"There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated," wrote Bishop Butler in the preface to his 
Sermons on the Moral Life. "One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature." The latter approach was that of Butler himself. It was also the method employed by John Wesley. In dealing with the problem of morals, he began with man, his proper nature and economy.

It is necessary then to attempt to analyze Wesley's view of the nature of man as well as what may be called his moral psychology before his conception of virtue can be intelligently delineated. Such an analysis forms the subject matter of this chapter.

I. The Hybrid Being

John Wesley, with cost of his contemporaries, began his thinking with the Cartesian presupposition that the universe is completely filled with two types of substance: matter or material, extended substance; and spirit or immaterial, thinking substance. The first is composed of the four basic elements -
earth, water, air and fire - and is entirely passive. The second, on the other hand, is active substance, the only source of any and all motion, "this being the proper distinguishing difference between spirit and matter, which is totally and essentially passive and inactive."¹ In terms of this dualism, there are only three general classes of being of which we have any conception: (1) "pure spirits, immaterial and extended substances, (2) material bodies, "extensive and solid substances"; and (3) "fixed beings formed by the union of an immaterial substance and a corporeal."²

Such a classification of beings is, of course, an abstraction. Actually, the universe is literally filled with being, so that there are "no gaps or chasms in the creations of God."³ These views Wesley also shared with most men of the 18th century. "There was", he says, "a 'golden chain', to use the expression of Plato, let down from the throne of God; an exactly connected series of beings, from the highest to the lowest."⁴ Only "one soul is out of this chain, and that is he that made it."⁵ In between the extremes of created beings, "from an unorganized particle of earth or water to Michael, the archangel,"⁶ lies literally an infinite gradation of existence.

. . . the scale of creatures does not advance per saltum, by leaps, but by smooth and gentle degrees; . . . frequently imperceptible to our imperfect faculties. We cannot, accurately, trace many of the intermediate links of this amazing chain, which are abundantly too fine to be discerned either by our senses or understanding."⁷

On the other hand, it is possible for man to "observe, in a gross
and general manner, rising one above another; first, inorganic earth; then minerals and vegetables, in their several orders; afterwards, insects, reptiles, fish, beasts, men and angels."

In this grand hierarchy, severer being has an excellence peculiar to it, determined by the rank appointed for it in the universe." Each class of existence has its own proper end, perfection, happiness, according to its rung on the ladder; but no being is unto itself. Each is related to the other; all have intercourse with all; and 'In the assemblage of all the orders of relative perfections, consists the absolute perfection of this whole, concerning which God said 'that it is good.'"

Man is seen, of course, as the middle link in this great chain of being. Since the "transitions from one species to another are almost insensible," he is very intimate related to the creatures beneath and the creatures above. Yet he is neither beast nor angel; he is man with an activity and an excellence uniquely his own. In terms of the two substances in the universe, he is a hybrid being, a union of two entirely different substances. "A substance that thinks and which has a principle of action within it, is united to a substance void of thought and purely passive." Yet between these separate entities with their distinctive qualities, a wonderful harmony and an intimate connection exists.

The union of souls to organized bodies, is the source of the most abundant and wonderful harmony that exists in nature. A substance without extension, solidity and form, is ignited to an extended, solid and formed substance . . . from this surprising connection there springs a reciprocal commerce between the Two substances; a kind of action and reaction
which constitutes the life of organized and animated beings.\textsuperscript{13}

Wesley was particularly interested in, and rather widely read in, the fields of metaphysics, physiology and psychology of his day which dealt with the problems of the nature and relations of mind and body. He had no contributions to make here; but he wrestled with these matters and had opinions upon them which influenced the way he understood the Christian message and the way he articulated it to others. In his general reflections at the end of his volumes on natural philosophy, where he is dealing with the limits of natural reason, he gives evidence of his acquaintance with some of the perplexities of the times.

\ldots do we truly know ourselves? do we know the most excellent part of ourselves, our own soul? \ldots O where is the soul lodged? in the pineal gland? the whole brain? in the heart? the blood? in any single part of the body? or, is it (if anyone can understand those terms) all in all, and all in every part? How is it united to the body? as to the body \ldots what is flesh? \ldots How does a muscle act? If you say, by being inflated and consequently shortened: I ask again, But what is it inflated with? If, with blood, how and whence comes that blood? \ldots that is blood? \ldots By what force is the circulation of the blood performed? \ldots Are the nerves pervious or solid? How do they act? By vibration or transmission of animal spirits? what are animal spirits? If they have any beings, are they of the nature of blood or ether?\textsuperscript{14}

Descartes had played the primary role in setting the stage for the way in which the 17th and 18th centuries approached these issues when he divided his world into two entirely distinct and absolute substances: spirit, the essence of which was mind or thought; and matter, the distinctive characteristic of which was solidity or extension. He cast into his times the complex metaphysical, psychological and physiological problem of how such
radically different entities could be so intimately united in the same being as they appeared to be in man.

At least three solutions were offered to the metaphysical aspects of this perplexity of the union of the body and the soul. Spinoza held to a parallelism or a pre-established harmony. "The soul and matter are like two separate clocks wound up by God to go in perfect correspondence." The followers of Malebranche ascribed to occasionalism or providentialism, which sees no natural causal connection between body and mind. Activity in one is merely the occasion for activity in the other. God alone through immediate action can effect the relationship. His constant intervention explains the apparent union of the two. Interactionism is the third explanation and was, perhaps, held by Descartes. According to this view, the separate substances are in vital union. By "laws of vital unions, established by the original dictates of the Creator, the body and soul are continually acting and reacting upon each other.

In explaining this interaction physiologically, Descartes made use of the ancient concept of animal spirits, which remained, in one form or another, a cardinal point of physiology and psychology through the 18th century. These animal spirits were thought to consist of the finest parts of the blood, and to be "very like a very subtle wind, or rather a very pure and vivid flame." This ethereal fire is the most rarefied type of matter and hence was admirably fitted, in the imagination of the times, to mediate between matter and spirit. These spirits, manufactured by the blood and filling the nerve fibers, were the agents of
sensation mediating between the external world and the mind, on the one hand, and agents carrying out the behests of the mind, on the other hand, thereby accounting for intentional or voluntary bodily movements.

Another discussion provoked anew by Descartes, which concerns us, had to do with organic motion in the human being. From the time of the Greeks, bodily motion was accounted for by some part or power of the soul. "In opposition to earlier views, Descartes removes from the concept of the soul every part of the concept of physical life." The term "soul" was reserved for the rational powers of man. It is an immaterial, thinking substance. Motion in man is accounted for solely on the basis of mechanism. The human body is a wonderful machine. Animals do not reason, have no soul, and are nothing other than machines. According to Descartes, the various spirits, propelled by an innate heat in the heart put there by God, account for all bodily movements. There was no longer need for the ancient view that a part of the soul is the principle of bodily locomotion.

Wesley absorbed much of this Cartesian thinking which so largely determined the mental climate of 18th century men. He describes the human body as a portion of organized matter; a curious, wonderfully complex machine composed of the four basic elements - earth, air, fire and water, duly proportioned and mixed together. United to this material body is "an immaterial principle, a spiritual nature, endued with understanding, and affections, and a degree of liberty, or a self-moving, yea, self-governing power." There exists a remarkable and finally
mysterious interaction between these two substances which is to be explained by "the natural laws of vital union." 24

How two such substances of so widely different natures, can be joined . . . we know not. All we can tell is this: God has ordained that certain perceptions in the soul should constantly follow certain motions in the body, and certain motions in the body such perceptions in the soul. 25

In spite of the mystery of the relationship, the soul united to a "flesh and blood body" and is, in every way, dependent upon this physical machine. As a matter of fact, "The soul, during its vital union with the body, cannot exert any of its operations, any otherwise than in union with the body, with its bodily organs." 26 This is true of all the powers of both the understanding and the will. Sometimes it seems that Wesley held that each mental operation had its particular physical counterpart. This is to say that there are "bodily organs" upon which "the imagination, the understanding and every other faculty of the mind more immediately depends." 27 The dependence of the soul upon the body accounts for, in part, the imperfection of our higher principles; for the body "very frequently hinders the soul in its operations, and at best serves it very imperfectly. Yet the soul cannot dispense with its service, imperfect as it is . . ." 28

Wesley also accepted the idea that the animal spirits 29 mediate between the body and the mind. These spirits are the most rarefied of matter, called ethereal or vital fire. Because they were the most rarefied kind of matter and the closest that matter can come to spirit, they were thought to be the proper mediums 30.
in the continual process of interaction between the body and soul.

In accounting for physical motion, in nature at large or in the body, Wesley believed that the rarest of the four elements, fire, (perhaps it is the same as electricity) was the immediate cause. In the body, fire constitutes the vital flame from whence flows the animal heat. It is this animal heat which permeates the whole machine and causes motion. Man comes by this fire through breathing the atmosphere about him. The lungs, "an engine fitted for that very purpose," take in air, which has connected with it bits of fire, and bring the air into the blood. The blood separates the fire from the air which moves the body in every respect.

Without this spring of life, this vital fire, there could be no circulation of the blood. Consequently, no motion of any of the fluids, any of the nervous fluid in particular: (if it be not rather, as is highly probable, this very fire we are speaking of). Therefore, there could not be any sensation, nor any Muscular motion. I say there could be no circulation; for the cause usually assigned for this, mainly, the Force of the heart is altogether inadequate to this supposed effect.

In spite of all this mechanical talk, Wesley is thoroughly persuaded that matter, though ever so ethereal, is matter still and cannot finally account for motion. By Wesley's time, it was not the animal alone which was conceived of as simply a machine; many were insisting that materialistic and mechanistic Principles were adequate to explain man. This was the same as atheism and Wesley fought it with a vengeance. Matter cannot move matter. Fire moves the lever but something has to move the fire. Spirit,
and spirit alone, can do this. It is either the action of God Himself, "the only true primus mobile", or created spirits to whom God "imparts a spark of his active, self moving nature." The vital fire is a necessary factor in motion, but it cannot move itself. None of the four elements has the least power of self-motion; none of them can move itself. "But" says Watts "does not that ship move?" Yes, but not of itself; it is moved by the water on which it swims. "But then the water moves." True, but the water is moved by the wind, the current of air. "But the air moves." It is moved by the ethereal fire, which is attached to every particle of it; and this fire itself is moved by the almighty spirit, the source of all motion in the universe. But my soul has from him an inward visible motion whereby it governs at pleasure every part of the body.

Wesley held that the spirit in man governs every motion of the body except involuntary motions or reflex actions. The body apparently operates mechanically, but the machine is finally energized by the spirit of God. This "is a marvelous instance of the wise and gracious providence of the great Creator . . . were it otherwise, grievous inconveniences might follow." So, although the body of man is a machine, a portion of organized matter, "fearfully and wonderfully made," the motivating force, the generator, is always spirit and, finally, the universal spirit of God.

Wesley was completely fascinated by this "creature full of wonder", man. What is man? he asked over and again. In this section we have begun the attempt to give his answer. Man is the "great amphibian" standing halfway between heaven and earth. Man is a material substance, "a curious machine," linked to a thinking substance with a principle of motion. "In my present
state of existence," says Wesley "I undoubtedly consist both of soul and body." Thirty-seven The soul is the thinking substance. Sometimes Wesley refers to it as the mind, the higher or inner principle, the intelligent nature, the spirit. It has a variety of unique faculties, that is, powers or functions, the understanding of which are of signal importance in answering the question: What is man? " . . . every spirit in the universe, as such is endued with understanding and, in consequence, filth a will, and with a measure of liberty; and these are inseparably united in every intelligent nature." Thirty-eight Even now the question has not been answered. There is one more element in the human constitution and that the most significant of all; for God:

made us sensible, rational creatures; and, above all, creatures capable of God. It is this, and this alone, which puts the essential difference between men and the beasts. Thirty-nine

Such is the general structure of the human soul. In the following sections of this chapter, each part will be discussed in some detail - the understanding, the will, the principle of liberty and the capacity of God. Our concern with these various powers, and the same is true for Wesley, will be entirely practical. We are only interested in them as an introduction to his moral views and will only consider those aspects of each faculty which have direct bearing upon those views. Throughout all that lies ahead, we will be aiming at the nature of the unique excellence of man according to his place in the great chain of being.
II. The Human Understanding

To the first of the "higher principles" in man which constitute the soul, Wesley usually applied the name "understanding" rather than reason "because the word understanding is less equivocal." Of course, the term "reason" did have widely varying meanings in his day. Wesley himself sometimes uses it to refer to the eternal relations in the universe or the eternal fitness of things. Other times he meant by it rational argument or the purely discursive faculty in man. For the most part, however, he uses "reason" to indicate the higher cognitive powers -in general, that is, the understanding.

Reason is much the same with understanding; it means the faculty of the human souls; that faculty which exerts itself in three ways, by simple apprehension, by judgment, and by discourse . . . The faculty of the soul, which includes these operations, I here mean by the term reason.41

For this division of the rational powers, Wesley is indebted to the peripatetic Scholastics in whom he was thoroughly saturated. After reading the Essay on Human Understanding, he observed that "The operations of the mind are more accurately divided by Aristotle than by Mr. Locke. They are three, and no more: simple apprehension, judgment and discourse."42

There are, however, other functions of the soul and body which, if not properly a part of these "higher powers" of the understanding, are yet so closely related that neither apprehension, nor judgment, nor discourse can be comprehended
without them. These other functions are sensation, imagination and memory. They may be "lower" because of their more intimate connection with the body. Wesley mentions all six of these faculties together in one discussion where he is attempting to distinguish the mental powers from those which are purely physical. He says,

I find something in me that thinks . . . something which sees, and hears, and smells, and tastes, and feels: all of which are so many modes of thinking: It goes further. Having perceived objects by any of these senses, it forms inward ideas of them; it judges concerning them; it sees whether they agree or disagree with each other; it reasons concerning them, that is, imposes one proposition from another; it reflects on its own operations; it is embued with imagination and memory; and any of its operations, judgment in particular, may be subdivided into many others."

It is obvious that Wesley thought in the framework of the faculty psychology of the day, which associated with every distinguishable operation of the mind a corresponding power or faculty. Each term employed refers both to the capacity itself and to the particular activity of the capacity. Furthermore, each general power, as for instance the imagination or judgment, has perhaps several functions which can be discerned. As Wesley said above, any of the mind's operations "may be subdivided into many others."

Anyone who wishes to comprehend the mind of the founder of "the people called Methodists," or understand the way he viewed Christian thought and practice, must have some grasp of his conception of these various operations of the human understanding. It is our intention now to attempt at least a preliminary comprehension of Wesley's conceptions of the
functional nature and interrelations of these six major mental powers: discourse, judgment, apprehensions, memory, imagination and sensation.

A. Simple Apprehension

The natural place to begin our scrutiny of the intellectual powers is with simple apprehension. As a matter of fact, for our special purposes, this is perhaps the most important of the mind's faculties and will remain the focal issue in this whole discussion on the rational part of the soul. Before we begin, it might be of help to point out that this consideration of Wesley's ideas on sensation and perception will not only make it further obvious that he was greatly influenced by the new Cartesian philosophy, but it will also clearly indicate that he had absorbed much of the sensational psychology of the century. Locke particularly affected him, directly as well as indirectly.45 One might add that his schooling in the systems of the Aristotelians, and his rather intimate acquaintance with the Stoics, had well prepared him for these developments.

Wesley used the terms "simple apprehension" and "perception" synonymously. "It seems," he said, "that Mr. Locke only gives a new name to simple apprehension, terming it perception."46 "Simple apprehension is barely conceiving a thing in the mind, the first and most simple act of the understanding."47 It is the capacity of the mind to be conscious of or to perceive whatever object is presented to it from whatever source and, theoretically, without any judgment entering in. Or again, simple
apprehension refers to the elementary intellectual act of awareness.

Wesley held to a representational view of knowledge. "Objects do not strike immediately on the soul . . . She only receives impressions by interposed mediums." From the impressions given, the apprehending power forms ideas or mental images which are the proper objects of the mind. Furthermore, all these ideas in their uncomplex form originate in sensation. The understanding "can give us no information of anything, but what is first presented to the senses". Wesley throughout intended (whether he succeeded or not is another matter) to reject the theory of innate ideas. To repeat this important conception: "All the knowledge which we naturally have is originally derived from the senses." "Our ideas are not innate", he says. The mind at birth is an empty cabinet. Man does not even naturally possess an idea of the Creator.

After all that has been so plausibly written concerning "the innate idea of God;" after all that has been said of its being common to all men, in all ages and nations: it does not appear, that man has naturally any more idea of God, than any of the beasts of the field: . . ."

Over and again, Wesley reiterated the words: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu," which he claimed was an ancient view "now universally allowed". All knowledge for Wesley finally rests in experience, and experience is sensation. This is the basis for one of his controlling ideas, "experimental faith", by which we have a "living knowledge" of God.

The core of what has been said is: Through one or another
of the sense avenues originally flowed that which is the basis of every idea we apprehend of any object related to this world or any other, having to do with either our external or internal environment.

. . . those who want any sense, cannot have the least knowledge or idea of the objects of that sense: as they that never had sight, have not the last knowledge or conception of light or colours.\(^{55}\)

This, of course, means that "there is a great difference between our senses, considered as avenues of knowledge"\(^{56}\) and that these senses are manifold.

B. External Sensation

The source of all sensation through which we know the external material world are the five common physical senses which Wesley understands and orders after Aristotle, beginning with the lowest and grossest, touch, and moving up through smell, taste and hearing to sight, the highest, most extensive and refined of all the outer "inlets of knowledge." As we have said, these senses mediate to the mind all objects of the material world. The external object acts upon the outer sense organ causing a disturbance which is transmitted, by the flow of animal spirits, along the nerves to the sensorium,\(^{57}\) which is the physical seat of the soul residing in the brain.

. . . in every sensation there is, one; an outward object; two, its action on the organ of sense; three, a perception of it in the mind. The action of the object on the organ, is by means of the nerves communicated to the brain. And then, not otherwise, the perception follows.\(^{58}\)
This movement of the nerves produces an impression on the brain which, by the laws of vital union and reciprocal action, produces a like impression on the soul stimulating the apprehending power to produce an idea. "... the nerves being variously agitated by the objects, communicate their motions to the brain, and to these impulses the perceptions of the soul correspond ..."59

There is a double operation in the formation of all single ideas; the bodily act of sensation and the mental act of apprehension. They are two separate functions knit together in one process;

God having so closely connected the soul and the body that on certain motions of the body, (if conveyed to the brain by means of the nerves) certain perceptions of the mind always follow.60

Furthermore, the mind is both passive and active in her role in perception - that is, in this operation by which simple ideas are received. It is passive in that it is wholly dependent upon sensation which produces the imprint, so to speak, on the soul. As a matter of fact, there are really two sides to the activity of sensation: the physical impression and the spiritual impression received by it. The mind is passive in all of this. Every sensation, of whatever sort, is a pure given. It is just there; encountered, if you will. And this is extremely important to Wesley's thought. At this point, at least, he represents an old and typical British empiricism and would have understood the empirical premise of Hume's epistemology.
Yet the mind is "not altogether" passive in perception. Indeed, it plays a very active role. It looks down upon the impression apprehending it, forming ideas of what is presented. "In many cases," Wesley goes so far as to say, a man "may or may not receive the impression; in most he may vary it greatly." In another activity of the mind in the perceiving operation, which is even more significant for Wesley's thought, is the "principle of assent." In the mind's perceiving, there is a kind of affirmation or acceptance of the presentation. A part of what is meant by this is that we assent to the reality or truth of the object presented. It is an expressed confidence that there is a reasonable correspondence between the image in the mind and the object represented by it. Along with Descartes, Wesley spoke of "clear and distinct ideas" as being the ground for such assent. All representational systems in which one does not directly apprehend the external object, are faced with the problem of the existence of such objects. Wesley is convinced, however, that any object, clearly and distinctly apprehended, faithfully represents the object which occasioned the idea. A conviction of the existence of the object appears to be given with the apprehension of it. We simply trust our senses, so Wesley claims, and, if we do not or cannot, we "must necessarily sink into universal skepticism.

This "principle of assent" has another characteristic, which is in some way related to perception, that ought to be noted at this point. It is an element which, in some, if not all, acts of apprehension, might be described as a gearing-in of the soul.
This ought to be no surprise, for to separate out any one operation from the rest is an abstraction. None of the mental powers function in sheer isolation as we shall have occasion to note time and again. Assent, in this sense, connotes the idea of a determination of the self relative to the object apprehended. This, of course, introduces the actions of judgment, will and liberty into simple apprehension making it not quite so simple after all.

To return to the main issue one moment longer: Wesley's fundamental understanding of the nature of faith, as we shall see more clearly later, definitely presupposes both an active and passive side to apprehension. Faith for him is sense perception defined as the "evidence and conviction" of a certain class of objects. The word "evidence" points to the passive role of apprehension; that is, to the naked givenness of the impression. Conviction, on the other hand, indicates the active role of the mind in the three senses listed above.

Although the detailed study of faith must wait for another chapter, the mention of it here, since it is an inner sense of the soul, serves to introduce us to the next class of senses through which the soul receives its ideas. It is to be noted that what has been said in this section about the function of the apprehension relative to external sensation, is also true in the case of internal sensation.

C. Internal Sensation

The views of the Scottish Moral Sense School made a deep impression upon Wesley's mind. He read both Shaftesbury and
Chapter one mathews

Hutcheson. The latter's ideas, especially, can easily be recognized in many of Wesley's writings. Certainly Wesley accepted Hutcheson's disposition to refer "every determination of our mind to receive ideas independent of our wills" to a particular sense. If one is clearly and distinctly aware of impressions which are not mediated by some one of the external "inlets", he must account for them by other senses. We have, Wesley believed, vivid impressions of ideal and spiritual beings; of inner states of our own being; and of interpersonal relationships, the reality of which we cannot doubt. Obviously, these impressions did not originate in the physical senses, so "seeing that all our ideas...originally come from our senses, it is certainly necessary that...[we] have senses capable of discerning objects of this kind". Such senses, according to Wesley, we do have. The activity of those faculties is what he meant by internal sensation. "Seeing, feeling, joy, grief, pleasure, pain are ideas," says Wesley, "even as sticks and stones which are perceived by the mind are ideas. Both are rooted in sensation, outer or inner. In the operation of internal sensation, the soul or mind, by inward powers, impresses upon itself (not perhaps without the aid of the body) certain images which it then perceives and forms ideas of by the apprehending power.

There are various kinds or classes of these inward senses as there are various kinds of external senses. Whatever the exact number matters little; Hutcheson sometimes listed twelve and sometimes five. Almost any operation of the soul, including the
lower appetites, might be considered, according to this view, a sense. Locke's conception of reflection, the power of the mind to reflect upon or to he aware of its own operations, is certainly an inner sense for Wesley, because it is an avenue of knowledge of what goes on in the mind. Again, there are in the human constitution certain innate modes of feeling or natural desires which are unique capacities of the soul to "relish and distinguish particular objects appropriate to them. These also are the source of ideas. For instance, the self has the natural capacity to distinguish, desire and enjoy the approval of other personal beings. This is a sense of honor or praise. Perhaps man has an innate disposition of sympathy for fellow creatures, if so, this too is an internal sense.

A whole cluster of internal senses are closely connected with the imaginative power. These were, by many writers in Wesley's age, discussed under the idea of taste. He joined in the discussion himself with a little essay called Thoughts on Taste, published in 1780. In this work, he includes among the inner senses, a sense of beauty, a sense of the sublime, a sense of curiosity, and a sense of abstraction. He also speaks here, as he does in a few other places, of the moral sentiments; that is, of a public sense and a sense of benevolence by which we distinguish and delight in genuine virtue and the well-being of our fellows.

It has not seemed necessary to do more than list these various faculties because they will all be dealt with again in another context. It might be illuminating at this point,
however, to allow Wesley to speak somewhat at length for himself out of his essay referred to above.

Taste is that...internal sense, which relishes and distinguishes its proper object. By relishes, I mean, perceives with pleasure...and as various as those objects are, so various are the species of taste. Some of these are objects of the understanding. Such are all speculative truths; particularly those of a metaphysical or mathematical nature. So we say, a man has a taste for metaphysics; which is more than to say, He has judgment therein. It implies over and above, that he has a relish for them; that he finds a sweetness in the study of them;...Another species of Taste, is that which relates to the objects that gratify the imagination. Thus we are accustomed to say, a man has a taste for grandeur, for novelty, or for beauty: meaning thereby, that he takes pleasure in grand, in new, or in beautiful objects, whether they are such by nature or by art...But is there not likewise a kind of internal sense, whereby we relish the happiness of our fellow-creatures, even without any reflection on our own interest, without any preference to ourselves...May we not likewise observe, that there is a beauty in virtue, in gratitude, and disinterested-benevolence? And have not many at least a taste for this? Do they not discern and relish it, wherever they find it?.."

Finally, Wesley believed that there is another class of inner senses in the soul of man through which he has knowledge of "God and the things of God". Here he went beyond Mr. Hutcheson. Wesley was convinced that we have or can have simple ideas or impressions of objects relating to "another world." These "images" are given, as all experience rests on the given. Since the given is in sensation, however, it is "necessary" to have senses capable of discerning objects of this kind: not those only which are called natural senses...but spiritual senses...a new class of senses...not depending on organs of the flesh and blood, "to be the evidence of things not seen", as your bodily senses are of visible things; to be avenues to the invisible world, to discern spiritual objects, and to furnish you with ideas of what the outward "eye hath not seen, neither the ear heard.""
The external senses can only mediate objects of the temporal order. They are not capable of directly furnishing the mind with ideas of things of the spiritual world. Some understanding of that world can be gained indirectly from the outer senses by inference. But it is both so meager and uncertain, so imperfect and obscure that "it is all a mere enigma still." Consequently, where the spiritual senses are not functioning, there is

scarce any knowledge of the invisible world...scarce any intercourse with it. Not that it is afar off: No:...it encompasses him round about. The other world, as we usually term it, is not far from every one of us. It is above, and beneath, and on every side."

Yet the man whose special "faculties suited to things invisible" are asleep, discerneth it not. Wesley, as noted earlier at times, used the term "faith" to designate both the faculty and operation of "spiritual sensation". "It is with regard to the spiritual world what sense is with regard to the natural. It is the spiritual sensation of every soul which is born of God." Wesley is saying that as all genuine knowledge of the natural world is derived from sensation so all genuine knowledge of the "supernatural" realm comes from sensation. Furthermore, we can be just as sure of the existence or reality of the object in one case as in the other.

Since this very important part of Wesley's thought will be the special object of attention in a whole chapter later on, these few remarks suffice for the present. The essence of what Wesley is saying in this whole matter of inner sensation is that we have other kinds of experience than that associated with the
outer senses and which is just as given. Through such experience, the mind is furnished with classes of ideas, the reality of which we have no more reason to doubt than we have to doubt the reality of any idea in our minds. Call these experiences intuitions, immediate awareness or by any other name, the reality is there. Wesley spoke of it in various ways himself but generally in the manner described above.

Simple apprehension for him was both a passive and active power which perceives, forms ideas of impressions made on the soul by internal sensation as well as by the outer senses. Furthermore, when these impressions, of whatever source, are clear and distinct, it gives to them the assent of our being. There are, however, capacities other than sensation that play a part in simple apprehension; namely, imagination and memory. These call for a brief consideration.

D. Imagination and Memory

The imagination and memory along with sensation we have called the lower powers because of their more direct relation to the body which distinguishes them from the purely mental activities of perceiving, judging and reasoning. All three of the lower faculties seem to be, in part at least, physical phenomena. This is likely more true of sensation and imagination than it is of memory in that it alone of the three, so Wesley thought, will survive the separation of soul and body at death.74 Regardless of what their exact nature may be, neither the one nor the other can function without the aid of some one or more of the bodily organs. It is probably that both imagination and memory result
"from the motion of animal spirits, through those traces which were made in the brain, while the outward objects were present." Perhaps both are involved in presenting objects to the apprehension, although it might be more accurate to say that they represent Objects to the mind, since that presentation is indirect rather than direct.

Any attempt to discover the fine discriminations Wesley may have made between these powers, if he made any, would be of little value to the ends of this discussion. As a matter of fact, he speaks of the memory as being "nearly allied to the imagination." The important thing is that the two of them account for at least four different operations related to apprehension: first, the preserving before the perceiving faculty sense impressions after the objects which occasioned them have ceased to exist in sensation; second, the "treasuring up" of ideas of all kinds from whatever source by which is built "a fund of knowledge which increases in richness every day;" third, the returning of ideas or images, after once having been stored in the memory, to the apprehension by idly remembering, in which the mind is more passive, or intentional "recollection," in which the mind is wholly active; fourth, the operation of mixing and combining together images once presented by sensation in a thousand ways to form new images which may or may not correspond to something in reality. The second and third of these functions belong more to the memory, which is primarily a conserving faculty; while the first and last are proper to the imagination.
Wesley shared with his contemporaries a special interest in the last of these four operations; that is, the picture-making capacity of the imagination. It was observed earlier that the aesthetic senses of man are associated directly with this particular faculty. Wesley at times calls this class of interior feelings and desires the imagination. Whether associated or synonymous, the aesthetic senses and the combining power work together in manufacturing images of all kinds and types which play a major role in the operation of the soul. An important distinction, however, was drawn between what was termed "creative imagination" and "idle fancy". The first is the positive, constructive, deliberate use of this power of mixing sense impressions, which is the fundamental ingredient in every kind of creative activity. It forms the basis for all genuine philosophizing, oratory, poetry, music and all the arts. All genius of whatever kind depends upon "an unusually extensive and lively imagination." The term "idle fancy" has to do with the same capacity but was employed when "the imagination, without leave, starts to and carries us away hither and thither, whether we will or no; and all this from the merely natural motion of the spirits or vibration of the nerves." Without any guide or direction, the fancy drifts from one delightful scene to another, detracting, deceiving and overriding the mind; "painting vain images" which arouse all kinds of "foolish and hurtful desires." The imagination was suspect for many in the 17th and 18th centuries, and Wesley shared this suspicion. It was for him a shadowy, vague,
potentially dangerous power of the mind, because it was particularly susceptible to bodily influences; because it was capable of persuasively presenting to the mind as real objects which in fact had no correspondence in reality, because there was no end to the "proud and vain and wicked imaginations" it could hold before the passions of the soul, enticing and enslaving them.

Nevertheless, imagination is a God-given faculty and, if used as He intended,85 performs a useful purpose along with memory, the five outer senses and the various kinds of internal sensation in mediating the world within us, without us and "the world all around us" to the apprehending power of the mind where simple ideas are formed. From these simple ideas comes every object of the mind which makes possible the activity of judgment and discourse. "To be without ideas," says Wesley, "is not to think."

E. Judgment and Discourse

Thus far the first power of the understanding has been considered in its relation to simple ideas derived from sensation. In turning to the other two major powers of the intellect, judgment and discourse, we will still be dealing with apprehension, but this time with its relation to those complex ideas which are created by the mind itself out of the material supplied in sensation. It might be advisable, however, before we move on, to review the major emphases of what has thus far been said: First, Wesley thought of an idea as a mental object either present to the apprehension or stored in the memory. The only way
we have of knowing the natural and spiritual or inner and outer worlds is through these ideas. Second, these ideas of the mind are, in their elemental foray occasioned by either internal or external sensation and this is their only source. Third, the mind is both passive and active in this process of sensation. The impression upon the soul is brute given; the mind's perception of the impression is its own act. Fourth, if the given impressions are vivid and lively, the mind readily accepts them as faithfully representing the occasioning object although deception is possible here through faulty sense organs or a capricious imagination. Fifth, there is connected with the apprehending act an assent of being to the object, a determination of the soul relative to it.

All of this has to do with sensing, but the apprehension is also involved in the thinking process of the mind. There is an assent to complex as well as simple ideas. Complex ideas are the products of the judging and reasoning faculties of the mind and are both "compounded...out of" and "ultimately reducible into" simple ideas. Indeed, thinking can only take place where "ideas of sensation" are first present. Since there are no innate ideas, the products of the senses are "the foundation and raw materials" of all thought and, therefore, of all our notions and abstract knowledge.

If knowledge be defined as the apprehension of clear and distinct ideas, then man has two kinds: sense knowledge and rational knowledge. The first is direct and immediate,; it is the perception of elemental and original ideas. The second is mediate
and indirect knowledge. It is the apprehension of complex ideas which are created out of the "ideas of sensation" by the other operations of the mind. These operations, as indicated above, are Judgment and Discourse. Although they are purely mental powers, the highest and most abstract, they nonetheless operate only with "the concurrence of material organs". Thought can only take place in conjunction with the brain and, if it is injured, we think poorly, if at all.87 Indeed, "thinking is the property of an embodied spirit"; "a pure spirit, if we speak strictly, does not think at all.88"

The first of these two faculties to operate after simple apprehension is judgment. "Judgment", Wesley says, "is the determining that the things before conceived either agree with, or differ from each other."89 It is the power by which we form propositions out of simple ideas or, in the language of logic, form "compounded terms out of simple terms. It is the power that, with the assistance of memory, "judges concerning"91 ideas of sensation, separating and comparing them, enlarging or diminishing them, dividing and compounding them."92 There is both a practical and theoretical side to this activity. Judgments of good and evil are made along with judgments of truth and falsity.

The practical function of the judgment is of major significance in Wesley's moral psychology. It is intimately related to, or perhaps a part of, what Wesley means by conscience and, at the proper time92b, the two will be considered together. The important point, at the moment, is that this discerning, comparing, compounding, abstracting power - the judgment - is one
of the ways in which the mind is "furnished with a new set of ideas" widely varied in nature and, of course, complex.

Complex ideas are also born of the discursive faculty, which Wesley frequently calls reason or discourse. "Discourse is the progress of the mind from one judgment to another." It is the inferring of one thing from another; it is the power of creating a "syllogism...which is a discourse expressed in propositions". From this source is presented to the apprehension, notions or what Wesley calls "dicomplex or twice compounded" ideas. In very brief, there are several kinds of such ideas which, in terms of the degree of validity and the substance with which they deal, are designated "infallible, scientifical, certain, probable and doubtful". These can actually be reduced, so Wesley says, to two kinds of discursive knowledge: First, science or demonstrative knowledge which includes the first two categories above. In this case the concluding proposition of the reasoning process is "an evident one, which extorts assent as soon as it is understood". Second, opinion or dialectical knowledge which has respect to propositions that are, to one degree or another, simply probable.

This raises again the problem of certainty which was a lifelong concern for Wesley and is of the utmost significance to understanding his view of faith. It is now clear that there are both two sources and two kinds of ideas which the mind apprehends: simple ideas, which have their rise in the senses, and complex ideas, which are the product of the higher powers in the mind itself working upon the elemental ones. The apprehension is active in both processes in that assent must be given in each
instance to the presented idea. It has already been noted that
the clearness and distinctness of the sense image induces assent.
The same principle operates relative to complex ideas. Sensitive
knowledge, as against discursive knowledge, however, always
"carries in it the highest certainty." This is equally true of
all kinds of sensation: internal as well as external, spiritual
as well as natural. According to this system, the question is not
"whether the evidence of sense be true, but whether it be truly
the evidence of sense." Moreover, since sense knowledge "is the
foundation of all knowledge", it is "highly necessary. . .that
this evidence of sense should be so immediate, clear, and
undoubted." And "if. . .the truth of this admitted of any
doubt. . .we should wander about in endless skepticism, without
the least certainty in anything."

Clearness and distinctness are likewise the criteria of
assent in the other kinds of apprehension. When the judgment
intuits the relationship between two terms clearly and
distinctly, the apprehension assents to this judgment. When the
mind is clear and distinct in each of the steps in discursive
reasoning, it readily assents to the conclusion. Or, again, when
one remembers or recollects clearly and distinctly some
idea-stored in the memory, the mind quickly gives its assent. The
imagination, as noted earlier, is the outlaw in this process,
just because it can and does deceive the apprehending power at
this point.

This is not to suggest that perversion in the mental
processes is simply or primarily due to the imagination. All our
powers are liable of going wrong. Wesley says "our apprehension is apt to be indistinct, our judgment false and our discourse inconclusive." The word "therefore" could be inserted between each of those phrases in that remark. "Reasoning justly", he says, and this is extremely important in his thinking,

On any subject whatsoever presupposes a true judgment already formed, whereon to ground your argumentation. Else, you know, you will stumble at every step: because ex falso non sequitur verum. It is impossible, if your premises are false, to infer from the true conclusions. You knew likewise, that before it be possible for you to form a true judgment of them, it is absolutely necessary to have a clear apprehension.

This suggests one of the reasons why Wesley is so extremely critical of natural reason. It can so easily go wrong. It is not only subject to faultiness along the way in the reasoning process itself where mistakes of many kinds can be made, but also it can go wrong at the root. Either certain senses are not functioning at all or very poorly or the man does his reasoning from the wrong set of sense data or the sensations he does use are short of clarity and distinctness. In such ways the total activity of ratiocination may be falsified; although, of course, the individual may not be at all aware of it.

There is yet a deeper reason why our final confidence cannot be placed in reason. Wesley remarked, quoting Hobbes, "It is the true remark of an eminent man, who made many observations on human nature; 'If reason be against a man he will always be against reason.'" This is to say that man can manipulate his reasoning. Indeed, there is a radical bias in the mind which permeates every powers. There is a very real sense in which a man attends to and apprehends what he determines to direct his
attention to. He imagines and stores in his memory what he decides to image and store. The judging faculty is also conditioned, which becomes especially clear in its practical activity. It does not operate impartially, so to speak, but relative to what our hearts are set upon. In brief, the mind is permeated thoroughly by will. What a man loves determines his whole nature. Several other capacities of the soul must be understood in order to grasp what Wesley meant by this bent of the mind. Some light will be thrown upon it in the discussion immediately following on the appetitive powers of men.

III. Will or Affections

The soul of man is, in the second place, endued with a will which to Wesley was all he understood the Scriptures to mean by the word "heart." Sometimes he spoke of the "elective faculty" or "the principle of liberty" as the will, but, for the most part, he applied this term to what he called the "train of affections". The will and the affections are indeed the same things", he said over and again, "as the affections are only the will exerting itself in various ways."

The will is the active principle of the soul, "the only spring of action in that inward principle." It encompasses the whole appetitive nature. "We find in ourselves various appetites for good things and aversions to evil things." We are conscious in ourselves of manifold sensibilities: inclinations, propensities, appetites, desires, feelings, affections, passions. All of these together comprise the will, whatever moves us toward or away from an object. Without this faculty, man does not and
cannot act at all. The mind alone is hopelessly paralyzed; it
initiates no movement. Had it not been conjoined with the will,
man's "understanding would have been to no purpose." Of course,
the will, on the other hand, is dependent upon the various powers
of the understanding both for objects and judgments to excite it
to action and for general guidance and control. Without such
assistance, it is blind, capricious thrust.

Like all spiritual principles, the appetitive power is
dependent on "animal frame". "...the soul can no more love than
it can think, any otherwise than by the help of bodily organs." Although mental and physical feelings are not the same, it is
impossible to have one without the other. In the great debate
between the materialists and spiritualists as to whether the
sensibilities primarily reside in the body or the mind, Wesley,
of course, sided with the spiritualists. Nevertheless, these
sensibilities, as well as most if not all the functions of the
"higher principle" in man, were for Wesley of a mixed nature.
One might say that he almost thought of a series of corresponding
and parallel capacities in the "material substance" and the
"thinking substance". At any rate, no part of the will can
presently operate independent of the bodily machine. Although the
body "very frequently hinders the soul in its operations, and, at
best serves it very imperfectly. Yet the soul cannot dispense
with its service, imperfect as it is. . ." "

In speaking of the will, Wesley most frequently uses three
terms: affections, desires, passions. Often these are used
interchangeably. Any one of them, particularly the affections,
can refer to all the active powers, as for instance in the above statement, "The various affections are simply the will exerting itself in various ways." Actually, there is just a twofold major division in the will as Wesley understands it: the desires and the affections. The first are the innate propensities which prompt action without reference to the mind’s determination of good or evil. The second are disturbances of both body and soul which result from a judgment of good or evil relative to objects represented to the apprehension. The passions, as Wesley used the term, do not constitute a separate division in themselves but are rather the affections and desires raised to a high or undue degree.

For a complete view of the springs of action of the soul, one would have to include such powers as temperament, dispositions, habits and the like, which are also sources of movement. but these will have to wait. Our present task is to attempt to indicate what Wesley may have meant by the desires and affections and passions, which are the basic raw materials of the will.

A. The Natural Desires

The first special class of sensibilities in the will is the natural desires. These may be defined as innate capacities or propensities of the soul to suffer and to act, prior to all reflection and any previous experience, relative to particular objects and for the sake of the well-being of both body and soul. Man is so constituted by nature that he experiences some quality of pain or pleasure along with perception of sensation. To put it
another way, at least some apprehensions of the mind, originating in either external or internal sensations, are accompanied by perceptions of feeling, and these feelings directly initiate movement in the soul. These various capacities for particular agreeable or disagreeable feeling and their corresponding movements toward or away from the object with which they are associated are innate to the soul and are called the natural desires. There are various kinds of such propensities in man. The external and internal senses listed earlier form the basis for their classification. There are first the desires associated with the "pleasures of the external senses, whether of the taste, smell or touch"\textsuperscript{114} with which the physical appetites are closely related. The second are those connected with the "pleasures of the imagination. . .that internal sense whereby we relish whatever is grand, new or beautiful."\textsuperscript{115} Finally, there are that class of desires which might be called intellectual or, better, the personal senses of "honor, glory, renown." The question as to how the moral senses and that class of internal senses which Wesley called spiritual, may, in his thought, fit into this scheme will be discussed later in connection with the meaning of consciences

It has already been noted that the desiring process has both a passive and active side. It is, on the one hand, a suffering of the soul and, on the other hand, an activity of the soul. In most instances, it begins with an object present to the mind. Exceptions are the cases where some uneasiness, more or less periodically arises before any object of desire is apprehended,
blindly initiating movement toward elimination of the restlessness. This is true, by nature, of certain physical appetites and, by habit, of certain acquired cravings. In most instances, however, an object is first present to the understanding which causes or occasions the soul to suffer feelings. It is important to note that these feelings differ in kind and quality according to the capacities with which they are connected. One can speak of higher and lower pleasures; some, for example, the delights of beauty, are "infinitely more delicate than others."

The third step in this operation is desire. From the suffering or affection or feeling, action proceeds. The agreeable or disagreeable sensations raise desire to hold in view, to possess, to unite with an object, which agitates the soul to movement.

Things which are perceived by our senses, or represented by our imagination, so necessarily affect us, that we can by no means hinder ourselves from having an appetite for some and an aversion to others.

It scarcely needs to be pointed out again that all such powers as the desires, although never divorced from bodily functions, are primarily mental phenomena. Furthermore, they are not simply the creations of repeated experiences of physical pain and pleasure but special innate faculties or powers. Here, as in other instances, one and the same term, "desire", is used to refer to both a faculty and the operation of that faculty. The desires are natural capacities, as Wesley says, to "relish and distinguish" particular objects. "By relishes", says Wesley, "I mean, perceives with pleasure." Man has, for instance, a
faculty for recognizing and delighting in beautiful objects which prompts desire for them.

If the question is raised as to whether we seek by these senses the object or the pleasure which accompanies the object, Wesley would say both, although one can be so perverted that the securing of pleasure and the avoidance of pain of all and any kind tend to become the only spring of action. Wesley points to this two-in-one movement by continually linking the ideas of "loving the creature" and "loving pleasure," or the desire of "things" and the desire of "pleasures".

Wesley very frequently depreciated these "pleasures of sense", as shall become very clear in time, but the "natural desires" were not for him evil in themselves. They are natural and anything truly natural is good, although at times, to repeat, Wesley can and does let flow such remarks as "All these desires are not from God, but from the prince of this world." He always viewed them as dangerous sirens wooing the careless soul to destruction. "Every sense is a snare to us," says. This is, of course, true for Wesley of any capacity closely tied to the body which "constantly tempts us to evil." Nevertheless, these powers are implanted in man by the good God, for the well-being of both body and soul and, when kept under the check and authority of a higher, "hidden and sublime appetite", they do just that. This in no wise excludes physical delight "as some have strangely imagined." God "has inseparably annexed pleasure to the use of those creatures which are necessary to sustain the life ... given us."
To sum up what has been said: The desires are powers or propensities of our nature closely tied to the senses and to sensitivities which, when aroused, move the soul, prior to all judgment of good and evil and previous to all experience of physical pain and pleasure, relative to particular objects, which are "necessary to sustain the life. . .given us." 129

In almost every sermon, Wesley discusses these springs of action, consistently classifying them, as we have seen, with the aid of what he calls "the exact and beautiful enumeration of St. John" 130; that is, "the desire of the flesh, the desires of the eyes, and the pride of life." 131 These correspond, he feels, to the physical appetites associated with the "outward senses"; the aesthetic desires connected with the "internal sense", the imagination, and the personal propensity or the "Pride of life" "nearly the same with what the world terms 'the sense of honor'." 132 Since the natural desires play such a vital part in the moral economy of man, some further word of explanation will be given in the following pages to each of the three classes.

1. The Physical Appetites

The first class of desires are those connected with the physical senses. These Wesley refers to as the lusts of the flesh, or desires for "objects of sense" 133 and of the pleasures of the "outward senses." 134 Although Wesley includes all of the five common senses when he uses the term "desire of the flesh", he is speaking "more particularly of the three lower senses, tasting, smelling, and feeling." 135 These have a "more immediate
reference to the body and are chiefly, if not wholly, intended for the preservation of it.  

Indeed it is probable that these lower senses will cease when at death the "organs" of sense will be destroyed, their having no further usefulness.

The two higher external senses of sight and hearing play more direct roles in the next classification of desires, those associated with the imagination, as we shall see. Although they do, of course, share in mediating to the mind certain objects which arouse the physical urges.

Wesley rather consistently lists the bodily appetites as hunger, thirst, sex and the urge for bodily ease. These appetites especially depend upon the three lower, outer senses noted above. While the two are not synonymous, the appetites operate through the capacities of physical feeling, tasting, smelling. The pleasures of these external senses are related to the lower cravings, either sex, or hunger, or thirst or the craving for rest. These appetites are in several ways different from other kinds of desire. First, they are innate cravings in the soul fixed in our very nature and naturally propelling us toward their gratification. This is to say that they are periodically, at least, aroused without the mediation of an object. In such moments, a physical uneasiness appears and continues until they are satisfied by their proper objects, leaving a pleasurable sensation. The delight connected with these urges is a feeling of the soul, of course, as is true of all affections; but it is referred to as sense or physical pleasure to distinguish it from
the pleasures connected with other functions of man such as the imagination. This kind of emotional sensation is, as mentioned above, mediated to the soul through the external senses, especially touch, taste and smell.

The physical appetites are among the most powerful driving forces of the soul. When increased by repeated indulgence, they tend to take over the whole will. Yet, since they are amenable to habit, they can be moderated under the control of a higher principle and made to serve the proper ends of life.

2. The Desires of the Imagination

The second cluster of desires is distinguished from the lower appetites in several ways. First, they are connected with a class of internal senses; second, they are not naturally aroused in the absence of an object; third, their appropriate objects are entirely different; and, fourth, they involve a higher and finer quality of feeling or pleasure. The "desires of the imagination", as they are called, are really the aesthetic powers of man. Wesley usually makes a threefold division in them: the sense-of beauty; the sense of the sublime; and the sense of the novel. Man, he says, "takes pleasure in grand, new or beautiful objects, whether they are such by nature or by art. And herein there is an unbounded variety."[138]

Although these internal senses are as natural to man as either sight or hearing"[139] they are "dependent" powers. They are what Hutcheson called reflex or secondary senses because, while they are distinct and original powers of sensibility with their own unique functions, they are dependent upon external senses,
especially sight and hearing, to present objects to the mind before they can operate. It is within these primary images that the reflex sense, then, perceives its appropriate object. For instance, it is not until, say, the sense of sight holds before the mind a certain figure or scene that the reflex sense, the sense of beauty, perceives in this figure or scene its unique object, that is, the forms of beauty.

These powers are called Desires of the imagination" because of their close alliance to the "picture-making" faculty. The imagination holds the sense object in the mind after the object has ceased to exist as was indicated. It may also be that the imagination is the power which recovers sense impressions from the memory. The most important role of the imagining faculty, in regard to these senses, is its capacity to create new objects of all kinds and description in which the secondary desires may perceive and delight in their objects.

Wesley's essay on Taste has already been referred to and quoted at some length. The desires of the imagination are listed there, as well as in a score of other places in his works, as the sense of beauty, a sense of the sublime and the sense of the novel. The first of these three senses is the capacity to distinguish and enjoy grandeur, stupendousness, sublimity in objects of nature, such as the ocean, the sky, the stars, the night or in objects which are man-made as the pyramids or, again, in the fantastic creations of the imagination which have no basis in reality but which raise in us emotions of awe, wonder, terrors reverence and the like. The sense of beauty is
the innate faculty by which forms of beauty are recognized. These are to be found, Wesley says, in "the works of nature in particular" but also in those works which are additions of "art to nature; as in gardens" and in those which are "more works of art . . . representations of nature, whether in statues or paintings" or music. The sense of the novel is more difficult to describe, but man has delight in what is new, different, strange, curious. Anything frequently repeated tends to become "utterly flat and insipid." For the same reason, it would appear that this sense is a necessary addition to the other senses in this class at least, if not in every class. It must be added to beauty as well as grandeur", says Wesley, "or it soon palls upon the sense."

Although there are but three primary desires of the imagination, there are many others which are more of a "mixed natures; that is, those that are formed out of some combination of the originals. Wesley thinks this is true in the case of music and poetry. Thirst for learning also belongs in the category of mixed or complex aesthetic desires. The study of "languages", "history", "experimental and natural philosophy", as well as "mathematical and metaphysical studies" have their source in the natural desires for the beautiful, the grand and the curious. This does not mean that, because these desires are complex, they are not naturals The desire for knowledge, Wesley says, is a "universal principle"

There are, however, artificial aesthetic desires, Wesley believes, such as whims for one thing or another which delight
us. These can become so fixed in our nature by habit that they operate as cravings very much like the physical appetites and when full-grown warp or stifle every other power of the soul.

Although subject to such disorders, as are all other faculties, the desires of the imagination are in no wise to be despised; neither the powers themselves nor their objects nor their particular pleasures. On the contrary, when under proper regulation, "they are much to be desired:" and that on many accounts. It greatly increases those pleasures of life, which are not only innocent but useful."148

3. The Personal Propensity

The third and last class of natural desires is pointed to in "that uncommon expression. . .the pride of life"149 also termed "the sense of honor" or "the thirst for praise". This sense or desire is a capacity to recognize certain attitudes taken toward the self by other personal beings that arouse corresponding pleasurable sensations and propel one to seek such attitudes and to shun their contraries. In one place he defines it as "a desire and love of praise; and, which is always joined with it, a proportionable fear of dispraise."150 It is that whereby we are determined to delight in the love, esteem, and good opinion of others and to be disturbed and uneasy when we are despised and thought ill of.

Such a "sense of honor is as natural to man as the sense of tasting or feeling."151 It is, Wesley thought perhaps the highest and undoubtedly the most powerful of all the natural desires in the human constitution. He says in one place that the thing
which men of the most elevated spirits have preferred before all the
pleasures of sense and imagination put together; . . . is honor, glory,
renown. . . It seems that hardly any principle of the human mind is of
greater force than this. It triumphs over the strongest propensities of
nature, over all our appetites and affections. 152

Apparently man is so constructed that he can scarcely exist
without the appreciation of others. He innately desires the
approval of his fellow creatures, and he has pleasurable
sensations of a most desirable kind when he possesses such. On
the other hand, he fears the disapproval of man and is acutely
pained when such an object of consciousness is present. This
propensity, says Wesley, "in plain words, is the seeking the
honor, the 'applause', 'admiration', 'glory' which comes of men." When this is pursued in a more pompous ways by kings, or
illustrious men, we call it 'thirst for glory'; when it is sought
in a lower way, by ordinary men, it is styled, 'taking care of
our reputation'." 153

The object of this desire, honor bestowed upon the self by
another, raises two issues: first, the self's idea of the kind of
a self that is worthy of honor; second, the matter of what
constitutes the basis of honor in the eyes of the other before
whom we live. Since this propensity, as such, is not interested
(if we may speak in such a fashion) in anything but the approval
of the other, the first problem isn't an immediate concern.
Ultimately, it is, of course, as will be seen when matters
pertaining to the proper organization of the moral life are
discussed. The second issue, on the other hand, is of immediate
significance. For, in order to attract the honor and praise of
men, the self must embody or possess those qualities or objects
which the men before whom it lives deem worthy of such attitudes. This gives rise to the many secondary desires associated with the "pride of life." What men regard as worthy of honor varies greatly in detail according to time and place, but they all may be summed up in such ideas as "grandeurs pomp and power." These men desire and strive after for the sake of praise, forming in themselves derived desires which directly move the soul. Thirsts are developed for "clothes, houses, furniture, equipage, manner of living", anything at all "which generally procures honor from the bulk of mankind." There is literally nothing, Wesley is persuaded, that a man will not strive after - possessions, learning, authority, even a show of virtue - in order to satisfy his unquenchable "thirst for praise." Perhaps no one thing so absorbs the natural man as wealth. Wesley wrote time and again on the craving for riches - which was the source of so much ignorance, vice and misery in the world, tracing it back to the innate desire for acceptance or esteem.

It is obvious, even to a casual reader, that Wesley saw this propensity as perhaps the most dangerous of all the powers of the soul. Frequently he talks as if the capacity itself is evil and, therefore, is to be literally torn from the soul. Yet Wesley always speaks to situations and in each one he tends to overstate himself. In other contexts, Wesley saw the desire for esteem as good, providing such desire for and delight in the honor and approval of others was based upon the prior approval of God. This, however, carries far beyond our present concerns.

4. Mixed or Acquired Desires
Chapter one mathews

There are other fundamental propensities of the human soul which are termed desires such as the desire for happiness, the desire for virtue, the desire for the well-being of others, and the desire for God. These are, however, in one way or another, distinct from the sensibilities here being discussed, as will become clear shortly. Excepting these "higher" thrusts, all of the natural desires of man may be subsumed under one or the other of the classes outlined above: physical appetites, aesthetic desires, personal propensity. It remains only to enlarge a little on two matters which have already been suggested several times before. First, the root desires may be and are, in each individual, mixed together in a thousand combinations. Second, these combinations, through repetition, become desires in themselves. These are called secondary derived, acquired, unnatural, artificial desires. When they become fixed in our nature, they are termed 'habits" and are about as permanent and maybe more powerful than their originals. They become as second nature to us. It appears that these artificial desires arise when we become conscious that some particular object is a means to the gratification of one or another of our natural desires. Through repeated experience, the object itself is associated with certain feelings and hence becomes an end in itself, an object directly sought for its own sake.

Such desires can emerge out of any one of the natural desires, as the craving for tea out of the physical appetites, or the madness of collecting butterflies out of the desires of the imagination, or the thirst for fame compounded from the personal
propensity. Or, again, certain secondary desires may be the product of all the classes of natural desires at once. Although many examples of such a complex disposition could be cited, the acquired desire for money, already mentioned, is perhaps the best illustration of these tendencies in the desires. It arises from the desires as a means to their gratification; it is a mixture of all classes of desires, and it becomes a powerful and independent end in itself, capable of upsetting the whole inner constitution of man. Wesley asks, after having discussed all of the various human drives,

To which... is the love of money to be referred? Perhaps sometimes to one, and sometimes to another; as it is a means of procuring gratifications, either for "the desire of the flesh", for "the desire of the eyes", or for "the pride of life". In any of these cases money is only pursued in order to further an end. But it is sometimes pursued for its own sake, without any farther view. One who is properly a miser, loves and seeks money for its own same. He looks no farther, but places his happiness in the acquiring or the possessing of it. And this is a species of idolatry... indeed the lowest, basest idolatry of which the human soul is capable.157

The last sentence, in which idolatry is mentioned, is a significant note upon which to bring to a close this discussion of the first class of the sensibilities of the soul which comprise the will. For it is the natural desires which, according to Wesley, above all else among the internal powers, tempt or propel men to forsake their proper end. These innate urges are good and necessary for the well-being of soul and body. Yet they also play very major roles in that over-all perversion and destruction of man that Wesley terms "love of the world". Never satisfied, never at rest, they appear to be the chief activating powers of the will, more basic and dynamic than the next class of
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sensibilities to which they are closely related, the human affections.

B. The Affections and the Passions

It is difficult to draw a sharp line between the desires and the affections for they are both functions of the general inclining power or will. The term "affections," defined as anything which affects and propels the soul toward or away from an object, includes, of course, all of the motive powers. There are, however, so Wesley believed, affective states and springs of action distinguishable from the natural desires, which are more properly termed the affections.

The affections or passions (these words are often used synonymously by Wesley) may be described as perturbations or feelings of the soul, closely associated with bodily functions, which arise from a Judgment of the understanding relative to an apprehended object and issue in the movement of the soul toward or away from that object.¹⁵⁸

Although the affections are innate tendencies by which "we incline to good and have an aversion to evil", they are not propensities which are directed toward particular objects as is the case with the desires. They are, rather, movements of the will which depend upon the practical reason's determinations of good or evil. Potentially any object present to the mind through any external or internal sense, is an object of the affections. Yet bare apprehension of an object does not arouse them. The perception must be accompanied by a judgment of Good or Evil, profitable or injurious, agreeable or disagreeable, according to...
same principle of the mind, before these feelings and movements occur in the sensitive nature. This is to say that the affections naturally have three elements: judgment, feeling, and impulse; while the desires, by nature, have only the last two elements.

Like the natural desires, the affections have a passive side and an active side; both emotional states or feelings and impulses or desires are involved. In their operation, there is first an impression upon the soul. The soul is said to suffer, to be modified or perturbed. Feelings are aroused. Secondly, from this suffering, desires are raised which initiate movement toward or away from, as the case may be, the object of value or disvalue in the mind.

All that has been said thus far implies that these powers have their seat in the soul. This is true but, as usual, something further must be said. The affections, like the other faculties, are of a mixed nature. Every alteration of the soul, due to the laws of vital union, produces a change in the spirits and fluids of the body. These bodily functions, in turn, influence the soul. Wesley opposed any mechanistic-materialistic view which made the passions wholly or primarily commotions of the body. Although he understood that the role of the physical in the affections is particularly significant, the mind, the judgment, initiates this movement. The soul is first modified (modifies itself, if you like), which then modifies the body, and is, in turn, modified further by these physical modifications. In this way, the body can and does influence the soul; and, once these material counterparts of the affections are aroused, they
are never wholly under the control of the soul; indeed, by habit or sudden awakening, they may get completely out of hand. So bodily states always attend upon states of the soul, but the latter are not reduced into the former. There is little doubt but that he would subscribe to Beattietas view at this point,

Joy and sorrow belong properly to the mind while pain and pleasure belongs to the body. There may be bodily pain without sorrow and bodily pleasure without joy and there is maybe no sorrow without Pain and Joy without pleasure. Only when the soul chooses bodily pain and pleasure as the criterion of good and evil does joy and pleasure, pain and sorrow amount to the same thing.\textsuperscript{161}

It is only when the rule of judging is Worldly pleasure" that the physical side becomes the determinant of the mental. Regardless of the rule of Judgment employed, the affections will always be, even unto death, "clogged with flesh and blood," as Wesley puts it.\textsuperscript{162}

If it be objected that it still hasn't been exactly indicated just what Wesley understood these powers of the soul to be, the objection must be accepted. Wesley himself couldn't say exactly what the affections are any more than he could say exactly what the natural desires are. We are conscious that they are unique changes in the soul just as we are conscious of reasoning. Beyond this, it is difficult to go. The affections are, in brief, elemental capacities of the spiritual nature as pain and pleasure may be elemental in the body.

The exact number of these feelings and impulses is a problem perhaps beyond resolution. We are aware of a great variety. Efforts have frequently been made in history to reduce the many and complex to a relatively few cardinal passions from which all
the rest take their rise. We have differed widely, however, as to the exact number of these originals and as to schemes of classifying them. Some, as the Stoics, have held that there are four cardinal affections: delight and desire, grief and fear. Others have believed that there are five, six, seven, eight or eleven primitive ones.

Sometimes Wesley lists together eight passions or affections: love and hatred, joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, hope and fear. He further divides these in terms of the present and the future: 

"[love and hatred, joy and sorrow, respecting present good and evil; desire and aversion, hope and fear, respecting that which is to come."

On other occasions, he lists only six parent affections: desires and aversions, joy and sorrow, hope and fear. Wesley has here dropped love and hatred which is understandable since he consistently breaks down love into desire for and delight in an object. Hatred, according to this division, would be a mixture also - that is, sorrow in and aversion to something. One might be justified by using Wesley's present and future" categories in reducing the total number of root affections to four. Love would be a mixture of desire and joy, hatred of aversion and sorrow, respecting present good or evil; while hope and fear would be respectively mixtures of joy and desire, sorrow and aversion relative to anticipated good or evil. This would leave desire and aversion, delight and sorrow as the four elemental passions beyond which one cannot go and out of which all the affective states originate.
This perhaps makes it appear that behind all our affectional character are two basic mental principles or powers, delight-desire and sorrow-aversion, which are love and hatred, respectively. Both of these are forms of appetite which is the essence of will. They might be defined as follows, taking our departure from a definition given by Wesley. ". . . the very nature of grief. . . "166 Joy would then be an easiness, a pleasurable or grateful sensation in the mind on the apprehension of some present good. Aversion and desire would be the movement attendant upon these feelings of sorrow and delight. This fits in with Wesley's views, expressed in his remarks on Locke's essay, that the will is moved by our "desire to enjoy pleasure, as much as to avoid pain."167

Actually, whether the primitive affections be eight, four or six matters little. Whatever the original number, they combine to form basic secondary affections which become like the Primary ones in strength and aptness. Furthermore, this mixing and combining seems never to end until the derivative feelings and impulsions are almost beyond enumeration and complex beyond all hope of disentanglement. Many such powers that we are at least vaguely aware of do not even have a name. These secondary affections were usually termed Tempers or Dispositions in Wesley's day. When fixed by repetition, they become habits in their bodily as well as mental aspects. They are then independent powers capable of overriding all other guiding and impelling principles. Example of such secondary affections would includes
gratitude, pity, resentment, malice, confidence, envy, contempt, and so on ad infinitum. Be will have occasion in another chapter to deal with these tempers more in detail.

Perhaps it would be illuminating, as well as serving as a summary of what has been said thus far, to look at the whole affective process involved in one of the tempers. It has hitherto been observed that there are three main elements in an affection: judgment, feeling and impulse. By oversimplifying and slowing down the process in, say, the disposition of gratitude, these three elements will become clearer. First, an object is present in the apprehension, an act of another being in which something has been freely given to the self. This is a very complex awareness, to be sure, but let us center our attention, as far as possible, on the gift itself. Secondly, the judging faculty makes some determination relative to this object that it is good, beneficial, valuable or agreeable, according to some standard in the mind. Thirdly, this apprehended judgment modifies the physical organism affecting the fibers or grooves of the brain, which releases the vital fluids of the body and produces agreeable sensations. These sensations, in turn, modify the soul, affecting some quality of feeling relative to the valued object, which we call grateful. Such feelings are some complex mixture of the primitive affections, but they are unique in that they are directly related to this kind of an apprehension. If the object were altered, there would be different kinds or shades of feeling. For instance, feelings would vary according to whether the benefactor were God, man or beast. Finally, the consequence
of such "sufferings" of the soul, that is to say of the grateful feelings aroused, is an impulse, an urge, a desire to reciprocate. Which then complete the process by tending to the issue in appropriate actions intended to please the benefactor.

Gratitude may then be defined, as Wesley defines it, as delight in benefits received with a desire to reciprocate. It is obvious that had the mind judged the object to be evil, quite another process would have been initiated which could not bear the name "gratitude" but rather some such label as "anger" or "resentment." To hold on to our example a moment longer, it is important to realize that the feelings described in the illustration, although derived, are positive entities which can be recognized and given the name "grateful." They are just there in themselves as much as any originals. This is true also of the impulses which cannot be separated from the feelings. Again, these feelings and desires can become fixed habits of the soul which are designated by the same term, gratitude; or their opposite tendencies, ungrateful feelings, can become set habit in the will which is called "ingratitude."

The subject of the human affections occupied the attention of Wesley for three-quarters of a century. Although he wrote no specific treatise upon them, he dealt with them, in one way or another, in almost everything he wrote. It is difficult to know exactly how he may have thought on many of the details of this subject. The preceding discussion, however, draws the main lines. More can and will be said about this class of sensibilities, especially about the various ways Wesley; characterizes them:
such as, rational and irrational; virtuous and vicious; natural and unnatural; harmful or beneficial; malevolent or benevolent; holy or unholy; easy or uneasy; calm or violent. A discussion of what is involved in these distinctions must, for the most part, wait for another context. Some light, however, will be thrown upon them in the following brief observations on what Wesley meant by the passions.

C. The Passions

It was suggested in the introduction to this section on the appetitive operations of the soul that the passions are not a separate power of the will. They are such a manifest characteristic of the root powers that they can almost be treated as a distinct class of sensibilities. A passion is actually any affection and perhaps also any desire which is raised to a high or "undue" agree. The general distinction, in Wesley's time, between affection and passion was just this matter of degree.\textsuperscript{168} The one was calm and easy; the other, turbulent and uneasy. "Pathos I, says Wesley, "means a violent or impetuous affection."\textsuperscript{169}

The passions are strong and sudden commotions of the mind which are accompanied with similar commotions in the body. Sudden and powerful flows of the vital fluids are released in the body which are prone to take over the total functioning of the "higher principle" in man. The passions are, for this reason, less under
the control of the soul than any other emotive tendency. Because they are more turbulent, more capricious, more unbridled than the affections, Wesley often refers to them as irrational, vicious, brutal, harmful, unholy and unnatural. In an early letter, "Wesley speaks of 'vicious and foolish passions' as against virtuous and rational affections." This does not mean, however, as is clear in the letter, that any strong feelings are evil in themselves. Wesley confesses that he was, at one time, influenced by the Stoics on this matter, but that he came to the place where he had either to give up these "brute philosophers" or give up the Bible. Jesus himself was a man of strong feelings. His passions were always proper, but passions nonetheless. The important thing is that we become passionate about the right things -- angry at sin, for example. Both the more violent feelings and desires and the fore calm avid sedate emotions and impulses, are quite capable of perversion. Both must be placed on their "proper objects and duly regulated." This is especially true, of course, of the "brutal passions", yet even these are not to be rooted out as such. We are to be masters of ourselves, to possess our souls, says Wesley, to be "calm and serene . . . superior to all irrational and disquieting passions." The main point here is that we rule and not be ruled by our affectionate nature. This matter of the proper economy, of the soul will be the subject of subsequent chapters. The important fact, at this stage, is to understand when the affectionate powers - all of them, Secluding the passions - flow from their proper source and toward their proper end. They are "intrinsically and essentially
good and acceptable to God.\textsuperscript{172} This is the way He made us, and all that He created He called good. It is clear in all this that, in Wesley's mind, the peripatetic view of the regulation of the passions won out over the stoics' disposition to eliminate them entirely.

One further word on the passions. Wesley sometimes appears to understand these strong commotions as having primarily to do with apprehensions of real for supposed evils of a particularly difficult nature. Such ideas of adversity excite what the Scholastics called the irascible affections or the passions, for instance, "fear, horror, rages\textsuperscript{173}" to use a list from Wesley. In another place, he terms "anger and sorrow and fear\textsuperscript{174}" as the passions. Although this view influenced Wesley as we shall see more clearly later in the examination of the tempers in man, this is not the usual distinction he made between affections and passions. The concupiscible affections themselves can be raised to an irrational decree of excess which is quite capable of driving us out of our minds. In considering the Scripture passage, "I rejoice greatly," Wesley comments "St. Paul was no Stoic. He had strong passions, but all devoted to God.\textsuperscript{175}

We return to Wesley's definition of a passion as a "violent and impetuous affections. He believed that this was applicable to the natural desires as well.\textsuperscript{176} Wesley's paramount concern, if not anxiety, about these particular operations of the soul, as well as all the powers of the will, was that they be brought under the guidance and regulation of the understanding; not under mere
"natural reasons" however, but under the reason which itself was submitted to the rule of God.

We are to love and hate, to rejoice and grieve, to desire and shuns to hope and fear, according to the rule which He [God] prescribes whose we are, and whom we are to serve in all things.\textsuperscript{177}

Before these matters of the proper orientation and interrelations of the powers of the soul can be considered in any detail, however, one must possess some understanding of what Wesley meant by freedom or the principle of liberty which is the next faculty of the mind to command our attention.

IV. The Principle of Liberty

"I am conscious to myself," says Wesley, Of one more property, commonly called libertyn.\textsuperscript{178} This third property of the soul, usually called the "principle of liberty", introduces one of the most crucial and yet one of the most opaque aspects of Wesley's thought. Perhaps the chief difficulty is that he raised and thought about the problem of freedom in quite different contexts and was not always, at least, conscious of this fact. Part of the time he considered it in a presuppositional fashion; that is, as a power or principle which man now, in some measure at least, possesses and uses in the formulation of character. At other times he thought about liberty not as a present possession but as a future goal to be obtained or as a value to be realized. In this sense, freedom is a state of being resulting from the formation of character which enables one to choose the good because he knows and wills the good. These two approaches, with
all the complexities existing in each, are bewilderingly mixed together in Wesley's thinking. The attempt to untangle them must be postponed until a later chapter where the second context of freedom will be considered. The present discussion will be limited, as far as possible, to the first of the two understandings of freedom: that is, freedom considered as a "distinct property of the soul."\textsuperscript{179}

A. The Free Fill Debate

Man, for Wesley, was neither simply a material machine nor a passive puppet. The human being was spirit and not "mere matter", a self-moving spirit and not just a mechanism. Again men are moral selves, responsible to some degree for their perceiving, judging, reasoning, desiring, feeling and acting; they are never merely pawns in the hands of some exterior force, be that some cosmic power or the living God. All of this is involved in what Wesley was insisting upon with his stand for freedom, sometimes termed the power of self-determination, sometimes the principle of liberty or the electing faculty, sometimes free will. Whatever it is called or however it is to be finally understood, it was for him a reality found in every human soul, given in "some measures" with life itself.

This stand, of course, cast Wesley into the midst of what was perhaps the most contentious controversy of the 18th century, that between the Neccesarians and Libertarians over free will. In the debate, he was anxious, as were most defenders of "liberty",\textsuperscript{179}
to preserve, on the one hand, his belief in the reality and
goodness of God and, on the other hand, his belief in the moral
accountability of man and the possibility of human virtue. All
types of determinism - philosophical, theological, psychological
or physiological - were to him ultimate threats to these beliefs
which were for him essential values. He therefore opposed with
vehemence any and all who held to the "melancholy doctrine of
necessity."

Those whom Wesley Saw as enemies in this issue were,
concretely, the mechano-materialists and the predestinarian-calvinists. Although great differences separated these positions,
Wesley tended to hump them all together when he wrestled with the
problem of freedom. All determinists were one in being modern
exponents of an "exceeding ancient opinion, yea near as old as
the foundation of the world" designed to excuse man from
responsibility and which was based on a logical contradiction and
involved in an inadequate metaphysic, which, if permitted to
stand, would issue in the collapse of all religion and morals and
which finally was utterly opposed to the inward reflection of all
mankind. In maintaining his case for freedom, Wesley had
no creative contribution to make but employed all of these
metaphysical, theological, moral and psychological arguments
which were common to the 18th century and represented the common
sense of by far the most people who lived in it.

Wesley felt that all necessarians, past and present,
accepted as a fundamental axiom "that man is not a free but a
necessary agent, being absolutely determined in all his actions
by a principle exterior to himself."\textsuperscript{181} Such a view for him was logically untenable and preposterous. The term "agent," as will be seen in a moment, meant for him, at the very least, the liberty of self-locomotion. It would hence violate the laws of reason to speak of a determined agent. "Liberty necessitated, or overruled, is really no liberty at all. It is a contradiction in terms. It is the same as unfree freedom: that is downright nonsense."\textsuperscript{182}

The basis for this logical criticism is found in the metaphysical reasons Wesley advanced in behalf of the doctrine of freedom. These have primarily to do with his views of motion discussed earlier. He held to the ancient view that motion is explained only by spirit and that self-motion is an essential power of the soul. Matter is entirely passive; even in its most ramified form "fire", which mediates between spirit and matter. Mechanical arrangements are to be found in nature, human and otherwise, but the force, the energy, the power which moves these, is spirit. Although God, who is the infinite spirit, is the one final source of all movement, He has given to certain beings a limited capacity to move themselves and to initiate motion. Man, as a finite spirit, has this limited freedom. In this sense at least, man is a free being, is an agent.

Far more important for rejecting the idea of necessity were the moral and religious grounds. First of all, determinism in its materialistic and mechanistic forms, tended to rule God out of this universe and hence fostered naked atheism. All forms of necessity were attacks on the character of God. They all reduced
Him to something less than the one Perfect Good and finally made Him the author of evil, "the proper cause of all sin in the universe." Although this might not be theoretical atheism, it could not help but be a source of practical atheism.

Again, the Scriptures which, according to the Libertarians, undeniably teach the fact of human freedom, would be shown to be false by the hypothesis of necessity and therefore not "of divine original." Such a thought could scarcely be entertained by most people in the 18th century who possessed an unshakable conviction that the Bible was the revelation of God and hence the truth of very truth. To question its veracity was to challenge the common sense assumptions of the age without latch life, in their imagination, would be hardly worthwhile or possible.

Secondly, Wesley believed, along with most people of the times, including many who would not subscribe to the religious views above, that without the idea of freedom, moral and social chaos would rule for both virtue and order, temporal and eternal, would be impossibilities. "If all the passions, the tempers, the actions of men, are wholly independent on their own choice", says Wesley, "then there can be no moral good or evil." Nothing is then "rewardable or punishable." He goes on to insist in the same work that without freedom

there can be nothing good or evil, rewardable or punishable . . . the doctrine of necessity . . . destroys both, leaves not a shadow of either, in any soul of man: consequently it destroys all the morality of human actions . . .; ark leaves no room for any Judgment to come, or for either rewards or punishment.
The final and most significant argument for freedom, the one which the Libertarians ultimately fell back upon, was the appeal to consciousness. It is this psychological argument that concerns us most in dealing with the faculties of the mind, for it is by the same consciousness that we know any of our inner powers. One is conscious to himself, Wesley thought, of a power of deciding and choosing even as he is aware of a power of desiring or thinking.

I am fully as certain as this, that I am free, with respect to these, to speak or not to speak, to act or not to act, or to do this or the contrary, as I am of my own existence... to deny this would be to deny the constant experience of all human kind. Everyone feels that he has an inherent power, to move this or that part of his body, to move it or not, or to move it this way or the contrary, just as he pleases. I can, as I choose, (and so can everyone that is born of woman) shut or open my eyes, speak or be silent, rise or sit doom, stretch out my hand, or to draw it in, and to use any of my limbs recording to my pleasure, as shell as my whole body.

The idea of this power of the soul is presented to our minds by internal sensation, even as an outward reality is mediated by the outward senses. If we cannot trust our senses, all of them, (and we have no more reason to trust the external than the internal senses) nothing is certain and "universal skepticism" reigns.

For I have the testimony of all my outward and inward senses, that I am a free agent. If therefore I cannot trust them in this, I can trust them in nothing. Do not tell me there are sun, moon, and stars, or that there are men, beasts, or birds in the world. I cannot believe one tittle of it, if I cannot believe what I feel in myself, namely, that it depends on me, and no other being, whether I shall now open or shut my eyes... . If I am necessitated to do all this, contrary to the whole both of my inward and outward senses, I can believe nothing else, but must necessarily sink into universal skepticism.
When we have a clear and distinct idea presented to the mind by sensation, whether it originates by the outer or inner outlets, we must assent to it. "fine God of Truth" has not "given up all mankind to a strong delusion," to believe a lie."¹⁹¹

More light is thrown on the overall backdrop for Wesley's thinking upon presuppositional freedom in his two essays, "Thoughts on Necessity" and "Further Thoughts on Necessity," than is to he found in his rewritings against the predestinarians. In both of these essays, Wesley picks out three opponents: Lord Kames, David Hartley and Jonathan Edwards. These three men represent, respectively, cosmic, physiological and psychological determinism. The manner in which he interprets and dismisses these systems well illustrates the above discussion upon what Wesley understood himself to be and how and why he became a defender of human freedom.

Kames, according to Wesley, saw the universe as "one immense machine, one amazing piece of clockwork, consisting of innumerable wheels fitly framed and indissolubly linked together. Man is one of these wheels, fixed in the middle of this vast automaton." Although man imagines he is free, "inevitable necessity governs all things and man has no more liberty, than stones."¹⁹² It is such an obvious fact to Wesley, as has already been observed, that only "spirit" can initiate motion that he quickly dismisses this view as the idle fancies of a "poor infidel," who by his own system "must plume on in the fatal whirlpool! ... without hope! without help!"¹⁹³
Hartley, the exponent of associationalism, "now adopted by almost all who doubt the Christian system," says Wesley, believed that

as long as the soul is vitally united to the body, all its operations depend on the body; that in particular all our thoughts depend upon the vibrations of the fibers of the brain, . . . In that expression, "our thoughts", he comprises all our sensations, all our reflections and passions; yea, and all our volitions, and consequently our actions, which he supposes, unavoidably follow those vibrations.

The inference of this is "the total necessity of all human actions". From what has been said earlier about Wesley's own views of the relations of the soul and body, it is manifest that he had to take the ideas of Hartley seriously. He readily admits that this conception "certainly contains a great deal of truth, as will appear to any that calmly considers it." Still this is determinism; the body rules the spirit. There is a "knot" here relative to freedom. Wesley is sure, however, that he can "cut the knots." This he does, not perhaps without a certain discomfort, by simply asserting the reality of freedom on the grounds of consciousness of freedom, of defending the character of God, and preserving virtue in the world.

The third advocate of "the melancholy hypothesis of necessity" dealt faith in this tract is Edwards from whom he quotes directly. "Actions necessarily arise from their several motives: therefore, all human actions are necessary."

In all cases the choice must be determined by that motive which appears best on the whole. But motives are not under our power. Man is passive in receiving impressions of things, according to which the last judgment is necessarily formed. This the will necessarily obeys, and outward action necessarily
follows the will. 197

This is psychological determinism. Although Wesley was very close to this view himself, as we shall see, he criticizes it here by insisting that the principle of liberty is a separate power of the soul and that this freedom operates in every internal as well as externals action. Man is not entirely passive in any of the activities of the soul - apprehending, judging, feeling, desiring. Freedom operates at each step. If it were otherwise, sinful man would either be trapped in his evil character or be simply a pawn in the hands of God. Wesley would accept neither alternative. His answer here as elsewhere, was that man was free. Nevertheless, it was perhaps this position more than any other which forced Wesley to deepen his understanding of freedom. Indeed in these very essays he almost reversed his whole position as we will have occasion to note presently.

In this setting, delineated by men like Kales, Hartley and Edwards and the counter-arguments of the secular and religious advocates of free will, Wesley took his stand for human liberty, wrestles with what it meant to be free or how such a stand fitted the events of life, particularly life in the Christian faith.

B. Empirically Considered Freedom

For Wesley the thinking substance is a unity composed of several powers or capable of exercising itself in various ways, in thinking, desiring and electing. "It seems . . . that every spirit in the universe, as such, is endued with understanding, and, in consequence, with a will, and with a measure of liberty:
and that these three are inseparably united in every intelligent nature." These powers are both inseparable and interdependent. None would be of any purpose by itself. The understanding is impotent without the will and the will is blind without the understanding. Without liberty, "a power distinct from both," "capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the motions of the body" "both will and understanding would have been utterly useless." With this view of freedom as a "distinct property of the soul," Wesley Placed himself in the historical stream of voluntarism. Whatever freedom may be, it can never be reduced into or finally determined by any of the other functions of the mind. Wesley is opposed to both intellectual and sensitive determinism. Freedom, he thinks, "is very frequently confounded with the will, but it is of a very different nature."
spontaneity or contradiction and the freedom of contrariety or choice.

1. The Freedom of Contradiction.

The freedom of contradiction points to the voluntary or executive power of the soul. "By a single act of my will, I put my head, eyes, hand or any part of my body in motion." This is the act of volition or the action of the voluntary power.

Volition is a separate and distinct function of the principle of liberty in the same way as apprehension is in the understanding and desire is in the will. Volition may be defined as the last operation of the soul preceding activity of any kind. If one thinks of all action as depending upon force or energy, volition is that which releases energy executing the act. To change the figure: volition is the meshing of gears which issues in activity. One is conscious to himself, Wesley believes, of such a triggering operation; of a "power" to do or not do; to act or not act.

I am as full certain of this, that I am free, with respect to these, to speak or not to speak, to act or not to act, to do this or the contrary, as I am of my own existence.

However, the freedom of volition is involved in more than just external actions. Wesley conceives of action as being both internal and external. External has to do with relation to the world through the body, those which involve muscle and other organs. Internal acts have to do with the various operations and interrelations of the pointers of the soul. In relation to all external activity, volition stands between the mind, plus the
will, and the outer act. Whatever role the other powers of the soul may play in deliberate external actions, actions of the soul upon the body, they are the immediate fruit of a volition. Although I have no comprehension of how I do it, says Wesley, "by a single act of my will I put by head, eyes, hands or any part of my body in motion." In the interactionism existing between soul and body, due to the laws of vital union, volition is the last mental operation as the soul moves the body. Without it, action does not take place. The freedom of contradiction means the power to open the valve and also to cut off, in any given instance, the certain influence of the soul upon the body. This is also true of the reverse procedure. It was suggested in an earlier context that volition entered into apprehension. The mind has the power to attend to or cut off a sensation presented by the physical organs.

Again, this voluntary power is capable of being exerted with regard to all the faculties of the soul, as well as all the motions of the body. The freedom here may be infinitesimal but it seems that some measure of it is present. Volition operates in theory at least wherever activity of any kind goes on and such mental phenomena as apprehensions, judgments, feelings and desires are activities. In refuting the psychological determinism of Edwards, Wesley speaks of the power "to cut off the connection" (to do or not do) "between these various internal events." In the gap between, the transition from one operation to another, the principle of liberty or volition functions. Man as agent is here disclosed. Between the sensation and the
apprehension, between the perception and the judgment, lies at least the shadow of freedom. Between the judgment and the emotion, between the feeling and the desire, lies the shadow of freedom. And, finally, between all of these betweens and the external act, again, lies the freedom of volition. This is a part of Wesley's word to all who suppose "vibrations, perceptions, judgments, passions, tempers, actions, ever so naturally follow each other," that the freedom of contradiction or volition is operative in all activity, internal as well as external.

2. The Freedom of Contrariety

The second function of the principle of liberty in man, according to Wesley, is that of choosing between good and evil, between the higher and the lower. This aspect of freedom cannot be separated from volition but they are not the same operation. Wesley distinguishes them in this fashion. Freedom of contradiction is "the power of choosing either to do or not do" while freedom of contrariety is the power of choosing "to do this or the contrary, good or evil."

There is a certain element of indeterminism in this view but it is never sheer indifference. This choice does not operate in the absence of all designs or motives. It does not function entirely in vacuity, wholly uninfluenced by present dispositions or past happenings as if a completely new beginning could be made with every exercise of choice. Quite the contrary is true. It is always a choice among alternatives. Furthermore, this liberty is not a freedom from inclination as if it operates only where there is "an equal balance of good and evil." There is perhaps always
a bias in the will, a greater urge in one direction than in another. In summary, man is not free to be without motives and not free to have unequal motives. There is neither sheer indifference nor sheer equilibrium.

Again the liberty of contrariety is present in the other operations of the soul as is the freedom of contradiction. It is present in apprehension that is, in choosing, to attend to one object rather than another. It is present in the activity of judging. So also is such choice active in feelings, in maintaining one set rather than another. In one, wherever volition is there is choice of good and evil and volition is present in every internal and external action.

The interdependence of the various powers of the soul has already been mentioned. All are active in every event. As will is present in the actions of the understanding and vice versa, so election is present in both the will and understanding and both are present in every activity of choice.

It has been indicated several times that the elements of assent or gearing in, is present in every internal act. There is a conscious adoption of feelings, of judgments, of desires, and of apprehensions. This assent points to freedom. According to Wesley every act, internal or external, is mixed with the activity of these three higher powers: understanding, will, and liberty. But none of these are autonomous. None can be reduced into the other. One does not elect save where there is judgment and desire. Freedom is a selecting power between two possibilities - and these possibilities are presented by the mind
and the will together. Freedom cannot manufacture its own motives. There is, to repeat, no absolute freedom: we cannot move every part of the body at will.\textsuperscript{214} Neither can we change our views at will. "It does not depend upon my choice: I can no more, think, than I can see or hear, as I will."\textsuperscript{215}

C. Freedom of Spirit.

Thus far, the capacity of freedom has been dealt with on only one level, like the other powers of the soul. But these capacities, and especially freedom, point beyond themselves to something which possesses or is endued with a mind and a will and a principle of liberty. This is to anticipate just a little but it seems Impossible to obtain any real understanding of what Wesley meant by freedom if it is not seen that he raised, or was forced to raise, the issue of freedom on a deeper level. The spiritual substance is not for Wesley synonymous with the activities of thinking, feeling and choosing, which have been described. There is a trans-empirical reality here. Behind, beyond, beneath, and above these processes of thought, will, and election is an "I", a self, a spirit, a core of being which manifests itself in all the powers and activities of the soul, Wesley points to this self by the term "capacity for God" which will be discussed presently at some length.

The question of freedom raised on this deeper level is this: Is the spirit of man which transcends the powers of the soul free? It appears that Wesley gives to his question a "Yes and No" answer. Man is free but this freedom is "bound", is "wounded", is
"sick." The self is essentially free but actually in bondage. This is to say that man at the core is a thrust of being or a relationship or a capacity for a fundamental relationship or thrust of being, which concretizes itself in all the empirical aspects of the soul. And when a man comes to consciousness of himself, his self is set; a thrust of the spirit has already taken place. As he discerns himself, he discovers a relatedness which expresses itself in "every power, in every faculty of the soul." Furthermore, this bent of the self, according to Wesley, is toward that which is not man's proper end. It is toward some god and not God, toward the evil and not the good. And, therefore, all that a man thinks and desires and chooses in this thrust is toward evil. Wesley insists over and over that "no child of man has a natural power to choose anything that is truly good," though in this same place he goes on to add, "And yet I know (and who does not) that man has still freedom of will in things of an indifferent nature."

Man may and does choose but it is a choosing of relative goods in the context of and determined by the thrust of the self. But he cannot choose the final good. He cannot by choices of relative goods, by devices which flow out of a radical perversion, alter the core of his being, that is, choose the truly good. To put this in Aristotelian language, man can choose among means but not among ends, for the ends are what determine the choices of means. All choices are finally for Wesley indifferent besides those in which the self and God, or our final good are involved. Relative or indifferent elections are
possible, ultimate and radical determinations are not for man as we know him. So it is that man's freedom is in bondage, that man's spontaneity is not spontaneous, that man's indeterminacy is determined, that man's liberty is choked off.

Wesley was far more Augustinian than Pelagian at this point. He was much closer to Jonathan Edwards than to many of the religious and secular humanists who opposed Edwards. At times, to be sure, Wesley could speak as we have seen, in a most optimistic fashion about the freedom of man; nonetheless, he well understood and took seriously what the advocates of necessity in his day were pointing to. All his life he agonized over the issues they raised and this just because he so deeply grasped the enslavement of the soul. He disagreed with the heart of what they were saying, for reasons discussed previously, and used all the arguments of the libertarians against them. But he appreciated much of the force of their reasoning and he could and did use their doctrine of necessity against naive professions of free will. Wesley's view of sin was too deep not to take the Necessarians seriously. The will of man, he says, "is free only to do evil; free to 'drink in iniquity like water;' to wander farther and farther from the living God." To think otherwise is to think in an unchristian way. Wesley heaped naked scorn on the self-styled learned individual who talked:

at large of his rational faculties, of the freedom of his will, and the absolute necessity of such freedom, in order to constitute man a moral agent. He reads, and argues, and proves to a demonstration, that every man may do as he will; may dispose his own heart to evil or good, as it seems best in his own eyes. Thus, the God of this world spreads a double veil of blindness over his heart, lest by any means,
"the light of the glorious gospel of Christ should shine upon it." 221

Man might be free but his freedom was ultimately bound by a thrust of the self deeper than his understanding, deeper than his will, deeper than his volitions and choosings, as we shall have occasion to see shortly. About this sickness in the care of the self, sickness in the freedom in this core, Wesley had entertained no doubts; in fact his whole understanding of man, as we find him, and of the Gospel as given, was based on this view of the perversion of man.

Freedom on this deeper level is present in a warfare between opposing intentions and inclinations which increases the closer, truly free act, approach. The following quotation, in which he speaks of the state of the man thus wakened to his danger, offers an example:

Here ends his pleasing dream, his delusive rest, his false peace . . . The shadows of happiness flee away, and sink into oblivion: so that he is stripped of all, and wanders to and fro, seeking rest, but finding none.

The fumes of those opiates being now dispelled, he feels the anguish of a wounded spirit . . . Sometimes it may approach to the very brink of despair . . .

Now he truly desires to break loose . . . and begins to struggle . . . He would fain escape; but he is . . . fast in prison . . . He resolves against sin, but yet sins: he sees the snare, and abhors and runs into it. So much does his boasted reason avail . . . Such is the freedom of his will; free only to evil . . .

The more he strives, wishes, labours to be free, the more does he feel his chains . . . the more he frets against it the more it prevails; he may bite, but cannot break his chain. Thus he toils without end . . . till at length the poor . . . helpless wretch is even at his wit's end, and can
barely groan, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"  

The sum of the contention being made is this: man according to Wesley is essentially a free being. A radical, metaphysical, transcendental freedom is at the core of his being. But this capacity to thrust himself or relate himself ultimately is already exercised when he becomes aware of himself, in terms of which his thinking, desiring, and choosing operates.

In summary, three things can be said at this time about this freedom. (1) It is a phenomenon which touches the core of what it means to be a self and to have a God. (2) It manifests itself only in the midst of inner crises which finally reach volcanic proportions. (3) It cannot operate save as a response to God's prior activity.

V. The Human Conscience.

Wesley adds to the several natural powers of the soul, which have been discussed, still another faculty that for him is quite distinct from any other capacity in man; namely, the conscience. In the sermon "The Heavenly Treasure in Earthen Vessels", it is listed with, but set apart from, all the other powers. Actual man has, or is, an "immaterial principle, spiritual nature", Wesley writes, which is first, "endued with understanding, and affections, and . . . liberty; . . . and, secondly, at that is vulgarly [popularly] called natural conscience."

Some late writers indeed have given a new name to this, and have chosen to style it, a moral sense. But the old word seems preferable to the new, were it only on this account, that it is more common and familiar among men, and therefore easier to be understood. And to Christians, it is undeniably preferable, on another count also; namely,
because it is scriptural; because it is the word which the wisdom of God hath chosen to use in the inspired writings.  

It may be that it is more difficult to unravel his thoughts concerning this power than any previously considered, for many winds of thought relative to the nature and meaning of the conscience played on Wesley's mind as he thought about this capacity in the soul of man. For instance, the Stoics' concern for awareness of the moral worth of inner states and actions the Scholastics' and Anglicans' interest in the reality and manner of knowing the moral law, the Puritans' view of the conception of an inner tribunal of judgment which makes for an easy or uneasy state of mind; the aesthetic schools' idea of an unique sense that is affected by the moral qualities of actions; and Butler's wrestling with the problem of the authority and power of the conscience.

Wesley's thinking was perhaps more directly shaped by the current ethical reaction to the egoism and conventionalism of Hobbes. Both the rational intuitionists, who were manifestations of the revival of Platonism, and the aesthetic intuitionists, who worked with the Lockean Psychology, were opposing Hobbes on both counts. Although different in some respects, these two schools equally stressed direct experience as the basis of an oral knowledge and equally insisted that the principle of benevolence was at least as much a part of virtue as the principle of egoism. Wesley took his stand at this point with both the Cambridge Platonists and the moral sense school.

The combination of all these influences, ancient and contemporary, raised issues with which Wesley consciously or
otherwise had to grapple. Is the conscience natural or super-added by grace? Is it fundamentally an intellectual or sentimental pointer? Is it an inlet of knowledge for moral ideas or the power of determining concrete actions or a judge-executing sentence upon the moral life? Is it the representative of God in the soul or can it be the voice of one of the gods? Can it be perverted or destroyed? What is its contents? How is it related to the other powers in the soul? And so on.

Of course, Wesley did not resolve these problems. He was not really interested in resolving them; although he was quite capable of boasting that, whereas tile "numberless treatises" written on the subject have "rather puzzled . . . than cleared" the issue and since "there is still wanting a discourse upon the subject, short, as well as clear" . . . "I will endeavor to supply" the defect. 225

The fruit of this endeavor is his sermon "On Conscience" where his mature thought is to be found. The main lines of his ideas can be sketched by describing first the essential operations involved in the faculty of conscience; second, the rule of judgment upon which conscience depends; and, third, the origin and perversion of its functions.

A. The Meaning of the Conscience.

The term conscience seems to be used by Wesley in two ways: in a broad and in a narrow sense. In the broad meaning, the conscience is a complex faculty (if it can be called a faculty at all) in which many of the activities of the soul have a share. In the narrower meaning, conscience refers simply to an inner
"monitor" or "tribunal" whose function is to "accuse . . . and excuse" the man relative to internal and external actions. Whichever view is finally preferred matters little for even the narrower view cannot be separated from that which is a very complex experience involving many if not all operations of both mind and will.

Whatever Wesley finally meant by the conscience, it is clear that it was for him a very complex experience. The term indicates several operations which finally involve almost every power of the soul: the internal reflective sense and the memory, the apprehension and judging faculty, a direct intuitive faculty and/or the moral, public sense, the feelings and desires, plus what is perhaps the unique core of it all "a tribunal . . . to accuse, . . . and to excuse".²²

The Latin and Greek derivatives of the word conscience imply, Wesley says, "the knowledge of two or more things together; that is, "the knowledge of our words and actions and, at the same time of their goodness and badness."²² This, as is seen from the context, is relative to a rule in the mind. But then he adds, "if it be not rather the faculty whereby we know at once our actions and the quality of them."²² Whether it is viewed more intellectually or emotionally, more as an operation of various powers or as a separate faculty, certain functions can be pointed to which are included in it.

Conscience, then, is that faculty, whereby we are once conscious of our own thoughts, words, and actions; and of their merit or demerit, of their being good or bad; and, consequently, deserving either praise or censure and some pleasure generally attends the former sentence; some uneasiness the latter.
Wesley expresses it in another place as follows:

God has made us thinking beings, capable of perceiving what is present, and reflecting, or looking back on what is past. In particular, we are capable of perceiving whatsoever passes in our own hearts or lives; of knowing whatsoever we feel or do; and that either while it passes, or when it is past, this we mean when we say, man is a conscious being; he hath a consciousness or inward perception, both of things present and past, relating to himself, of his own tempers and outward behavior. But what we usually term conscience, implies somewhat more than this. It is not barely the knowledge of our present, or the remembrance of our preceding life. To remember, bear witness either of past or present things is only one and the least office of conscience. Its main business is to excuse or accuse, to approve or disapprove, to acquit or condemn.230

The conscience for Wesley seems to have several operations: (1) the reflective power by which we know what goes on and notice that this has to do not only with behaviour but with tempers, that is to say, of both internal and external actions. These are both present and past, involving the memory as well as the reflective sense. (2) It involves a judgment or intuition of the rightness or wrongness of an act. The first is in the apprehension and then the judgment pronounces right or wrong to what is perceived. (3) There is a sense of ought with feelings of approbation or disapprobation. Wesley sums these up by saying of the conscience that

It appears to have a three-fold office: first, it is a witness, testifying what we have done, in thought, or word, or action; secondly it is a judge, passing sentence on what we have done, that it is good or evil; and, thirdly, it, in some sort, executes the sentence by, occasioning a degree of complacency in him that does well, and a degree of uneasiness in him that does evil. 231

It is clear that the core of the moral faculty or its "main business", as Wesley says, "is to excuse or accuse, to approve or disapprove, to acquit or condemn." 232

We may understand conscience to be a faculty or power, implanted by God in every soul that comes into the world, to
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perceive what is right or wrong in his own heart, in his tempers, thoughts, words, and actions. This is not just the moral reason but a separate faculty, the core of which is the accusing.

B. The Rule of Conscience.

"But", asks Wesley, "what is the rule whereby men are to judge of right and wrong, whereby their conscience is to be directed?"

It has been shown that the essence of the conscience is a "tribunal in the breast of men, to accuse sinners, and excuse them who do well." It is not usually thought of as an inlet of moral knowledge, but it does not operate except in the presence of moral ideas or a moral rule by which it "is to be directed". The next question is the source of this rule which "is found, at least in some small degree, in every child of man. Something of this is found in every human heart; passing sentence concerning good and evil, not only in all Christians, but in all Mohammedans, all pagans, yea, the vilest of savages."

Wesley speaks generally of the moral standard as a law written upon the heart of the "natural man". But what does this mean? Do we have innate moral ideas or are such ideas supernaturally infused in the soul? Are they the product of convention or the fruit of discursive reasoning or does man have a special intuitive faculty by which a moral law is perceived? Is such a law mediated by a special class of internal senses? The first two possibilities are not congenial to Wesley's way of thinking. We have seen that he rejected the view of innate ideas, no ideas of any kind are in the mind at birth. Again, these ideas are not supernaturally infused at some time after birth. Time and
again Wesley does speak of the "inner monitor" and certain other powers associated with the conscience as supernatural gifts. The ideas themselves, however, are not miraculously impressed upon the mind. That convention and reason have much to do with our moral notions is obvious to Wesley but such sources do not present clear and certain ideas and, even if it were otherwise, the question remains as to where they originally come from. It appears that man has certain innate powers of perceiving moral concepts which are the genuine and ultimate source of the law in the heart.

Wesley can think of these capacities as being more cognitive in nature or more emotional. It has already been suggested that he tried to incorporate both the intellectual and sensitive views of the conscience which were present in his day. At times, and this will be discussed more fully in the chapter on faith, Wesley thought of the "eyes of the understanding" or the "eyes of the soul", through which man intuits realities of a certain class, as moral laws. They are not innate, are not the product of discourse but are directly apprehended. Experience of a certain kind calls forth the immediate assent of the mind. Take, for instance, "That royal law, that golden rule of mercy, as well as justice, . . . a rule which many believe to be naturally engraved on the mind of everyone that comes into the world." 237 Although they may be wrong about its innateness, they are right about its being a "common notion." Man has a native capacity by which it is recognized directly as true. It commends itself", Wesley continues, "as soon as heard, to every man's conscience and
understanding; insomuch that no man can knowingly offend against it, without carrying his condemnation in his own breast." 238 The mind of man is so constituted that moral principles have a self-evidencing quality. Do not, asks Wesley, certain moral ideas "appear as soon as the understanding opens? as soon as reason begins to dawn? Does not everyone then begin to know that there is a difference between good and evil, how imperfect so ever, the various circumstances of this sense of good and evil may be?" 239

In an earlier section, Wesley's tendency, following the Scottish School, to attribute all impressions to some unique sense faculties was discussed in some detail. According to this view, man has certain moral senses by which he immediately discerns and delights in virtue. In his sermon, "On the Conscience", Wesley gives first a more cognitive description of the conscience and then adds:

Professor Hutcheson, late of Glasgow, places conscience in a different light. In his essay on the passions, he observes, that we have several senses, or natural avenues of pleasure or pain, beside the five external senses. One of these he terms, the public sense; whereby we are naturally pained at the misery of a fellow creatures and pleased at his deliverance from it. And every man, says he, has a moral sense; whereby he approves of benevolence and disapproves of cruelty. Yea, he is uneasy when he himself has done a cruel action, and pleased when he has done a generous one. 240

As has already been noted, Wesley places these senses of virtue and benevolence among the various species of internal taste. They function reflexively. When an action, state of personal conduct, is present as an object to the mind, this sense perceives in it moral qualities; for instance, the sense of beauty perceives in a mental object qualities of beauty and then has feelings appropriate to the moral object perceived. This is what Wesley
means when he defined conscience as "the faculty whereby we know at once our actions and the quality of them". Of course, this is referring to the moral sense alone rather than to both the sense of virtue and the public sense which is more properly termed the conscience.

Now whether Wesley thought of the conscience more after the intuitionists or after the aesthetic school matters little. For both were trying to ground the matter of virtue in immediate experience which offered the utmost in certainty. Together Wesley spoke of the eye of the mind through which we see the moral law or of internal senses of the soul which mediate impressions of virtue, his concern was that all of our ethical notions arise out of simple ideas directly apprehended by the mind. Here the revival of Platonism mediated by the Cambridge men and the Lockean psychology mediated by Hutcheson, met in the mind of Wesley.

A little has been hinted as to the content of the rule of the moral judgment. Wesley believed, as suggested above, that the "golden rule" is universally known and accepted. Whether from intuition or natural sensation, concern for our fellows of benevolence was close to the heart of the meaning of virtue. This is spelled out, as we shall see later, in terms of justice, mercy, and sincerity or honest dealing with others. There is no question about where Wesley stood in terms of the egoistic-altruistic debate initiated by Hobbes and still very much alive in the 18th century. In his sermon on conscience, the formula of Micah 6:8 is used to indicate the content of the natural
conscience. "He hath showed thee, oh man, what is good; and what
doeth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy,
and to walk humbly with thy God?" 242

This suggests the final point to be made relative to the
source of our judgments of right and wrong. We have been speaking
of the conscience as having to do with the sense of virtue and
the sense of benevolence. There is another sense with which it is
perhaps more intimately connected than any other; namely, the
spiritual sense or the immediate awareness of God. "It seems that
there can be no conscience, which has not a regard to God. If you
say, 'Yes, there certainly may be a consciousness of having done
right or wrong, without any reference to him.' I answer, this I
cannot grant." 243 How this may be true is something for another
chapter. Now the intention is simply to point out three inlets of
knowledge which are the basis for the accusing and excusing of
the conscience; sense of God; sense of virtue; and the sense by
which we manifest concern for others. The rule of life has to do
with God, self, and neighbor. These three hither innate inner
senses or desires are placed over against the three lower lusts
of the flesh, desire of the eyes and the pride of life. These
higher or moral powers or stings of action and the knowledge and
rule obtained from them, are the proper concerns of the inner
monitor. Together they constitute the basic raw materials of what
may be called the moral nature of man.

C. Source and Perversion of the Conscience.

If what has so far been said concerning Wesley's view of the
conscience is not to be misleading, several further issues must
be raised and commented upon at least briefly. First of all, at the beginning, it was noted that Weslev set the conscience off from the other faculties of the soul, never listing it directly with the understanding, will or the principle of liberty. It is for him a superadded capacity. After giving his definition of the "tribunal within", he says:

This faculty seems to be what is usually meant by those who speak of natural conscience: an expression frequently found in some of our best authors, but yet not strictly just. For though in one sense it may be termed natural, because it is found in all men; yet, properly speaking, it is not natural, but a super-natural gift of God, above all his natural endowments. 244

Or again in the same sermon after speaking of the conscience in the light of Hutcheson's views, Wesley makes the following comment:

All of this, is in some sense, undoubtedly true. But it is not true that either the public or moral sense, (both of which are included in the term conscience) is not natural to man. Whatever may have been the case at first, while man was in the state of innocence, both the one and the other is now a branch of that supernatural gift of God which we usually style, preventing grace. 245

The conscience in Wesley's day was just beginning to be thought of as a strictly natural power. For the most part, it was rather conceived of as a divine element in man. Such Wesleyan remarks as "all that is vulgarly called natural conscience" 246 would by no means have jarred every ear. Furthermore, Wesley himself felt the tension of the times to this faculty. On several occasions, in talking of the conscience, he dropped the remarks "whether or not this is natural or superadded by the grace of God". 247 Sugden and others have pointed out that the conscience ought not be any more singled out as a gift of grace than any other power of the soul, the mind, or the will. 248 And this is true, but what Wesley is trying to say, it seems, is that certain of our natural powers
are more directly the point of contact with the transcendent than others. This is the case with freedom which Wesley also terms a superadded power but not so much so as conscience. It is enough now simply to indicate that at these points Wesley felt that the self-before-God breaks through into the psycho-physical structure of the hybrid creature.

This introduces us to the puzzling problem of the perverted or distorted conscience in Wesley. As hinted above, this is the same perplexity faced in freedom. Perhaps the place to begin is with Wesley's comment: "There is none of all of its faculties that the soul has less in its power than this." He is pointing to the same thing when he says, "Conscience is placed in the middle, under God, and above man." Here is that which is a part of the self yet transcends the self. Least of all the faculties is it capable of manipulation. This is Butler's conscience of "manifest authority" of which he says, "Had it strength, as it has right ... it would absolutely govern the world." But Wesley differs with Butler: the conscience can be and is radically distorted. Both the understanding and the conscience, these leading powers of the soul, are polluted; consequently so is the man and all he does.

The rule by which good and right are determined is faulty. what is involved in this statement is that there is defect in the practical reason, which determines, according to the rule, the act to be done; and the inward monitor which determines whether what is done is according to the rule is faulty. And all of these are faulty because the final thrust in man is false. "Nothing can
be clear without true faith." Literally no power of the soul is plumb if the core of the self is out of gear. Wesley more than once suggests that the conscience "varies exceedingly; according to education, and a thousand other circumstances." "In every case, the last appeal must be made to our own conscience. Yet our conscience is far from being an infallible guide, as every wrong temper tends to bribe and blind the judge."  

Wesley also speaks of a "hardened conscience". It is possible to do and be precisely opposite to what is right and good "and yet not to be condemned by your own heart", "without any self-condemnation", "without any remorse", even "perhaps glorying in this very hardness of heart!" Indeed, this power meant to mediate God and the will of God can become utterly blind, a wholly false light and not only so but so rooted in man that, when truth breaks in, it erupts like a volcano.

But there is also a false light in the dark mind, which often "calls evil good, and good evil " And such a conscience is like a blind and furious horses which violently runs down all that comes in his way . . . wakened by the spirit of conviction, it [the false light] will rage and roar, and put the whole man in a consternation. It makes the stiff heart to tremble, and the knees to bow; sets the eyes a weeping, the tongue a confessing. But still it is an evil conscience, which naturally leads only to despair; and will do it effectually, unless either sin prevails over it to lull it asleep, as in the case of Felix, or the blood of Christ prevail over it, sprinkling and purging it from dead works!  

One wonders if Wesley doesn't have two consciences in man. As with freedom about which he spoke in terms of "some measure or degree", so with conscience, he speaks qualitatively - "some discernment of good and evil, with an approbation of the one, and disapprobation of the other".  

It seems as if the inward monitor becomes a slave of the actual thrust of life. That is, the end a man seeks is pleasure
and - if he sets up a rule concerning the means to that end and makes a concrete judgment relative to it - then the conscience, in service of the thrust, condemns if the judgment is not in accord with the rule or end, or if the feelings and desires or the actions are not in accord with the judgment. This is to say that the conscience becomes simply a tool of society or of the self, which relates itself to the creature, or of worldly prudence, which is worldly ends sought by worldly means with the aid of worldly maxims. If this be true, one can understand how it would rant and rave when another thrust of the self was imminent.

This would suggest that the conscience operates relative to both the final moral principles and to the practical decisions relative to them. What it comes down to is that the conscience can be manipulated to almost the nth degree, but yet it still points to God, others and virtue -- vaguely, dimly, a faint and lonely cry in a dark and deserted wilderness, but nonetheless a voice. Even though it seems to engage violently in resisting any response to its cry, it cries on. There is always that anxiety and uneasiness of another way that we are not actually what we are. At times there is some knowledge of God and some desire for Him; this is to say some existential knowledge. This makes explicit the tension. All of this is very remote and dull and feeble. But it is there. It is the faint remnant of the image. The monitor is a faint reminder that man is not what he ought to be. It is a faint but real uneasiness at being falsely related. Here we are face to face with God. This one is not said to be related to God; he neither fears nor loves Him, but this
uneasiness is there. This is the point where the transcendental self touches the empirical. Such is the "spirit of contradiction within". Such is the unfathomable nature of man and this we must deal with in the next section.

Let us summarize Wesley's view of the conscience before we move on and try to bring this chapter together. The conscience is a power of accusing or excusing the self, closely associated with pleasing and unpleasing feelings, which follows an awareness of, a correspondence to, or a contradiction between our internal and external actions. It is a moral rule in the mind which is either directly intuited or mediated by special classes of internal senses and it has to do with virtue, God and neighbor.

The practical judgment is the comparative power operating relative to the moral life. This power, like all the powers of the soul, functions in terms of the fundamental orientation of the soul. It judges in the light of what is loved, the end to which we are related. It has to do with the proper means to that end. By experience, or by convention, or from the Bible, a rule or a set of maxims is given by which the moral judgment functions. Reason also shares in this for it makes inferences and draws conclusions. But again this discursive process is under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or some other spirit -- what a man loves. The final practical judgment is assented to and actions follow.

The conscience is a power that operates after the judgment, condemning and excusing. It works on two levels: (1) relative to the spirit in man, uneasiness is always present if any other
spirit than God's is ruling a man; (2) relative to the concrete judgment made. Perversion enters here. The conscience may be so dull, asleep that it will check simply the judgment against the actual Spirit in a man. This gives some peace (false though it is) -- still it is never perhaps wholly asleep. Conscience is the least faculty in man's power.

VI. The Capacity for God

The various powers of the human soul which have thus far been discussed from the natural constitution of man. "...in the power of self motion, understanding, will, and liberty, the natural image of God consisted." 259 In all of these, man was made "after the likeness of his Creator" 259 and no one of them has priority over the other, neither mind, will nor freedom. There is, however, an element in man not yet discussed which, according to Wesley, is the most fundamental and distinctive and which does have priority over all powers of the soul. This is "the capacity for God". At one place Wesley calls it "the sole characteristic of human nature". 260 The human being is essentially neither a rational nor a volitional animal. Men are certainly "sensible, rational creatures", he says. But "above all man is a creature capable of God." 261 If we can rightly speak of this as one capacity among other capacities, it is "far more valuable than all the rest put together". It is more properly envisioned, not as one among other powers (Wesley never really lists it in this way), but as above and beyond all capacities of the thinking substance. It is man's "highest excellence" 263 It is the core of the soul, the heart of the spirit, the essence of the self which
is "endued with mind, will and liberty". The capacity for God is what determines the "state and use of all ... faculties"; it is the basis of the "perfection of man" and the only ground of genuine happiness.\textsuperscript{264}

The whole of what follows in this treatise will be dealing with this capacity in relation to the other powers of the soul but some broad lines need to be sketched at this point. Wesley's eclecticism particularly shows through in his dealing with this supreme element in man. He talked about it in various ways with the aid of many thinkers such as Aristotle, Plato, Locke, Augustine, Thomas, the Mystics, as well as others. Three conceptions can be easily separated out of Wesley's thinking which illuminate what he was trying to point to with this term "capacity for God:" first, man has a proper perfection determined by his place in the scale of being, second, man has an innate thirst for his own happiness which can only be satisfied by a relation to the final good; and, third, man has certain "divine sensibilities" through which God and the things of God can be known, loved and chosen.

Attention has been given earlier to Wesley's acceptance of the idea of the "great chain of being". There is an infinite gradation of existences in the universe and

"Every being has an activity peculiar to it, determined by the rank appointed for it in the universe."\textsuperscript{265}

The unique activity depends upon the unique element in the constitution of the being at the particular level in the scale. The proper activity of man and the excellent functioning of that activity is the proper excellence of man.
To determine this peculiar power in man one must look at his place in this chain of being. Wesley frequently examines man over against the lower animals. "What then is the barrier between men and brutes? the line Which they cannot pass?" In opposition to those who see the rational functions of man as his distinctive activity, he answers that "It was not reason. Set aside that ambiguous term: exchange it for the plain word, understanding: and who can deny that brutes have this? We may as well deny that they have sight or hearing." His answer goes further: it is not any of the "natural" functions of the soul; no more is it will or freedom than it is the powers of understanding. In an earlier section it was noted that Wesley not only rejected the Cartesian view that animals are mere machines but that he attributed to them all the usually recognized higher powers. In speaking of the original creation of the brutes, he says

...these, as well as man, had an innate principle of self motion; and that, at least, in as high a degree as they enjoy it at this day. Again: They were endued with a degree of understanding; not less than they are possessed of now. They had also a will, including various passions which, likewise, they still enjoy; and they had liberty; a power of choice; a degree of which is still found in every living creature.

Animals share in the thinking substance. They possess souls, rational as well as sensitive. In answer to the question "What does distinguish man from beast?", Wesley says

It is this: man is capable of God; the inferior creatures are not. We have no ground to believe, that they are, in any degree, capable of knowing, loving, or obeying God. This is the specific difference between man and brute; the great gulf which they cannot pass ever.

The capacity for God is "...the mark, the only mark which totally separates man from the brute creature".

God is not only the source but also the final end of all created being. Every creature tends toward this end. But whereas
the lower beings unconsciously and necessarily move toward God, man does it consciously and by self-determination. Man alone can know, love, choose, serve and enjoy God. This is his proper end. Man is a relational being, he is not synonymous with his proper end; he is separated from himself; he is not who he is; there is a lack in him to be gilled; he does not possess his true end but stands out from it and hence must relate himself to it. Although he does not determine what his final end is, he determines himself relative to it. A part of his end is to determine himself toward his end.

Wesley talks of the capacity for God in a second way. He begins with a root urge in man to happiness, that is, toward joy and peace. This is the propensity behind all desires and drives. Happiness is our common aim, and an innate instinct continually urges us to the pursuit of it." This is a natural power of the human soul. "So greatly have they erred who have taught that, in serving God, we ought not have a view to our own happiness!" Man is a restless, thrusting animal, forever seeking his happiness by uniting himself with one object or another but "there is no happiness outside of God". Wesley says,

...as there is but one God in heaven above and in the earth beneath, so there is only one happiness for created spirits, either in heaven or earth. The one god made our heart for himself; and it cannot rest until it resteth in him. It is true, that while we are in the vigor of youth and health; while our blood dances in our veins; while the world smiles upon us, and we have all the conveniences, yea, and superfluities of life, we frequently have pleasing dreams, and enjoy a kind of happiness. But it cannot continue; it flies away like a shadow; and even while it does, it is not solid or substantial; it does not satisfy the soul. We still pant after something else, something which we have not. Give a man everything that this world can give,. . .still, amidst our plenty something still,
We were made to be happy in God and nothing else can make us happy. This thirst for happiness is satisfied only when man is realizing his proper activity in the scale of being. "The great Creator made..." and every being "answering the end of its creation" is happy. Wesley calls upon mankind to know and maintain their rank in the scale of beings. Rest not 'till you enjoy the privilege of humanity; the knowledge and love of God. Lift up your heads, ye creatures capable of God! Lift up your hearts to the source of your being!" 

This introduces a third way in which Wesley talked about man being "capable of God". If man is to realize his proper relation to God and hence find happiness, he must have knowledge of "God and the things of God". But since, as we have seen earlier, the "natural" senses are not able to mediate knowledge of the spiritual realm, man must have a special sense or class of senses through which he can understand and lose his proper end. Such powers man does possess. Although they may be closed or asleep or dead and hence in need of opening, awakening or resurrection, they are a part of the natural constitution of man. Such faculties Wesley points to with the term capacity for God.

These three ways of dealing with this aspect of man may be brought together in some such fashion as this: There is but one proper objective good for man, namely the God who made him. The subjective good of man is perfection and happiness. He has a proper excellence determined by his place in the scale of being which is to know, love and enjoy this objective good. He also has an innate appetite for happiness which can only he satisfied by
the realization of this activity directed toward God. Perfection and happiness, then, are inseparable. Finally, man has the "divine sensibilities" through which the objective good can be known, making possible the realization of the subjective good of virtue and blessedness.

The "capacity for God" is a part of the natural constitution of man but it is the core of man. It is the spirit of man and this spiritual being is then clothed with understanding, will, freedom and conscience. In the following sections, the nature of this capacity and its relation to the other powers of the soul will become clearer as the problems of faith, love and happiness in the thought of Wesley are considered.

Man is an immortal spirit, created in the image and for the enjoyment of God. This is the one, the only end of his being; he exists for no other purpose. God is the centre of all spirits; and while they cleave to him, they are wise, holy, and happy; but in the same proportion as they are separated from him, they are foolish, unholy, and unhappy.
NOTES

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3 Works, II, p. 139.

4 Loc. cit.

5 Philosophy, II, p. 192.

6 Works, II, p. 139.

7 Loc. cit.

8 Loc. cit.

9 Philosophy, II, p. 190;

10 Philosophy, II, p. 186.

11 Philosophy, II, p. 184.


13 Loc. cit.

14 Philosophy, II, pp. 467-68.


16 Descartes here, as many before and after him, depended on the classical formulation of this doctrine of natural, vital and animal spirits by Galen, a second century physician. The point is to bridge spirit and matter by an infinitely fine material substance. According to Galen, Venous blood enriched in the liver from the food brought from the alimentary canal and endowed the nutritive quality spoken of as the 'natural spirits', flows from the heart to all parts of the body along the veins, and returns back to the heart along the same channels. Some of the blood passing from the right side of the heart to the left by minute pores in the septum of the vehicles, invisible to the eye of man, mixes there with the air sucked in through the lungs by action of the heart. this mixture is by the innate beat of the heart, 'concocted' into arterial blood, endowed with 'vital
spirits' which flow from the heart along arteries to all parts of the body, returning by the same channels. When it reaches the ventricle of the brain, the arterial blood, by the help of air blown in through the pores of the ethmoid, or sieve-like, bone, gives rise to 'animal spirits', and flowing of the pure spirit along the nerves brings about sensation and motion."

17 Foster, Sir Michael, *Lectures on History of Physiology during the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries*. Cambridge University Press, 1901, 199.


19 This Whole question of animals being mere machines caused extensive debate in the 17th and 18th centuries which contributed to the understanding of man. A good dissuasion of this whole matter is found in Rosenfeld's book, *From Beast Machine to Man Machine*.

20 Man's physical organism functions in a purely involuntary way. It has no principle of movement other than the beat of the heart, which causes the flow of blood and animal spirits through the system. Similarly, the animal body operates without the guidance of any non-corporeal principle. (Rosenfeld, p. 6)


25 *Philosophy*, I, p. 114


28 *Works*, VI, p. 73.

29 At times Wesley suggests, with later thinkers, that perhaps the understanding of the nerves as solid fibers, which are like cords tightly strung, tooting from the brain to the appendages, is the more correct view. Willis for one held this. (See Brett, Vol. II, 191.) Of course, animal spirits or nerves as solid fibers, they both perform the sure function.
30 In 1786, in a little essay entitled *Some Thoughts on an Expression of St. Paul in the first Epistle to the Thessalonians*, Wesley suggests a view of the soul as the "medium". It is, he says, the immediate clothing of the spirit and that probably it consists of electric fire, the purest of all matter. At death the body perishes but not this material soul. The material soul is the means by which the spirit acts upon the body and the body upon the spirit. Here one can see the idea of the plastic soul of the Cambridge Platonists. This is really important for it is simply another way to understand what Wesley and most others in his day felt could not be understood, and that is how an immaterial substance could act upon a material substance or vice versa. Wesley does not usually employ this division.

32 *Loc. cit.*
33 *Loc. cit.*
34 *Works*, VI, p. 234.
36 *Works*, II, p. 403.
38 *Works*, VII, p. 270.
42 *Works*, VII, p. 446.
43 *Works*, II, pp. 402-03.
46 *Works*, VII, p. 446.
48 *Works*, II, pp. 402, 446.
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50 Works. VII, p. 335.
52 Works. II, p. 309.
54 Loc. cit.
55 Loc. cit.
56 Loc. cit.
58 Philosophy. I, p. 94.
59 Philosophy. II, Pt. IV, Ch. 5.
60 Philosophy. I, p. 114
61 Works. VI, p. 211.
63 Loc. cit.
64 Loc. cit.
65 Works. VI, p. 211
66 Works. VIII, pp. 12, 14.
67b See below, p,
69 Works. VIII, p. 130
73 Works. VIII, pp. 45.
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75 Philosophy I, p. 114.
76 Works. VII, p. 461.
77 Philosophy I, p. 114.
80 Philosophy. I, p. 113.
81 Loc. cit.
82 Works. VII, p. 461.
84 Standard Sermons II, p. 4750
85 Loc. cit.
87 Philosophy. II, p. 433.
88 Loc. cit.
89 Works. II, p. 127.
90 Works. VII, p. 610.
91 Works. VII, p. 2320
92 Philosophy II, p. 439.
96 Works. VII, p. 610.
98 Works. VII, p. 621.
99 Philosophy. II, p. 441.
100 Loc. cit.
101 Loc. cit.
102 Philosophy, II, p. 442.
103 Works, VII, p. 609.
104 Works, II, p. 127.
105 Works, II, p. 126.
107 Works, VI, p. 362.
109 Philosophy, I, p. 40
110 Works, VI, p. 274.
111 Letters, IV, pp. 3-4.
112 Works, VI, p. 73.
113 Works, VI, p. 274.
115 Loc. cit.
117 Works, VII, p. 453.
118 Philosophy, I, p. 113.
119 Works, VII, p. 453.
120 Loc. cit.
121 Works, VII, p. 6.
124 Works, VI, p. 347.
125 Loc. cit.
126 Philosophy, I, p. 113 0
128 Loc. cit.
129 Loc. cit.
130 Works, II, p. 207.
131 Loc. cit.
133 Works, II, p. 431.
135 Works, II, p. 1860
136 Works, I, p. 452.
137 Loc. cit.
139 Works, II, p. 186.
140 See above, p.
141 Works, II, p. 186.
143 Loc. cit.
144 Loc. cit.
145 Loc. cit.
146 Loc. cit.
147 Works, I, p. 329.
149 Works, II, p. 188.
I have accepted the assistance here of Beattie who Wesley read. "A passion therefore may be said to be a notion of the soul attended with pleasure or pain, affecting both mind and body and arising from the view of something which is or appears to be good or evil." So also of Hutcheson who, in his Essay on the Passions, page 1, described the affections and the passions as these modifications of actions of the mind consequent upon the apprehension of certain objects or events, in which the mind generally conceives good or evil."

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At times it almost seems as if Wesley looked upon the affections as seated in the body. He did not quarrel with this view in his Philosophy: "The passions receive nourishment, grow and become strong like the fibers, which are the seat of therein (Philosophy. II, pp. 216-17.) If by passions, violent affections are meant, and Wesley usually Ma set this, then perhaps he would agree.

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Works, I, p.453.


Loc. Cit.


Works, VI, p 333.

Works, VII, p 446.


Works, II, p. 432.

Letters, I, p. 73.

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173 Works. II, p 150.
174 Standard Sermons, I, p. 336
175 New Testament, p. 514
176 Works. II, p. 150.
177 Works. I, p. 450.
179 Loc. cit.
180 Works. VI, p. 200.
181 Works. VI, p. 204.
182 Works. II, p. 69.
183 Works. VI, p. 2070
184 Loc. cit.
185 Works. VI, p. 205.
186 Loc. cit.
187 Works. VI, p. 208.
188 Works. VI, p. 404.
190 Works. VI, pp. 210-11.
192 Works. VI, p. 214.
193 Works. VI, p. 216.
194 Works. VI, p. 209.
195 Works. VI, p. 201.
196 Works. VI, p. 209.
197 Works. VI, p. 211.
198 Works. II, p. 69.
199 Works, VI, p. 20B.
200 Works. II, p. 4040
201 Works, II, p. 69e
204 Works, II p. 404.
205 Works, VI, p.
206 Works II, p. 404.
207 Works, II, p. 404.
208 Loc. cit.
209 Works, VI, p. 214.
210 Works, VI, p. 215.
211 Works, VI, p. 208.
212 Loc. cit.
213 Works, V, p. 651.
217 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 188-89.
218 Works, VI, pp. 200-216.
219 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 18-89.
223 Works, II, p. 479.
224 Standard Sermons, I, p. 223.
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225 *Works, II*, pp. 376-77.
227 *Loc. cit.*
228 *Loc. cit.*
229 *Loc. cit.*
234 *Loc. cit.*
236 *Works, II*, p. 479.
244 *Works, II*, pp. 377-78.
245 *Works, II*, p. 378.
246 *Works, II*, p. 479.
247 *Loc. cit.*
254 Works, VI, p. 781
257 Works, II, p. 479.
258 Works, II, p. 50.
259 Loc. cit.
260 Works, II, p. 57.
261 Works, II, p. 50.
262 Loc. cit.
263 Loc. cit.
264 Loc. cit.
265 Philosophy. II, p. 190.
266 Works, II, p. 51.
267 Loc. cit.
268 Loc. cit.
269 Loc. cit.
270 Works, II, p. 57.
271 New Testament, p. 19,
272 Standard Sermons, I, pp. 276-77,
274 Works, VI, p. 431.
275 Works, II, p. 431.
277 Works, II, p. 57.
278 Works, VI, p. 581.
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