's love of God but God's love for man, and the neighbor, therefore, is exactly every child of God. It is when man is loved "for his Creator's sake" and "for the sake of his Redeemer"[342] that all final divisions among men are cast down: the unfriendly as well as the friendly become the objects of our kindly affections and of our acts of kindness. Indeed, when we value the creature for the sake of his value to the Creator, every

being which He had made, the lower as well as the higher (regardless of what relative scales of value we use), becomes an object of our scorn. No one is beyond the pale of those "to whom this love is due", especially not those who are our enemies -- "those who are now 'despitefully using and persecuting us'".[343] Nor may we except those who are "the enemies, of God and their own souls".[344] It is the "excluded" man, the enemy, the one who is a threat to the self and to what the self loves who receives the attention here.

It was just this enemy which worried Wesley -- the unlovely, the wicked, the ignorant. Here it was that he saw that the love of complacency was inadequate either as the ground or the essence of this love. Universal benevolence, he insists, is quite different from complacent love on several counts. When the love of God in Christ fills our hearts, we love our fellows

> "not with a love of esteem or of complacence; for this can have no place with regard to those who are (if not his personal enemies, yet) enemies to God and their own souls; but with a love of benevolence, -- of tender good will to all the souls that God has made."[345]

Esteem is delight in the virtues of those men who are above us according to one or another scale, while complacency is delight in the excellencies of our equals. But what of those who are beneath us, the unlovely ones, the vicious ones, the enemies? Complacent love is not sufficient. Another kind of love is needed to include them, a pitiful love excited by another's lack or misfortune or need. It is always a "tender" benevolence, for when we were in need, God loved us. Out of gratitude and in imitation of God, we respond to others' needs.

Yet this is not just an "affection" for or a feeling with another. It is a fixed disposition to do good to another which issues in good. It is not a concern for some abstract idea of humanity. Rather we must regard "every man as our neighbour who needs our assistance",[346] whom providence puts in our way. This is to say that the first man we meet who is in need, be he Christian or not, friend or foe is due our good will. The shocking thing was that Christ called all men his brothers and every man his friend, neither the quality of character nor the idea of reciprocity invades this relationship. It may be that this man is a brother in Christ or a man of virtue but, relative to the good will due him, this is quite beside the point. It may be that we will receive or have received good from him; this again is beside the point. The first man we meet who is in need is our neighbor and due our good will. In this sense he is our friend and our brother. We love another not because of our own virtue or his, but for the sake of, on account of, and in relation to, God's love for him expressed in creation, redemption, and providence.

3. The Relation of Compassion and Complacency.

We now turn to the manner in which Wesley related these two understandings of the love of man: friendship or fraternal love and universal or neighbor love. For the purpose of clarity, let us review the distinctive elements in each.

(1) Friendship love is complacency which is aroused by the moral beauty which another possesses. It is a response to the completeness of the fellow. Neighbor love is compassion which is elicited by the needs of another. It is a response to a lack or emptiness in him.

(2) Friendship love is grounded indirectly upon God's love for man, but directly upon the self's and the other's love for God. It is a matter of the lovely one loving the lovely one. Neighbor love, however, is grounded directly in God's pitiful love for the self and for the fellow. The needy one who has received compassion from God, out of gratitude offers compassion to the needy one who also is loved by God. (3) Furthermore, friendship love is reciprocal in nature, a two-way relationship while universal love is a sacrificial, unilateral movement from the self to the neighbor. (4) Finally, both of these relations issue in good will, internal and external. From both complacency and compassion benevolence flows but, in friendship love, the object of this beneficence is necessarily restricted, while in neighbor love the object is unlimited.

Wesley never brought these views together into any real harmony, but neither did he ever separate them. The neighbor for him, the one to whom our benevolence is owed, was every man born of woman. He never digressed, in any instance, from this idea. Thus, he was aware that complacent love was not enough to encompass the evil and unrighteous folk. If these were not to be left out, compassionate benevolence was necessary. On the other hand, there are both good and wicked men in all degrees, friends and enemies, brothers and strangers, lovers of God and haters of God. Our relation to the one group is and must be different from our relation to the other. "To love these [men of the world] with a love of delight or complacence, to set out affections upon them [to delight in them] is . . . absolutely forbidden."[347] We are, however, to enjoy and give the hand of fellowship to those whose hearts are right with our hearts;[348] that

is, to those who have a faith in God which is "filled with the energy of love", producing obedience and service toward God and complete good will toward man.[349]

Complacent benevolence, then, as Wesley saw it, can no more be set aside than can compassionate good will. Both are legitimate; both are just there as a part of life as we know it. Nonetheless, although he saw them as belonging together, Wesley related them in quite contrary ways, making first one subsidiary to the other then reversing the order. The relationship he assumes is one of balance, in varying degree between the two types of love of neighbor. Since an even balance could not be achieved, the two aspects remain for him in constant and troublesome tension. As a further consequence, Wesley appears to justify two radically different and contradictory attitudes toward life. When he put the emphasis on complacent benevolence, life tended to become a drawing away from responsibility to the world and a turning in upon the self where all is for the sake of the individual and his own salvation. But when he stressed compassionate good will, quite an opposite mode of behaviour ensued; an outflowing from the self to the world, to the very point of self-abandonment for the glory of God and the happiness of man. In the first instance, life is primarily a matter of seeking after God and salvation with the fellow creature being used as a means to that end. In the second instance, life finds its source in being loved by God and flows out toward the neighbor who is of value because of God's relation to him. In brief, the first approach makes for a defensive, miserly, cautious, exclusive mode of existence; while the second embodies the contrary qualities of openness, generosity, expansiveness, inclusiveness.

In the first suggested approach, all men, friends and foes alike, are our neighbors and we love them with compassion. But then we move to concern for particular good men whom we are to "love in a higher degree". The center of attention is directed here toward the brother but, actually, there are degrees of love toward the neighbor. We are to love the Christian brother "in a higher degree than . . . the bulk of mankind".[350] The love owed to the brother is different from that owed to the world.

> . . . not only as thou lovest all mankind; not only as thou lovest thine enemies . . . not only as a stranger, as one of whom thou knowest neither good nor evil, — I am not satisfied with this, — no; . . . love me . . . as a friend that is closer than a brother; as a brother in Christ, a fellow citizen of the New Jerusalem, a fellow soldier engaged in the same warfare . . . a companion in the Kingdom . . . a joint heir of His glory.[351]

Furthermore, there are differences in this brother love. Some are united to a particular congregation, that of "his nearest, his best-beloved brethren . . . ". "These he regards as his own household; and therefore, . . . naturally cares for them, and provides that they may have all the things that are needful for life and godliness."[352] This means that more good will is due to some, the brethren, than to others, We are tp be more concerned with the end of some than others, more willing to equate some men's happiness with our own. Although in this view every man is our neighbor, Wesley has two different objects here because there are two kinds of neighbors: the first-class neighbor and the second-class neighbor. This is a "surplus benevolence" view.

It is his thinking in terms of complacent love which, in part, occasions Wesley's note of withdrawal from the world. He fears that

complacency, which is to be reserved for God and the God-like, will be directed toward the world if we associate too closely with it. We must be filled with an "undissembled benevolence"[353] toward the people of the world; that is, toward those "who know not God".[354] But we must ever be careful not to go too far "lest we contract . . . a love of complacence or delight in them".[355] For among worldly men is a highly infectious plague which spreads from soul to soul.[356] To have fellowship with them is to run the risk that "they will attach you again to earthly things".[357] Association with sinful folk is necessary, of course, in day-by-day intercourse -- in business activities, and in personal relations with our families and fellow citizens. "Yet we should enter into no sort of connection with them, farther than is absolutely necessary."[358] The Christian is to be civil and courteous to worldly folk yet at the same time "keep them at a proper distance".[359] This is related to Wesley's asceticism: the body is evil and the prison house of the soul. Consequently, the world is evil and must be fled. He implies that the sickness of society is mightier than the power of God's love, that the sickness will overcome the remedy and we are to withdraw.

Furthermore, this complacent good will seems to lend itself to a self-regarding love of others, which is to say that the benevolence here tends to love its disinterestedness. This is evident in the same sermons quoted above. "The only way to heaven [is] to avoid all intimacy with worldly men".[360] "There can be no profitable fellowship between the righteous and the unrighteous."[361] Our ungodly neighbors are to be loved just so far as not to weaken and destroy our own soul.[362] Concerning friends, Wesley declares that he himself

resolved to "choose such only, as . . . would help me on the way to heaven".[363] His advice to fellow Christians was to "drop all familiar intercourse" with those who refuse to give their hearts to Christ and "save your own soul".[364] The neighbor here tends to become less than every man, recognized only in terms of his own goodness, and therefore becomes simply a means to the salvation of the self.

This is not to suggest that compassionate love has no place here. But it is relegated to a minor role, in which it serves as a balance over against the self-regarding activity of man. In summary: we are to do good to all men and more especially to those in whom we delight. This is the situation when Wesley majors on brother love and assigns neighbor love the subordinate position.

The second manner of relating complacent and compassionate good will gives principal emphasis to the latter. In the relationship spelled out in the above paragraphs, Wesley moved from universal love back to particular love and centered there. At other times, he moved from particular out to universal love, which then became the focal point. When primacy is given to universal love with brother love assuming the subordinate position, Wesley emerges as the evangelist rather than the conscious preserver of the fellowship. Although perverted, this is our Father's world which we are to enter with healing compassion, rather than a foreign world lost to the powers of evil against which we build an island fortress in order to protect the good. Wesley recognized the naturalness, necessity and value of brother love but complacency is not enough, for all men are

our brothers. Complacency cannot, must not become the basis of benevolence nor define the neighbor. We must strive to overcome this natural restricted love of the friend and direct our love to all men, particularly our enemy -- all those who negate our being. The basic concern is for compassion to all.

Wesley held that Christianity offers man the true view of the neighbor, which conquers the false view based on blood, nearness or virtue. He saw that the Christian has a "natural affection for" and "naturally cares for" his brethren. This is good and as it should be but our love must not stop there. By nature (actual man) we define our neighbor and hence channel our good will in terms of our friends. But Christianity is a revolution which overcomes this barrier to universal benevolence. Our view of the neighbor is revolutionized: love now flows to every man. We move from the Christian community into the world freely doing good to all. As seen from a secular vantage point, we are tied by blood and geography to a selected group but Christianity breaks down these walls so that the world is not only our parish where good tidings are proclaimed, but the field in which good words are practiced. Within Christianity, this is true: the "ecumenical man" is he who has overcome narrowness of sect and denomination. A good summary of this second approach is found in the following quotation from a letter to Mr. Middleton.

> Above all, remembering that God is love, he is conformed to the same likeness. He is full of love to his neighbour; of universal love; not confined to one sect or party; not restrained to those who agree with him in opinions, or in outward modes of worship, or to those who are allied to him by blood, or recommended by nearness of place. Neither does he love those only that love him, or that are endeared to him by intimacy of acquaintance. But his love resembles that of Him whose mercy is over all his works.

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C. A Summary: The Love of God, Self and Neighbor

In this chapter we have been dealing with love as the basic spring of action and ruling principle of the soul. It was discovered to be a dual principle: the love of God and the love of man. The two aspects of the human spirit do not have, however, equal status. The love of God is prior both logically and psychologically to the love of man. God alone is to be loved for His own sake, while the neighbor is to be loved for the sake of God. This means that the creature is to be loved in relation to God; that is, in relation to God's relation to him as his Creator and Redeemer. It also means that he is to be loved because of your love for the God who first loved you. One imitates the excellencies of the One he delights in and God loves the neighbor. One obeys the will of the One he is grateful to and God commands love to the neighbor. Moreover, one cannot truly love his fellow unless he loves God with a love born of God's love for him.[366] "Unless we love God, it is not possible that we should love our neighbor as ourselves."[367] God's love for us is the only source of our love for God and both of these are the foundation of neighbor love. Sometimes Wesley speaks of both brotherly love and love to God as flowing directly from God's love to us, yet not in the sense that these principles have equal status. For the most part, however, he claims that neighbor love springs from our love to God. Actually it is both, for only as God's love creates our love to God, does it become a fountain of universal disinterested benevolence.

Wesley uses strong figures in expressing both the intimate connection between love of God and love of man, and the priority

of the first over the second. The one is the "necessary fruit[368] of the other. Love of God "constrains us" to love our fellow creatures[369];indeed, we "cannot avoid" loving him if we love God.[370] The love of God "instantly produces"[371] love of neighbor. Furthermore, as our devotion to God increases, there is "increase in the same proportion"[372] in our "benevolence to all mankind".[373]

Wesley was vehemently opposed to any ethical or religious thinking that divided religion and ethics or reduced one into the other. There can be no "separating the love of our neighbor from the love of God".[374] "Call it humanity, virtue, morality, or what you please, it is neither better nor worse than atheism. Men hereby will fully and designedly put asunder what God has joined -- the duties of the first and second table."[375] There is no genuine moral virtue where there is no genuine religious experience.

> And as reason cannot produce the love of God, so neither can it produce the love of our neighbor; a calm, generous, disinterested, benevolence to every child of man. This earnest, steady good will to our fellow-creatures never flowed from any fountain but "gratitude to our Creator". And, if this be (as a very ingenious man supposes) the very essence of virtue, it follows that virtues can have no being, unless it springs from the love of God. Therefore, as reason cannot produce this love, so neither can it produce virtue."[376]

The dual thrust of man's being is toward God and neighbor: grateful enjoyment of the Creator for His own sake and compassionate or complacent benevolence toward the creature for the sake of God. These are, according to Wesley, inseparably united although love of man is secondary to and dependent upon love of God.

But there is another element present in this thrust which we have noticed from time to time, namely self-love. Wesley wrote very little directly on the subject of self-love, but it was implicit in all his thinking upon neighbor love. He didn't need to say much about self-love for it was simply presupposed. First of all, his view that every man seeks his own happiness implies a love of self. Of course there is a false or perverted love of self which is a self-love that turns in on the self. According to Wesley, this is what happens when man seeks his satisfaction in anything less than God. Proper self-love is present when we are rightly directed toward God. To put it in a more Aristotelian form: loving the external object includes loving the activity of loving the object and loving the pleasure which is the necessary accompaniment of the activity of loving the external good. The thrust of man's being, then, was toward the good, toward the perfecting activity and toward the enjoyment which is the fruit of that activity. Love of self is automatically and intimately associated with love of God. As was suggested earlier, the imitation of and obedience to God, which flow from grateful delight in Him, involve a holy concern for the self. We are to do all for the glory of God.

> In other words, we are to do nothing but what, directly or indirectly, leads to our holiness, which is his glory; and to do every such thing with this design, and in such a measure as may most produce it.[377]

> . . .There is one thing needful, -- to do the will of God; and his will is our sanctification; our renewal in the image of God, in faith and love, in all holiness and happiness.[378]

Far from being a sin, self-love is "an indisputable duty".[379] The rule is "be ye holy" as well as "be ye merciful". Self-love is proper self-love only when man loves God and hence the neighbor. In any other context, it is perversion or self-centeredness. Proper self-love is perfection and happiness. It is a seeking after the most excellent functioning of the highest activity of man which is love of God; it is a seeking after the pleasure which cannot be divorced from that activity; it is a seeking after virtue or holiness or righteousness and the accompanying joy and peace. This is not merely a by-product of love of God and man but a self-conscious aim or thrust of our being along with love of God and man. The movement of the soul was not simply toward God and others but also toward that movement toward God and others. The eye was to be kept not only on God and neighbor but also was to turn in on itself and observe itself observing God and others. Our concern is not only with God but also with our concern for God.

At this point, Wesley was a thorough-going Aristotelian and Scholastic. He did not see that one might realize his being without directly seeking it. Although this idea is, at least, suggested when he speaks of laying down one's life for others and when he defines the law as love for others, Wesley never fimlly saw that the perfection of the self would come as a by-product if we centered our attention on God and the neighbor. He did not see that, although Christ embodied all the virtues that Wesley admired in Him, He was not greatly concerned about embodying them. The Greek ideal is never, in the opinion of

the writer, quite congenial to the Christian understanding of life and can never wholly be converted to it. Our thrust in life is not to be directed toward our virtues but toward God and the neighbor, the fruit of which is our character. If it is directed toward character, we achieve a character but it is a different character than that which is the fruit of aiming simply at God and man. The subjective good is a consequence of the thrust toward the objective good but, when our subjective good becomes, so to speak, our objective good, we get a subjective good but not that at which we aimed.

This understanding of self-love leads to the conclusion that the spring of action in the soul is for Wesley a three-fold rather than a dual principle. The final thrust which constitutes the spiritual core of man is toward God, neighbor, and self and the three are inseparable. The love of God is on one level. He alone is to be loved for his own sake and with the whole heart. Love of self and love of neighbor are on a subordinate level which is dependent upon the higher. On this lower level perfection of self and good will toward others have an equal status. Man is to will both to the same degree and neither is to be reduced into the other. Both are an expression of the love of God. Glorifying God meant, for Wesley, both holiness and benevolence. There is no final conflict between self-love and social love. "For how is it possible that the good God should make our interest inconsistent with our neighbors?[380] Although the two loves are never the same thing, as a matter of fact, they reinforce one another. To love the neighbor builds up the virtue of benevolence

which is a part of the perfection of our character. On the other hand, it is only when the disposition or virtue of benevolence is established that the love of neighbor flows.

> Love of our neighbor is absolutely different from self-love, even of the most allowable kind; just as different as the objects at which they point. And yet it is sure that, if they are under due regulation, each will give additional force to the other, till they mix together never to be divided.[381]

The temptation of any Christian perfectionist is to center upon self-love to the degree that all else becomes simply a means to this end. The neighbor, in this case, is used by and for the self and love for others becomes an exercise through which the self builds up virtue. Even God tends to become an instrumentality to man's ends. Many examples of such perversions can be pointed to in Wesley. However, this was never his intention. "The love which our Lord requires in all His followers is the love of God and man; — of God, for his own, and man for God's sake."[382]

Love, then, — the love of God, man and self — is the active principle of the soul which, when firmly established, determines all of our moral life. The man who is properly oriented in life gratefully delights in the Creator, is disinterestedly benevolent toward all creatures, and seeks for the perfection of his own being. This is the center of gravity of his spirit which expresses itself in every internal temper and in every external practice. It is with this manifestation of love in the heart and life of man that the next part of this treatise is devoted.

II. LOVE AS THE MORAL CHARACTER.

In the present chapter the initial purpose is to analyze the meaning of love and happiness in the thought of Wesley and to understand the manner in which they are related. The problem of love is the large task and the main part of that was accomplished in the above section, in which love as the ruling principle was discussed. The remaining work, to which we now turn, is to examine briefly the way the ultimate spring of action in the soul expresses itself in what Wesley designated as internal and external righteousness, and then to note the manner in which joy and peace are necessary consequences of such a life.

A. The Internal Life of Love.

The active principle of the soul orders and rules the total inner life. Some kind of love regulates the natural constitution of man discussed in Chapter One. If a man's spring of action is love of the world, every class of the spiritual powers is under its tyranny. If the primordial thrust is toward God, then the triple principle- love of God, man and self, or neighbor-love and self-love under the love of God- controls every faculty and its functionings. It is this ordering of the inner life that Wesley called holiness or righteousness or the mind of Christ or the Holy Spirit within man. The labels he gave to it are manifold. In attempting to analyze this life of love in the soul, the major attention will be directed toward the rule of love in the will for it was the moral virtues with which Wesley was by far the most concerned.

Love, the ruling principle and spring of action, is the final guide and motivating power of the soul. Reason as well as will is under its domination. The power of apprehension is directed by love in what it attends and assents to, and habits of attention "to God and the things of God" are formed in those who love God. The practical judgement and/or conscience in the spiritual man is given a new rule of piety, benevolence, and perfection by which it judges right and wrong and determines proper means and ends. In the sermon "On the Conscience", Wesley says that the Scriptures form the concrete rule for the Christian. Habits of Christian wisdom and prudence are formed in relation to these practical determinations. Lastly, the powers of ratio-

cination are transformed by the love of God by being supplied with first principles which are not present to "mere natural" reason.

In his view of the functioning of the soul, traits of both Aristotelianism and Platonism or both Augustinianism and Scholasticism can be observed. Behind both reason and will was love or the basic orientation of the soul. But reason, assisted by the moral virtues, was the proper guide of the desires, affections and passions- "setting them on their proper objects and duly balancing them." It was with these moral virtues and the inner actions of thoughts and feelings which issued from them that Wesley was most interested. Indeed, one might say:mcmost obsessed with. It will be with these moral habits and qualities, called tempers in Wesley's time, which will occupy our attention in the rest of this section.

1. The Nature of Tempers.

The term temper was widely used and popularly understood in Wesley's time. It was frequently employed as a synonym for virtue. Like the term virtue it had both a broad and narrow meaning, referring to the interior moral life in toto as well as to some particular quality or excellence of that life. In the broad sense temper indicates the over-all bias, tone, disposition, both of mind and heart, as distinct from the outward conversation of life which issues from it. A man's temper is his character, the total orientation and organization of his inner faculties, his tendency or propensity to design and think, to desire and feel in one way rather than in another. This total disposition is determined and summed up in what a man loves or seeks his happiness in. In this sense then there are just two general or overall tempers to be found in mankind: love of God- the direction of both heart and mind toward God; and love of the world- the orientation of heart and mind away from God to things of this world.

Although both the mind and heart are involved in the idea of temper, the primary reference is to the affectional nature. When it is used in a series along with such words as designs and desires it points specifically to the affections and desires and passions as they are rightly or wrongly conbined, directed, and regulated. The term always carried connotations of control, balance, moderation, proportion, regulation and evepess of the feelings. This means proper submission of the mind.

Temper was also very closely related to the idea of temperment. At times the words are used interchaggably but for the most part the latter refers to the organization of the vital powers of the body, especially as these affect the soul. Wesley, as did most people in the eighteenth century, held to some form of the ancient physiological doctrine of the temperaments. (See Ch. I) The particular combination of the basic elements or humors of the body found a physical tone or temper which had a corresponding affect upon the soul. This is called a man's animal frame or natural, that is physical, temper and according to the historical classifications, could be sanguine, choleric, melancholic or phlegmatic. These influenced the moral temper making it relatively easy or difficult to mold the various powers of the soul. Indeed, as we saw earlier, there is a close relation due to the laws of vital union, between the body and soul. The animal temper affects the moral and the moral, the spiritual. So in one way the character of a man includes the animal as well as the spiritual frame. This is one of the reasons Wesley felt that final moral perfection was impossible in this life as long as we are in the body.

> "..... the animal frame will affect more or less every power of the soul; seeing at present the soul can no more love than it can think, any otherwise than by the help of bodily organs."[384]

The natural temper, or our temperament is a matter which is beyond our control and hence we are not responsible for it - not to be praised or blamed for it, be it good or bad. The moral temper - disposition of the soul, we are responsible for, except as it is influenced by powers beyond us.

The term temper refers not only to the over-all character struc-

ture but also to particular qualities or dispositions of the soul, such as humility, patience, benevolence or meekness. It can mean either a more or less fleeting tendency or a permanently fixed habit. A temper has to do primarily with the feelings or affections. Sometimes it is used almost synonymously with affection or, more probably, with a definite combination of feelings. Yet the mind is never divorced from it as director or regulator. A temper may be defined as a quality of the inner life including intention, desire, and feeling, flowing from the basic orientation and issuing in an external act. Benevolence, for instance, includes as intention and desire to do good to the neighbor accompanied by a kindly feeling toward him. Even the passive tempers, as we shall see, are not divorced from design, for there is no gentleness except benevolence be present.

The tempers are basically concerned with the affections. An affection, as defined in Chapter I, is a perturbation of the soul and body accompanied by the sensation of pain or pleasure. This disturbance arises when the mind is confronted with an object which it pronounces good or evil and causes the soul to move toward or away from the object.

The practical reason is the director and regulator of these affections. When they are trained so that with "ease and readiness" they follow reason this is a disposition or temper. When this disposition becomes fixed it is a habit, also termed a temper or a virtue.

Tempers are good or bad, virtues or vices, for Wesley, according to whether they spring from the love of God or love of the world. Wesley also calls the tempers arising from the latter spring of action

"unholy", "unreasonable", "unnatural", "irrational" and "disquieting". The virtuous tempers are of course the opposite. In speaking of the new birth Wesley talks of "an inward change from all unholy, to all holy tempers.[385] These are all falsely oriented and unregulated dispositions - foolish, lustful, passionate, such as envy, jealousy, revenge, vanity, malice, fear, sorrow, rage, evil desire, anger. As we shall see later, they are all included in pride and passion. And as happiness or peace and joy[386] ever follows upon virtue, so all tempers which are holy are also easy while the unholy ones are uneasy.[387] Such tempers (including hatred of God and his creatures) are disquieting, they gnaw at the soul, they are hell within; whereas the holy ones are easy and calm, bringing heaven within.

2. The Classification of the Tempers

The tempers of man have been classified in various ways in western thought. Some have used the objects to which they refer as a basis for schematization. For instance, there would be self-regarding, social and religious virtues, or this worldly and other worldly tempers. Others divide them according to their source; that is, as to whether they are naturallyacquired, or supernaturally infused. Again, the faculties of the soul with which they are primarily concerned may be used as a principle of classification. Illustrations of this system are: intellectual virtues, and virtues of will; or rational tempers and animal tempers; or, again tempers in the "active" powers of man and tempers in the "passive" powers. There are other schemes that have been or may be suggested. The one chosen depends on the total outlook of a man. Usually several are made use of in the same

system and no system of classification appears to be adequate to deal with all that a given age or philosophy considers a virtue or vice. There are apparently, always some tempers that just won't quite fit a given scheme.

Wesley, of course, did not work out any detailed systematic scheme relative to the human tempers. For the most part he is content simply to quote the lists of graces or the fruits of the Spirit found in the New Testament. Yet he has an implicit pattern which repeated reading of his works brings to the surface. One can point to two slightly different ways he has of generally organizing these inner qualities of the moral life. Both schemes have their source and unity in love, but in one there is a threefold list of cardinal or living virtues while, in the other, these three are reduced to two root tempers. The phrase "humble, gentle, patient love" occurs in almost every writing of Wesley, pointing to the unity of virtue in love and to the threefold division of the tempers: humility, gentleness, and patience. In the sermon "On Meekness" the opposite dispositions or corresponding vices are enumerated. Wesley speaks of being saved from all "unholy tempers, from all pride, passion, impatience" and then goes on to describe these by indicating some of the subordinate tempers included in the cardinal ones. "We are saved from all arrogance of spirit, all haughtiness and overbearingness" or pride, the opposite to himility; "from wrath, anger and bitterness" or passion, the counterpart of gentleness; and "from discontent, murmurings, fretfulness peevishness", or impatience as over against the virtue of patience.[388]

In the other scheme there are two parent dispositions: humility and meekness. Both gentleness and patience are here included under meekness, giving two instead of three basic tempers. Wesley frequently sums up the whole inner life of virtue or holiness as "humble, meek love". This is undoubtedly the preminent schematization

in Wesley. Perhaps it is the only one which could be termed systematic at all. A brief elaboration of this scheme will help clarify the various dispositions of the soul in their interrelatedness as these appeared to Wesley.

Wesley classifies the tempers in terms of the inner powers of man, in terms of the objects to which they refer and in terms of the love from which they spring. The two cardinal virtues, humility and meekness, are closely interrelated. These virtues are in relation to love of God and love of man. Their opponents, the vices of pride and passion are in relation to love of the world. But all four tempers have to do with, or are directed toward, certain object -- God, self and neighbor. Again, Wesley orders the habits according to the powers of the soul. Humility is the parent virtue of all the tempers having to do with active powers, and meekness the original of all that have to do with the passive. Wesley sees all life as a doing and a suffering. We are continually acting and being acted upon. He exhorts his reader: "Be thou a lover of God, and of all mankind. In this spirit, do and suffer all things".[389]

The virtues which have primarily to do with our doing are "active" virtues; those which have primarily to do with our suffering are "passive" virtues. This first is humility; the second, meekness. Speaking generally, one is concerned with the orientation of the springs of action -- the desires and affections; the other, more with the passions -- that is, with their proper balance and control. This is particularly true of the more violent passions of fear, anger, and sorrow, and especially with intense desires and affections which, in high excitement, we generally think of as passions, as we

saw in Chapter I. In the exercise of the active tempers, the self is basically the actor; in the passive tempers, it is the patient. In the sermon on "God's Love to Fallen Men" Wesley says, "Upon this foundation, even our suffering, it is evident all our passive graces are built; yea, the noblest of all Christian graces, Love enduring all things". 390

Wesley often speaks of both suffering and doing the will of God. Some of the tempers refer to one and some to the other. In the sermon mentioned above Wesley relates the passive virtues to the evil in the world which causes suffering. He also makes trust and confidence into a passive virtue, that which is relying on God in the midst of adversities which tend to make God appear as unworthy of trust.

When the term temper is used in the plural it refers to particular qualities, excellences on dispositions of the soul, such as kindliness and patience. These are the virtues--a term which Wesley uses synonomously with tempers, dispositions and when these become fixed, they are habits of the soul. A temper or virtue or disposition can refer to a particular holy intent and/or feeling in a given situation, or point to a habitual tendency to so design and/or feel in every situation. The latter is what Wesley wants. Perfection or holiness or perfect love is the solidification of these tempers into fixed habits. The tempers are a tendency of the affections to express themselves in a certain way, right-directed and modulated by the reason. Wesley implies that the mind gives some order to the will. The nature of that order is due to the orientation of the mind. But only order given by a mind ruled by

the love of God gives genuine order.

There are then two cardinal virtues in man: humility, which has to do with the active powers plac ing the mind and heart upon their proper objects; and meekness which is concernod with the passive part of the soul, the due control and regulations of the passions. Now Wesley, as noted above, also divides the tempers according to the objects toward which they are directed -- God, self, and the neighbor. This means that each of the primary dispositions are broken down into three classes of secondary tempers. Humility in reference to God is dependence or obedience, in reference to the self is lowliness or self-knowledge, and in reference to the self is lowliness or self-knowledge, and in reference to the neighbor is benevolence or kindness. The same is true when the passive virtue of meekness is considered. Relative to God meekness is resignation; relative to the self it is patience; relative to the neighbor gentleness. In one way of speaking there are six fundamental dispositions: there are active obedience, lowliness, benevolence and there are resignation, patience, gentleness. Or to use another approach, passive. Two of the six are religious virtues, obedience and resignation; two are self-regarding, lowliness and patience; and two are social, benevolence and gentleness. The two virtues in each class are closely related--resignation is passive obedience to God; patience is passive lowliness; gentleness is passive kindness. You can have one without the other.

Now pride is divided according to the object toward which it is directed, into obedience to God, kindness toward man, and lowliness in ourself. Each of these is active. It is active

obedience, active kindness, active lowliness. In Meekness, we have seen, is resignation before God, gentleness to all men, and patience in ourselves. These are passive. Resignation is passive obedience to God, gentleness passive kindness, and patience is passive lowliness. All the other tempers in the human soul (and they are manifold and complex) can be traced back to the six dispositions or on back to the two primary tempers of humility and meekness and finally back to the fundamental orientation of the soul--love of God and man and self. The sum of all these dispositions constitutes the proper temper or character of the soul and is what is meant by the love of God and of man, and what Wesley meant by the "mind of Christ" which man is to possess.

It is this basic orientation of the soul which divides the tempers into virtues and vices or to say the same thing; holy and unholy dispositions. If a man is present to the world in terms of love of God and man, virtuous tempers are built up in the form described above. If a man "loves the world" he will be of a vicious temper which is opposite at every point to the holy dispositions described above. Pride and passion, the opposite to Humility and meekness are the root vices. And each of these vicious tempers can, like the virtuous tempers be sub-divided according to their relevant

objects. Relative to God, pride is independence, the opposite to obedience; relative to the self, it is conceit, the counterpart to lowliness; relative to the neighbor, it is malevolence as over against benevolence. The same is true of Passion. It is rebellion against God, fretfulness in the self and anger toward the neighbor, the counterparts of resignation, patience and gentleness. The temper of the vicious man is pride-filled, passion-filled love of the world.

All of this indicates that in Wesley's thinking there is a basic unity and interrelation of the virtues. Both the good tempers and vices flow from and move toward the fundamental bent of the soul. What a man loves determines his character. He is filled with either prideful, passionate love of the world or humble, meek love of God and man. Virtue is for Wesley a unity. You have all the virtues or all the vices (and there are infinite degrees of both) in terms of what you finally love - the two can exist together in the same character although one or the other is more prominent. This is the unstable man of the divided will and this is the state of the man who fears God. He has some love for God in him, which brings forth virtue. He also loves the world and hence is filled also with vicious dispositions. The man of God is a man of "humble, meek love." In every action he is ruled and motivated by humble love. This is to say he acts in obedient love, in lowly love, and in benevolent love. And in every action he suffers, he is resigned, patient and gentle. This is holiness of heart and when it becomes a fixed habit is perfect love. This interior structure of the moral virtues is a comparison Wesley made between Christians and non-Christians.

> "For Christians are holy; these are unholy: Christians love God: these love the world: Christians are humble these are proud: Christians are gentle: these are passionate: Christians have the mind that was in Christ:" 391

Of course under each of these cardinal virtues are secondary virtues which are almost beyond enumeration. All are, however, some form of humble meek love. The last quality of a virtue mentioned earlier was the fact that the tempers are springs of action. They issue in external acts. A right act is the child of a holy temper. External righteousness proceeds out of internal holiness. To this outer life we must now turn our attention.

B. The External life of Love

Wesley spoke frequently about the Christian man's having the mind that was in Christ and walking as Christ walked. The first points to the inner life of love as we have described it above. "Walking as Christ walked" indicates the external behavior which flows from humble, meek love. Wesley always insisted that outward and inward religion or holiness must be kept together. "God hath joined them together from the beginning of the world; and let not man put them asunder."[392] He opposed those about him who would neglect either holiness of heart or holiness of life. He wished to give equal emphasis to both and firmly believed that because of the reciprocal action between them it was finally impossible to disjoin them. Still just what did Wesley mean by the Eternal religion?

He talks about Christian action in two ways: first, by speaking of justice, mercy and truth as duties; second, by speaking of works of piety and works of mercy. In the duty approach, the attention is directed toward the neighbor and in the second approach, primarily toward the self. In this last instance, the neighbor is quite a

secondary concern and the purpose and intention of action, which Wesley calls the means of grace or good works, is to build up our own perfection. Works of piety include exercises

> . . .such as public prayer, family prayer, and praying in our closet; receiving the Supper of the Lord;searching the Scriptures, by hearing, reading, meditating; and by using such a measure of fasting or abstinence as bodily health allows.[393]

Works of mercy "wherein God has appointed His children to await for complete salvation" are deeds which minister to the body and souls of men

> . . .such as feeding the hungry, entertaining the stranger, visiting those that are in prison, or sick, or variously afflicted; such as the endeavouring to instruct the ignorant, to awaken the stupid sinner, to quicken the lukewarm, to confirm the wavering, to comfort the feeble-minded to succor the tempted, or contribute in anyway to the saving of souls from death.[394]

To these means of grace one can add the works of discipline, upon which Wesley placed much stress, as a means of developing the character. This, then, at first glance might appear to fit our scheme of a relation to God, self and neighbor. This is not the case, however, for all three of these outer activities are performed for the sake of the perfection and happiness of the self. Turning to the other approach, Wesley's listing of the external duties as mercy, justice and truth were the common classification employed in his day. The same is true of the meanings he gives to them. Justice is giving all men their proper due; mercy means benevolent actions; and truth is honest dealing with men. In a letter to Dr. Warburton, he follows his usual practice of finding passages of Scripture to fit his scheme. He calls them the fruits of the spirit which

> "consist, 'in all goodness, kindness, tender-heartedness' — opposite to 'bitterness, envy, anger, clamor, evil speaking; in all righteousness,' rendering to all their dues — opposite to 'stealing'; 'and in all truth,' veracity, sincerity, — opposite to 'lying'." [395]

Now we see the neighbor as the object of the intention. Benefits to the self are by-productive and derivative. But even a casual reader of Wesley would observe that he very seldom speaks in this fashion. On the other hand, his writings are full of descriptions of the works of piety and mercy and discipline, where the perfection of the self is of primary interest, the interest in the neighbor is quite secondary. Here is raised again the problem in Wesley which was mentioned in discussing the relation between compassionate and complacent benevolence and in the description of the threefold spring of action in the soul of man. Although Wesley held that love of

self, or perfection; and love of others, or benevolence, were to have an equal position under love of God; the former tended always to appear in the first rank. This means that the internal life of love was exalted over the external; that the disposition of love of the neighbor was more important than the act, which inversion really means that social love tends to be reduced to self-love. A clear example of this occurs when Wesley talks of the necessity for a Christian to remain in the world. He says:

> some intercourse even with ungodly and unholy men is absolutely needful, in order to the full exertion of every temper which He described as the way to the kingdom; that it is indispensably necessary, in order to the complete exercise of poverty of spirit, or mourning, and of every other disposition which has a place here, in the genuine religion of Jesus Christ. Yea, it is necessary to the very being of several of them; that of meekness, for example, which, instead of demanding 'an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth', doth not resist evil, but causes us, when smitten 'on the right cheek to turn the other cheek'; to turn the other also so that mercifulness, whereby we love our enemies, bless them that curse us, do good to them that hate us, and pray for them that despitefully use us and persecute us; and of that complication of love and holy tempers which is exercised in suffering for righteousness sake. Now all of these, it is clear, could have no being, were we to have no commerce with any but real Christians."[396]

The exterior life was in Wesley's mind to be lived for the sake of the interior life. This is seen in one of the most repeated phrases in Wesley's works "Unto him that hath shall be given". He spells this out in his Notes.

> "Whosoever hath -- that is, improves what he hath, uses the grace given according to the design of the Giver; to him shall be given -- more and more, in proportion to that improvement. But whosoever hath not -- improves it not, from him shall be taken away even what he hath -- here is the grand rule of God's dealing with his children of men: a rule fixed as the pillars of heaven.[397]

He is saying that the inner tempers only develop into fixed habits when they are exercised. "It is use that brings perfectness."[398]

The virtues or tempers for Wesley were both graces and achievements. They are given to us, on the one hand, and at the same time we build them. The holy dispositions flow out and are formed by the love of God which, as we shall see later, is in itself a gift. This love, however, does not create full-grown habits. It plants the seed of the tempers. They only come into maturity as they are exercised. Actions corresponding to the dispositions build up the dispositions. On the other hand, it is the tempers which determine the actions if we will that act. A certain virtue or temper produces an act, which in turn, strengthens or develops that virtue. There is even a further reciprocal action here. Love of God sows the seed of virtue which produces the action, which matures the virtue, which strengthens the principle of love in our hearts. And it is in the service of the development of the self that the external works of piety and mercy are to be understood. So that, when Wesley sees a dual commandment from God, love of self and love of neighbor, it was the first that had the preference. The New Testament conception of radical love for the neighbor never finally found itself at home in Wesley's thought.

Perfection of character always remained the central emphasis in Wesley. Perfection is the mature Christian life where the gift of/the love of God has itself become a fixed attitude of the soul through the various habits it formed now grown strong through external actions. It is a humble, meek love become a fixed disposition.

"Christian perfection . . . is only another term for holiness. They are two names for the same thing. Thus, everyone that is holy is, in the Scripture sense, perfect."[399] To understand this more fully one must begin with the ways in which man is present to life. First is the natural man. His ruling principle is love of the world., from which is formed the cardinal habits of pride and passions along with their many offspring that together constitute his character. These fixed dispositions in turn hold him fast to love of the world. The man who fears God is a double-minded man. He is ruled by two opposing principles -- the world and God. The principle of the world conquers in the struggle because of the fixity of the habits springing from love of the world. The Christian or evangelical man loves God. But there are several levels in this stage. Wesley distinguished these with the help of St. John's threefold distinction of all christian believers: little children, young men, and fathers."[400] The little children love God but their dispositions are weak and often they fall into love of the world, due to the vicious tempers which remain. In the young men there has been a growth in virtue which has proportionally weakened the unholy tempers. Finally, the fathers are perfected in love. The holy virtues have become fixed habits eliminating those tempers which are the product of the love of the world.

This is humble, meek love brought to its fullness. It is the life of genuine virtue, the only kind of "righteousness" which issues in "peace and joy".

C. Love and Happiness

Wesley believed that happiness and virtue were united by the very nature of things. But it is from righteousness that joy and peace naturally flow. They are the consequence of genuine holiness and can never stand alone. Man is to seek both virtue and happiness for these are the aspects of self-love which, as we have seen earlier, form a part of the ruling principle of the soul. Yet virtue has the priority. In using his favorite Scriptural formula, Wesley says, "first 'righteousness' then 'peace and joy' in the Holy Ghost."[401] Although these cannot be separated, one is dependent upon the other. In the moral life, our first aim is to be toward the perfection of our character. Since happiness is a fruit of virtue, "real, solid, substantial happiness" is found only in those who love God. And "as our knowledge and love of Him increase, by the same degrees, in this same proportion, the kingdom of an inward heaven must necessarily increase also."[402] Neither the man who fears God nor the man who loves the world can have genuine happiness. Those who have turned from the eternal toward the realm of temporal things may have a certain sense of "merriment", a certain sense of false peace, but they have neither permanence nor depth. "While we are at enmity with God, there can be no true peace, no solid joy in time or in eternity."[403] On the other hand, the man who merely fears God has no peace for there is no unity in his soul. He is torn between obeying God and obeying the world. "So that, by halting between both, he loses both, and has no peace in either God or the world." "He is a motley mixture of all sorts of contrarieties;

a wheel of contradiction jumbled into one."[404]

It has become obvious that Wesley thought of happiness in terms of joy and peace. This breakdown parallels the conception of inner virtue as right orientation and proper balance of the powers of the soul. Joy has primarily to do with the direction of the soul; while peace is, in the first place, the fruit of the proper harmony of the powers.

The quality of joy in the life of the man who loves God is of two types. First of all, it is the joy of present delight and, secondly, the joy of future hope. The present joy is the direct fruit of, or an aspect of, our love of God. It is the root affection of delight which is there in the contemplation of the excellence of the supreme Good; that is, God. It is also a delight in present salvation — a man's feeling "of solid joy, which arises from the testimony of the spirit that he is a child of God."[405]

Joy is also, as noted above, the delight which is associated with the temper of hope. "Joy in the Lord. . .cannot but attend a hope for immortality"; or "a confident expectation of Glory."[406] When an individual has a future and is free of anxiety concerning his ultimate destiny, he has the joy of hope. The opposite to this is "fear which hath torment"[407] from which the lover of God is delivered. Hope is a quality of life which "banishes fear . . .fear of the wrath of God; fear of hell; fear of the devil; and in particular fear of death."[408] Stated positively it is the joy of the hope of both "perfect holiness and everlasting happiness"[409] which constitute the final and proper perfection of man.

In summary, men of true holiness

> rejoice in the hope of the glory of God. God is shed abroad in their hearts, through the Holy Ghost, which is given unto them. And hereby they are persuaded (though perhaps not at all times, nor with the same fulness of persuasion), 'neither death, nor life, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, should be able to separate them from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."[410]

This happiness which "goes hand in hand with virtue" is peace as well as joy. Peace is that even quality of spirit which is the consequences of a soul whose powers are unified and harmoniously balanced. In speaking of the original perfection of man, Wesley wrote that "from this right state and use of all his faculties, his happiness naturally flowed[411]. The virtues of humble and meek love, especially the latter, make for a "tranquility of spirit" and "evenness of mind." On the other hand the vicious man is a restless soul for "all unholy tempers are uneasy tempers."[412] They create a present hell in the breast"[413] and are "general sources of misery"[414]. "As long as these reign in any soul, happiness has no place there."[415]

Peace and joy are the possessions of the righteous man and precisely because he is righteous. But the tempers of happiness are not simply the "reward"[410] of virtue. They also react reflexively upon holiness for its upbuilding. "Peace and joy" Wesley said, "should never be separated from righteousness, being the divine means of both preserving and increasing it"[417]. Or, again, "There is scarce a greater help to holiness than this, a continual tranquility of spirit and evenness of mind."[418] This idea of interaction of virtue and happiness is just one more instance of

Wesley's seeing all powers of the soul and all aspects of the proper moral life admirably fitted together and acting and reacting in a wonderful harmony.

This idea of harmony is an excellent note upon which to bring this chapter on the life of love to a close. We have found that the true active principle of the soul-love of God, neighbor and self, all holy tempers and righteous practices, and the happiness of joy and peace, are intimately related and bound together constituting that life of love, which is the proper moral and spiritual being of man and the essence of genuine religion. Many excellent summaries of this life are to be found in Wesley. The following is almost picked at random.

> True religion is right, in two words, gratitude and benevolence; gratitude to our creator and supreme benefactor and benevolence toward our fellow creatures. In other words, it is loving God with all our heart, (notice that Wesley stresses here exclusively right tempers and not actions) hence our knowing that God loves us, that we love Him, and love our neighbor as ourselves. Gratitude toward our Creator cannot but produce benevolence toward our fellow creatures. The love of Christ constrains us, not only to be harmless, but to do no ill to our neighbor, but to be useful, to be "zealous of good works" as we have time, "to do good to all men"; of true, genuine morality; of justice, of mercy and truth. This is religion, and this is happiness; the happiness for which we were made. This begins as soon as we begin to know God, by the teaching of His own spirit. As soon as the father of spirits reveals His son in our heart, and the sun is shed abroad in our heart; then, and not until then, we are happy. We are happy, first, in the consciousness of his favor, which indeed is better than life itself; next, in the constant communion with the Father, and with His Son, Jesus Christ; then, in all the heavenly tempers which he has wrought in us by his spirits; again, in the testimony of His spirit, that all our works please Him; and, lastly, in the testimony of our own spirits, that "in simplicity and godly sincerity we have our conversation in the world." Standing fast in this liberty from sin and sorrow, wherewith Christ made them free, real Christians "rejoice evermore, pray without ceasing, and in everything give thanks and their happiness still increases as they grow up in the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.[419]

Notes

Chapter II

279 New Testament, p. 547.

280 Works, VIII, pp. 3-4. The same quotation appears in Letters, II, pp. 269-70 in Wesley's 1746 discussion with Thomas Church.

281 Letters, VI, p. 266.

282 Letters, I, No. 14.

283 Works, II, p. 448.

284 Works, II, p. 228.

285 Works, II, p. 192.

286 Works, II, p. 399.

287 Works, II, p. 192.

288 New Testament, p. 259.

289 Works, II, p. 431.

290 Works, II, p. 188.

291 Works, II, p. 186.

292 Works, II, p. 431.

279a Works, II, p. 189.

280a Works, II, p. 188.

281a Works, II, p. 399.

282a Works, II, p. 432.

283a Works, II, p. 192.

284a Standard Sermons, I, p. 535.

285a New Testament, p. 456.

287a Works, II, p. 189.

288a Works, II, p. 193.

289a Works, II, p. 189.

290a Works, II, p. 182.

291a Works, II, p. 181.

292a Standard Sermons, I, p. 95.

293 Standard Sermons, II, p. 235.

294 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 72-83.

295 Letters, III, p. 106.

296 Standard Sermons, II, p. 72.

297 Works, II, p. 73.

298 Works, II, p. 44.

299 Works, II, p. 406.

300 See Sermon CXIV, "On, What is Man?", Works, II, pp. 402-406.

301 Works, V, p. 753.

302 Letters, VII, pp. 37-38.

303 New Testament, pp. 451-58.

304 Works, VII, pp. 269-70.

305 Works, II, p. 521.

306 Standard Sermons, I, p. 293.

307 Works, II, p. 281.

308 Standard Sermons, I, p. 152.

309 Works, V, p. 754.

310 Works, V, p. 753.

311 Standard Sermons, I, p. 531.

312 Works, VII, p. 495.

313 Works, VII, p. 443.

314 Standard Sermons, II, p. 225.

315 Standard Sermons, I, p. 152.

316 Works, VI, p. 347.

317 Works, II, p. 444.

318 Standard Sermons, I, p. 530.

318a It is, however, truly exercised only when the love of God is in our hearts.

319 Standard Sermons, I, p. 530.

320 Loc. cit.

321 Loc. cit.

322 Standard Sermons, I, p. 531.

323 Standard Sermons, I, p. 293.

324 Standard Sermons, II, p. 497.

325 Works, VII, p. 243.

326 Standard Sermons, I, p. 293.

327 New Testament, p. 436; Standard Sermons, I, pp. 348-49.

328 Standard Sermons, I, p. 349.

329 New Testament, p. 638.

330 Works, II, p. 778.

331 Loc. cit.

332 Works, II, p. 199.

333 Standard Sermons, II, p. 144.

334 Standard Sermons, II, p. 142.

335 Works, VI, p. 778.

336 Standard Sermons, I, p. 531.

337 Standard Sermons, I, p. 62.

338 Works, V, p. 753.

339 New Testament, p. 169.

340 Wesley does not always, if ever, see that this is true in brother love.

341 New Testament, p. 169.

342 Works, II, pp. 348-49.

343 Standard Sermons, I, p. 293.

344 Standard Sermons, I, p. 62.

345 Works, II, p. 281.

346 New Testament, p. 169.

347 Works, II, p. 113.

348 Standard Sermons, II, p. 136.

349 Standard Sermons, II, p. 137.

350 Standard Sermons, II, p. 140.

351 Loc. cit.

352 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 144-45.

353 Works, II, p. 347.

354 Works, II, p. 198.

355 Works, II, p. 199.

356 Works, II, p. 201.

357 Works, II, p. 202.

358 Works, II, p. 199.

359 Works, II, p. 210.

360 Works, II, p. 203.

361 Works, II, p. 207.

362 Works, II, p. 203.

363 Works, II, p. 211.

364 Loc. cit.

365 Works, V, p. 753.

366 Standard Sermons, II, p. 81.

367 Standard Sermons, II, p. 197.

368 Standard Sermons, I, p. 293.

369 Standard Sermons, I, p. 104.

370 Standard Sermons, II, p. 80.

371 Works, VI, p. 43.

372 Works, VI, pp. 234-35.

373 Loc. cit.

374 Works, VII, p. 271.

375 Loc. cit.

376 Works, VI, p. 359.

377 Works, VI, p. 616.

378 Works, VI, pp. 615-16.

379 New Testament, p. 500.

380 Letters, I, p. 167.

381 Works, V, p. 753.

382 Works, VII, p. 495.

383 See Chapter I.

384 Letters, IV, pp. 3-4.

385 Works, VII, p. 205.

386 See below, p.

387 Works, VI, p. 385.

388 Works, VII, pp. 54-55.

389 Standard Sermons, I, p. 422.

390 Works, II, p. 45.

391 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 91-92.

392 Standard Sermons, I, p. 392.

393 Standard Sermons, II, p. 45.

394 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 455-56.

395 Letters, IV, pp. 347-48.

396 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 384-85.

397 New Testament, p. 47.

398 Letters, VI, p. 138.

399 Standard Sermons, II, p. 156.

400 Letters, VI, p. 146.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF FAITH

CHAPTER III

Throughout his long life Wesley breathed an atmosphere charged with concern for the problems of certainty and virtue. This climate of concern provided the backdrop for his whole thought and work. It particularly influenced his lifelong wrestling with the nature of the knowledge of God.

The empirical movement, in challenging the great rational monuments of the seventeenth century, was making a magic word out of the term "experience". The mind began as an empty cupboard and reason was dependent upon the "given" in experience, which was understood as one form or another of sensation. Whatever truly is, intrudes itself upon us in experience. What was clear and distinctly perceived to be in or risen out of experience brought both logical and psychological certainty. Here was reality, judging all our conceptions of the real.

Wesley carried this orientation into the area of religious thought and practice. This is, perhaps, the unique contribution of the founder of Methodism to Christian doctrine as several writers have pointed out. It is certainly the keystone of Wesley's thinking and the central emphasis of the whole Revival. In the first half of the eighteenth century, religion was conceived, both by Christian and non-Christian, to be either a mere rational matter or blind acceptance of tradition. From Wesley's perspective, these approaches were equally impotent and he stubbornly opposed both with his view of "experimental religion". Experience was the necessary condition for all genuine religion. What was clearly and distinctly given in

our experience and corroborated by the experience of others brought certainty issuing in far-reaching consequences. This first of the Methodists had imbibed the empirical temper of his day.

Again the almost universal concern in this century with the moral problem -- on the part of Christians, Deists, and atheists alike -- as we have already had occasion to note also dominated the interest of Wesley and significantly shaped his understanding of religious knowledge or faith. His concern for practical virtue did much to lead him to a view of living, transforming faith as over against the popular idea of faith as assent to this or that set of truths which did not and could not, in Wesley's experience of the matter, issue in genuine virtuous living. Any conception of faith which was not inseparably joined with moral activity, was not genuine faith at all.

These two concerns Wesley brought together in his theology. Proper Christian faith is experimental in nature and necessarily results in moral revolution. It is "faith that worketh by love". The two emphases could not be divorced. Practical morality follows from experimental knowledge as night the day. The nature of our character and actions proceeds not from the nature of our speculations about reality but from our experience of reality.

The great Creator has so linked together faith -- the experimental knowledge of God and works -- holiness of heart, and practice, that, where one is not found, the other does not exist. And when any man attempts to divorce them or to neglect the one or the other, he is not only perverting true religion but attempting the impossible.

It is our purpose in this chapter to analyze Wesley's view of experimental knowledge of God and to show how it is productive of the life of love and happiness previously described. Perhaps it will add to the clarity to begin with a view of the various ways in which Wesley classifies or understands faith and then proceed to discuss proper Christian faith and the witness of the spirit. Finally in a section on the faith of a servant and the faith of a Son, the manner in which Wesley relates "knowledge" and "virtue" will be discussed.

I. GENERAL TYPES OF FAITH

Wesley recognized several kinds of faith which he distinguished in terms of the essential nature of "faith" and in terms of the object or content of faith. These primary distinctions are then mixed together creating four different types of faith. By use of these types, Wesley is able to classify men relative to spiritual matters and to plot the stages of development in the spiritual and moral pilgrimage of mankind. We will first attempt to explain the major divisions.

A. General and Particular Faith

In almost every discussion of faith, Wesley distinguishes between what he calls its general and particular form.

> Faith is an evidence or conviction of things not seen, of God and of things of God. This is faith in general. More particularly it is a divine evidence or conviction that Christ loved me and gave Himself for me. . .[383a]

For the most part this distinction has reference to the content of faith or to the conception of the object of faith. General faith is that knowledge of the invisible, eternal and spiritual worlds which is afforded man outside the Christian revelation. It is what can be known of "God and of the things of God" through both natural revelation — that is, through reason's inferences from the data concerning the natural world presented to the mind by the physical senses — and through the special historical revelation given to the Jews and, in some rare cases, to others.

Particular faith, in this sense, refers to what God has accomplished through and disclosed of Himself in the event of Christ.

In this action alone, God has uniquely and finally unveiled Himself to man. We behold the true and saving glory of God only in the face of Jesus Christ. At times Wesley refers to all the truths about "God and the things of God", all the truths about the invisible, eternal and spiritual worlds found in the Bible, as part of general faith and, as over against this, the knowledge of the action of God in Christ as particular faith. He was wholly persuaded that without this event and man's knowledge of it there could be no salvation, no genuine virtue or satisfying happiness.

Perhaps the most significant feature in this distinction between general and particular faith is that in all the former God is known only as a Creator, Lawgiver, and Judge. This image dictates the manner in which one understands his existence and makes his response to life. Particular faith, on the other hand, is the knowledge of God as a loving, forgiving Father who transforms the meaning of existence and, therefore, the whole of our intentions, tempers and conversation in the world.

Both the general and the particular knowledge of God mediated through nature and reason, on the one hand, and the event of Christ, the Scriptures and the Christian community, on the other, played vital roles in the thought of Wesley. Outside these sources no truths of God are known.

B. Speculative and Experimental Faith

The second and by far the most important distinction in Wesley's understanding of faith is that indicated by the terms "speculative faith" and "experimental faith". The first might be called a propositional faith, a "conviction of such or such truths"[384a] the assent of the mind to propositions or doctrines -- "that speculative notional, airy shadow, which lives in the head and not in the heart".[385a] This Wesley calls a dead faith for "though it may have some small influence upon practice",[386a] it does not and cannot initiate the spiritual revolution necessary for true virtue. It is, by itself, in no way "saving", unable to expel either vice or ignorance. This is not proper knowledge of God. Experimental faith, on the other hand, may be designated as personal faith. It is not mere assent of the mind to truths about God although it includes such assent. It is rather the response of the whole person to the personal activity of God involving the feelings and volitions as well as the intellect. This is, in the Christian sense, a knowledge which includes an experimental evidence of "God and the things of God" accompanied by a conviction of the same, especially as this is related to one's own existence and destiny. Such knowledge brings about such a filial confidence in God as to shift the center of gravity of one's whole being which issues in all internal and external holiness. This genuine awareness of God, experimental faith, is the only source of all virtue and happiness, the one means of salvation.

Speaking of speculative faith, Wesley says in one of the most mature statements of his position, "Hitherto faith has been

considered chiefly as an evidence and conviction of such and such truths. And this is the sense wherein it is taken this day in every part of the Christian world."[387] In this same sermon, he accuses not only Deists and heathens but also most Christians, Protestant as well as Catholic, of accepting faith in this speculative and propositional sense. In his early life, the evangelist himself had similar views about faith. When he first definitely set his course in the direction of the religious life in 1725, he wrote to his mother, "I call faith an assent upon rational grounds. . .Faith must necessarily at length be resolved into reason."[388] This is generally the Christian rationalist's point of view. Less than a year later in 1726, he had shifted more to the stand of Protestant orthodoxy, when he again wrote to his mother, "I am therefore, at length come entirely to your opinion that saving faith (including practice)[389] is an assent to what God has revealed because He has revealed it and not because the truth of it may be evinced by reason."[390] Late in life, Wesley gave an autobiographical statement of the development of his views on justification and saving faith.[391] He confesses utter ignorance, at the time he was ordained a deacon in 1725, about the nature and the conditions of justification. "I was equally ignorant of the nature of saving faith; apprehending it to be no more than a firm assent to all the propositions contained in the Old and New Testaments." Wesley goes on to say "As soon as, by the great blessing of God, I had a clearer view of these things, I began to declare them to others also." The "clearer view" came after the crisis of 1728. It was then he saw that the Christian relationship conception of faith and that of the Protestant orthodox were in essence the same, bare

assent of the mind to truth, and that proper Christian faith was something more than rational assent.

In a letter to "John Smith" in 1745, Wesley points out his opposition to the current and popular understanding of faith. Smith had written: "It is the nature of faith to be a full and practical assent to truth." To this Wesley replies:

> . . .surely no. This definition does in nowise express the nature of Christian faith. Christian, saving faith, is a divine conviction of invisible things; a supernatural conviction of the things of God, with a full confidence in His love. Now, a man may have a full assent to the truth of the Bible (probably attained by the slow steps you mention), yea, an assent which has some influence upon his practice, and yet not have one grain of this faith.[392a]

This well expresses Wesley's stand on the matter and he never changed.

Let us consider briefly the difference between these views of faith. All types of faith -- general, particular, speculative and experimental -- have to do with "knowledge" of the spiritual world, of God and the things of God, His character and methods of dealing with men, and with the nature of man and his relation to God.

Speculative faith is, in some sense, remote or indirect knowledge of God. It is either assent to the inferences of one's own reasoning from sensations of the natural world or the blind acceptance of the tradition of some community, Christian or otherwise, which very well may be based on other men's reasoning or blind acceptance. Such knowledge can offer, at best, not certainty but bare probability. Reason is radically limited in regard to matters of the spirit and the evidence of tradition is dim due to distance. Naked intellectual probablility has little propelling force. On the other hand, experimental faith is immediate knowledge, direct encounter

Bible, experimental faith would be impossible.

C. The Four Types of Faith

As has been suggested above, the elements in these two general classifications of faith are compounded to form four specific types of faith which Wesley never tires of describing. All men are committed to one or the other and they include all stages in the development of the spiritual life. These four types may be designated: (1) general speculative, faith of a heathen; (2) particular speculative, the faith of a devil; (3) general experimental, the faith of a servant; (4) particular experimental, the faith of a son.

What Wesley called the faith of a heathen was mere rational belief in the general truths about spiritual things which can be known outside the Christian revelation. "To believe in the being and attributes of God is the faith of an heathen."[395a] Although the faith of a heathen must not be confused with experimental faith of any kind, for it could not make holy or save, it had its place and was a part of the presuppositions of the higher faith. Wesley shared in the appreciation of the power of reason so significant in his century. He never doubted that one could know by discursive reasoning that God is, and something of the nature of God. He agreed with the Deists; by reason we could know that there is a God, that He is due the worship of man, that His moral laws are unveiled in nature for the rational creature to read, and that these laws must be obeyed under the sanction of reward and punishment. Speaking of saving faith over

against this kind of belief Wesley says,

> This is not barely the faith of a heathen: namely, a belief that "there is a God" and that He is gracious and just, and consequently, "a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him"[396]

The assent of the mind to or the "embracing of such and such truths" about things of the spirit, as can be inferred from the natural world, is the faith of "a Mohammedan or a heathen; yea, of a deist or materialist."[397]

The second type of propositional faith is the particular type, which Wesley labels the faith of a devil. It is the position of a Christian Rationalist or a Christian deist; it is the faith of most Catholics and Protestants today, that of the Anglicans and orthodox in England. It is the same as the faith of a heathen except it includes the doctrines and creeds of Christianity. It is assent to what the heathen affirms plus the truths contained in the Bible, especially the New Testament, and/or, more specifically, an assent that Jesus is the Christ. This is still mere rational faith, "the faith of a devil, the faith of a Judas, that speculative notional, airy shadow, which lives in the head and not in the heart."[398]

Wesley not only agreed with the Deists, as long as their view was not seen as synonymous with faith as a living principle of the heart, he also believed with most people of his day that the Bible was the revelation of God. He was not a literalist nor did he take the Book, in some respects, as an infallible record. But he, with the people about him, found it impossible to doubt that the Bible was the Word of God. Indeed, on occasions, he pointed out that one had a just, rational basis for accepting it as the Word of God. Again, however, this is not to be confused

with proper Christian faith. In speaking of Christian faith, and having already distinguished it from the faith of a heathen, he says:

> Neither is it barely the faith of a devil; though this goes much farther than the former: for the devil believes, and cannot but believe, all that is written both in the Old and New Testament, to be true."[399a]

Many Christian people surrounding Wesley, especially the Calvinists, were equating faith with acceptance of the Bible as true. In 1768, Wesley wrote to the Countess of Huntington

> Yet I have been lately surprised to observe how many who affirm salvation by faith have lately run into this; they have run full into Mr. Sandeman's notion that faith is merely an assent to the Bible, and not only undervaluing but often ridiculing the whole experience of the children of God.[400a]

Wesley understood that such an assent to those truths which are given in the Christian revelation is necessary and a part of Christian faith, but they are not the essence thereof. In 1746, Wesley wrote to Thomas Church:

> Concerning the state of religion. . . the true, Christian, saving faith — we believe it implies abundantly more than assent to the truths of the Bible. "Even the devils believe that Christ was born of a Virgin, that He wrought all kind of miracles, that for our sakes He suffered a most painful death to redeem us from death everlasting." These articles of our faith the very devils believe, and so they believe all that is written in the Old and New Testament. And yet, for all this faith, they be but devils. They remain still in their damnable state, lacking the very true Christian faith. The right and true Christian faith is, not only to believe that the Holy Scriptures and the articles of our faith are true, but also to have a sure trust and confidence to be saved from everlasting damnation through Christ.[401a]

Both the faith of a heathen and the faith of a devil are the low types of speculative faith which does not produce virtue. Wesley's concern with the problem of how man becomes holy, centered

his interest in experimental faith, which is the source of both the controlling fear of God when God is "experienced" as judge, and the love of God when God is seen as merciful father. Such responses were called the faith of a servant and the faith of a Son, which are the general and particular aspects of experimental faith. The discussion of these two kinds of faith will be postponed until the general idea of saving faith has been examined in more detail.

II. The Nature of Saving Faith

Saving Faith is that personal knowledge of God which issues in a revolution in the life of love. In describing saving faith, Wesley consistently used the Hebrews 11 text; "Now faith is the substance (Wesley frequently translates it "subsistence") of things hoped for, the evidence (Wesley often adds "and/or conviction") of things not seen." Much of his life was spent directly or indirectly expounding this text. Yet this is only the "first branch" of faith; from the experience of evidence and conviction necessarily flows the second branch of faith, "filial trust", a "sure trust and confidence" in God.

> Taking the word in a more particular sense, faith is a divine "evidence" and "conviction" not only that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself," but also that Christ loved me, and gave Himself for me. . . . This faith necessarily implies an assurance (which is here only another word for evidence, it being hard to tell the difference between them) that Christ loved me, and gave Himself for me: For "he that believeth" with the true living faith "hath the witness in himself": "the spirit witnesses with his spirit that he is a child of God." "Because he is a son, God has sent forth the spirit of His Son into his heart, crying, Abba, Father"; giving him an assurance that he is so, and a childlike confidence in Him. But let it be observed, that, in the very nature of the thing, the assurance goes before the confidence. For a man cannot have childlike confidence in God 'till he knows he is a child of God. Therefore, confidence, trust, reliance, adherence, or whatever else it be called, is not the first, as some have supposed, but the second, branch or act of faith.[402a]

Saving faith, then is a supernatural evidence and conviction of the love of God plus what is inseparable from it and is made possible by it; namely, reliance on the love of God and God of love.

In saving faith, there are several ingredients intimately associated and in a particular and psychologically necessary order. The experience nevertheless is a unity; a person cannot experience

one aspect of it without the rest. Wesley says, in speaking of this faith, that one

> might first apprehend, then assent, then confide, then love, and yet receive faith in a moment; in the moment wherein their general confidence is so that they can say "My Lord and my God."[403a]

In the following pages we will deal with experimental faith: first as divine evidence and conviction and, second, as trust and confidence. The problem of faith as the witness of the spirit and assurance will be treated separately at the end of this section.

A. Faith as Divine Evidence and Conviction

We have had occasion to ~~one~~, in Chapter One, that Wesley was influenced both by the sensational psychology of this times and the illuninationism of the seventeenth century Platonists. The mind is an empty cabinet at birth; there are no innate ideas of God [404a] or anything else. All ideas originate in experience. The understanding "can give us no information of anything, but what is first presented to the senses".[405a] "But there is a great difference between our senses considered as the avenues of our knowledge."[406a] The external senses can only mediate objects of the temporal order. They are not capable of furnishing the mind with ideas of things of the spiritual world. For such sensations we must look elsewhere, and this, Wesley says, is the role of faith.

> Faith is that divine evidence whereby spiritual man discerneth God, and the things of God. It is with regard to the spiritual world what sense is with regard to the natural. It is the spiritual sensation of every soul which is born of God.[407a]

Men have a direct, immediate consciousness of a distinct spiritual nature by which simple ideas are apprehended by the mind so clearly and distinctly that consent is elicited. This consciousness, since it is simple and not mediate, the fruit of discursive reasoning, is thought of as sensation.

Wesley also accepted the current faculty psychology: for every operation there must be a corresponding power or faculty.

> Faith implies both the perceptive faculty itself and the act of perceiving God and the things of God. And the expression "seeing God" may include both, the act and the faculty of seeing Him.[408a]

Whether or not one speaks of special "inlets of knowledge"[409a] or "spiritual senses"[410a] through which impressions of the "other world" are made upon the soul and apprehended by the mind to indicate the unique Christian experience of "God and the things of God", it is a phenomenon that is just there and there with far-reaching consequences. Wesley finally said he cared little what terms were employed to point to it. He used many phrases himself: internal sensation or feeling; inward consciousness; immediate impressions or impulses in the soul; experimental assurance; illumination of the mind and heart; interior revelation.

Man has powers which make this experience possible. Sometimes Wesley talks as if some "actual" men do not possess such powers or senses.[411a] Most of the time, however, he is certain that all men, as we know them, have this "capacity for

God" but that they are not functioning; they are unopened, asleep or dead. The average man

> "has scarce any [knowledge of the invisible world]...he has scarce any intercourse with it. Not that it is afar off; no: he is in the midst of it; it encompasses him round about. The other world, as we usually term it, is not far from every one of us: it is above, and beneath, and on every side. Only the natural man discerneth it not. . ."[412a]

God is constantly present acting upon man, calling unto him but these "make no impression on his soul. . . he heareth not. . . He seeth not the things of the spirit of God. . . utter darkness covering his whole soul, surrounding him on every side."[413a] There is nothing man can do to open the spiritual senses or to penetrate the "thick veil" which obscures this other world. Wesley says that as the external senses of new-born babes are opened, made active by the external object, so only God can by His action bring to life the spiritual senses. Whatever else these views may indicate, it is certain that they testify that Wesley meant that faith is a given and God was the causal agent in it all.

Now what is the object of this faith? What does it evidence? In sermon on faith, written in 1791, Wesley makes a distinction between faith as a "divine conviction of God and the things of God" and as a "divine conviction of the invisible and eternal world".[414a] The invisible world refers to spiritual entities: our own souls; the souls of other men; disembodied spirits, both good and bad, angels and demons; and God who is a spirit. Faith is the evidence or consciousness of the existence and reality of these beings. The eternal world has to do with

the realm and incidents lying beyond death, as heaven and hell and the last judgment. Wesley, in the same sermon, says that evidence of these, the invisible and eternal worlds, is "nearly related to, yet not altogether the same" as the evidence of God and the things of God.[415a] In another sermon this evidence of God he calls the spiritual world or the inner Kingdom. By this he means knowledge of the nature and action of God relative to man, and a knowledge of the nature and actions of man relative to God. It is in particular a knowledge of "ourselves as we are known of Him".[416a] It has to do with the image of God in our minds whether it be that of an "angry judge" or a "loving father"[416b] and of our relatedness to God as we so conceive Him. It is this latter class of the objects of faith-"the spiritual world" or "God and the things of God", the relation of man and God, or more especially, God's relation to me and mine to Him - about which Wesley is overwhelmingly concerned and it will be the major concern of this essay.[417a]

Does Wesley mean to imply by this understanding of faith that one gets ideas of God and the things of God by some kind of supernatural infusion? Is this some form of mystical intuition? I think not. Wesley was no mystic. Such tendencies were in him, but he repudiated the mystical view. It did not fit into his thought.[418a] Supernaturally infused ideas belonged to the realm of enthusiasm and, although he was constantly accused of this, he as persistently denied it. The chief fault he found with the mystics was their unmediated union with God; their neglect of any means of transmission of the ideas of sensation and reason, particularly of the historical revelation in Christ; and their neglect of the historical Christian community.

God has spoken in nature and in history and man receives no other ideas about God and man and the relations between them than he does through these mediums. We possess these ideas either by reasoning about the simple ideas of natural world (the effects of God) apprehended through external sensation or by the process of education which is again through the medium of the outer senses.[419a] The content of this education is the tradition passed on by "natural" communities which comes from the revelation in nature; or it is the record of the revelation of God in hisotyr, history particularly his action in Christ as it is recorded in the Scriptures and passed from one generation to another by the Christian community along with records of their own experience with that revelation and the God behind it. Religion, especially the Christian religion, could not be a mere individual or isolated matter. It was social in its very nature.

Without the Christian community, without knowledge of the Scriptures, without God's action in Christ, there is no Christian experience, no proper knowledge of God.

That aspect of experimental faith, with which we are now concerned, is not a means whereby we apprehend new ideas which never existed before or, for that matter, old ideas, new to us, "magically" impressed upon our mind. It is rather the "illumination" of the ideas that we already possess, through inference or education, in such a fashion that they become living realities for us; realities in which we are personally involved, with which our destiny is inexorably bound, arousing feelings, directing intentions, building virtues and controlling actions.[420] This is what Wesley means when he speaks of God's revelation in Christ and His revelation in the heart of man, and the latter could not happen had the former never been. The truths revealed in the oracles of God are revealed in our hearts; the law is impressed on our hearts. Christian faith is the evidence (the personal illumination) of the "invisible world: of all those invisible things which are revealed in the oracles of God. But, indeed, they reveal nothing, they are a mere dead letter, if they are not <u>mixed</u> with <u>faith</u> in those who hear them".[421] Again, in writing to William Law

> Faith is . . . an ἔλεγχος, and "evidence" or "conviction" . . . "of things not seen", a supernatural, a divine evidence and conviction of the things which God hath revealed in His Word; of this in <u>particular</u>, that the Son of God hath loved me and given Himself for me.[422]

It is a conviction of the truths which God has revealed; or, more particularly, a divine conviction that "God was in Christ, reconciling

the world unto Himself."[423] As we have suggested, we shall see more fully as this chapter continues that this experimental evidence of the spiritual world applies both to the heathen and the Christian; the difference is in the ideas of God.

This illumination is not the enlightening of some innate idea within, not an idea which is simply the fruit of ratiocination, but it is the illumination of God's external historical revelation mediated to us through the Christian community.[424] We could not experience God's love for us if God had not revealed His love in the person and work of Christ. There is no doubt but that Wesley was influenced by the Cambridge Platonists at this point and particularly by John Smith, (although he read many of them) who talked widely of illumination and of spiritual sense. Wesley viewed the matter in a similar fashion, with some very important exceptions. For example, for these Platonists or Neo-Platonists, reason was illuminated and this enlightened reason judged the Scriptures. In these thoughts they were in harmony with the rationalistic temper of the times. For Wesley, the truths of the Scriptures, embodying the unique revelation of God in Christ, are what are illuminated and the judge of all illuminations. Here the orthodox background of Wesley prevailed over the influence of Christian rationalism upon him. All of this makes clear what we have earlier insisted upon: that faith as assent to truths has a place in Wesley's view of the proper knowledge of God. What Wesley objected to was anyone making this the whole of Christian faith. Faith is assent in this sense, but not only this. It is also such an experimental, personal, practical, affective involvement as to revolutionize one's total existence.

What we have been attempting to describe is the ingredient of evidence in the idea of faith. We have seen that Wesley spoke of it as sensation and as illumination, of the invisible and eternal and, in particular, the spiritual kingdom. We have seen that all such "evidence" is dependent upon the revelation of God in nature and in Christ; private, novel impressions or impulses or imaginings have no status except they be judged by right reason and the Scriptures. This "evidence" is an experience, a consciousness, an awareness, an impression, in which what is known of God becomes a living reality for the person. It is an experience in which one understands himself to be personally confronted by the final "upagainstness" (which he can only speak about in categories presented to the mind by the senses, nature and the Scriptures); that is, by God -- God as judge seen in the revelation in nature, God as Father seen in the revelation in Christ. Such an evidence makes possible the assent of the mind, (called conviction) and calls forth a childlike confidence in God and a sense of dependence upon him. All of these taken together contributes a proper saving faith which issues in a radical revolution of man's nature, and which is also reflected in his character and actions. Only so long as such a knowledge of God remains does the revolution exist and grow. If the knowledge continues to the end, the revolution shall some day be complete. This is our hope. Faith is the response of the whole man -- mind and will, feelings and desires to the action of God in Christ.

We have been discussing in the above paragraphs the manner in which the part evidence plays in the idea of faith is deeply personal

and effective. Now we shall turn our attention to evidence as it is seen to be given. Evidence suggests that something happens to us in which we are passive. Wesley calls this a "supernatural and divine evidence". Perhaps Wesley uses "divine" to point to the content of the evidence and "supernatural" to indicate the causal agent. Certainly Wesley never doubted that God was the cause of the experience. His critics picked this up and asked, How do you know? His language made it seem as if immediate knowledge of the agent was included some way in the experience itself and maybe at times he thought this. But his final answer to this question, repeated over and again, was that the only things we can know immediately are the effects of the spirit, not the spirit itself. That God or this spirit is the cause, we learn from the Bible and only from the Bible. All we can know are the fruits of the spirit and never the spirit Himself.

This is sensation in the Lockean sense: we are first of all passive in the matter; later there is an active element. When he calls it supernatural, he means it is not natural. It is not a matter of our own efforts or of our own powers of reasoning. There is an inescapable givenness here. The only thing I know, he wrote to Samuel, is that whereas I was blind now I see. What was "dark", now is "light". Where there was a veil, now no veil intervenes. The given apprehension is present to the mind with such clarity and distinctiveness that assent is compelled. This brings us to the next step in our understanding of faith, which is conviction. Conviction has to do with the assent of the person to the evidence. In Wesley's view of knowledge there was not only a passive element, the given in sensation, but an active element, the assent in apprehension. On the

passive side, like Locke, he felt that sensation originated by the action of an external object. But, like the Stoics, he held that the mind assented to this idea presented to it by the senses. An element of judgment is in apprehension. First is the "sensation", the given, the evidence, and secondly the assent of the man or the conviction or acceptance. One meshes his gears with the evidence. The sensation is clear and distinct and, because of this, the assent is called forth. The assent or consent of the mind is conviction but this conviction points to feeling as well as intellectual assent. Actually, this consent cannot be separated from either what comes before it, evidence, or what comes after it, confidence; the three are one. Indeed, Wesley speaks of conviction as including evidence and sometimes as including confidence. Sometimes he translates the Greek word (ἔλεγχος) in the Hebrews 11 text simply as conviction; at other times, as evidence or conviction; and still other times, as evidence and conviction, saying the term implies both. And this is the way he usually uses it.

> But what is faith? It is a divine "evidence and conviction of things not seen;" of things which are not seen now, whether they are visible or invisible in their own nature. Particularly, it is a divine evidence and conviction of God, and of things of God.[425]

This evidence brings with it certitude in the highest degree, which is conviction. Certitude has to do with the clearness and distinctness of the evidence and of the attitude called forth. Wesley calls this faith a divine conviction. Evidence has to do with apprehension, and conviction has to do with assent to this apprehension, which assent involves more than just the mind. This faith is an inner light, an illumination, an intuition. It is an immediate impression on the soul

of man by God. Wesley likes to speak of it in terms of inner senses which hitherto have been asleep but which are now awakened by an action of God to apprehend God. Man assents to this evidence. But the source of this evidence is God. Evidence for Wesley is a givenness. When it is a clear and distinct sensation, whether it be of objects of the world mediated by external sens, or things of the spiritual world mediated by the religious sense, it compels assent. This is the meaning of evidence and conviction in Wesley and when they pertain to matter of the spiritual realm they constitute one aspect of faith which Wesley called the first branch.

B. Faith as Trust and Confidence.

Wesley consistently holds that a saving knowledge of God includes, as one essential part, "a true trust and confidence of the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ".[426] This is not only "an act of the understanding; but a disposition" of the total man. Christian faith is "convincing evidence" as we have seen; it is also "filial confidence". It is not one nor the other, but both. Neither can one be present without the other; it is psychologically impossible although one may logically separate them in analysis. Evidence and trust are two sides of the same coin: the given and the reaction to the given; the action upon us and the response called forthyby the action. Faith is, first, the evidence and conviction that the God in Christ is love and loves me and, secondly, a sure reliance upon, a trust in, an adherence to that love of God and God of love.

> And it is to be observed that in the very nature of the thing, assurance goes before confidence. For a man cannot have childlike confidence in God until he "knows" he is a child of God. Therefore, confidence, trust, reliance, adherence, or whatever else it be called, is not the first, as some have supposed, but the second branch or act of faith.[427]

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Faith is the compelling idea of God as love and as loving me, which is the action of God that enables, yes, compels one, to shift from confidence in the self or the world to a childlike reliance upon God. This and nothing else is the author of faith. This sight overcomes the essential man.

> Heavenly, healing light now breaks in upon his soul. He "looks on Him whom He had pierced, and God, who out of darkness commanded light to shine, shineth in his heart". He sees the light in the face of Jesus Christ. He hath a divine "evidence of things not seen" by sense, even of "the deep things of God"; more particularly of the love of God, of His pardoning love to him that believes in Jesus. Overpowered with the sight, his soul cries out, "My Lord, and My God!"[428]

Perhaps it would help to give once again the whole picture of Wesley's view of faith. In Sermon 13, Wesley says faith

> is not only an unshaken assent to all that God hath revealed in Scripture -- and in particular to those important truths, "Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners", "He bore our sins in His own body on the tree", "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world".[429]

Here Wesley is including assent to the Bible and in particular the heart of the Bible, God's action in Christ, as a part of the Christian faith. These truths are illuminated in such a fashion as to call forth our assent. But this isn't the core of the matter. He goes on.

> . . . but likewise the revelation of Christ in our hearts; a divine evidence or conviction of His love, His unmerited love to me a sinner.

This is the first part of Christian faith proper. Note it is the awareness of God's love and personally applied to me, a sinner. This we know in the experience of faith as a Servant, in which I am until the Christian experience takes place and which necessarily must precede this Christian experience. Now comes the second part of

Christian faith which cannot be divorced from the first and which follows necessarily from the evidence and conviction that God loves me personally:

> a sure confidence in His pardoning mercy, wrought in us by the Holy Ghost; a confidence, whereby every true believer is enabled to bear witness, "I know that my Redeemer liveth", and that I have "an advocate with the Father, and that Jesus Christ the righteous is my Lord," and "I know that He hath loved me" and "given Himself for me". He has reconciled me, even me, to God and I "have redemption through His blood, even the forgiveness of sins".

We have seen how a convincing evidence of God's love in Christ, particularly applied to me, calls forth in me a confidence in, a reliance on, an adherence to, a sense of dependence upon this God. But what exactly does such a trust in God mean? It can only be understood in the context of the preceding experience. Trust only comes to one who has hitherto been a "servant of God". Trust comes to one who has known God as his own Creator, Lawgiver and Judge and as One who makes demands and before Whom he is responsible; who understands his present and future destiny in being oriented toward God (he is said to fear God in the sense that the "fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"); who sees the meaning of his existence in obeying His will and in being well-pleasing in His sight. Further, he is one who has seen this destiny frustrated. God's demands hopelessly outrun his obedience. Aware of his sinfulness, his guilt and his absolute helplessness, the light of meaning has gone out; fear, horror, and despair consume his heart.

> For all this is no more than a dead faith. The true, living Christian faith, which whosoever hath is born of God, is not only assent, an act of the understanding; but a disposition, which God hath wrought

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> in his heart; "a sure trust and confidence in God, that, through the merits of Christ, his sins are forgiven, and he reconciled to the favour of God." This implies, that a man first renounce himself; that, in order to be "found in Christ", to be accepted through Him, he totally rejects all "confidence in the flesh"; that, "having nothing to pay", having no trust in his own works or righteousness of any kind he comes to God as a lost, miserable, self-destroyed, self-condemned, undone, helpless sinner; as one whose mouth is utterly stopped, and who is altogether "guilty before God". Such a sense of sin (commonly called "despair" by those who speak evil of the things they know not), together with a full conviction, such as no words can express, that of Christ only cometh our salvation, and an earnest desire of that salvation, must precede a living faith, a trust in Him, who "for us paid our ransom by His death, and [for us] fulfilled the law in His life." This faith then, whereby we are born of God, is "not only a belief of all the articles of our faith but also a true confidence of the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ."[430]

This is the context in which the experience of Christian faith is given; the firmly convincing evidence that God loves me now, just as I am; that I am forgiven, accepted of God; that I am His child reconciled to God. It is this love that calls forth my trust. I trust this love, this God who loves me. I entrust to Him my destiny, present and future. I trust Him for salvation and accept my forgiveness, accept my sonship in such a way that I go about endeavoring to be His son. As a matter of fact, in Wesley it is difficult to distinguish between trust and the first fruit of trust which is the love of God. It is when we are conscious of God's love for us and only when we are so conscious, that we are enabled to love God. This includes, as we have previously seen in Chapter 2, a sense of dependence upon God, a warm affection for or a desire of and delight in God, a sense of gratitude for His benefits and an earnest inclination to please and obey Him as a son. When Wesley says love and not faith is

the heart of religion or that love is never done away with, that it is the end of religion while faith is the means and will be done away with, he is not talking about the whole of Christian faith but only the first branch as evidence; trust which moves into the idea of love will remain always. Our destiny will be realized. We will ever be dependent upon Him. This never changes.

Wesley calls this second branch of faith, filial confidence. He expresses this confidence by speaking about how the consciousness of God's love calls forth from the depth of our souls such cries as "Abba, Father" and "My Lord and My God" and enables us to testify: "The life that I now live I live by faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me." He uses for the most part, though he also employs others, these three biblical expressions, and he repeats them over and over.

The "Abba, Father" cry is pulled from us when we see God as love and loving me as a son or child. The abstract idea of the fatherhood of God has become personal; God has become my father and I have become His son. This is confidence, this is trust which is the second "branch" of saving faith. And it is this confidence, born of an immediate awareness of God's love, which initiates the radical re-direction of the basic thrust of the human soul from love of the world to love of God.

C. Faith as Witness and Assurance

Wesley's famous doctrine of assurance is intimately connected with faith. Indeed assurance is faith or a degree of faith. The particular form of this idea was called forth by the spirit of the times. He was concerned with the problem of certainty in reference to things of the spirit — to God and the things of God and, in particular, to God's love for us. He was pwrsuaded that where clear certainty existed something happened, a revolution in heart and practice. In his day, the Deists spoke of right reason as the ground of our assurance, but Butler pointed out that this gave only high probability and was not sufficient for producing true virtue as Wesley thought the times demonstrated. The Traditionalists held to the Scriptures as the only sufficient witness, or added thereto the doctrines and creed of the church, but Wesley saw that assent to these testimonies did not bring the kind of certainty that reformed character and actions. In fact, Wesley told Dr. Middleton that if churchmen in England continued relying on "traditional evidence" alone, they would finally "one after the other give up the external, and (in heart at least) go over to those whom they are now contending with;"[431] that is, the Deists. The kind of certainty which did initiate such a change was to be found in immediate and direct experience — the internal evidence or witness.[432] However, this could never be separated from right reason or the testimony of the Bible and, in a secondary way, the church. But, as we have seen, Wesley had given up his early rationalism and orthodoxy. Assurance of God's love for us enabled us to love God, and this was the source of all

inner and outer holiness. Wesley refers to this in the New Testament as "experimental assurance".[433]

This doctrine of the "witness of the spirit" or assurance in Wesley, which is the keystone in his whole understanding of the Christian faith, caused much controversy in his time and, indeed, ever since. First of all, Wesley was not clear in the matter himself and, if he ever got it straightened out in his own mind, it was not until some twenty years after he first proclaimed it. Again, the age was particularly afraid of and opposed to anything which savored of enthusiasm and much in the Revival that did just that was connected with this doctrine. But when Wesley was able to state it in a more mature fashion, one could see that he was perhaps right when he said it was nothing more than the position stated in the Scriptures and held by the Early Church, the Reformers and the Church of England.

In the doctrine of assurance, there are two witnesses: "a direct as well as a remote witnes..... first, by an inward consciousness; and then, by love, joy, and peace."[434] To these, Wesley also adds external practice. The primary or direct testimony is the witness of God's spirit to man's soul, an immediate awareness of God's love for man such as calls forth his reliance upon it. This is of the very essence of proper faith as we shall presently see. The secondary or indirect witness proceeds from the first and is wholly dependent upon it. It is the testimony of our own spirit. Through the reflective sense or power of perceiving the inner workings of the soul, man is aware of the fruits of the spirit -- feelings of love, joy, and

peace. The mind relates these emotional awarenesses with its apprehension of the truths of the Bible and draws the inference of God's love for us. Another branch of the secondary witness has to do with actions rather than feelings and the same reasoning process is involved. To be sure, these two are not separated, but serve as checks on one another.

Wesley often confused these two witnesses, mixing them together and giving priority to the secondary one. Furthermore, his idea of the direct testimony underwent a rather radical alteration. He was not straightened out on these matters until the late 50's. We'll look at these two witnesses more carefully and then draw some conclusions relative to their place in his understanding of Christianity.

1. The Direct Witness

From what we have seen of Wesley's conception of saving faith, we need only an illustration or two taken from a sermon written in 1767, to see that his view of the direct testimony of the spirit amounted to virtually the same thing.

> . . .by the testimony of the Spirit, I mean, an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God immediately and directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus hath loved me, and given Himself for me; that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God.[435]

In the same sermon, commenting on the "Abba, Father" texts in Romans and Galatians, Wesley points out that, as soon as we are aware of God's love for us (evidence and conviction), we utter the cry "Abba, Father" (confidence).

> Is not this something immediate and direct, not the result of reflection or argumentation? Does not this Spirit cry, "Abba, Father", in our hearts, the moment it is given,

> antecedently to any reflection upon our sincerity; yea, to any reasoning whatsoever?[436]

This, he says, describes "a direct testimony of the Spirit".

Wesley is saying, that, under certain circumstances, we become immediately consicious of the love of God toward ourselves; that we are personally forgiven of our sins and personally reconciled to God in such a fashion that we are enabled to trust and rely upon God, to cry "Abba, Father". From this response flows our love of God which transforms our character and actions. This I suggest is the very essence of proper Christian faith and indeed Wesley came to refer to it as such. When this was questioned by a correspondent in 1756, Wesley replied: "The assurance in question . . . cannot be a distinct thing from faith but only . . . a high degree of faith." This is Wesley's mature and final view of the matter.

He did not, however, always see it this way. In 1738, he wrote to Arthur Bedford,

> . . . the assurance of faith . . . I believe is not of the essence of faith, but a distinct gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby God shines upon his own work and shows us that we are justified through faith in Christ.[437]

This indicates that an important shift in Wesley's thinking took place through the years. It appears that both his understanding of justification and assurance changed and that these changes were intimately connected.

From the very beginning of his evangelical ministry, in 1738, Wesley saw that the assurance of God's love, that is the immediate awareness of his mercy particularly applied to me, brought with it a shift of orientation and a life of virtue. Without this there was no genuine love or obedience to God. This was his chief and greatest

insight and he never lost or altered it. If the label "Christian" is used to point to one who loves and obeys God, then a man could not be a Christian who did not have the experience of assurance for this was proper Christian saving faith, although there are various degrees of it.

Wesley learned of this experimental faith or assurance from the Moravians, but it was tied to a view of justification with which it was not compatible. This resulted in confused thinking for some ten to twenty years. This idea of justification by faith was legalistic in nature although it intended quite the opposite. It savored of a market place transaction and a very artifical type of that. The Anselmic view of the atonement was the basis of it. Man because of his sin was not only alienated from God but God was also, by that sin, estranged from man. God had made legal pardon a possibility through the death of His son. Yet this reconciliation becomes an actuality only when man believes in this atonement God has provided. This belief was intellectual in nature, an assent of the mind to the doctrine of atonement. On the basis of such faith offered to God, God then accepted a man. He becomes reconciled to man and gives man pardon. Here is a bargaining activity: you offer this and I'll give that; you believe me and I'll justify you. To be sure, the use of faith here was an attempt to get around justification by works and to be loyal to the idea of faith alone, but it was a misinterpretation of Luther and faith simply now became a "work". Right belief, rather than good works, became the price exacted. To make sure this was all a matter of grace, a wooden doctrine of election was employed which made the

trading activity a farce. God was seen as electing some to believe. Into these he supernaturally infused the power to behave, so that he could, in turn, be reconciled to them and hence pardon their sins. In this way, justification was entirely of God. Although Wesley rejected part of this from the start, especially the doctrine of election, it was generally his view early in the revival period.

It was in some such framework that Wesley at first attempted to set the experience of assurance. He seems to have had two ways of stating the doctrine of assurance at that time. In the first instance, he held that the justifying transaction did not actually take place until one had the experimental knowledge or assurance of it. This means that one is not in God's favor until he has a "sense" of forgiveness; or, God's acceptance of a man was brought about by that man's sense of acceptance. One could not be saved from the wrath of God without a sense of being saved or, in other words, the direct witness. The objective was made dependent upon the subjective. Wesley for years argued fervently for this view. He called this justifying faith, meaning that the witness brought our justification or favor with God. Closely associated with this was what Wesley called regenerating faith. But justifying and regenerating faith, except for purposes of analysis, were the same thing; if not, regenerating faith becomes a simultaneous consciousness of immediate awareness of forgiveness, a consciousness which is the product of immediate awareness of forgiveness. As Wesley came to see, this whole view of assurance and justification was artificial and absurd. Much of the opposition to the doctrine of immediate witness was aimed in this direction and was merited.

The second way of understanding this doctrine is similar, yet with differences, to the foregoing conception. This view is suggested in the above quotation where Wesley calls the sense of pardon "a distinct gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby God shines upon His own work and shows us that we are justified through faith in Christ."[438] There are several steps set forth here relative to justification and regeneration. (1) An estranged God provides the means of His acceptance of and reconciliation to man in the death of Christ. (2) The condition for this becoming an actuality is, as the Scriptures say, man's belief that God has acted in Christ. This belief is not practical saving faith but a rational assent to a doctrine above the power of reason on the basis of the testimony of the Word of God. (3) God then directly discloses to the man who so assents that he is accepted of Him and is in a state of justification. This disclosure is the sense of pardon or the witness of the spirit. (4) Finally, the assurance of his acceptance before God releases man's trust and confidence, which transforms his total life. Here the sense of pardon is the regenerating faith. Man is justified by belief in the atonement; God, then supernaturally lets man in on the secret which is the witness that transforms his basic love. To see assurance in this second fashion, as an addition to justification, is still not Wesley's mature view. Here the witness is primarily to man's state and not to God's love.

These two views were apparently held simultaneously. Both were vague and mixed together. It was not until the mid-forties that Wesley begins to disentangle them. In 1747, he wrote an important letter to Charles in which he indicated that the time had come for a clear and

concise statement upon this issue. At this time, he clarifies some of the ambiguity in and between these two views, admitting that the ideas of justifying faith and the sense of pardon came to him in his early days and that there has been confusion.

In this letter to his brother, John admits that he had believed justifying faith to be "that faith which whosoever hath not is under the wrath and curse of God"[439] and that this faith was synonymous with a "sense of pardon". One was not accepted of God without this sense of forgiveness. But now in 1747, Wesley has changed his mind. These two, our acceptance and the witness, are clearly separated. Justifying faith, whatever its nature, is different from and prior to the sense of pardon. "I cannot allow", he goes on to say, "that justifying faith is such an assurance or necessarily connected with it." He bases this shift, as usual, upon the Scriptures, experience, and reason. Concerning the latter, he says "the assertion that justifying faith is a sense of pardon is contrary to reason; it is flatly absurd. For how can a sense of our having received pardon be the condition of our receiving it?"[440] A sense of pardon has nothing to do with altering God's attitudes but is "a distinct, explicit assurance that my sins are forgiven." Wesley says it is a reality that "is the common privilege of real Christians,"[441] not necessary for present justification, and "is the proper Christian faith, which purifies the heart and overcomes the world."[442] Notice that Wesley here makes the immediate witness the same as proper saving faith. There is, however, confusion remaining for he also refers to it as the privilege of some, as if all Christians did not have at least some

awareness of God's love for them.

In summary: the doctrine of assurance, as expressed in this letter, meant that, after God had been reconciled to man and forgiven him because of man's faith, there was the awareness that this transaction had taken place and man was now in a state of favor with God. It was the immediate consciousness that, through justifying faith, God was reconciled to men. A man is objectively forgiven by God because of his faith in the merits of Christ, and then man is given the divine witness that he is justified. One thing Wesley was clear on from the beginning was that the Christian revolution and the holiness of heart and life which follows, does not stem from any objective transaction but from an assurance of being loved by God.

Wesley's thought continued to change or develop in reference to faith. As time went on he talked less of justifying faith or used less frequently the distinction between justifying and regenerating faith. Oftimes the first was made synonymous with or used instead of the latter. "Justifying faith is a divine evidence that Christ loved me and gave Himself for me."[443] In 1749, Wesley wrote that "Every truly believer hath the witness or evidence in himself."[444] The true Christian has the evidence of God's love for him personally which changes his life. And this evidence means assurance. This appears as if Wesley is reverting to his earliest opinions upon this matter. Such is not the case, however. What happened is that his views on justification as well as other theological conceptions, underwent at least some modication which altered and brought to maturity his thoughts on assurance, and

saving faith. The market place image of justification tended to fall into the background. God to Wesley became less of a trader in souls and more of a great Physician. Even the servant of God was accepted by Him. God's action in Christ flowed out of His forgiving heart and Christ was the disclosure of that forgiveness. The stress was more and more placed upon man's need for reconciliation rather than upon God's. The focus was placed upon man's problem of whether or not God is a loving father and forgives us our trespasses. This enabled Wesley to more freely deal with his central concern: the healing which takes place in the human heart when man becomes immediately aware that God does love him. Now the objective side of the atonement was, so to speak, God's business. Wesley was now fundamentally interested in the subjective side; that is, man's consciousness of the objective reality and the fruits which flow from such consciousness, "holiness of heart and life." From the overwhelming sense that "I, even I, was forgiven, pardoned, reconciled," from an immediate and direct impression that the great God of Love, loves me, is called forth a personal, whole-hearted trust, reliance, adherence to God which enables me -- even compels me to cry "Abba, Father". From such an impression nothing less than true genuine Christian virtue and happiness flows. As we have seen this is proper Christian saving faith. Experimental faith and "experimental assurance" as a direct witness come to the same thing. Instead of being something unnecessarily added, or something which can be entirely dispensed with, the direct witness and testimony of the Spirit stands at the very heart of Wesley's thought. It is the point of real and necessary connection between the knowledge of

faith and the virtue of holiness with its accompanying lasting happiness.

At least, one or two other important ideas of Wesley's, relative to the problem of the direct witness, ought to be mentioned. First of all Wesley maintained that there were many degrees of faith or assurance in opposition to those who held to the belief that either you had faith or you did not. The faith which works by love Wesley felt must be a matter of almost infinite levels. Although all saving faith or Christian assurance was the same, he distinguished several different degrees of it. Against those who opposed such an idea he insisted

> (1) That faith is one thing, the full assurance of faith another. (2) That even the full assurance of faith does not imply the full assurance of perseverance; this bears another name, being styled by St. Paul "the full assurance of hope." (3) Some Christians have only the first of these; they have faith, but mixed with doubts and fears. Some have also the full assurance of faith, a full conviction of present pardon; and yet not the full assurance of hope, not a full conviction of their future perseverance. (4) The faith which we preach as necessary to all Christians is the first of these, and no other. Therefore (5) It is no evasion at all to say, "This (the faith which we preach as necessary to all Christians) is not properly an assurance of what is future."[445]

Wesley more and more made a distinction between faith and full faith, assurance and full assurance which corresponded to his meaning of the Christian life in terms of definite stages.

> . . .there may be faith without full assurance. And these lower degrees of faith do not exclude doubts, which frequently mingle therewith, more or less.[446]

> "The full plerophory (or full assurance of faith) is such a divine testimony that we are reconciled to God as excludes all doubt and fear concerning it. This refers only to what is present.[447]

Wesley came to see, from experience and observation that,

shortly after the regeneration in which one finds new health, a deeper awareness of sin or sickness occurs, challenging one's faith. In 1745, Thomas Church asked Wesley the difference between his terms "clear assurance" and "full assurance" Wesley replied

> Sir, I will tell you. The one is an assurance that my sins are forgiven, clear at first, but soon clouded with doubt or fear; the other is such a plerophory or full assurance that I am forgiven, and so clear a perception that Christ abideth in me, as utterly excludes all doubt and fear, and leaves them no place -- no, not for an hour. So that the difference between them is as great as the difference between the light of the morning and that of the midday sun.[448]

In the stage when we pass from babes in Christ to young men in Christ, faith is weak, mixed with doubt and fear, and assurance is dim. "By weak faith I understand", says Wesley,

> (1) that which is mixed with fear, particularly of not enduring to the end, (2) that which is mixed with doubt, whether we have not deceived ourselves, and whether our sins be indeed forgiven, (3) that which is not yet glorified the heart fully, not from all its idols. And thus weak I find the faith of almost all believers to be within a short time after they have first peace with God.[449]

Wesley doggedly held to his view of degrees of faith, against the assaults of all opponents. There was another battle in which he was engaged which throws light on his stand on assurance, and, and further demonstrates what he meant, by this experience, proper Christian faith. There were those who spoke of assurance as a certainty regarding their future and eternal standing before God. For Wesley the direct witness was present faith in God's love. In speaking about an opponent, Wesley says "We speak of an assurance of our present pardon; not as he does, of our final perseverance."[450] Wesley did hold to a view of assurance about the future but this was not the doctrine of the assurance of faith. He called this the "full assurance of hope" or the "plerophory of hope" which is "a divine testimony that we shall endure to the end; or more directly, that we shall enjoy God in glory."[451] In 1768, Wesley said, "I believe a few, but a very few, Christians have an assurance from God of everlasting salvation . . . or full assurance of hope."[452]

It has not been our intention to suggest that Wesley ever clearly thought through what he meant by the direct witness. His thought to the end abounded in contradictions on this idea. Our contention is that it was for him an immediate awareness that God loves us personally and that this is the faith of evidence and conviction which is the proper christian faith that issues in a moral and spiritual revolution.

2. The Indirect Witness

The indirect or remote witness is an important but secondary aspect of Wesley's view of Christian experience. This does not mean

that he always kept it a secondary matter. Indeed he apparently was never able to clearly state, and distinguish between, the two witnesses and oftimes the dependent one enjoyed most of his attention. The indirect testimony or witness of our own spirit is the assurance that we are accepted of God, possess divine grace, have Christ in our heart, love both man and God, keep the commandments, are generally virtuous in heart and life, or are in a state of salvation. It is based on an awareness of the fruits of the spirit in our lives plus a knowledge of the Scriptures' description of a holy life, and their disclosure that such a life is well-pleasing before God. The practical judgment, then, determines the agreement between our lives and the Biblical requirements, and reason concludes, therefore, that we are in a state of grace.

The emphasis here is on the fact of our own virtue, while the immediate witness of God's spirit, on the other hand, is, at its best, at least, the direct awareness of God's love for me. Wesley held these two testimonies closely together, referring to them as a "joint testimony".[453] Yet he is perfectly clear that the one is dependent upon the other. Without the direct testimony of God's love for me, there can be no indirect testimony, for only from the fruit of the former can there be a remote witness. "We assert", says he, "that the fruit of the spirit immediately springs from this testimony."[454] Indeed, if the fruit does not appear, there has been, Wesley believed, no genuine witness of God's spirit, or we are not living in faith. The relationship here is like that between faith and love. Where love is not present in a man's life, there is no faith in that man. So where there is no indirect witness there is no immediate awareness

of God's love. In this sense, the second witness plays a confirming role but one of no little significance.

The fruit of the spirit includes, as we have seen, both the internal tempers and the "outward and more distant effect", external practice. It has earlier been pointed out how Christian actions flow from the Christian tempers which result from the consciousness of God's love. So this witness based upon the effect of faith has two aspects: one having to do with feelings through which we are aware of internal tempers; and the other, with awareness of our own deeds or practices, which are dependent on the tempers as they are known by the feelings.

> We . . . allow that outward actions are one way of satisfying us that we have grace in our hearts. But we cannot possibly allow that "the only way to be satisfied of this is to appeal to outward actions and not our inward feeling. On the contrary, we believe that love, joy, peace are inwardly felt, or they have no being, and that men are satisfied they have grace, first by feeling these, and afterward by their outer actions. 455

Wesley found some folk stressing practice to the neglect of feeling, such as the orthodox Christians, and some folk who did just the opposite, such as the Quietists or Antinomians in general. These parties, he felt, perverted religion which for him properly includes both the inner and outer aspects of life. "What God hath joined together", he said in reference to this problem, "let not man put asunder." Works without feelings, as well as feelings without works, are equally suspect. This remote witness must and does include both. Nonetheless Wesley himself appears to have placed generally more stress on internal feelings.

I would rather say, faith is "productive of all Christian

holiness rather than of all Christian practice": because men are so exceeding apt to rest in practice so-called -- I mean in outside religion; wheras true religion is imminently seated in the heart."[456]

Fear of fanaticism or enthusiasm made Wesley's contemporaries unusually suspicious of his concern with inner feelings. Wesley's answer to such criticism was that all Christians agreed that such phenomena of love, peace and joy had an important place in the Christian life. But the only way we have to obtain ideas of such realities is through internal sensation. It is in the very nature of things that these should be perceived[458] by the mind through the internal sense of reflection or consciousness by which we are aware of all activities of our souls such as thinking, believing, feeling. "We must be inwardly sensible of divine peace, joy, love, otherwise we cannot know that they are."[459] These objects of this internal sense are as clearly apprehended by the mind as external objects presented by the outer senses.[460] One perceives these "as clearly as he does the light of the sun."[461] In brief, these "fruits, effects, are inseparable properties of faith"[462] and must be felt or they have no being.[463] He who feels them not has them not.[464] The conclusion of the whole matter is: " . . . all, therefore, who condemn inward feelings in the Holy Ghost, leave no room for love, joy, peace in a religion; consequently reduce it to a dry and dead carcass."[465] "The very thing Mr. Sinstra calls fanaticism is no other than heart religion."[466]

Furthermore Wesley insisted that it is only the effects of faith that we feel. We do not feel the final agent of them; that is, God or the Holy Spirit. Wesley often spoke as if we did, but when, this was pointed out to him, he was quick to change his expressions, and explain himself more clearly. "By feeling, I mean,

being inwardly conscious of not the operating of the Holy Ghost but the graces he operates in the Christian."[467] Love, joy and peace are realities and "whoever has these, inwardly feels them."[468] "But, continues Wesley, "observe, what he inwardly feels is the fruits themselves, "; that is, he does not feel the spirit of God; he connects the spirit with the giver of proper faith, whose activity we know about from the written revelation. "Whence they (the fruits) come he learns from the Bible. This is my doctrine concerning inward feelings, and has been for above these forty years."[469]

All of this further indicates that this is an indirect and mediate witness as distinguished from the immediacy of the first witness. One is not <u>directly</u> aware through this witness that he is a "child of God". He, rather, arrives at this assurance indirectly. It is a rational conclusion based on the evidence of the Scriptures and may be the first witness plus his internal sensations of the fruit of the spirit. The remote witness is:

> the result of reason, or reflection of what we feel in our own souls. Strictly speaking, it is the conclusion drawn partly from the Word of God, and partly from our own experience. The Word of God says, everyone who has the fruit of the Spirit is a child of God; experience, or inward consciousness, tells me, that I have the fruit of the Spirit; and hence I rationally conclude, "Therefore, I am a child of God."[470]

The same process takes place relative to the second part of the indirect witness, that is relative to external actions. It is perceived by the mind that the Bible specifically indicates the kind of actions to be performed by a Christian. The mind also perceives the actual actions of a man. Reason comparing these together makes a judgment as to their agreement or disagreement. The Bible also

declares that such practical fruit flows from a justified state. Therefore reason concludes that we are in the favor of God. The witness of works supplements the witness of feelings; they serve as a further check. For true love and joy and peace issue, as we have seen, in like activities. When the outer works are not present one is deceived if he imagines he possesses the internal fruit or confesses to have experienced saving faith or pretends to have assurance of God's favor. Feelings can no more stand alone than can works. The two parts of this witness belong together, supplementing and checking one another.

Wesley says of this assurance that it "is nearly, if not exactly, the same with a testimony of a good conscience toward God."[471] As we have seen in Chapter One, the conscience is a term applied to the function performed by several faculties. By the power of internal reflection, we perceive our tempers and intentions; by external sensation we know the rule of life from the Scriptures without which the mind is helpless to judge; the perception of the agreement and disagreement of the two is the function of the practical reason; and an innate sense of pleasure or remorse accompanies such a judgment concerning our virtue. This is generally the process described above and brings out distinctly that the object of this assurance is our own state of righteousness and that the final concern is with an inner peace of conscience. The following rather long quotation underlines this even more fully:

> . . .how does it appear to you, that you are alive, and that you are now in ease, and not in pain, Are you not immediately conscious of it, By the same immediate consciousness you will know if your soul is alive to God; if you are saved from enmity and have the ease of a meek and quiet spirit. By the same means you cannot but perceive if you

> love, rejoice, and delight to God. By the same you must be directly assured that you love your neighbor as yourself; if you are truly affectioned to all mankind, and full of gentleness and long suffering. With regard to the outward mark of the children of God, which is, according to St. John, the keeping of His commandments, you undoubtedly know in your own breast, if, by the grace of God, it belongs to you. Your conscience informs you from day to day, if you do not take the name of God on your lips, unless with seriousness and devotion, with reverence and godly fear; if you remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy; if youhonor your father and mother; if you do all as you would they should do unto you; and if you are temperate therein, and do all to the glory of God. Now this is properly the testimony of our own spirit; even the testimony of our own conscience, that God hath given us to be holy of heart, and holy and outward in conversation. It is a consciousness of our having received in and by the spirit of adoption, the tempers mentioned in the word of God, as belonging to His adopted children; having a loving heart toward God, and toward all mankind; hanging with childlike confidence on God our Father, desiring nothing but Him, casting all our care upon Him, and embracing every child of man with earnest tender affection, (so as to be ready to lay down our life for our brother, as Christ laid down his life for us), -- a consciousness that we are inwardly conformed, by the Spirit of God, to the image of His Son, and that we walk before Him in justice, mercy, and truth, doing the things which are pleasing in His sight.

In summary: the remote witness is an assurance of being in God's favor based on an awareness of our feelings and actions; compared with a knowledge of God's word. The important part for our purpose is its dependence upon the experience of immediate awareness of God's love, which is true knowledge of God and proper Christian faith. This witness is not in anywise the same thing as saving faith but it necessarily flows from it and in turn reenforces it.

III. THE ORIGIN AND CONSEQUENCE OF FAITH.

When Wesley spoke of being called to bring knowledge, virtue and happiness to an age mixed in ignorance, vice and misery, he meant by knowledge that saving or experimental faith which has just been described. This "faith of a son" was found to be a divine evidence and conviction, an immediate awareness or assurance that God in Christ loves me personally, which inspires a sure trust and confidence in Him. Two questions remain: first, how or under what circumstances does this faith come to be; second, and this is the final issue in this treatise, how is this faith related to love and happiness as they were analyzed in Chapter Two.

A. Faith of a Servant.

In his sermon, On the Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption, Wesley offers what he calls a "plain account of the threefold state of man, the natural, the legal and the evangelical."[472] These are the stages on the journey of the soul or the ways in which men are present to God. The man in the evangelical state loves God. The ruling principle of his soul is grateful delight in the Creator. The faith from which it springs is that of a Son. The legal state is distinguished by the controlling principle of the fear of God. The practical knowledge upon which this rests is termed faith of a Servant. In the natural state, man neither fears nor loves God. He is without experimental knowledge of God and his whole soul is directed away from God toward the world.

These are broad categories and overlap. No man exists completely in the last mode; that is, the natural state. In its pure sense it is indeed a "fictional abstraction," but so are the others. At any rate, there is no man who has a wholly negative relation to God.

> For allowing that all the souls of men are dead by nature, this excuses none, seeing there is no man that is in a mere state of nature;....[473]

We have seen that Wesley believed that all men have some theoretical knowledge of God and His will through conscience, natural reason and education. He went further than this, however. Every man also has some practical knowledge of, some sense of personal involvement with, God. There is "the first wish to please God,

the first dawn of light concerning his will, and the first slight transcient conviction of having sinned against Him." These are the beginnings of the faith of a Servant, and hence of the legal state or that first positive mode of being related to the Creator. It is the beginning of the fear of God which Wesley defines as:

> having, at least, such a degree of that "evidence of things not seen", as to aim "not at the things which are seen, which are temporal, but at those things which are not seen, which are eternal"; such faith as produces a steady fear of God, with the lasting resolution, by his grace, to abstain from all that he has forbidden, and to do all that he commanded.[474]

In the broad sense the faith of a Servant is the counterpart of the faith of a heathen that was described in the beginning of this chapter as the theoretical speculative knowledge of, or mere rational assent to, the truths about God and the things of God which can be known by natural revelation. The faith of a servant is the immediate awareness of these realities. It is a type of direct evidence and conviction or inner assurance of God. It involves a kind of reliance or trust in God which might be designated as servile or fearful confidence as over against the filial and loving confidence present in Christian faith. The faith of a servant is a consciousness of God personally applied. Here God is seen only as Creator, Lawgiver and Judge, but this is not an abstract matter. He is my Creator, my Lawgiver, my Judge. In brief, the faith of a servant is a low form of saving faith.

Such knowledge of God, as we saw in Chapter Two, alters the spiritual core of man. It is the first shift from our accepting

love of the world as our manner of living. The thrust of the soul is redirected and a corresponding alteration in the total moral life occurs. This faith,,as all experimental knowledge, is an active principle which cannot be divorced from practice. The one who has this faith fears God, and he that "feareth God" also "worketh righteousness." In commenting upon this text Wesley describes the servant of God as

> He that first, reverences God, as great, wise, good, the cause, end, governor of all things; and secondly, from this awful regard to Him, not only avoids all known evil, but endeavors, according to the best light he has, to do all things well.[475]

This description represents, of course, a high level of this mode of being. We have already noticed that there are infinite degrees of this legal faith, all the way from the first stirring of the conscience to the state of genuine repentence. What is described here represents more than vague and momentary visions and desires for God. It is a developed relationship with God which marks a definite turning away from lower things. Such a life is that of the good or moral heathen. At times Wesley berated these characters and natural morality. At other times he had high praise for the pagan moralists and philosophers. After reading the Odyssey Wesley spoke highly of Homer, saying that he found him "on all occasions recommending the fear of God, with justice, mercy and truth."[476] A still higher stage in the legal state was, of course, open to those in the Jewish tradition who were recipients of a special revelation of God and His will.

Wesley's views on the fear of God and the faith of a ser-

vant were never fully worked out. But they did clarify late in his ministry when his thoughts upon justification underwent alteration. The man who has the faith which enables him to fear God, resulting in a desire to do His will, is accepted of God "through Christ, though he knows him not."[477] "Let it be well observed," says Wesley, "that 'the wrath of God' no longer abideth on Him."[478]

What has been said about this way of life does not mean that only those outside of Christendom exist in this fashion. The man who lives in a Christian culture may and does at one time, if he finally comes to the experience of the love of God, live in the fear of God. He must not and cannot, however, rest there for he has heard with his mind the Word. To remain in the legal state would be for him to dwell in the category described earlier as the faith of the devil. The faith of the servant or the fear of God, for the man within the hearing of the Gospel, finally reached it's height which is really a depth. Awarenesses come to him which are not given to the Pagan, but it is the end of the raod for this manner of life. Wesley describes it as follows:

> "By some awful providence, or by his word applied with the demonstration of his spirit, God touches the heart of him that lies asleep in darkness and in the shadow of death. He is terribly shaken out of his sleep, and awakes into a consciousness of his danger. Perhaps in a moment, perhaps by degrees, the eyes of his understanding are opened, and now first (the veil being in part removed) discern the real state he is in. Horrid light breaks in upon his soul: such light, as may be conceived to gleam from the bottomless pit..... He at last sees the loving, the merciful God, is also "a consuming fire;" that he is a just God and a terrible, rendering to every man according to his works, entering into judgment with the ungodly..... He now clearly perceives, that the great and holy God..... is an avenger of every one who rebelleth against him...." 479

B. The Experience of Repentance.

Repentance, in the sense that it is being used here, is for Wesley another stage on the way of salvation. It is the last stage in the fear of God and the first in the love of God. It is a transition state from faith of a servant to faith of a son. Repentance is the experience in which man is brought to his final extremity, where his rebellious will is wholly broken. It is an experience in which his soul is consumed by despair - by the despair that is the gateway to an experimental saving faith in the love of God in Christ. Here man is brought to an awareness of his inability "either to remove the power, or to atone for the guilt of sin (called by the world despair); in which properly consists that poverty of spirit, and mourning which are the gate to Christian blessedness." [480] How does one come to this state?

The Servant of God is, as observed above, one who in living faith discerns God as a Lawgiver and Judge before whom he is personally responsible, as the One who holds in his power his total destiny, present and future. This generates as a controlling principle in his soul the disposition termed fear of God. This awakens his conscience to some degree with a desire to do God's will. Yet this principle shares the heart with another previous and more powerful principle: the love of the world. Man's inner being is torn in warfare, with love of the world conquering. He has identified himself with God, but he is ever being defeated. He endeavors to please God to the best of his understanding, to live up to the dictates of his conscience, but the more he tries the less he is able to succeed, so set is his character in habitual love of the world. This hopeless situation is gradually

> He resolves against sin, but yet sins on; he sees the snare, and abhors, and runs into it.... And the more he frets against it, the more it prevails; he may bite but he cannot break his chain. Thus he toils without end, repenting and sinning... till at length the poor, sinful, helpless wretch, is even at his wits ends. [481]

Man, acutely aware of his sin and guilt and helplessness, is now in a condition of "fear, horror and despair". [482] The experience of the fear of God has run its course. Wesley promises that "unless the Servants of God halt by the way, they will receive the adoption of sons. They will receive the faith of children of God, by this revealing His only begotten Son in their hearts." [483] The fear of God leads them to trust in the love of God, but the journey goes through the valley of the shadow.

This whole process is also seen through Wesley's view of the law as the schoolmaster, which leads us through the abyss to the love of Christ. One of the uses of the law, he says,

> is to bring him unto life, unto Christ, that he may live. It is true, in performing both these offices, it acts the part of a severe schoolmaster. It drives us by force, rather than draws us by love. And yet love is the spring of all. It is the spirit of love which, by this painful means, tears away our confidence in the flesh, which leaves us no broken reed whereon to trust, and so constrains the sinner, stripped of all, to cry out in the bitterness of his soul, or groan in the depth of his heart,
>
> I give up every plea beside, —
> Lord, I am damn'd; but Thou hast died.
>
> We are undone through the severity of the law in order that we might have the experience of the love of God in our hearts.[484]

It is in this crisis situation that the self-will of man is broken. He is left with nothing on which to rely. As one writer has put it, the <u>will</u> of Man is in this experience "reduced to zero". The love of self, of pleasure, of objects of sense, which is love of the world involves a hidden rejection of and rebellion against God. This negative thrust of the spirit is nakedly exposed and is reduced to nothing, so that a man must first

> renounce himself . . . [and come] to God as a lost, miserable, self-destroyed, self-condemned, undone, helpless sinner; as one whose mouth is utterly stopped, and who is altogether guilty before God." Such a sense of sin (commonly called "despair" by those who speak evil of the things they know not), together with a firm conviction, such as no words can express, that of Christ only cometh our salvation, and an earnest desire of that salvation, must precede a living faith, a trust in Him.[485]

Repentance, in Wesley's scheme, is no simple matter of changing opinions or feeling sorry for misguided actions. Rather, it is a

soul-shaking experience which leaves one "naked, indigent and undone."[486] False peace and joy fade away turning to misery, sorrow and remorse. Any sense of virtue and righteousness is replaced by a feeling of guilt, fear and helplessness. God, the lawgiver and Judge, has become in the imagination the great Enemy.[487] Life has become death. Freedom has became bondage.

This is the experience without which there is no christian faith. Repentence is a horrible sickness which not to have is a greater horror. It is a great gift of God initiated by the Holy Spirit and flowing from his infinite love and mercy. Wesley captures the terror and wonder of it all, the severity and mercy manifest in it, in a discussion upon the faith of a servant the highest and lowest stage of which is found in repentance.

> The Holy Spirit prepares us for his inward kingdom, by removing the veil from our heart, and enabling us to know ourselves as we are known of him; by "convincing us of sin," of our evil nature, our evil tempers, and our evil words and actions; all of which cannot but partake of the corruption of the heart from which they spring. He then convinces us of the desert of our sins; so that our mouth is stopped, and we are constrained to plead guilty before God. At the same time, we "receive the spirit of bondage unto fear;" fear of the wrath of God, fear of the punishment which we have deserved; and, above all, fear of death, lest it should consign us over to eternal death. Souls that are thus convinced feel they are so fast in prison, that they cannot get forth. They feel themselves at once altogether sinful, altogether guilty, and altogether helpless. But all this conviction implies a species of faith; being "an evidence of things not seen;" nor indeed possible to be seen or known, till God reveal them unto us.[488]

Wesley then adds these words:

> But still let it be carefully observed, (for it is a point of no small importance,) that this faith is only the faith of a servant, and not the faith of a son.[489]

Repentence is by no means the Christian revolution. It is but the long dark night before the rise of a new day,

C. The Christian Revolution.

The essence of the Christian revolution, in Wesley's opinion, is the shift in the core of the human spirit from love of the world to love of God. As we have seen, this initiates a transformation in all life and practice which brings with it an enduring happiness. It has also been suggested that the basis or ground or condition of this revolution is saving faith.

One might say that the key to the whole Revival and corner-stone of Wesley's over-all scheme after 1738 was the text from I John: "We love him because he first loved us," which he never tired of quoting. In very brief, Christian knowledge, the faith of a son stands in the middle of the text as a mediator. Man desires and delights in God when he is immediately aware of Him in such a fashion that he can personally place his trust in God's love for him.

It is by, and only by, "a sense of the love of God shed abroad in his heart" that a man is "able to love God". "God calls a sinner his own . . . And by this very thing, the consciousness of his favor, he works in him the grateful, filial affection from which spring every good temper, and word and work."[490] Or again Wesley says, "By faith alone, the love of God and all mankind is shed abroad in their hearts, bringing with it the mind that was in Christ and producing all holiness of conversation."[491] Wesley uses frequently the New Testament figure "shed abroad". God is for Wesley

a God of love, but to believe this as an impartial spectator or to merely give the assent of the mind to this idea has no revolutionary psychological and moral consequences. But when this love is "shed abroad in our hearts, something happens. This phrase "shed abroad" is used synonomously with saving faith understood in both of its branches. It is, first of all, a direct witness or an immediate evidence, which cannot further be explained, that God is love or that the one in Christ is God. But it is more especially an awareness that this God loves me, forgives me, accepts me personally. This impression is given in such a manner that the consent of the mind is compelled. It is a divine evidence or conviction, that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not imputing to them their former trespasses:" and, in particular, that the Son of God hath loved me, and given himself for me, and that I, even I, am now reconciled to God by the blood of the cross."[492] Then it is that the deeply personal response of filial trust in God, a firm reliance on His love for us is called forth from the soul, & expressed in such cry as "Abba Father" or "My God". This is the second branch of experimental faith. "Christian faith implies a confidence in the love of God, and . . . such confidence has a direct tendency to salvation, to holiness both of heart and life."[493] This experience of faith is the fundamental meaning of these phrases such as "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts", Then it is that the revolution in the spirit of man occurs. When and only when God's love shines in our heart do we love God. Because he first loved us and revealed that love in our hearts do we gratefully

delight in Him. From this flows disinterested benevolence toward all men along with a humble concern for our own holiness which is the essence of the proper moral life.

All of this is what Wesley meant to convey by the perpetually used text "faith that worketh by love". Saving faith for him was an active thing. It caused things to happen. It is by necessity inseperable from love of God and man.

> And this love we suppose (according to the Christian scheme) to flow from a sense of God's love to us; which sense and persuasion of God's love of man in Jesus Christ, particularly applied, we term faith - a thing you seem to be totally unacquainted with. For it is not the faith whereof we speak, unless it be a working by love, a faith 'zealous of good works', careful to maintain, nay, to excel in them. Nor do we acknowledge him to have one grain of faith who is not continually doing good, spend and be spent in doing all good, as he has opportunity to all men."[494]

It is not that love ought to flow from faith. It is, rather, in Wesley's view, that it must, it does. Where love is not present there saving faith is not present. It is an "unholy, unsaving faith".[495]

> That faith which hath not works, which doth not produce both inward and outward holiness, which does not stamp the whole image of God on the heart, and purify us as He is pure, that faith which does not produce the whole of religion . . . is not faith of the gospel, not the Christian faith.[496]

But what are the conditions under which this faith is given in the first instance? This brings us back to where we left off in the last section. This faith is found or given to the one who has the faith of a servant in the highest degree which is the experience of repentance. It is in that situation when a man's inner world is reduced to nothing that Christian faith is born. It is when a man has reached his limits, is helpless and in despair,

when God has become his enemy and his final destiny is utterly at stake. It is when he is given to know himself as he is known by the eternal. This is the time in which "his eyes are opened in quite another manner than before, even to see a loving, gracious God . . . He "sees the light of the glorious love of God, in the face of Jesus Christ." He hath a divine "evidence of things not seen" by sense, even of "the deep things of God"; more particularly of the love of God, of his pardoning love to him that believes in Jesus. Overpowered by the sight, his whole soul cries out, "My Lord and my God". For he sees all his iniquities laid on him, who "bare them in his own body on the tree", he beholds the Lamb of God taking away his sins. How clearly now does he discern, that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself! . . . And that he himself is reconciled to God, by that blood of the covenant."[497] In all of this Wesley is simply a reporter. He reports what happens and how it happens. And this means that if it does not happen it doesn't. This does not mean that Wesley thought that man is without a role in all this. His view of freedom would not allow such a view. It does mean that man's role in faith is an action which is a response to an activity which is not his activity and without which he could not act. Moreover, "every moment"[498] the Christian is dependent upon God's revealing in our heart his love for us. Although, as we saw in Chapter II, our love for God is strengthened and undergirded by the strengthening of the virtuous habits which flow from love, the Christian can never stand alone. Love in this life at least is ever dependent upon faith. Love cannot live without faith

as faith cannot exist without love.

By way of a summary, it might be helpful to have another of the many long statements Wesley made in which he tried to summarize his understanding of the christian revolution in its totality.

> Man cries out of the deep to Him that is able to save, "Lord be merciful unto me, a sinner!" It is not long before he find "redemption in the blood of Jesus, even forgiveness of sins," the Father reveals His Son "in his heart;" and he "calls Jesus, Lord, by the Holy Ghost". And then the love of God is "shed abroad in his heart by the Holy Spirit which is given unto him." From this principle springs real, disinterested benevolence to all mankind; making him humble, meek, gentle to all men, easy to be entreated, — to be convinced of what is right, and persuaded to what is good; inviolably patient, with a thankful acquiseence in every step of his adorable providence. This is religion, even the whole mind which was also in Christ Jesus, and has any man the insolvence or the stupidity to deny that this is happiness, yea, that it
>
> yields more of happiness below
> Than victors in a triumph know?
>
> There can be no doubt but from this love to God and man a suitable conversation will follow. His "communication," that is discourse, will "be always in grace, seasoned with salt, and meat to the ministers, grace to the hearers." He will always "open his mouth with wisdom, and there will be on his tongue the law of kindness." Hence his affectionate words will "distil as the dew and as the rain upon the tender herb" and men will know, it is not he only who speaks, but the spirit of the father that speaketh in him. His actions will spring from the same source with his words, even from the abundance of a loving heart, and while all these aim at the glory of God and tend to this one point, whatever he does, he may truly say, —
>
> end of my action thou
> In all things thee I see;
> Except my hallowed labor now,
> I do it as to thee!
>
> He to whom this character belongs, he alone, is a Christian. To him the one, eternal, omnipresent, all perfect spirit, is the "alpha and omega, the first and the last;" not his creator only, but his sustainer, his preserver, his governor; yea, his

> father, his saviour, sanctifier, and comforter and his all, in time and eternity. It is the benevolence springing from this root which is pure and undefiled religion. But if it be built on any other foundation, as it is of no avail in the sight of God, so it brings no real, solid, permanent happiness to man, but leaves him still a poor, dry, indigent, and dissatisfied creature."[499]

The knowledge of God as Wesley conceived it, the heart of which was experience of and trust in God's love manifested in Christ, is the only source and ground of the true life of love and virtue and hence all genuine happiness. His position here is even stronger. In their very nature, faith and love are inseparable. Where one is found the other is necessarily present.

Notes

Chapter III

383a Letters, IV, p. 116.

384a Works, VII, p. 198.

385a Letters, I, p. 240.

386a Letters, II, p. 48.

387a Works, VII, p. 198.

388a Letters, I, p. 23.

389a Note the phrase "including practice". Wesley had now read Kempis, Taylor, and Law and this practical side of faith was being stressed. Saving faith is a term much used by the orthodox. It was coupled with a legalistic view of the statement which caused Wesley much difficulty and misunderstanding, as we shall see. Wesley kept this term but changed the meaning of it later.

390a Letters, I, p. 25.

391a Works, VIII, pp. 111-12.

392a Letters, II, p. 48.

393a Works, II, p. 384.

394a Journal, V, p. 452.

395a Letters, VI, pp. 361-62. Wesley here and in other places speaks of the faith of a Jew as a type between the heathen and the Christian in both the speculative and experimental classes. He continues the above quotation: "To believe the Old Testament and to trust in Him that was to come was the faith of a Jew."

396a Works, II, p. 385.

397a Loc. cit.

398a Letters, I, p. 240.

399a Works, VI, p. 362.

400a Letters, V, p. 74.

401a Letters, II, p. 269

402a Standard Sermons, II, pp. 449-51.

403a Works, VIII, p. 76.

404a "After all that has been so plausibly written concerning 'the innate idea of God'; after all that has been said, of its being common to all men, in all ages and nations; it does not appear, that man has naturally any more idea of God, than any of the beasts of the field; he has no knowledge of God at all; no fear of God at all; neither is God in all his thoughts. Whatever change may afterwards be wrought, (whether by the grace of God, or by his own reflection or by education) he is, by nature, a mere atheist." Works, II, p. 309.

405a Works, VII, p. 335.

406a Works, II, p. 406.

407a Works, VII, pp. 4-5.

408a Letters, III, p. 174.

409a Standard Sermons, I, p. 526.

410a Wesley over and over again made a figurative comparison the internal spiritual senses to the external senses of seeing, hearing, and feeling. Sometimes he includes tasting; I don't know that he ever made such use of smelling (See Standard Sermons, pp. 233-34; Works, VIII, pp. 4-5; Standard Sermons, pp. 302-03). We are said to see God, and particularly God's love for us, in such a fashion that we look for and behold this God in all things at every moment from that time on. We are said to hear the Word of God, particularly his word of forgiveness to us, so that from henceforth we are attentive to and willingly obey his word, when and howsoever it is given. These two have to do with faith proper; the next with the effects of that faith. We are said to feel the presence of God--that is, the fruit of the spirit, particularly our love of God within so that now "his whole soul is now sensible to God".

411a Standard Sermons, I, p. 304.

412a Standard Sermons, I, p. 302.

413a Loc. cit.

414a Works, II, pp. 385-86.

415a Works, II, p. 386.

416a Works, VII, p. 292.

416b Standard Sermons, I, p. 193.

417a Wesley very frequently, in using his favorite text from Hebrews, distinguishes between things hoped for and things not seen but present. Whenever he makes these distinctions, he appears to be referring primarily to the second classification made above, that is, to the spiritual world or to "evidence of God and the things of God". One of the many examples of this is found in New Testament, page 586: "Things hoped for are not so extensive as things not seen--The former are only things future, and joyful to us; the latter are either future, past, or present, and those either good or evil, whether to us or to others. The subsistence of things hoped for--giving a kind of present subsistence to the good things which God has promised; the Divine, supernatural evidence exhibited to, the conviction hereby produced in a believer, of things not seen--Whether past, future, or spiritual, particularly of God, and the things of God."

418a Wesley admits to Charles in a letter that he temperamentally leans toward enthusiasm. He says that the mystics had an early appeal for him, and were almost his ruination (Letters, I, p. 207). Yet he was always interested in and retained a high regard for the mystics.

419 Works, II, p. 310.

420 The most important aspect of all this is personal involvement. Perhaps this is the most important aspect. The spiritual world and God are not just objects which we detachedly contemplate; they are realities with which our destinies are tied up. God is seen to have a personal intention toward us.

But our primary interest now is the nature of this evidence relative to the Christian experience. This is the real contribution of Wesley. It is an evidence that God loves me, that my sins are forgiven, etc., that I--even I--am reconciled to God. Here an idea of a God of love is in my mind or rather that God loves me. This is the key to the whole Christian revolution. This is the fundamental-supernatural evidence that is given, but it follows the experience of the Servant. This is the faith of a Son. This image determines the way I understand my world and controls my response.

421 Works, II, p. 387.

422 Letters, III, p. 359.

423 Journal, V, p. 338.

424 He both opens and enlightens the eyes of our understanding. Out of darkness he commands light to shine, and takes away the veil which the "God of this world" had

spread over our hearts. And we then see, not by a chain of reasoning, but by a kind of intuition, by a direct view, that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. . .", Works, II, p. 72.

425 Works, VII, p. 195.

426 Letters, I, pp. 329-30.

427 Standard Sermons, II, p. 448.

428 Standard Sermons, I, p. 192.

429 Standard Sermons, I, p. 270.

430 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 284-85.

431 Letters, II, pp. 384-5. The whole passage reads: "Without this I cannot but doubt, whether they can long maintain their cause; whether, if they do not obey the loud call of God, and lay far more stress than they have hitherto done on this internal evidence of Christianity, they will not one after another give up the external, and (in heart at least) go over to those whom they are now contending with; so that in a century or two the people of England will be fairly divided into real Deists and real Christians.

And I apprehend this would be no loss at all, but rather an advantage to the Christian cause; nay, perhaps it would be the speediest, yea, the only effectual, way of bringing all reasonable Deists to be Christians.

432 Loc. cit. In writing to Dr. Middleton in 1749, Wesley compares the "internal evidence" to "traditional evidence". The latter is important, he says, and to be honored yet not to be compared with the internal which enable one to say "One thing I know; I was blind, but now I see." The testimony from tradition is so difficult it is only for the learned, it's weak due to the distance, and vague because it has passed through so many hands; whereas the internal is so easy, close, and plain that "a peasant, a woman, and a child may feel all its force".

433 New Testament, p. 433.

434 Standard Sermons, II, p. 355.

435 Standard Sermons, II, p. 345.

436 Standard Sermons, II, p. 349. Cf. Standard Sermons, I, p. 208.

437 Letters, I, pp. 255-56.

438 Loc. cit.

439 Letters, II, pp. 108-09.

440 Loc. cit. Cf. Sugden's note, Standard Sermons, I, p. 210.

441 Letters, II, pp. 108-09.

442 Loc. cit.

443 Works, III, pp. 159-62.

444 Letters, II, p. 384.

445 Letters, III, p. 305.

446 Letters, III, p. 161.

447 Letters, VI, p. 323; V, pp. 358-59.

448 Letters, II, p. 192.

449 Journal, II, p. 355.

450 Journal, I, p. 83. See also his discussion with Arthur Bedford in 1738: Letters, I, pp. 254-55.

451 Letters, VI, p. 323.

452 Letters, V, pp. 358-59.

453 Standard Sermons, II, p. 355.

454 Standard Sermons, II, p. 346.

455 Letters, IV, pp. 331-32.

456 Letters, II, p. 61.

457 Lee, op. cit.

458 Letters, II, p. 64.

459 New Testament, p. 506; Letters, IV, p. 363.

460 Letters, V, p. 365.

461 Letters, II, p. 64.

462 Works, VII, p. 399.

463 Letters, IV, 331-32.

464 Letters, II, p. 64.

465 Journal, V, p. 426.

466 Loc. cit.

467 Works, VIII, p. 106.

468 Letters, V, pp. 364-65.

469 Loc. cit.

470 Standard Sermons, II, p. 346.

471 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 345-46.

472 Works, I, p. 83.

473 Works, III, pp. 3-4.

474 Works, II, pp. 451-470.

475 New Testament, p. 304.

476 Journal, V, pp. 339-40.

477 New Testament, p. 304.

478 Works, VII, pp. 198-200.

479 Works, V, p. 84.

480 Journal, II, p. 278.

481 Works, I, p. 80.

482 Letters, II, p. 342.

483 Works, VII, p. 198.

484 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 52-53.

485 Standard Sermons, I, p. 285.

486 New Testament, p. 184.

487 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 285-89.

488 Works, VII, p. 235.

489 Loc. cit.

490 Works, VII, p. 229.

491 Works, VIII, p. 70.

492 Works, I, p. 67.

493 Works, IV, p. 1.

494 Letters, II, p. 38-39.

495 Standard Sermons, II, p. 34.

496 Standard Sermons, II, pp. 33-34.

497 Works, I, p. 76.

498 New Testament, p. 477.

499 Works, VII, p. 75.

Concluding remarks:

In this study of Wesley both the use of his scheme of Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness, and the use of the method of the centering our attention upon the area of what we have called moral psychology in analyzing the elements in this scheme, has opened, for the writer at least, some new understandings of Wesley, or has thrown new light upon old ones. It has also made necessary and possible some virginal excavations into certain important aspects of his thinking which he never made very explicit.

The more original digging are to be found, first of all, in chapter one where the attempt is made to describe the various powers of the human constitution. Wesley, of course never expressed himself very clearly on most of the matters discussed there. In the light of his purposes, it really wasn't necessary for him to do so, for these matters had to do with the commonly assumed knowledge of his listeners. And as long as Wesley was approached as a theologian rather than as an ethical thinker, those who wrote about him would have little incentive to investigate this area. The approach used in trying to uncover this aspect of his mind was to become, first of all, intimately familar with the relevant terms and phrases which Wesley used repeatedly, and then to read widely in the works of the, relatively speaking, second-rate writers of the age, who more systematically expressed the way the average man conceived of such things. Particular attention was, of course, paid to those men whom Wesley himself read, such as Hutcheson and Beattie.

Another place of virginal plowing which this approach to

Wesley demanded, and one where there is much remaining to be done, was the analysis of the virtues and temper. This was particularly true relative to their classification. This was made the more difficult because there is no book which the writer was able to discover which dealt specifically and historically with the schematization of the inner tempers of man.

As to contributions toward new understandings of Wesley, the first is the uses the writer has made of Wesley's view of the various modes in which man is present to life and God: hatred and rejection; fear and appeasement; faith and love. Here it became most clear that Wesley was an ethical thinker or a moral theologian whose primary concern was with the logic of the practical life. The analysis made of love for God as grateful delight illuminates many areas of Wesley's thought and helps to clarify the relation of the Reformation and Catholic influences upon Wesley. At this point Lindstrom was of particular help in a general way who, I think, is right in his observation that little has been done in the way of a "systematic analysis" of Wesley's view of love.[500]

The work on love of neighbor and the whole matter of the relation of self-love and benevolence offer, I feel, a contribution toward further study in the thought of Wesley. Other areas might be mentioned such as Wesley's shift in thinking about justification and assurance; the breaking down of the ideas in Wesley's view of faith and noting their interrelation: Further nuances of meaning came, through this approach, as we studied Wesley's view of the new birth or what we have called the Christian revolution. Again,

some of the darkness which surrounded Wesley's idea that faith is a gift, yet at the same time an act of man, was dispelled.

I began this study of Wesley with some interest in and appreciation for his thinking. As the study progressed this appreciation soon faded and I became almost offended with his view of the Christian faith and life. Yet when I finally broke through the theological approach to Wesley and saw him as a thinker, and as a creative and original thinker, about the interior history of man he began to make real sense and I must confess has in no small way influenced my thinking. I am also persuaded that at such points as those suggested above he can make contributions to the conversations within the Christian community. I am now prepared to recommend to our times a new reading of John Wesley.

Notes

Concluding Remarks

500 Harold Lindström, Wesley and Sanctification. Stockholm: 1946, p. 161.