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GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING FOR VILLAGE RESIDENTS:
THE MAHARASHTRA VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

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ABSTRACT:

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The thesis of this dissertation is that Third World development is best done when it is based upon a strategy of wide-spread, comprehensive, village-level development; that such a strategy is most inexpensively accomplished, and with least social dislocation, but the use of a catalytic force embodied in a structured movement of volunteers; and that this movemental force can be rapidly created and trained by an intensive, liberational educational experience using imaginal methods.

It is proposed that the criterion of experimental, scientific success by which this thesis should be evaluated is the actual alteration of social reality which results from its employment in real-life situations. The dissertation is a preliminary evaluation of one such project conducted in the State of Maharashtra, India by the Institute of Cultural Affairs. It is the most advanced of a series of such projects in more than 30 countries. The approach of the study is rooted in the perspective of critical theory, grounded in ethnographic reporting of first-hand observation of the project and the training school which enlists the movemental volunteers.

The dissertation has two main sections. The first surveys the

theoretical context of development and the role of liberatory education in movements for social change. It concludes with an historical sketch of development in India. The second section describes and evaluates the Maharashtra Project: the social philosophy and educational methodology of the Institute of Cultural Affairs; the form, content, and impact of the Human Development Training School; and the economic and social alteration accomplished in one particular village, Maliwada.

This study discovered that a catalytic movement for development had been created, with over 500 full-time volunteers at work in villages across the state. All had been trained in the intensive liberational education experience of the H.D.T.S. This training shifted the cognitive behavior of the students; equipped them with new skills of communication, technology, and motivation; and altered the affective dimension of the students, expanding their world-view and opening them to choose new life careers.

As a result of the efforts of the graduates of the H.D.T.S., villages across the state are rapidly developing after the fashion of the demonstration village, Maliwada. There village income was tripled in two years by upgrading agriculture and introducing small scale industries. Urban amenities and services were made available and former residents moved back into the village, reversing the urban migration flow. Maliwada's approach was imitated by other villages wishing to develop. Thus, in this one instance, the thesis of this dissertation is supported.

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Introduction

The Interventionist Methodology

The twentieth century has been a period of dramatic social change in every part of the globe. Kenneth Boulding(1964:1) calls it the age of the Great Transition from civilization to post-civilization. Three great movements have prepared the way for this century of alterations: 1) Westernization, European expansionism and its cultural extension; 2) World Development, the internationalization of capitalism and the growth of a global economic system; and 3) Modernization, the explosion of scientific and technological discovery which has resulted in man's enhanced capacity to control his environment. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that to be alive in the last third of this century is to be caught up in one or another, or all three of these massive happenings.

But men and women must decide how they will participate in these movements of change. Some have chosen, at least in their professional lives, to stand outside these movements, to observe and analyze them. While most of these persons will acknowledge their entrapment in their own milieu, they strive to be detached, disinterested observers. Others find themselves inescapably drawn into the process of change and they seek to help fashion what that change will be like. Still others seek to combine these perspectives, using "objective analyses" in the service of programs of change.

The dramatic successes of the physical and natural sciences in providing men ways to understand and manipulate their environment, and thereby to substantially alter their standard of living, has resulted in the widespread adoption of "scientific methods" for the

study, and possible control, of social reality. This introduction will examine the major approaches to social science which have emerged, and build a perspective for participation in the movement towards global development.

I. The Empirical or Positivist Approach

Max Weber early set the central issue for those who would pursue a social science. He maintained that a scientific approach could be taken towards "social facts", but these must be separated from cultural values. He believed that values shaped social forms; they can be observed and studied, but values are sociologically unjudgable. The choices individuals and societies make between values are essentially arbitrary. Once the values have been chosen, a scientific approach can analyze the societal implications which result.

The positivist school of philosophy, especially under Auguste Comte's leadership, reinforced the fact-value dichotomy by dismissing knowledge claims for all but those things which could be empirically observed (the realm of the sciences) and the formal systems of knowledge (logic and mathematics). The positivist-empiricist approach, which is perhaps the dominant force in the social sciences, has attempted to analyze society from a value-neutral perspective.

Empiricist social scientists have sought to emulate the natural sciences. They have built up an extensive data base of observed "social facts". They have discerned regularities of

relationships between different sets of social facts. They have attempted to articulate laws of social behavior and to develop theories which would explain and interrelate these laws and regularities. But no generally accepted grand designs have emerged. When T.S. Kuhn(1970) produced his historical perspective explaining the development of natural science as a series of paradigm shifts, many social scientists appropriated his language and began describing the state of their efforts as "pre-paradigmatic". By doing so, they both laid claim upon a particular future(when some consolidating paradigm would eventually succeed) and justified their current disarray as scientific adolescence, a natural growth state.

Robert Merton is the foremost example of the empiricist school. In Social Theory and Social Structure(1949), the first edition of which antedates Kuhn's work, he argues that social science should not be compared with contemporary physics, but with the early stages of the physical sciences. "Between twentieth-century physics and twentieth-century sociology stand billions of man hours of sustained, disciplined, and cumulative research"(1949:6-7). As a strategy to reach the goal of scientific maturity, Merton advocated the development of "theories of the middle range".

Merton distinguished social theory from general orientations towards data, from methodologies and emphasis on statistical and quantification techniques, from the analysis of sociological concepts such as "status" or "role", and from "post factum sociological interpretations"(1949:90) which explain observations

but are not(to use a Popperian term) "falsifiable". Merton acknowledges the dearth of scientific laws in the social sciences. He defines such a law as "...a statement of invariance derivable from a theory"(1949:92).

In the context of commenting on a Durkheimian analysis of suicide rates among Protestants and Catholics, Merton puts forward his understanding of the elements of systematic theoretic generalizations:

1. They proceed to greater abstraction from particular data.
2. They are derived from interrelated descriptive propositions.
3. They permit perception of diverse, testable, consequences which may also explain other, apparently disconnected social patterns.
4. Thus they are predictive in nature.
5. They must be precise and determinate, in order to be testable.*

Merton's own theoretical orientation(professedly, middle range theorizing) focused upon extending Durkheim's functional analytic approach.

Merton's emphasis upon middle range theories cut against the grand theorizing of people like Talcott Parsons, whom Merton accused of merely holding generalized, unverifiable social orientations (1949, in the enlarged edition, 1968:52). Merton focused on more limited problem arenas in the absence of a guiding overall theory of society, as a strategy towards achieving a general theory at some unknown future time. His approach to theory corresponds directly to the empiricist approach to social problems.

* I am indebted to Bernstein(1976) for this summary of Merton's argument.

Sociologists, as distinct from the majority of anthropologists, have traditionally been more involved in seeking solutions to conditions their analyses identify as "social problems". This approach raises directly the issue of how problems are defined. Ernest Nagel(1961:492), in seeking to defend the empirical approach against "impossibility arguments", acknowledges that the definition of social problems leads back to the Weberian fact-value issue. He distinguishes two types of value judgments: the "characterizing" judgment which evaluates whether or not a condition exists(e.g., is there a large enough variation from the normal number of red corpuscles in a blood sample to say that anemia is present?) and the "appraising" judgment which labels anemia as "bad". Nagel claims it is possible to restrict social science enquiry to "characterizing" value judgments and thereby preserve its value-neutral orientation.

The empiricist claims he is able to study and advise on social and political conditions with the same kind of neutral, disinterested stance that the natural scientist brings to his studies. Whatever his perspectives and interests as a citizen, as a theorist he presents objective data and conclusions, subject to cross-checking and refutation by other social scientists. Richard Bernstein has graphically summarized this stance:

His job qua theorist is to interpret the world, not to change it; he interprets it by offering and testing theoretical explanations. He knows, or at least believes, that if one is seriously interested in "changing the world", this can be best accomplished through scientific knowledge--especially knowledge of the probable consequences of different courses of action.

Therefore, he endorses a categorical distinction between theory and practice or action....The task of the social scientist is to describe and explain social phenomena as accurately as he can....His task is not to make prescriptive claims about what ought to be--not to advocate a normative position.(1976:44f).

This middle-range theoretical position, disinterested and value-neutral, leads to major difficulties when the social scientist is consulted as an expert on social conditions. Nagel acknowledges the issue which arises in the determination of what problems to research. The research agenda is often set by the availability of public and/or private funding or by the ready access to data already collected for other purposes(e.g., census data) rather than as a part of a systematic research program(1961:486).

James Rule goes further in critiquing the empiricist approach. He argues that the empiricists assume there is a general consensus on what social problems are and that, therefore, empirical studies can discover solutions leading to ameliorative change which will have direct and positive effects for the whole society. Merton defined a social problem as "...a substantial discrepancy between widely shared social standards and actual conditions of social life"(1971:799). He described such "problems" as objective states of affairs, discernible by functional analysis on the basis of an organismic approach to society. He used the neutral sounding term "dysfunctional" to label such conditions.

However, Rule suggests that "...disputes over what constitutes 'shared social standards' (are) at the very heart of the conflicts which often pass as 'social problems'." He continues that even

when there is agreement on what a social problem is, "...the significance of the offending condition, and the details as to what would constitute its betterment, are matters of partisan difference" (1978:38f). Rule asserts that Merton is unable to provide any objective criteria for identifying social problems and evaluating insights for social betterment--what "improvement" would really entail. He argues that alternative solutions represent partisan positions in conflicts of interest. Therefore, "...a purely technical role for the social scientist...." fails (1978:44).

Some empiricists, such as Edward Eanfield and James Q. Wilson (1962:3), openly recognize that social/political problems usually represent disagreements between contesting parties. Their approach is a radical affirmation of scientific disinterest, justified by the cynical conviction that knowledge is not a significant element in resolving such disagreements. Therefore, they suggest that, in effect, social science has no relevance for the solution of social problems. It may be of assistance to one or the other party to the dispute, but will not be determinative in and of itself.

Rule, in the preface to his book, suggests that this is in fact how applied social science research is often used in governmental circles. Research is selected to bolster already held positions, rather than as objective indices to potential solutions to problems (1978:viii). He further charges that attempting to take the objective, "purely technical role" leads social scientists into adopting the perspective of the ruling governmental elite, accepting

their value orientation in defining social problems, and thereby tailoring their solutions to the consumers of their research.

Such a pragmatic perspective is perhaps best represented by Daniel Bell, and his colleague Irving Kristol. In the first edition of the journal, The Public Interest, they argued that it is best for the social sciences to take a pragmatic, non-ideological approach. Ideologies "...propose prefabricated interpretations of existing social realities--interpretations that bitterly resist all sensible revision"(1965:3f). Thus, Bell and Kristol sought solutions that were non-ideological, non-political. Rule summarizes his criticism of this approach, "This is precisely the difficulty with social problem solving; it is a profoundly political enterprise from beginning to end, and its ideology is nonetheless important for being concealed...."(1978:23). He goes on to point out that even the definition of something as "problematic" implies some vision of how society ought to be, and what kinds of action, or inaction, should be invoked. These choices, whether called ideological or something else, are political choices between conflicting views of society and conflicting programs for society. If the pragmatist ignores this reality, he simply hands over his decision-making to those in power whom he is serving.

This politically conservative, pragmatic, anti-ideological approach is also present in the sociological writings of Karl Popper. Popper, even more directly than Bell and Kristol, advocated rational planning which was open to public debate, moderate in scope, and

incremental in nature. A former Marxist, he opposed "utopian planning", which entails sweeping rearrangements of society, in favor of "piecemeal social engineering" because there is no way to anticipate the effects of sweeping social changes and the extent and complexity of utopian plans makes their feasibility exceedingly difficult to assess. "At present," he writes, "the sociological knowledge necessary for large-scale engineering is simply non-existent"(1963b,I:162). In this perspective, and echoing the above discussion of Merton's middle-range theories, Popper argues for a step-by-step approach, where the causal factors can more easily be discerned, in which the innovator can learn from his mistakes, and in which the scientist can quickly discern and react to unexpected consequences. He justifies his position by admonishing men to "Work for the elimination of concrete evils rather than for the realization of abstract goods"(1963a:361).

Popper, obviously, is susceptible to the same criticisms of political servitude just made of Bell and Kristol. However, in framing his argument as an antithesis to Marxian utopian social planning, he elicits a further critique. Popper chooses to gloss over the possibility that there are large scale social forces which are responsible for the existence of undesirable social conditions. By ruling out comprehensive approaches, he seems to deny the possibility of systemic causes of social problems. His solutions seem to treat the symptoms of social conditions while ignoring root causes. This position is consistent with a more conservative political

stance and a certain naivete about political realities: that political leaders will take the "right" course of action to solve social problems if they are made aware of what those courses are. It seems to ignore the possibility that those political leaders may represent an interest group which actually benefits from the continuance of the particular condition. It seems overly confident in the power of a good idea to win out in a contest with the lure of material advantage.

But it must be acknowledged that Popper sounds an important warning note about the necessity of evaluating the effects of social change, and the increasing possibility of untoward and unexpected consequences as the scope of change increases. Unfortunately, he slights the untoward effects of inaction and piecemeal amelioration. His one-sided approach does not give assistance in the attempt to weigh one type of risk against another, in order to determine at what point it is preferable to do piecemeal change and when to concentrate on systemic change. The certainty of continued suffering would make assuming uncertain risks more palatable.

Gunnar Myrdal represents a significant divergence in the empirical approach. His position is especially significant for those who are concerned with the questions of global development. It was his similar critique of the piecemeal approach of Marshall Plan-like attempts at direct technology transfer to less developed countries that reversed international thinking and policies about development (Cf., Rich Lands and Poor, 1957). He suggested that

single-dimensional political actions only have significance in their larger social context, and pointed to the gap in technical capacity to employ large-scale technological transfers. He pointed out the interconnection of educational and economic development and advocated a comprehensive approach to development that took account of the level of social capital overhead already in place, the educational level, the administrative and capital infrastructures, and a host of other dimensions.

In his characteristic role as a foreigner studying indigenous social conditions (whether of Blacks in the U.S.A. or peasants in Asia), Myrdal was very conscious that solutions to social problems were neither neutral, nor of general benefit, but would favor some interest over others. He attacked the notion that any conditions could be justified simply by articulating that they perform a function, as if every function can be neutrally affirmed, e.g., that an entrepreneur performs a function in society and therefore merits profits (Cf., 1953:20). He insisted that such analyses were already partisan. He similarly insists that any pretensions to objective knowledge of the "common welfare" are illusory and incapable of being accepted by all reasonable observers.

Thus Myrdal comes back to the Weberian problem of fact and value. He affirms that values are not logically verifiable, but indicates that they are not wholly independent of empirical beliefs, either. People have "reasons" for the values they maintain, even if these beliefs are often opportunistically selected and arranged (1944:1027).

This desire in man to be rational suggests a strategy for the social sciences, one Myrdal embodied in his study of the role of the Negro in American society. The scientist can identify the "selective perceptions" which support the continuance of social conditions which are inconsistent with a people's more generalized value positions. He can generate accurate information to offset these illusory perceptions and thus make more rational the relationship between ultimate values and instrumental practices. Thus, his study emphasized the gap between the American egalitarian Creed and the practice of discrimination against Negroes. The scientist's role is to confront the illusory beliefs that sustain prejudice so that the actual relation between the races might approximate the egalitarian principles of the Creed. This strategy was used later by the Civil Rights Movement in its appeal to white middle-class liberals and in the courts. It was singularly unsuccessful with other segments of the populace, and 25 years after the initial Supreme Court victories, American society is still highly stratified on the basis of race.

In a position particularly significant to those interested in global development, Myrdal advocates adopting the values of the society being studied as the criteria for making more rational the beliefs and actions of that society. "A value premise should not be chosen arbitrarily; it must be relevant and significant in relation to the society in which we live. It can, therefore, only be ascertained by an examination of what people actually desire"(1958:2). As in the American situation, when values at different levels conflict

with each other, the more general ones should be chosen. However, Myrdal goes even a step further. Acknowledging that many values are maintained because of distorted perceptions of social reality, he suggests the investigator, especially in developing countries, may need to adopt values members of the society would surely hold if only the distortions were removed!

To a scientist engaged in making society more rational, it must be questioned whether he should not want to use the valuations people would have if their beliefs were correct and not distorted....(1969:66).

Thus, Myrdal, in seeking to make a society more rational, echoes Weber's contention that the analysis of social facts and causal relationships can help people to pursue their own value ends more rationally. In the same light, Myrdal attacks the disjunction of proposed programs for development from predictive analyses of their feasibility. Myrdal's British colleague, Paul Streeten, goes farther and suggests, "Programs without prognoses are idle wish dreams or empty protests"(Streeten, 1958:xiv). Streeten acknowledges that a prognosis may hinge on what a people believe to be possible, and that these beliefs about possibility are themselves alterable. So he is led to conclude, "Faith can move mountains"(1958:xxviii). Thus, social science can provide insight on choices of alternative programs-- not on the basis of a comparison of the ultimate values they express, but on the basis of a comparison of their respective prognoses, and the consistency of the means with the ends.

But Myrdal steps beyond Weber in advocating the adoption of, not just the currently held values of a society, but those he himself projects would be held if current distortions were removed by the application of sociological insight. In addition to the naive confidence that people will alter their beliefs just because they are disclosed to be inconsistent with other beliefs they, or their larger society, also hold, Myrdal calls down upon himself the charge of investigator-subjectivity in attempting to predict what values a people would hold if conditions were to change.

II. Critical Theory Approaches

In Frankfurt, a school of thinkers emerged in the middle decades of this century which attacked the Weberian dualism of fact and value. Led by Max Horkheimer, and including Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, the school's efforts culminated in the work of Jürgen Habermas. They were deeply critical of the positivist and objectivist bent of social science, and especially of the attempt at epistemological dominance which Habermas called "scientism", in which the scientists' and society's belief in science elevates it from one form of knowledge into the identification of knowledge with science.*

* Cf. the recent statement of John C. Sawhill(1979), president of New York University, advocating an approach to "...ethical inquiry as a science, analogous to biology or chemistry or physics." See also Dobbert(1970) for a more substantial account of the "religion of science".

Horkheimer claimed that knowledge and interest are inextricably connected in the scholar. In the 1930's, he decried the attempt in traditional theory to split man into "scientist" and "citizen"(1972:209f). Critical theory is more radical than traditional theory. It criticizes the "givens" of life, is unwilling "...to accept the prevailing ideas, actions, and social conditions unthinkingly and from mere habit...." but is an "...effort which aims to coordinate the individual sides of social life with each other....to examine the foundations of things...."(1972:270).

Critical theory is motivated by the practical intent of improving human existence. It is suspicious of ameliorative changes that leave men as recipients, and seeks to be so identified with oppressed peoples that its "...presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation, but also a force within it to stimulate change"(1972:215). It is concerned with the way the superstructure of society is organized, not merely the elimination of one abuse. In these statements, the echoes of Hegel and Marx are obvious, and like Marx, Horkheimer claims that the effectiveness of critical theory is to be judged on its ability to motivate the oppressed class to radically transform society(1972:231). This would be a union of theory and action.

However, Horkheimer became increasingly discouraged about the likelihood of a genuine proletarian revolution. If not the proletariat, who then would be the revolutionary class? To whom should critical theory be addressed?

Jürgen Habermas attempted a solution to this determinative problem. He began by using the classical Greek scholars to criticize the separation of political action and morality implicit in the Cartesian, and later positivist, approach to science. He derides the attempt to achieve technical control over historical actions as an inauthentic replacement of the political process of arriving at a rational consensus of the citizenry about the matters that affect their destiny. He calls this a "depoliticization" of society and an attempted legitimization of technologism(1970:75).

Habermas' solution anticipates the emergence of an "enlightened" class. To that end, he articulates what Bernstein (1976:192) calls a "philosophical anthropology". He speaks of three types of cognitive interests: technical, practical, and emancipatory, which relate to three types of science: empirical-analytical, historical-hermeneutical, and critical, each of which are grounded in one dimension of human sociality: work, interaction, and power. Work involves purposive, rational action by which man seeks to control his environment for survival. Interaction involves communication and intersubjectivity by which community is possible. Power involves man's capacity to shape his own destiny. Critical theory is essential to this task because it goes beyond the empirical search for "...nomological knowledge....to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed"(1971:310; cf., Streeten above, pg. 14).

Thus critical theory acts as a force for enlightenment which dissolves reified power relationships and resistences, thereby emancipating those who attend to it. Emancipation is a central theme for Habermas, and key to that is the kind of personal self-knowledge that can lead to a radical cognitive, affective, and practical transformation resulting in an enhanced autonomy and responsibility. These are crucial elements in the coalescence of a revolutionary movement. In this context, the choice of program options, especially at the strategic level, revolves not so much on theoretic solutions or empirical analyses(though those are involved) as on the differing capacities of the choices to create a consensus "...among the participants, who....are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations"(1973:33). Political action, policy options, are not reducible to technological issues, but concern those strategies which can motivate revolutionaries to common action.

Critical theory, while radically in opposition to empiricism as a vehicle for determining effective social action, is itself subject to three crucial criticisms. The first is a short-coming on the basis of its own criteria of effectiveness. No revolutionary class has emerged to embody critical theory. Horkheimer's ambivalence about the likelihood of a proletarian uprising is still being borne out. The Marxist predictions of a massive proletarian revolution have not yet occurred anywhere in the world. Habermas' emancipatory interest has likewise not found sociological embodiment and has added to the

confusion of who the intended consumers of critical theory are. Without a revolutionary movement, his approach is hardly distinguishable from bourgeois liberal idealism. Secondly, without specific content, critical theory is resistant to any kind of feasibility evaluation. There is virtually no basis for making a prognosis of the effectiveness of adopting the critical theoretical approach as it is abstractly presented. Lastly, as Bernstein points out, Habermas provides no illumination of how one practically would organize the "process of enlightenment"(1976:216).

III. Interventionism and Applied Anthropology

Anthropology has experienced the social science controversy more intensely than other disciplines. At one point there was a major debate as to whether or not it should even consider itself one of the social sciences. Evans-Pritchard(1962), after years of common labor with Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, broke with them by advocating the position that anthropology had more in common with history and the humanities than it did with the social sciences.

Some anthropologists have assumed a posture similar to Banfield's, that anthropology has no practical relevance to social issues, a position which has been reinforced by recent disclosures of governmental manipulation of anthropologists and their research for purely nationalistic ends, to the disadvantage of the subject people. However, the majority of anthropologists would feel more compatibility with Merton's approach, the search for middle-range theories and for

solutions to problems of limited scope based upon empirical research. In this perspective, they are in line with Malinowski, the pioneer of an anthropology based upon first-hand, empirical field research, and of collaboration with government servants in creating an enlightened and more rational approach to colonial administration.

Within the empiricist school another debate has centered on the subjectivity-objectivity question. This debate has sometimes been characterized in Kenneth Pike's categories as the emic - etic controversy. The attempt to understand and describe how a strange people think and feel about their life is difficult to formulate in falsifiable hypotheses. At the other extreme, careful, quantifiable work has been done on social cohesion and genetic inheritance, which has produced such hypotheses with predictive capacity (e.g., Chagnon, 1974). The polarity of empathetic observation/description and the search for quantifiable regularities continues.

The most startling example of a different anthropological approach is that which its originator, Allan Holmberg, called Participant-Interventionism. The Vicos Project, under the auspices of Cornell University (1952-57), was a radical departure from "normal" anthropological undertakings. A self-styled project of guided social change (Cf., Holmberg, 1959, 1960a & b), this project directly contravened the accepted approach of non-interfering participant-observation. Instead of trying to avoid causing any changes, beyond those inevitable by the introduction of an outsider into the culture, the Vicos Project was a deliberate attempt to occasion social change.

While anthropologists have often been consulted as experts on cultural resistances to technological innovation and modernization, dating at least to Malinowski's work (Cf., 1945) and even to some contacts in the predecessor agencies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs as early as 1879 (Foster 1969:196ff), this was a unique attempt to study change by occasioning it. In this sense, it was also a repudiation of the restriction of the social sciences to the investigative mode, and an assumption of the experimental mode of anthropological research.

There are many similarities between Holmberg's approach and that of the Critical Theorists. This was a clear effort at overcoming the so-called theory-action dichotomy. It was a comprehensive approach, in contrast with the largely piecemeal innovative approach of most applied anthropology. It was a self-conscious effort to initiate change rather than merely observe or advise on changes initiated by others. It proceeded from an evaluation of the central contradiction relative to modernization: isolation of the peasants from the larger socio-economic context as engendered by the feudalistic hacienda system, to a reasoned program of how to overcome this contradiction. It identified the potential revolutionary class (even if it did not label them as such), the haciendistas themselves. It focused its attentions on the development of human dignity by emancipatory guidance. A firm focus on individual enlightenment was maintained and embodied in planned change. Its elements were as diverse as the upgrading of the community school to encouraging

service in the armed forces, which expanded enlistees' worldviews. It took strategic decisions which would motivate the hacienda's peasants to become the catalysts of change, themselves. Much empirical data was gathered, patterns of change were noted, quantification of results was recorded, but these were servants of the larger enterprise of totally reconstructing the social structure of Vicos.

But, unlike the critical theorists, Holmberg adopted a Weberian separation of value and science. After an extensive catalogue of specifically held values which were the foundation of the experiment at Vicos, he affirms that "...no such value stand, of course, can ever be validated by science...." Yet, sensitive to the charge of blatant manipulation, he adds, "...we and a surprising number of Vicosinos....believed them 'to be good and desireable ends'" (1960a:473). While it might appear that this last statement is an acknowledgement of Myrdal's advice to accept the values and objectives of the people being studied, Holmberg quickly reveals this is not the case. Vicos was a carefully controlled experiment, with at least 130 separate and externally determined social goals. Hypotheses were tested and replaced until the goals were accomplished. Though the envisioned community would be egalitarian and democratic, the project was paternalistically created and freedom was progressively and beneficently bestowed. It was no happenstance that Holmberg began as the hacienda's patrón.

As unappetizing as such paternalism now appears, looking back through several decades of the struggles of oppressed peoples for freedom, it was a significant challenge to normal detached empirical social science. A year after leaving Vicos, Holmberg wrote, "I remain convinced that the interventionist or action approach to the dynamics of culture, applied with proper restraint, may in the long run provide considerable pay-off in terms both of more rational policy and better science" (1960a:471). The pay-off in policy had to do with insight into how development could be accomplished. However, since this project was too expensive to ever replicate, and since nations may not expect patrons to all be equally beneficent, the policy pay-off has been less than Holmberg hoped. The pay-off in better science, while also now largely ignored, is more specifiable. Vicos was a comprehensive and controlled experiment in social reconstruction. It was not a research field for idly checking out popular hypotheses. It was an experiment in reaching 130 specified developmental goals in all aspects of the culture, and of discovering the best ways to do that. There was nearly complete control of all interventions and of all variables. If an hypothesis was falsified in practice, another had to be found to replace it, and the process would continue until success was achieved. This entailed the kind of collective feedback which Holmberg maintains is rarely found in the social sciences, but is the backbone, especially in applied research, in the natural sciences. "Development requires correct insights, hypotheses, and analytic models. It compels their never-ending

revision until they pass the test of application"(1960a:477). Like the critical theorists, Holmberg's criteria of experimental scientific success is to be found in the actual alteration of social reality. It is in comparing the results with the predicted results. It is not content with mere description.

More recently, the Institute of Cultural Affairs, basing its approach on its own signal community experiment in the Westside ghetto of Chicago a decade after Vicos, has emerged as an agency which is self-consciously experimenting with social reconstruction with similarities to both Vicos and the Critical Theorists. Eschewing the detached, disinterested analytical approach of the empirical social sciences, just as Holmberg did, the I.C.A. recalls Sartre's phrase, "It is in changing the world that we can come to know it"(1970:252). Like Holmberg's project, the I.C.A.'s world-wide network of village development projects are comprehensive attacks on the structures of those village societies. But they fit within a particular understanding of the current critical contradiction in society that is different than Marx's, and considerably more specific than Habermas' approach.

If the Marxist contradiction analysis could be over-simplified as the alienation of the proletariat from both the means of production and the results of his labor, the I.C.A. analysis could be characterized as the alienation of "local man" from significant participation in, not just the economic, but also the political and cultural dimensions of his society by the mega-structuring of all of these sectors. Thus,

a strategic approach is formulated which focuses upon restoring to local citizens the capacity to forge their own destiny. It includes a self-conscious program of enlightenment, awakening participants to the extensive possibilities of which they have not been aware. Like Vicos, its programmatic objectives are quite measureable, at least in some arenas, e.g., a tripling of the income of the village within two years of the initiation of the project is a common objective in the less developed lands. Thus, the I.C.A., while practically embodying most of the insights of a critical theoretical approach, meets the three major critiques leveled against Habermas and his earlier colleagues (see above, pages 18f).

In later chapters the details of how the I.C.A. embodies this approach will be examined and evaluated. But one other methodological observation is required. The I.C.A. acknowledges the importance of the empirical sciences in the control of the environment, and of understanding the dynamics of social interaction and community. But, like Habermas, its primary emphasis is upon the emancipatory interest which releases victimized local man to claim his own destiny. To do so, the I.C.A. employs a method of continual contradiction analysis similar to that described by Critical Theorists. Unlike Holmberg's approach, this method resists stultification in any doctrinaire articulation of the proper programmatic content of social reconstruction. The manifestations of the central contradiction preventing a more human future are unique to each particular location, and shift across time as a

result of social change (Cf., Wallerstein 1979:vii-xii, "Some reflections on history, the social sciences, and politics" for a more detailed treatment of this point). The essence of this method is seen plainly in the structure of the week-long consultation which initiated each village project (see Chapter 6, Section IV, "The Mechanisms of Initiation").

IV. The Methodology of This Study

It is my thesis that Third World development is best done when it is based upon a strategy of wide-spread, comprehensive, village-level development; that such a strategy is most inexpensively accomplished, and done with least social dislocation, by the use of a catalytic force embodied in a structured movement of volunteers; and that this movemental force can be rapidly created and trained by an intensive, liberational educational experience using imaginal methods.

Like Holmberg and the Critical Theorists, I believe that the criterion of experimental, scientific success by which this thesis should be evaluated is the actual alteration of social reality which results when it is employed in real-life situations. It is in comparing the actual results with the predicted results and in comparing the actual results with the previous conditions that the validity of prescriptive theses is determined. I intend to give support to the validity of my thesis on the basis of one case study in Maharashtra, India. The project described and analyzed here was conducted by the Institute of Cultural Affairs. It is the most

advanced of a series of such projects in more than 30 countries. But as a development project, it is still very new, having been initiated only five years ago. Thus, this analysis is in the nature of an interim evaluation, and will be limited to the experience of one session of the educational training school and to results in one village. Five years from now, a more extensive evaluation can be made of the whole project, and its effect on the 25,000 villages of Maharashtra. Similarly, at that time, a cross-cultural analysis can be made of the projects conducted in countries of widely diversified cultures and economies.

My approach to this study is rooted in the perspective of critical theory, grounded in the ethnographic reporting of first-hand observation of particularities. However, the anthropological approach is more akin to Holmberg's participant-interventionism than of the less ambitious, description-oriented, participant-observation mode. I do not mean to eschew empirical and statistical measures; they will be employed as appropriate, but not as an end in themselves. My sources vary from the important theoretical writings on development and education of the leading academicians and Third World leaders, to the documents of the Institute of Cultural Affairs and other related organizations, to my personal notes of first-hand experiences and of the corporate reflections of Institute staff and Nava Gram Prayas (New Village Movement) volunteers. It is my hope that these reflections, analyses, and documentation may be of assistance to these dedicated volunteers, for it is by their efforts and sacrifice that the basic

needs of their neighbors and countrymen are being met.

This dissertation has two main sections. The first surveys the theoretical context of development. I begin by examining the Global Society which is emerging in the latter half of the twentieth century: the nature of its political linkages, its economic interdependence and its growing cultural commonnesses. I then recount what might be called "classical development theory", primarily as propounded by Walt Rostow, and its critique by the world-system and dependency theorists. It is the postulate of "underdevelopment" which provides the foundation for Third World agendas for development which have emerged in the last two decades, and which provide the theoretical framework for a strategy of rural development. The final chapter of this section reviews the history of development in India, the host nation for the particular case study to be reported in the second section.

The second section is entitled "A Strategy for Micro-Development" and describes and analyzes a particular attempt to embody my thesis about village level development by the Institute of Cultural Affairs in Maharashtra, India. The sixth chapter presents the social philosophy of the Institute, as it has articulated it in papers and speeches; the chapter presents the general approach to be embodied in specific village development projects. The next chapter examines the educational methodology of the Institute, called "Imaginal Education", and relates it to educational and epistemological theory. Chapter eight describes the Human Development Training School, the educational

project conducted by the I.C.A. to train village volunteers of Nava Gram Prayas, the catalytic New Village Movement. Chapter nine presents the intra-psychic alterations occasioned in the students of the H.D.T.S. which made them effective catalysts of village-level development. The last chapter analyzes the changes in one village, Maliwada, as a demonstration of the rapid development this strategy enables. The conclusion summarizes my whole argument.

Part I

THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Chapter 1

The Emergence of a Global Society

The twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of widespread self-consciousness that today we humans live in one common global society. Academicians, holding various theoretical positions and definitional stances, may argue over whether there really exists something that can be called a society on a global scale, or, if there is, when it can be said to have emerged. This century does not lack for great symbolic events to represent the "one world" manifestation: Einstein's articulation of $E=MC^2$, World War I, the League of Nations, World War II, the atomic bomb, the United Nations Charter signing in San Francisco, Mao's victory in China, Congolese independence and the rise of the new nations, sputnik, the man on the moon, the OPEC oil shock. But whether it be by the picture of the "earthrise" or the arrival of the transistor radio in his village, local man, all over the globe, recognizes his connection to a common humanity. He recognizes that his world involves regular and systematic inter-connections with peoples near and far. He grasps himself to be part of a global society.

Hedley Bull(1977:13) articulates four essential elements for the existence of a society: common interests, common values, common rules, and common institutions. His state-centrist argument is that there now exists a "society of states" which participate jointly in these common elements. Others, such as Morse(1976) and Alger(1977) would go further and suggest that individuals, sub-state units, and supra-state organizations also participate in these same elements; that to narrow the focus to nation-states is to miss the

full significance of the emergence of the global society.

Others, such as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin(1965) and Kenneth Boulding(1956), following more closely after Durkheim's "collective consciousness"(1915), focus upon the common awareness of mankind around the globe, which Teilhard calls the Noosphere. Both of these scholars, in language echoing Durkheim's "consciousness of consciousness", focus upon contemporary man's heightened self-consciousness to speak of this century as the emergence of a new global age of post-modernity or post-civilization.*

In this initial chapter I intend to simply show that Third World development takes place, or fails, in the context of social interconnection and interdependence in the political, economic, and cultural(defined in a more restricted sense) arenas. It is a world of political linkages which enweb men and women across the whole globe in formal and informal relationships. It is a world of economic interdependence in which the actions of any have repercussions throughout the whole system, though the capacity for significant impact is unequally distributed. It is a world of growing cultural commonness in cognitive procedures, essential elements of life style, and symbolization. It is this world-wide coalescence that I mean to denote by a global society.

* For a further explication of this theme, see Chapter 7, The Epistemological Basis of Imaginal Education.

I. The Emergence of the Global Society

Hannah Arendt, in accounting for the current state of The Human Condition(1958:248ff), speaks of "three great events (which) stand at the threshold of the modern age and determine its character..." The expansion of Europe established political-military dominance and carried the culture of the Western world across the whole globe. The rise of capitalism accompanied European expansion until a singular world economy was established. Both of these events were made possible by, and in turn helped to fashion, the rapid expansion and development of science and technology. While various authors have argued for the primal determinancy of one or another of these "events", to me, the evidence appears more persuasive that it was the systematic and interdependent interaction of these three developments which has produced the current global society. Depending upon the problem to be solved, attention may be focused upon one or another of these overarching trends: the threat of ecological disaster--the development of science and technology; the exploitation of the underdeveloped world--the rise of capitalism; the fragility of democratic governments in the "new nations"--the expansion and decline of European colonialism. But even by thus narrowing the focus, one cannot ignore the other accompanying factors. They are inextricable and interpenetrating.

The history of the world to the 16th century is the accumulated histories of isolated regions. It was about 1500 A.D. that the various peoples on the distant landmasses of the globe were first brought into direct contact with each other. L.S. Stavrianos(1975:3)

compares the ending of regional isolation (by the voyages of Columbus) to the breaking of the bonds of planetary isolation by the astronauts who landed on the moon. What had been parallel histories, which at times impinged upon one another, became a unified history of man.

At the time, an impartial observer might have suggested it would be more likely for China, whose civilization was more advanced, more cohesive and more powerful, to dominate the world scene than for Europe to do so. In fact, long before the Portuguese had sailed past Cape Verde to reach present-day Sierra Leone, still on the Northwest African coast, the Chinese, under Cheng Ho (1405-1433), had conducted seven maritime trade expeditions around South Asia to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and East Africa (Stavrianos, 1975:74). But the consolidated Chinese empire cut off its westward ventures while the divisive state powers of Europe, first the Iberians, then later the Northwest Europeans, competed with each other to span what, for the first time, was generally agreed to be a "globe".

The voyages of discovery and colonial expansion need not be recounted here, others have done that far more adequately (e.g., Stavrianos, 1975, and McNeil, 1979). It is enough to say that by the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the whole inhabited world had fallen under European influence, domination, or control. Fueled by political and economic competition, assisted by scientific and technological breakthroughs, especially in maritime and military innovations, white, Western civilization had become preeminent everywhere. But in 1904-05 an event occurred which was to be a

turning point in world history. The Japanese, who had resisted being included in the global society longer than any other people, but who, in less than half a century, had learned from the West and adopted its modernized science, technology, and organization of production, handed Western expansion its first defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Within sixty years, virtually the whole world was to likewise throw off direct Western political control. However, this did not result in a reversion to regional or local isolation, but to a new system of global political linkages.

Whether capitalism fueled and required Western expansion, was simply carried by it, or was interdependent with it, the expansion of these two forces was virtually simultaneous. Immanuel Wallerstein (1979:37ff) points out that "agricultural capitalism" developed in Europe and the Western Hemisphere in the 16th century. For Wallerstein, capitalism is the production of goods for exchange on a market for the sake of realizing a profit, and is characterized by a singular division of labor for a common market(1979:16). Gradually, through the mercantilist expansion with its primary accumulation of capital, and then explosively with the advent of industrial capitalism, this capitalist world-economy came to encompass the whole globe. Despite, or perhaps even due to, the fragmentation of the colonial empires and the emergence of economies organized on the basis of a hostile socialist ideology, this world economic system continues to flourish.

Such new innovations as the stern rudder, lateen sails, redesigned hulls, the compass, and shipboard artillery gave Western

mariners a decisive advantage. The loosening of intellectual constraints, fostered in the Italian Renaissance and supported by the religious and national pluralism of the Reformation, resulted in an outpouring of insights into the ordering of nature. Combined with technological applications of these insights to practical problems, a new spirit emerged which came to characterize modernization: the subjection of nature to the domination of man. Science thrived on this separation of the observer from the observed, and the resulting domination the experimenter was enabled to exercise. The early adaptation of scientific innovation to navigation and military affairs gave the West the power to dominate the rest. It also spurred imitation by those who were subordinated, first in military technology, then in productive capacity. Japan, after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, recognized the supremacy of Western science and technology in international relations and successfully adapted its society to them, resulting in the victory over the Russians, and the capacity to wage a global, industrialized war thirty years later.

The scientific and technological revolution, with its extension of power far beyond the capacity of a man or an animal, was to fundamentally alter the relationships of nation-states and peoples. No longer was sheer massiveness of numbers determinative. The "six-shooter" was not the only "equalizer". Applications of technology made the productive capacity of relatively small, but developed, populations prohibitively advantageous over unmodernized productive techniques, even when employed by masses of people. Adaptations of

of technology to transportation and communications eliminated the isolating and protective barriers of distance, oceans, and political boundaries. The exploitation and employment of modernizing technologies gave the West such obvious wealth and power that it soon became self-evident that survival required adaptation. Japan became the primal symbol of the possibilities of such a policy. Today, the advantages of scientific and technological modernization are virtually universally affirmed. Debate centers upon what appropriate technological adaptation entails, not if adaptation is appropriate.

II. A World of Political Linkages

In the year 1500, the world was governed by a number of regional empires. In China, the Ming dynasty, the latest in a series dating back three millennia, had already ventured by sea to Africa and was at the height of its three century reign. The Shogunate founded by Yoritomo had been in power in Japan for three centuries. The Mughuls were consolidating the largest empire yet seen in South Asia. The Safavid Shahs had just restored a native ruling dynasty to Persia. The Ottoman Empire in the middle-east had conquered Constantinople, was advancing in Eastern Europe, and was consolidating its power in the Arab lands. The Incas and Aztecs were firmly in control of large empires in South and Central America. Europe alone, among the more technologically developed civilizations, was experiencing the collapse of its empire.

During the next century and one half a new political configuration emerged, a society of sovereign nation-states. This configuration was confirmed in the peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. Implicit in the treaties signed in that year were a series of characteristics which have continued to shape thinking about nation-states to the present day, even in drastically changed conditions. Morse(1976.29ff) lists five: the sovereignty of the nation-state, externally independent and internally supreme; the primacy of foreign policy, which involves the state's continued capacity to exist and prosper in the face of external threat, over domestic issues; the heroic framework of great and masterless men in which nations and sovereigns(and later elected leaders) were identical; the necessity of a balance of power which prevented any one state from emerging to form a new European empire; and the assumptions of mercantilism that political and economic reality were inseparable, that national economies should develop autonomously and therefore require a favorable balance of trade, and that men always act out of self-interest.

Several scholars have suggested that it was precisely the emergence of this anarchical society of states, to use Bull's description, which fostered both Western expansion and the rise of capitalism. It was not only that adventurers like Columbus could find a sponsor such as Isabella after being turned down by the Italian nobility(diversity of opportunity), but also that the lack of the unified restraints, imposed by an empire, fostered competitive

specialization, and the absence of capital-draining tributes allowed for primitive accumulation which could fuel further expansion (Cf., Chirot, 1977:205). In the competition such a configuration encouraged, small advantages resulted in massive alterations of power and wealth, enhancing the value of innovation and invention. Quite naturally, those who conquered and came to dominate the world also imposed their concept of the nation-state, first as competing extensions of the European states, but in this century, as a world community of so-called nation-states. At first, sovereignty was vested in the heroic monarchs; later it was vested in the shared control of the people.

The order and pattern of European expansion has had a determining effect upon contemporary political configurations. Iberian explorations dominated the 15th and 16th centuries, establishing a trade route to the East with facilitating outposts along the way, and conquering the Amerindian empires and the Philippines. The resulting Spanish and Portuguese colonies, dominated by the expropriation of gold and silver bullion and monocultural agriculture featured a governmental and landed elite which administered and controlled the native population. European culture was superimposed on the various indigenous cultures. Export oriented primary resource exploitation, with coerced labor in the mines and on plantations, replaced indigenous self-sufficiency. A rigidly hierarchical society was established, eventually expanding to include a middle group made up of mestizoes, a racially-mixed population. The elites in this system were culturally,

politically, and economically more closely linked to their Iberian counterparts than to the indigenous populace among whom they lived. This social structure is still evident in much of Latin America, whose state boundaries largely reflect colonial administration divisions and major seaport capitals, which are externally oriented.

Early British colonial expansion focused on more sparsely settled lands and entailed wholesale emigration. British culture was transplanted, as a piece, to the new lands; it was not just the importation of a ruling elite. The native populations of North America, Australia, and New Zealand were not dominated and subjugated as laborers; they were simply pushed aside. European culture was wholly transferred to new locations. It is not surprising that, as these colonies grew in size to rival that of the parentland, they were the first to achieve independence. They became nation-states identical in all essential characteristics except location with their European counterparts.

European expansion to the East was primarily economic in its early phases, conducted, after the early Portuguese successes, by Dutch and British trading companies. Political domination came later and was accomplished by a miniscule population reinforced by a superior, though not more numerous, military force. In South Asia, Indonesia, and parts of North Africa, this resulted in direct imperial incorporation. These were inclusions of established political realities into a colonial administration patterned on European precedents. European forms and concepts were imposed upon radically

dissimilar cultures. With imperial disdain, reinforced by convictions of racial superiority, the Europeans, at times, set out to recreate those cultures and transform them into their own mould, at first by forming "....a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect"(Thomas Babington Macaulay's 1834 Minute on Education, quoted in Stavrianos, 1975:269). In other cases, especially in North Africa, political administrative structures were reformulated into European patterns with less attempt to impose other cultural innovations. In still other areas, notably China, Persia, and Turkey, domination was indirect. In all of these colonies and dependencies a native, Western-oriented elite was created which operated these Western-style governmental administrative procedures. The nation-states which eventually emerged continue to be shaped by these patterns and concepts, and often are administered by these same elites.

The late imperial division and acquisition of African territories followed a different pattern. Early European contacts had been limited to a few seaports and trading stations, most of which were abandoned with the end of the slave trade in the early 19th century. But in the last thirty years of the century nearly all of Black Africa was seized by the European powers. This process was highlighted by the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 in which the procedures of acquisition were agreed upon by the major European powers. By treaty agglomeration and distant metropolitan negotiations, a whole

continent of tribal peoples and primitive states was arbitrarily partitioned into colonial administrative adjudicatories. National and ethnic boundaries were regularly disregarded--a situation only matched by the equally arbitrary state boundaries created upon the demise of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I. The states which thus emerged, while adopting the administrative and political forms of their European metropolises, could hardly be called nation-states. They were more nearly international confederations within modern state frameworks. Their early years of independence were consequently dominated by working out the implications of regional cultural diversity within a political unity.

Across the globe the conditions were set for the emergence of a world-wide system of nation-states in the twentieth century. A commitment to "modern" administrative and social patterns supplanted traditional organization and practices. Localized sovereignties were subordinated to state sovereignties, though at times at fearful and bloody cost. A system of autonomous "nation-states" emerged. But, though the forms seem to indicate a world-wide extension of the classical state system which had appeared after Westphalia, the reality is very different.

In classical state theory, reflecting images drawn from the post-Westphalia period, states are self-contained entities which relate to one another through the direct interchanges of sovereigns or their representatives. International relationships are, and ought to be, exchanges of nation-states. Of course, this was never

strictly the case. In the latter half of the twentieth century, state-state exchanges are only one of a multiplicity of cross-border exchanges, and are not necessarily the most important ones. Alger(1977) suggests a number of other important linkages which are often overlooked or slighted, some of which are governmental in nature, and others which are not. All of these linkages are increasing in frequency of manifestation. States do not simply relate through their foreign secretaries; whole ranges of similar bureaucracies relate with one another across state boundaries, on issues of common concern, without ever consulting their respective foreign ministries. One's counterpart in the Ministry of Energy of another state is just a phone call away. Furthermore, sub-state units also have international concerns and often establish their own direct contacts; thus the State of Illinois maintains offices in a number of different countries who are interested in her corn and manufactures, and individual cities have "sister-city" relationships that extend to trade and cultural contacts. At the other extreme, many international exchanges are multilateral and involve a government in a regional and global interstate organization such as the European Economic Community and the United Nations.

Aside from the formal and institutionalized state relationships, Non-Governmental Organizations and extra-state relations have grown exponentially.* These transnational relations are often more determinative than a state's official actions. They include the actions of

* For an extensive cataloguing of exponential growth in transnational contacts and global commonizing factors, see the series of "J" curves in Anderson, 1979:34ff.

private businesses, such as multinational corporations. Multinationals carry on exchanges among their own constituent elements, with the government of a state, with other private actors, or with particular individuals. There is a wide array of semi-public agencies: charitable organizations, sports federations, religious associations, friendship societies, labor movements, and revolutionary forces. There are also an escalating number of individual contacts and exchanges: from visitation to foreign employment and service to migration. Alger points out that each of these entities, private, semi-public, and individual, has its own foreign policy which it pursues in its own direct contacts and in its contacts with its host government and society. I.T.T.'s participation in the downfall of the Allende government in Chile is only a spectacularly notorious example of a reality which, in more benign form, is commonplace--perhaps often unconscious. The state-centric understanding of international relations oversimplifies the real situation to the point of distortion. Plans and models created from that perspective court self-delusion. The global society which has emerged is marked as a society of transnational linkages.

III. A World of Economic Interdependence

One of the marks of the new transnational nature of international relations is the blurring of the distinctions between high and low policy (foreign affairs priority over domestic issues) and even between what is foreign and what is domestic. Interest rates, business

expansion, human rights, elections, welfare programs, construction projects, investment regulations all were once considered less important matters of strictly domestic concern. They are now the more frequent agenda of meetings of heads of state than are questions of national boundaries or the strengths of military alliances.

Of course, even the liberal laissez-faire separation of economic and political spheres, rejecting the mercantilist position which had held sway in the Peace of Westphalia, had not created an impenetrable barrier between the two. Clearly, free trade policies are themselves political policy, favorable to those with a more developed trade or industrial capacity and disadvantageous to those seeking to catch up. Thus, once Britain had established herself in a position of advantage by military force, she became a consistent advocate and enforcer of free trade.* On the other hand, in times of conflict, the blockade, shutting off all of an enemy's trade, was a regular military tactic.

These same patterns continue today. The Bretton Woods agreements at the end of World War II confirmed a free trade perspective for post-war relationships. The International Monetary Fund was to be a multilateral institution to prevent abuse of currency exchanges through competitive devaluations or currency blockages. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed so that "...barriers

* Cf., the destruction of the Indian textile capacity, in Frank, 1978:147-166; and the enforced opening of the Chinese, who were disinterested in inferior Western goods, requiring trade in exchange for opium, in the war by that name in 1839-42, in Stavrianos, 1975:277f.

to trade could be progressively dismantled on an international and universal basis"(Morse, 1976:126). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(The World Bank) was to facilitate the marshalling of capital for massive development projects, primarily of infrastructural capacity.

Each of these institutions has fostered global economic interdependence in what Daniel Chirot(1977) calls "The American World System". In a more nationalistic interpretation of his teacher's theory of The Capitalist World-Economy(Wallerstein, 1979; see Chapter 2, The Development Debate), Chirot contends that America decided to 'assume the costs of maintaining the world-wide capitalist system, to prevent it from falling into the chaos and potential dissolution which was threatened after World War I, to contain the spread of the anti-capitalist communist system, and thereby, to exercise her own domination of the world-economy. He credits America's willingness to adopt the unprecedented policy of aiding her defeated enemies as potential allies for saving "...the shaken capitalist system in Western Europe and Japan"(1977:149). Chirot goes on to demonstrate that American foreign aid was primarily directed, from Truman's first request for \$400 million during the Greek civil war, towards containing threats to the capitalist system rather than towards equitable development. He claims that it was the "continuing rise of nationalistic, anti-core revolutions in peripheral areas (which) ultimately produced a large-scale American aid program whose main purpose was to contain the rise of such movements and to make the peripheral world safer for American

investment and security interests"(1977:151f). He points out that aid tends to concentrate on the extraction of materials essential to advanced industrial economies or on industry "based on the exploitation of cheap labor". While such aid did not make these economies poorer, they did lead to unbalanced growth and overspecialization, the disarticulation of sectors of the economy, the strengthening of "enclave elites" who act more to the benefit of external interests than of those of their poorer countrymen, and the requirement of opportunities for American investment, which often recouped its original capital through repatriated profits in less than three years, further increasing the gap between the rich and the poor nations. He points out that U.S. investments in primary and extractive endeavors in underdeveloped nations continue to produce profits which are triple those of other investments. Thus poorer states are kept in the dependency of unbalanced, single-product economies which produce surpluses primarily for the benefit of foreign investors.

Chirot, at first focusing upon the political tensions between the capitalist and communist camps, seems to imply that there are two separate world economies. However, when he examines whether or not there is "A World Communist System", he reverts to a position closer to his mentor's, which contends that the key characteristic of a capitalist world system is that a common world-wide market exists, on which produced goods are exchanged for maximum profit. Wallerstein contends that the form of ownership of the means of production does not significantly affect this market mechanism, so that, to the extent

that socialist states engage in foreign exchange of goods seeking to maximize their balance of trade, they are direct participants in the capitalist world-economy.

Chirot interprets American military interventions and counter-revolutionary support in the Third World as primarily defenses against perceived threats to the control of underdeveloped nations by the developed core.* He suggests that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. act as if Lenin's Imperialism thesis(1916, quoted in Morse, 1976:65) were true; that is, that the capitalist core nations can only exist by exploiting the peripheral, underdeveloped sources of raw materials and cheap labor. Chirot does remind his readers that U.S. actions do not always fit this pattern, that strong counteraction was not taken over Venezuelan expropriation of oil and steel investments, nor were there strategic investments or resources at stake in the conflicts in Southeast Asia. Chirot characterizes most Third World conflict as anti-core revolutions, in which the U.S. acts to prevent states from withdrawing from the world system, while the Soviets act to support the revolts, believing that the contraction of the exploitable periphery will ensure the collapse of the capitalist world-economy. Chirot, however, suggests that both nations may be deluding themselves, that the imperialism theory may not be true, that its current descriptive success is due to the fact that both of these

* Chirot lists U.S. actions in China 1946-49, Greece 1946-49, The Philippines 1948-52, Iran 1952, Guatemala 1954, Cuba 1959-61, Laos 1959-75, The Congo 1960-65, Vietnam 1945-75(in aid to the French until 1954, then independently), the Dominican Republic 1965, Cambodia 1970-75, Chile 1971-73, and Angola 1974-75.

behave as if it were true, and therefore, their actions are predictable. He suggests that though core capitalist endeavors have extracted enormous profits from peripheral areas, it is not demonstrable that the system would collapse without them. He suggests that the interdependent core economy can flourish without exploitative profits from the periphery.

Whatever the likelihood of Chirot's thesis, its articulation is a demonstration of the acknowledged economic interdependence that characterizes the current global society. There exists a common world market in which goods are exchanged. There is a world-wide division of labor in which particular areas of the globe are overspecialized in extractive or monocultural production while the more balanced and diversified economies manifest the higher productivity of advanced technological superiority and higher wages. There is a common world resource pool from which manufactures are assembled from sub-units and raw resources drawn from an incredible diversity of locations. Both the absolute level and the proportion of world trade to domestic trade are increasing exponentially.

IV. A World of Cultural Commonness

As European expansion carried the political forms of the nation-state with it, it also conveyed many other dimensions of Western culture. M.N. Srinivas(1966:46f), the prominent Indian sociologist, speaks of the radical changes the British brought to his land. New technology and revolutionized communications integrated

the country, ended endemic local wars, extended knowledge beyond the privileged few, abolished suttee(the cremation of a man's wife upon his funeral pyre), female infanticide, human sacrifice, and slavery.

Westernization, as I have already indicated, created an elite, trained in Western values and embodying elements of Western culture, in every colony around the globe. Chirot(1977:135f) points out that it was this very elite who provided the leadership for the eventually successful anti-colonial revolutions. After Independence, these same elites carried out reforms that colonial authorities had been hesitant to impose. India's Congress Party, led by the British-trained Gandhi and Nehru, were committed to create a society emphasizing social justice and devoid of "castism"(Orenstein, 1963:83). But it was only with the adoption of the Constitution after Independence and with the passage of the New Hindu Code Acts of 1955 and 1956 that "Untouchability" was outlawed, "equality of status and opportunity" were guaranteed, and a uniform civil code, equally enforceable for all persons, was adopted(Galanter, 1968a:312 and 1968b:81f, also, see on Chapter 5).

Srinivas recognizes that Westernization(a term he prefers to modernization, because he thinks the former is ethically neutral, while the latter is implicitly judgmental about traditional society) involves certain implicit value preferences, which he characterizes broadly as humanitarianism, "...an active concern for the welfare of all human beings irrespective of caste, economic position, religion, age, and sex"(1966:48). He sees the spread of egalitarianism and secularization as outgrowths of this humanitarianism, and as essential

to the development of his nation as the economic and political revolutions it is experiencing.

Whether it be called Westernization or modernization, be praised or damned, there is a clear growth in the commonality of cognitive processes and categories, in the style of living, and in the symbolic forms (language, art, and religion/ideology) by which humanness is expressed. The global society manifests an unprecedented cultural commonness.

I have already mentioned the triumph of scientific thinking. It is truly becoming the common sense of the whole globe. Theodore Roszak suggests:

...the two major revolutionary traditions of the modern world: bourgeois liberalism and social democracy...in their impassioned dissent from the culture of the ancien regime, both have ridden the great running tide of scientific skepticism that appears in our history as an integral part of the revolutionary appeal to reason. Science.... provided both with their intellectual style and world view....
(Roszak, 1978:115f)

Implicit in the adoption of Western science is an altered relationship to nature, the subordination of the object to the subject. This is a radical reconceptualization for those accustomed to thinking of nature and its creatures, seen and unseen, as "subjects" interacting with men, and for those who envision man's role to be fitting in with the demands and constraints of nature, rather than trying to conquer them.

The political consequences of not adopting this common mode of thought have already been examined. These consequences have provided a powerful inducement to all who care about their political freedom. But

some, Roszak among them, are questioning the ecological and human consequences of the unthinking applications of the scientific approach and technological innovation. Harry Clay Blaney III claims we have already reached a point of "...increasing instability and high risk, threatening....the world system (with) a catastrophic collapse (1979:xii f). Whether attacked by the catastrophists, like Blaney and Roszak, or affirmed by the technological optimists, like Srinivas, Kahn(1976) and Stavrianos(1976), the omnipresence of the scientific mindset as part of the emerging global society is unchallenged.

A style of life is becoming increasingly common around the world also. Urbanization is a phenomenon experienced virtually world-wide. In its most obvious form, the increasing agglomeration of masses of people in the world's cities, it is becoming one of the overwhelming problems facing the global society, with its overloaded utility systems, inadequate housing, outstripped social services, and massive unemployment. This is a set of problems common to most of the globe, even in countries such as China, which have followed intentional policies to limit the growth of urban areas(Stavrianos, 1976:129). But beyond the physical characteristics of urban growth is the more pervasive spread of the urban style in urban and rural areas alike: instant and mass communications, clothing patterns, music, health patterns, egalitarianism, etc.

A key element of this emerging common style is the rise of individualism. Kindled in European civilization in the Enlightenment and sanctified in the Reformation, individualism played a crucial role

in the domination of the West and the spread of capitalism (Arendt, 1958:248). The dignity and equality of the individual and his right to unconstrained opportunity are prime tenets of the bourgeois liberalism which undergirds both political democracy and world-wide capitalism. In movements for human rights, for racial, sexual, and caste equality, and for national democratic procedures, this individualism is affirmed. In the spread of industrialization and commercialization of agriculture, with their consequent wage labor in which the individual is singled out and rewarded for his own effort, this trend is fostered. In the increase of the nucleated family pattern, corresponding to increasing employment mobility which accompanies industrialization and urbanization, this individualism represents a radical alteration of life style for many. It is not universal, and it is often resisted and opposed, but it is a persistent element in the growing cultural commonness of our global society.

Increasing cultural commonness is perhaps most obvious in what might be called a developing pan-human symbology. English is rapidly becoming the lingua franca of global society, supported by the other major European languages. In many former colonies, a European tongue is the only language common to all elements of the population, and despite its colonial overtones, is often a crucial symbol of national unity as an alternative to intrastate linguistic domination and regional/ethnic hegemony of one faction. Beyond the use of English as a nearly universal means of communication, there is also the adoption of a number of common international artificial languages, from

traffic signs to computer conventions. Of course, the rapidly increasing literacy rates expands the impact of this linguistic commonness.

The global expansion of art and the technologies for conveying artistic expression around the world (movies, radio, t.v., records and tapes, popular books, international cultural exchanges, sports events, etc.) have greatly expanded the consciousness of living in a common, but pluralistic society. These images of the geography, architecture, history, people, artistry, and happenings of other cultures have greatly expanded our understanding of the multi-cultural world in which we live, and reinforced the sense of belonging to a pan-human society. They reinforce and expand the shared history of the globe.

Yehudi Cohen (1970) has pointed out that, as civilizations expand, a universalization of language (the establishment of a lingua franca) and religion are necessary legitimizing factors. Many of the universal religions have, in fact, been spread by conquest. With European expansion, Christianity was carried across the globe, both in the transplanted European cultures of the North American, Australian, and New Zealand settlements, and in the superimpositional colonies of Latin America and Africa. Christianity was far less accepted in the North African and Asian colonies of administrative dominance in which other universal religions (primarily Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism) were already established. But Cohen goes on to point out that as civilizations get larger, religious legitimation tends to be secularized. It is to the spread of this secularized humanitarianism

that Srinivas was pointing. The images of egalitarianism, rationality, and personal dignity are part of this increasingly common secular-religion, finding expression in both the so-called universal religions and the ideological "isms". They serve as points of common reference and appeal for men of widely differing traditions and backgrounds. It is another sign of the growing cultural commonness of our global society.

V. Living in the Global Society

The trends which have been described in the foregoing pages are realities with which we must contend. There may be differences of opinion as to whether or not they comprise an emerging global society; I obviously think that they do. There may be differences of opinion as to whether these trends should be enhanced or resisted, or whether some should be enhanced and others resisted; on balance, I find the evolution towards a global society a positive occurrence, though I shall point towards certain of these trends which should be redirected. There may be considerable difference of opinion as to strategies and tactics for responding to the emerging global society.

But to live as though these trends did not exist is to live in illusion. To pretend that the developments which have been described here, together with the countless counterparts which they represent, are unimportant, is to invite unnecessary complications for one's planning. This is particularly true for those who are concerned with global development. The emergence of a global society

has powerful determining effects on development planning. These effects can be ignored only at one's peril. They may be incorporated as favorable conditions or opposed as harmful constraints, but they can be ignored only with great danger.

As I earlier suggested, it was the absence of effective imperial controls in Europe, with their inhibiting and resource draining institutions, which created the conditions for the expansion of Europe, the rise of capitalism, and the development of science and technology. It was the condition of "uncontrolledness" that gave impetus to the growth of the global society. In some ways, these trends can be described as an unrelenting drive towards bigness: big corporations, huge populations, massive weapons and forces of destruction, potentially catastrophic ecological conditions. There are those who would propose that the next logical development is the creation of a world-wide political order to contend with the problems posed by such magnitude. Some see it as the only solution to man's ecological destructiveness. Others see a system of world order as the only alternative to economic inequality. Still others see it as the only way to preserve peace. Others simply see world government as an inevitability which might be hastened or delayed by intensifying or ameliorating the internal contradictions of the current world system, but which cannot be avoided. Some would welcome such a system as a means to control those who exploit the current situation for their own aggrandizement. Others would welcome it because it would expand their capacity to manipulate the directions of development

to their own advantage.

The strategy described in this dissertation resists the movement towards massiveness. It contends that solutions can be found at the local level to the world's problems, and that such solutions will be more effective because of their capacity to engage massive participation. It is a strategy for restoring balanced self-reliance to every socio-political unit, starting at the local community level. Such an approach would foster genuine interdependence rather than interpenetrating dependencies. Some who advocate such a strategy call themselves decentralists; others call themselves neo-anarchists. I prefer to speak of a strategy of micro-development. It is a strategy which steels itself to refuse to sail with the popular currents, to ignore the siren's songs. It charts a course across trends. It cannot ignore the currents or it will end on the rocks. But it celebrates the promise that if the steersman holds firm, he may reach the calm waters that lead towards the ancestral home, the human community.

Chapter 2
The Development Debate

"Development" has become a major concern only in the last three decades. Before that, though some individuals, particularly anthropologists, churchmen, and enlightened colonial administrators were involved with the lives and cultures of the colonized "savages", their concerns were often couched in terms of the "white man's burden" either to "civilize and Christianize" or to "prevent the contamination" of their cultures. Only with the collapse of the colonial empires following World War II and the emergence of the New Nations, which came to be called "The Third World", did development become a theme in international relations.

..I. Classical Development Theory

Development became a concern at the same time as the reconstruction of Europe following World War II. It was highly predictable that the techniques of the Marshall Plan would be extended to the new nations, headed by India and Pakistan, who became independent in 1947. Development became a major concern of academics as well as government functionaries. Gunnar Myrdal made the first major contribution to development theory with a series of lectures early in the decade of the fifties, later published as Rich Lands and Poor(1957).

Myrdal observed that mere technological and capital transfers, while adequate to the reconstruction of the advanced economies of Europe, were not enough in the underdeveloped countries and colonies. He highlighted both economic and cultural incapacities for employing sophisticated technologies: the low level of social overhead capital

investment, inadequate commercial and administrative infrastructures, the virtual absence of an educated workforce, particularly those with technical skills necessary to man technological facilities. Myrdal advocated a comprehensive approach to development with a balanced effort, not just among the economic sectors, but also in education, health, government, and social organization. He used the image of the "vicious cycle" of degeneration, but indicated its opposite was the goal of development: a spiral of cumulative successes, in which advance in one arena would reinforce efforts in other complimentary arenas.

Only a few years later, in 1960, Walt Whitman Rostow published The Stages of Economic Growth(1964), which became the definitive approach to development in the West. The inclusion of Rostow and his Cambridge colleague John Kenneth Galbraith(as Ambassador to India) in the Kennedy Administration guaranteed that this approach would dominate, not only academic thinking, but governmental policy as well. But beyond either of these uses, the theory of stages of development captured the popular imagination and became ingrained in the thinking of voluntary aid organizations as well. It became the paradigm for approaching the Third World at the very time that the majority of new nations were gaining their independence.

Rostow subtitled his work, "A Non-Communist Manifesto" and intended it to be both an agenda for action from the West and a defense of the capitalist approach. His final chapter is a scathing comparison of the Marxist perspective and its historical manifestations

with the advantages of capitalism. We must return to examine his argument later, but will start by noting the similarities he acknowledges between the Marxist and his own position. Rostow suggests both are "views of how whole societies evolve, seen from an economic perspective. Both acknowledge the political and cultural consequences of economic change and the reality of class and group economic interests in both social change and war-making. Both lead to a consideration of true affluence as the goal and problems of development, and "...both are based on sectoral analyses of the growth process...." (1964:148).

Marxian theory, particularly in Stalinist articulation in the 1930's (see e.g., Frank, 1978:254 and Wallerstein, 1979:52) had already put forward a schema of social development that traced a path from primitive communalism through slavery, feudalism, and imperialist capitalism to socialism (and ultimately, though as yet unrealized, pure communism). Rostow (1964:157) points out that Marx made his analysis on the basis of Great Britain, largely doing his work before the Revolutions of 1848, and thus relied on the basis of only one historical case of development. Rostow also used Britain as his basic model, but elaborates his theory with illustrations from the U.S.A., Western Europe, Japan, and even Russia. Obviously Leninist-Stalinist thought uses the U.S.S.R. as its ultimate model. At about the same time that Rostow was publishing, the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party proclaimed that the U.S.S.R. had reached the post-socialist stage of being "...a state of the whole people...." which

would "...survive until the complete victory of communism"(quoted in Wallerstein, 1979:11).

It was against this background, and in opposition to it, that Rostow formulated his five stages of development. Appearing as it did at the moment of the emergence of a multitude of new nations, the political value of a schema which did not ultimately end in communism, but justified a path leading to democratic abundance, cannot be underestimated. Thus Rostow was again laying claim upon the ideology of egalitarianism for liberal capitalism, while emphasizing the superior democratic commitment to liberty. He was creating, for the new nations, an attractive political-economic alternative to the anti-imperialist agenda of the communists.

II. The Stages of Development

Rostow postulated five stages of development: traditional society, the emergence of the pre-conditions necessary for a transition, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and culmination in a society of abundance which he simply labelled post-maturity. He suggested that these were the universal stages of development for any society, though none would conform to them exactly. In distinction to the Marxist approach, he maintained that political and social factors, as well as more narrowly construed economic forces, cause economic change(1964:2).

Rostow characterized a Traditional Society as one that operates with a pre-Newtonian science, with non-mechanistic understand-

ings of cause and effect. Its economic production is limited, often at, or near, subsistence levels, and usually heavily focused on agriculture. Typically its social structure is narrowly hierarchical, focusing on family and clan connections. Although there was often some form of central rule, political power usually resided in the regions in the hands of landowners. A long-run fatalism, consonant with a static society, could be expected, in which a man's expectations were restricted so that "...the range of possibilities open to one's grandchildren would be just about what it had been for one's grandparents"(1964:5). This long-run fatalism did not eliminate the short-run option of personal improvement, though it did mitigate against it. It certainly discounted the notion of general improvement inherent in the conception of growth economics.

The Pre-conditions of Development describe a society that has begun a transition out of the traditional stage, though it is still dominated by the traditional forms. Britain's pre-conditions for take-off involved the application of the new insights of modern science to new production techniques in both agriculture and industry at a time when world markets were being extended geographically. In Rostow's more general case, however, these pre-conditions do not develop endogenously, but as a result of technological intrusions from the more advanced societies, usually under the aegis of colonialism. The shock of this intrusion spreads the idea of the possibility of economic progress and its necessity as a means to other "good" ends, such as "national dignity, private profit, the general welfare, or

a better life for the children"(1964:6). The marks of this transition are seen in improved and extended educational opportunities, the emergence and encouragement of entrepreneurs, the extension of banking and investment, particularly in social overhead capital, the expansion of commerce and trade and the beginnings of a modern manufacturing sector(N.B. the echoes of Myrdal). This transition is characterized by a dual society: the traditional one alongside modern economic activities. At the same time, an effective central state power is being built, often fueled by a growing nationalism at the expense of landed regional interests or colonial control.

Take-off, as the aeronautical image conveys, is an exciting, dynamic stage of development. It is the crucial stage which all developmentalists eagerly anticipate. Progressivism now dominates traditionalism. Technology has won the struggle with traditional forms of production. Social overhead capital(roads, railroads, electricity and other forms of energy, communications, etc.) is rapidly developing. Political power passes to those persons committed to modernization of the economy as a top priority. Investment rises above 10% of the New National Product. There is a rapid expansion of the industrial sector with a leading sector requiring the complementary expansion of support sectors and entailing a high level of plowback investment, rather than the distribution of profits. Often the take-off is fueled by a breakthrough in the primary sector of the economy, usually in agriculture, but in some cases by the extractive exploitation of natural resources. Once take-off has been reached, development is

practically assured.

The Drive to Maturity entails the extension of modern technology to every sector of the economy, and virtually to every aspect of the society. Productive output exceeds population growth. Reinvestment of profits runs between 10% and 20%. The nation begins to manufacture many of its own needs, thereby cutting down its total imports. It begins to define its own characteristic role in the international economy. In this sense, it is choosing interdependence, having arrived at the stage when it could produce everything it needs to be self-reliant. It will experience cycles of expansion with progressively developing leading sectors until a balanced development of all sectors is achieved.

The attainment of productive abundance heralds the stage of Post-maturity. The work force has been dramatically altered from that of the traditional society. It is largely urbanized. It is dominated by skilled and clerical workers and professionals. The end of unlimited technological expansion has been reached and the society is faced with a choice about its future. Since this is the stage Rostow ascribed to the advanced nations in 1960, when his book was published, he did not know what that choice would be. However, he described the alternatives as a new national assertiveness, the development of the welfare state, or an age of mass consumerism. Rostow ends his stages of development with the question, "Where next?" (1964:80).

Thus the theory of the stages of development was spelled out. Implicit in the theory is the assumption that any nation can develop. Galbraith expressed this confidence in his Economic Development in Perspective(1962), a series of speeches he delivered as United States Ambassador to India. He disparaged the division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries and suggested every nation is already somewhere along the line of development. The relations of nations, then, were among entities further or less advanced along that line. While he acknowledged that there was an advantage to being first in the development process, and that in fact "...the more developed countries are constantly widening their advantage over those that follow behind...."(1962:18), he felt that "...each country has something to gain from those that are in front. And it has something to offer those that follow"(1962:19). The three things that can be borrowed from the "more advanced" countries are capital, technology, and organization(1962:21). Thus the ambassador of the most advanced nation of the world seemingly condones the present economic situation among nations, while seeking to encourage one of the less developed countries(and the self-proclaimed leader of the non-aligned nations) to follow the same path. The political importance of the economic "theory" need hardly be mentioned.

III. The Revolt of Underdevelopment Theory

It was only a few years until Andre Gunder Frank, previously a member in good standing of the conventional school of economic

thinking, with a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, launched a major attack on developmental theory. He started from the same awareness of a widening gap between the more and less developed nations that Galbraith had acknowledged. Under the motto of "The Development of Underdevelopment"(1966), Frank, picking up themes articulated as early as 1952 by Paul Baran, charged that underdevelopment was the direct result of the development of the more advanced countries. He pointed out that "The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped...." and that, contrary to wide belief, underdevelopment is not the product of a nation's own characteristics or structure, but:

is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole(1966:95).

Thus, the lines were drawn for a new explanation of development, built upon a world-system conception.

With the advantage of two decades of hindsight, we can only see as naive Rostow's confident assertion that capitalism has surpassed Lenin's criticisms that "...capitalism, having an alledged built-in tendency for profits to decline, causes monopolies to rise, and crises to become progressively more severe, and leads to a desperate competitive struggle for markets, and to wars"(Rostow, 1964:154). Rostow points to anti-trust legislation to demonstrate the non-concentration of industrial power, but did not anticipate the fantastic expansion and dominance of multi-national corporations. He gloried in the confidence

of Keynesian control of the economy that could avoid crises, but did not foresee the fundamental alterations of the oil shock and the accompanying decade-long global monetary crisis. He trumpeted the doctrine of perpetual growth to offset the theory of diminishing returns, but did not account for the diminishing supply of limited natural resources. He exulted in capitalism's continued success as political colonialism came to an end, without realizing the incipient formulation of economic imperialism in his own words. Thus, Rostow's confident answers to Lenin's critiques now come back to haunt him.

Aidan Foster-Carter has summarized the common assumptions among developmentalists:

development was a non-continuous process, not involving irreconcilable conflicts of interest between developed and underdeveloped countries or between different social groups within the latter; that there was no structural connection between underdevelopment and development, that what was 'modern' was good and what was 'traditional' was bad, and that the two were unconnected (dualism); that development meant becoming more like the West (1976:172).

Others have pointed out that developmentalists, whether Marxian or Rostovian, have used the nation as their unit of analysis and theory, and treated it as if it were an isolated reality. Frank (1978:139-144) is particularly scathing in his critique of Marxist analysis of India. He criticizes the stages of development as being inherently ahistorical. They are "...notoriously difficult to apply to particular countries...." (Foster-Carter, 1976:172). Frank details the inadequacies of Marx and Engels' formulation of the "Asiatic mode of production" (adopted in the anti-communist ideology of Karl Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism in 1957) and the kind of contortions

necessary to fit India into the Stalinist historical sequence of primitive-slave-feudal-capitalist development. In addition, the ahistorical approach, searching for universals, misses the unique element that accounts for the dynamic nature of the expansion of capitalism: the original means of accumulating the necessary resources for launching the development of industrial capitalism. Thus, Amin(1974), Wallerstein(1974), and Frank(1978) all produced major historical works, focusing on the accumulation of capital in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. Universalist theories, by definition ignore the unique. In doing so, developmental theory loses the dynamism of the historical reality of its model states and thereby omits a crucial element in the development of underdevelopment of the nations to which the model is applied. Further, since the historical models which are used are all Western, the actual histories of the underdeveloped nations are ignored--a necessary condition for the imposition of an evolutionary scheme to account for the differences between the less developed and the more developed economies. As Frank notes, India had a very favorable trade surplus in the late 18th century, until Britain seized colonial control and forcibly reversed the trends of production and trade, most notably in "The Rape of Bengal"(1978:147-159).

A third assumption of conventional developmentalists is methodological: that what must be accounted for is what can be seen and counted--the empirical-positivist approach:

The empirical-positivist approach that is content to describe the facts and to try to measure the ebb and flow of value is incapable of grasping more than appearances. It cannot reveal the "hidden transfers" and the essence of the laws of accumulation on a world scale....economism does not allow us to go beyond analyzing the apparent mechanisms of the functioning of the capitalist mode of production, and so does not enable us to examine the relations between formations of different kinds which are integrated in the same world system....(Amin, 1974:3).

Thus conventional developmentalists do not account for the hidden contribution to capitalist development that comes from rural support of workers in all but a few years of their productive effort(Cf. Wallerstein, 1979:125-127 and 277f), and other costs which can be passed on to others, directly or indirectly. Amin asserts that the lack of a critical theoretical perspective leads empirical-positivists to focus upon appearances instead of reality.

Amin(1974:6f) further charges that "economic science" puts on the garb of a "theory of general equilibrium" and assumes a "static capitalism". This positivism requires that progress and change must originate from outside the system(so the necessity of Western aid in the form of capital and technology, Cf. Galbraith above, page 66). Accumulation, which is the heart of the internal dynamic that actually fuels the system, is thus ignored. Amin points out that for some conventional economists, e.g., F.H. Knight(1934), even profit is banished as anything more than the difference between the actual and the ideal(equilibrium) state. But capitalism simply isn't static. The dynamic factor is lost in conventional developmental analysis. Amin suggests that what is needed is a theory of value that accounts

for objective surpluses. Only thus will the developmentalist assumption that there are no surpluses in underdeveloped countries be exposed, and distinctive, wasteful, and exploitive uses of surplus become evident.

Wallerstein(1974:55ff), among the world-systems theorists (as he names them), presents the most cogent critique of developmental theory. He produces "six knotty questions", the developmentalist answers to which have proved inadequate. First he asks both Marxists and capitalists about surprising historical events: why the socialist revolution first occurred in peasant Russia, why the U.S.A. has not progressed to socialism, but could replace Great Britain as the most developed nation, why Britain was the first to develop, and why Canada, clearly below the most developed nations industrially, can have one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. These events all are difficult to explain on the basis of evolutionary developmentalism, as opposed to a systemic approach to development.

"The major anomaly of development theory was the continuing lack of development"(Foster-Carter, 1976:173). As Wallerstein puts it, "...how do we explain the fact that in many areas things seem to have gotten worse, not better? Worse in many ways, ranging from the standard of living, to the physical environment, to the quality of life"(1979:56). He is pointing not only to the "...growing gap between the industrialized countries and the third world...." but also to the "...deindustrialization of many areas of the world...." and specifically refers to the Indian textile case already mentioned by Frank. Waller-

stein carefully notes that this gap does not match the Marxist "polarization", since that was presumably to have occurred within a nation, not between nations. Further, since there are many nations economically in between, the increasing disparity of the richer and poorer nations is hardly a polarization at all.

The third phenomenon evolutionary developmentalism can't explain is the "regressions" that occur in some countries. Why do some countries develop quickly, while others do not? Why do some elites lead their countries into new social configurations, while others do not, even after making significant beginnings? Wallerstein finds the biographical explanations of "false consciousness" or "betrayal" less satisfying than an analysis of the larger social phenomena of which such elites are a part.

The persistence and intensification of nationalism is either deplored or explained away as a "transitional integrating phenomenon" by Western developmentalists. Marxists, proclaiming an international class struggle and international movement, are even more embarrassed. This has led to a conflict between more traditional Marxists such as Bettelheim, who maintain the centrality of the bourgeoisie-proletarian struggle, and those like Emmanuel who suggest that the global struggle is better seen in terms of the rich nations against the poor nations (Cf. Amin, 1974:22-27 for an account of this controversy).

Wallerstein's fifth anomaly has to do with the reappearance of sub-state nationalisms--not in the administratively created

cross-tribal nations of Africa, but of Quebec in Canada, Occitania in France, among the Scots and Welsh in Great Britain and the various nationalities in the U.S.S.R. Such "ethno-national" movements clearly contradict the developmentalist expectation of increasing national integration.

The sixth critique of development theory has already been mentioned above: the tremendous gap between the "ideal types" and "empirical reality". Frank(1968) goes so far as to say flatly, "It is impossible to find in the world of today any country or society which has the characteristics of Rostow's first, the traditional stage." He goes on to explain this in terms of the limited historical scholarship employed by the conventional developmentalists, "This is not surprising, since the construction of Rostow's stages takes account neither of the history of the new underdeveloped countries nor of their crucial relations with the new developed ones over several centuries past...." The examination of the relationships between the underdeveloped and the developed nations has dominated the world-system approach.

IV. World System Theory

Each of these six problems for developmental theory are easily explained in a world-system perspective. If one starts from the conviction that there is a world-wide capitalist system that dominates the whole globe, each of these realities follows logically. In a system with a singular division of labor(Wallerstein's defining

characteristic of a social system", 1979:5) and, thereby, a common history, each of the "surprising" events are explainable, if not predictable. They are problematic only if forced into a universal schema. Similarly, within a common division of labor, different functions are assigned to different areas and divergence is to be expected. It will, unless regulated in some way, tend to increase in magnitude. Since national boundaries are smaller than the total extension of the market-place, nationalistic self-interest is also to be expected. Political power (taxes, tariffs, trade barriers, foreign aid with preferential or necessitated purchases, etc.) can distort the world market, and is more easily exercised by the stronger states than the weaker ones--which explains the unequal exchange and the widening gap between them. Over time, ecological exhaustion, new technology, socio-economic consequences of natural or historical (e.g., war, depressions) phenomena all affect the "progress" or "regress" of national sub-systems without significantly altering the total system. Ethno-nationalism, among other explanations, can be seen as a consolidation of class and cultural solidarity of one segment in national sub-systems; the sub-system reflects the larger class dynamics of the whole system. Such a world system perspective does not have to try to explain empirical divergences from ideals since it seeks only to account for what actually exists and to point to ways in which the present historical reality might be changed.

Three contentions are at the heart of the world system perspective: there is one capitalist, world-wide, common market; there

is a common division of labor across the whole globe; the relationship between the various dimensions of this common market and common division of labor are best described as relations between a core of highly developed, rich, and interdependent national economies and a periphery of underdeveloped, poor, and dependent ones.

Wallerstein sets the beginning of the capitalist world system earlier than either Amin or Frank. He also seeks to clarify the distinction between industrialism and capitalism, which he defines essentially as "...production for sale in a market in which the object is to realize the maximum profit"(1979:15). With this definition of capitalism, broader than that of traditional Marxism, Wallerstein traces its growth from the "agricultural capitalism" of the 16th century, through mercantilism, into "industrial capitalism". Similarly, he traces the emergence of a European world economy from feudalism, through the failure of attempts such as that of the Hapsburgs to create a world-empire(in which political power and economic boundaries are co-terminous and interdependent) and the establishment of the modern world system. Thus, Wallerstein rejects wage labor as the defining characteristic of capitalism. He asserts that slavery, the "second serfdom" of Eastern Europe(or coerced cash crop production), encomienda tenancy, and sharecropping are not anomalies, but simply different means of treating labor as a commodity to be exploited for the sake of profit(1979:17).

Further, the form of ownership is not a determinative characteristic for participation in the capitalist world-system.

Wallerstein argues that there is only one world market today, and that all nations participate in it. Who owns the means of production and how the surpluses, captured in that market, are distributed is unimportant to the world market's functioning. Thus it matters not if production is owned by a single individual, by a worker's cooperative, by a stock company, or by a socialist state; their relations are defined in the capitalist world market and are thereby focused on the maximization of profits. To do this, increased efficiency of production is required to realize a maximum price for sales and a greater surplus on the market. Herein is one of the contradictions inherent in the present system: maximizing profits on the world market means withdrawing the maximum surplus from the majority, but continued growth depends upon mass demand. Demand, in turn, requires a redistribution of withdrawn surpluses to the majority so they can make purchases. Complete maximization of profits and continued growth are mutually contradictory forces.

Frank also points to the incorporation of the socialist countries into the world capitalist system. He further states that social units are "...substantially shaped by their participation in the world-wide process of capital accumulation and in the world capitalist system." Thus, he contends, "...capital has not so much transgressed state boundaries to become international in recent times, as that the nation-state itself was formed long ago as a by-product and servant of capital, whose existence and accumulation had already been international from its inception, before the nation-

state was born"(1978:251, Cf. Wallerstein on nation-state distortion of the "free" market economy, 1979:121f). Thus Frank also emphasizes the importance of the exchange relations of the market in the capitalist world system, and points out that socialist countries, by participating in it, assist the West in the accumulation of capital.

But beyond the question of the inclusion or exclusion of the socialist world is the inclusion within the world capitalist system of the whole globe. In its extensive dimension, the capitalist world economy has already reached its limit. There are no large areas unincorporated in the world system; its reach is global. The expansion of the world system now involves an intensive push, to incorporate the pockets skipped over in the global extension, and the resulting progressive proletarianization of non-industrialized areas(Wallerstein, 1979:278). But a central assertion of the world system is that varying modes of production exist side by side within it. Contrary to the concept of "dualism" expressed in developmentalism, these various modes are not just survivals, but are intentionally maintained within the capitalist world system. We must return to explain why this is so.

The second signal factor in the world system perspective is the singular division of labor which exists within it. As has already been said, this is the defining characteristic of the extent of a social system. The global division of labor began to emerge in the 16th century mercantilist and extractive enterprises and took on distinctive form with the various plantation patterns, and the

superimposition of colonial economies, as Geertz called it(1963:47).

Frank details the effects of the colonial imposition first by the indirect controls used by the Dutch in Indonesia(more fully recounted, though from a different perspective, by Geertz) and by direct control in India, where the British East India Company both ruled and controlled the land.

The key to this global division of labor is in the reservation to the more developed nations of the higher paid and technologically higher skilled jobs and banishment to the less developed countries of the lower paying, less skilled forms of labor(Cf., Marx's "relative surplus value" of saved labor costs through higher productivity vs. "absolute surplus value" of labor which is extracted by requiring longer hours from the laborer). Thus the developed core maintains the more technologically sophisticated means of production and relies on heightened productivity to realize surplus value. When technological equivalence is reached in the production of an item, further profit can be realized by using cheaper labor for the same skilled tasks; this labor is found in the underdeveloped countries--hence the transference of stagnating businesses to these nations(Cf. the movement of the production of textiles from New England to the South to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea). But notice that this division of labor is imposed. As Frank demonstrates, textile production in India in the late 18th century was systematically destroyed by the colonial powers, at the very time Britain was reserving this function for the firms involved in the incipient industrial revolution within her

borders. Thus there developed a broad division of labor that, after the 1790's became characterized as the industrially developed and the agriculturally bound. However, as Wallerstein points out (1979:71) the crucial aspect is not in the particular products involved (the U.S.A. has now become a major exporter of raw agricultural produce), but in the differential in wages, which accounts for the phenomenon of unequal exchange.

This discussion has now led to the relations between the various dimensions of the world system. Galbraith characterized these relationships as those of largely independent entities located at various points along a scale of development. It was as though he were describing men climbing a mountain and suggested that each was responsible to help each other up to the top, with those in the lead helping those further down, who in turn would help those below them. The world systems theorists attack this account as simply being untrue to the actual histories of underdeveloped countries. It is significant that Frank, Amin, and Wallerstein all were intimately involved in the struggles of the underdeveloped countries in the early 1960's. It is from their perspective, not that of Western "model" countries that they write. From this different perspective, a very different set of relations emerges.

Frank's analysis of the "Development of Underdevelopment" dramatically, if crudely, broke from the developmentalist perspective and began to describe these relations as oppositional, interdependent, and causal. "...contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the

historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and now developed metropolitan countries"(1966:95). Frank's contention is that even the "development" of industry in the satellite countries is development of those functions which are neither self-generating nor self-perpetuating. What is developed is increased dependence upon the markets of the metropole--and thus each step of development only increases the dependence. This condition is seen most dramatically when the market contracts or dies in the metropole and the satellite is left bereft, as happened in Brazil(Frank, 1966:97). It is this increasing dependence that Frank refers to as the "Development of Underdevelopment".

Amin(1974:17) has pointed out that 80% of the trade of developed countries is among themselves, and only 20% is with the underdeveloped countries. But this latter trade represents 50% of the trade of the underdeveloped countries, with only a small portion involved in trade among themselves. Thus, while trade with the underdeveloped nations is relatively unimportant to the developed ones, that same trade dominates the economies of the underdeveloped nations. Small changes in that trade have huge effects on the underdeveloped lands, while hardly being noticed in the developed ones. This is the meaning of dependence.

Frank's colonial language of satellite and metropole gave way to the categories "core" and "periphery". Wallerstein expands this model to include a third reality which he calls the "semi-periphery". He traces the development of the core area of the new world economy in

the 16th and 17th centuries as focusing on higher skilled agricultural production and thus tenancy and wage labor were favored. The peripheral areas, Eastern Europe and the Western Hemisphere, specialized in the "export of grain, bullion, wood, cotton, and sugar--all of which favored the use of slavery and coerced cash-crop labor"(1979:18). Mediterranean Europe, the semi-periphery then, specialized in higher skilled industry(e.g., silk), in commerce, and agriculturally, focused on share-cropping. Though the specific functions have changed over the centuries, especially since the industrial revolution, and though the particular national alignments have changed, Wallerstein maintains the relational dynamics have remained the same. In this, Frank now concurs(1978:256).

Wallerstein claims it is the presence of the semi-periphery, mediating the relations of the core and the periphery, which allows the system to avoid the polarization predicted by the Marxists, and allows it to have maintained itself for so long. The markedly unequal distribution of rewards in the capitalist world market would otherwise lead to its own violent overthrow. Though military power and "ideological legitimation" of the system are significant factors in its maintenance, the major stabilizing factor is "the division of the majority into a larger lower stratum and a smaller middle stratum"(1979:22). This mediating role is both economic and political in function, but the latter is more important. The semi-periphery is a buffer between the core and the periphery. It is both exploiter and exploited.

A key aspect of the analysis of the modern world system is the original accumulation of capital, for it is that which provided the dynamic for the whole system, and still shapes the relations between core, semi-periphery, and periphery. It is to this end that these three theorists have focused on the economic history of the 16th - 18th centuries. Marx accounted for the accumulation of capital only as the surplus value of labor extracted from those who have been disconnected from the land and from ownership of the means of production and have been reduced to selling their labor, as a commodity, for wages. The thrust of the pre-industrial revolution histories, produced by world systems theorists, is that it was the expropriation of primitive accumulation which fueled the original expansion of the world capitalist system (Amin, 1974:22, Frank, 1978:239-243). Primitive accumulation involves the surpluses derived by exploitation of "pre-capitalist" modes of production: bullion extracted from Latin America by *corvee*, plantation produce grown and harvested by slave or coerced labor, etc. When accumulation is achieved from non-capitalist production which is contemporary with the capitalist mode of production, Frank calls it Primary Accumulation (1978:241).

A second source of capital accumulation was from the super-exploitation of labor that unequal military strength fostered. Labor was secured, both wage and coerced, which was rewarded at levels which were not only below the value of the labor, but were even below subsistence levels! Marx called this the transformation of "...the labourer's necessary consumption-fund into a fund for the accumulation

of capital" (1954, I:599). This is one of a very few such references in Marx's works, but as Frank indicates, the reality was a major factor in the accumulation of capital before the Industrial Revolution. The decimation of the Amerindian populations in Spanish America, the expropriation, at fantastic cost of life, of slaves from Africa (then outside the European world-system--when Africa was incorporated into the periphery in the 19th century, it was no longer advantageous to transfer its labor across the ocean), the famines in India which wiped out a third of the population in the late 18th century and which were a result of the tax and plunder policies of the East India Company, all are examples of accumulation by the super-exploitation of labor, remuneration below subsistence or reproductive levels.

Crucial for our consideration is the fact that these methods of accumulation continue today, and thus provide the dynamic for the present relationships between the core and the periphery, a fact overlooked by traditional developmentalists. Primary accumulation is still wrought from the so-called "traditional" society which exists dually with the modern sector in so many underdeveloped countries. Often it relies on the super-exploitation of labor, if not directly in sub-subsistence remuneration, certainly in that it requires supplementation of that remuneration for the reproduction of the work force--that is, the family of workers often must be supported by extra agricultural efforts, and thus the work force is not reproducing itself (i.e., adequate support for a worker to raise his own children until they are ready to take his place in the work force). The work

force is recruited constantly from non-capitalist production. This is the surplus which can be accumulated by shifting production facilities from the high-wage (and benefits) core to the low-wage periphery. The labor value of the product is virtually the same, but the labor cost is drastically reduced to the producer. The difference is what fuels the capitalist world system.

V. Strategies of Change

What is the effect of the development debate on strategies of development? For Rostow and Galbraith, the strategies were quite clear. It was the responsibility of the more developed nations to assist the less developed ones by providing capital, technology, and organization. The assumption, reaffirmed in documents such as the 1969 Pearson Report: Partners in Development, thus focuses on the amount of aid offered by the developed nations to the rest of the world. However, the dramatic lack of results, and the actual widening of the gap between the richer and poorer nations has discredited this approach. The poorer nations have turned to more radical strategies of political and economic action. The richer countries have simply reduced the amount of aid offered.

Wallerstein's basic conviction is that there are no significant strategies for development until the world capitalist system collapses from its own internal contradictions. "The pundits note that 'the gap is getting wider', but thus far no one has succeeded in doing much about it, and it is not clear that there are very many in whose

interests it would be to do so"(1979:34). His vision is the creation of a new kind of socialist world-system which would be "...neither a redistributive world-empire nor a capitalist world-economy but a socialist world-government"(1979:35). Wallerstein does not see this as an imminent development, but does believe we are living in a kairotic moment of transition towards such a socialist world-government. This kairotic moment may be participated in by heightening the internal contradictions of the present system. We have already noted the contradiction between maximizing profits and surplus redistribution to maintain demand(page 76 above). Another contradiction is the growing number of socialist nations where industrialization has occurred, undermining the ideological legitimation of the entire system: that only private ownership of capital will lead to economic progress. The further growth of the number of socialist states, most likely in the semi-periphery, will heighten the awareness of this contradiction. Wallerstein(1979:278f) notes four secular trends which are bringing the system towards a crisis: the expansion of the world-economy(each wave of which has revitalized demand and maintained growth) has now reached its geographical limits; the increasing proletarianization of the quasi-feudal semi-proletarians heralds the arrival at a point where primary accumulation through super-exploitation of labor from the non-capitalist production sector will no longer be greater than the necessity of surplus redistribution to maintain demand, thus cutting into the surplus reserved for the owners of capital; the politicization of the workers into parties, worker's movements, and

liberation movements "...creates a vast current of anti-systemic groups....which are becoming too numerous simply to repress or co-opt. There is a threshold of collective size that is being approached"(1979: 279); and janissarization, the forced redistribution of the surpluses of the owners to their cadres of professional, managerial, and technical personnel, resulting in the growth of welfare-state propensities in the core nations, and the burgeoning of the tertiary, or service(non-productive), sector of these economies.

In the midst of these trends, another emergent contradiction which can be fostered is in the movements of sentiment, nationalism, and liberation, which are directly anti-systemic and opposed to the continuance of the status quo. The playing off of national cadres against the interests of the multinationals provides a second opportunity for systemic change, and is highly evident in the core countries currently, in the conflicts around the oil industry. By encouraging these contradictions, the replacement of the modern world-system might be accomplished.

"The only alternative world-system that could maintain a high level of productivity and change the system of distribution would involve the reintegration of the levels of political and economic decision-making"(1974:348). Though Wallerstein calls this a third form of world-system, and not a world-empire, it is hard to discern how a socialist world-government would differ from a redistributive world-empire, either from Wallerstein's writings or on the basis of existing national socialist regimes.

Until the world-system itself changes, perhaps in the 21st or 22nd century(1979:67), all that can be accomplished is the replacement of existing core countries by others from the semi-periphery, or of semi-periphery nations by periphery lands, since it is not possible for all states to develop simultaneously: the disparity of reward is the basis of the capitalist world-system. Though Wallerstein is dismayed at the ethical choice thus presented(helping one country will be at the expense of others--1979:76), he does spell out the types of movement that may occur.

The first is the movement from the periphery to the semi-periphery--the achievement of a high-wage sector that produces part of the needs of the nation, while leaving it dependent on imports in other areas. This step seems to be similar to the kind of development Rostow was indicating by achieving "take-off", though it is circumscribed differently in this theory. The differences between semi-peripheral countries seem to be defined most by political relations with core nations in conflict with each other. Wallerstein presents three strategies for accomplishing this change of status: 1) seizing the chance, 2) invitation, 3) self-reliance. Seizing the chance has to do with propitious action when circumstances present opportunities, such as rapid import substitution in moments of world economic contraction or war. This requires aggressive political action at a time when leadership in the core is weakened or distracted. It has the built-in problem of substituting one form of dependence for another, and tends towards the creation of national monopolies of these

new internal markets. The danger is the later replacement of this new internal production with an assumed external market now abandoned as no longer worthwhile for the core countries, for the sake of creating a favorable trade balance. It must be noted that such a problem is a clear indication that the country is now a part of the semi-periphery.

Some nations move into the semi-periphery under the sponsorship of core countries which protect its infant industries, or they make the move by winning a significant investment from international capitalism looking for surpluses by reducing labor costs. Such promotion by invitation is largely a phenomenon when the world-system is expanding, and runs the danger of being abandoned during a contraction. It may occur in nations less ready for industrialization than those who seize the chance, but it is likely to not go as far in total effect. Such uneven development may increase dependence.

The third option for advancement is self-reliance. Wallerstein is very dubious about the capacity of a peripheral country to move to the semi-periphery by this means. He acknowledges that Tanzania has made strides towards doing this, but notes it is largely because core nations don't really care about maintaining Tanzania in the periphery. Thus he seems to be characterizing this means as "self-reliance in the face of neglect". Frank(1966:99) also notes that, contrary to developmentalist thought, satellites develop most when isolated from their metropolises, through such things as war or depression in the metropole. These are times when the satellite is left to itself,

rather than when they are tightly bound and being assisted by the metropole.

Self-reliance is a much more important strategy for moving from the semi-periphery to the core. This requires a large enough market to justify the installation of advanced technology to produce more cheaply than existing producers. Political power becomes important here, to be able to control the access of other, non-national, producers for this market. This may require the extension of the political boundaries, either by unification, conquest, or regionalization. Subsidies, the reallocation of costs to other sectors of the economy, may be used to make a new product more competitive (a tactic used by Japan very successfully in the last thirty years), or wages may be reduced--but that will also dampen internal demand. On the other hand, increased wages, together with cost advantages from lack of transportation costs may result in increased internal sales. This process may be assisted by propaganda to affect the "tastes" of national consumers. Thus, Wallerstein presents some strategies for movement within the system, recognizing that every advance is at the expense of some other country, while awaiting the collapse of the whole modern world-system and the emergence of a world socialist government.

Samir Amin seems to be more hopeful for the development of presently dependent nations. His analysis of dependence focuses on three significant features: the economy is unevenly developed in dependent nations with much higher productivity in some sectors than

in others. There is a disarticulation of the various sectors with each other. Integration is usually higher between a sector and its complementing function in the outside world, while exchange between sectors within the nation is only marginal. Thirdly, the dominance through external trade of outside forces, and the dependence such trade entails (as already articulated above, page 80). Echoing Frank, Amin asserts that under these conditions, "...in the periphery, growth is not development, for its effect is to disarticulate. Strictly speaking, growth in the periphery, based on integration into the world market, is development of underdevelopment" (1974:18f).

Amin proposes a strategy of withdrawal, either nationally, or by regional alliance if nations are too small to act alone. His three strategies are 1) the creation of an homogenous economy, working to overcome unevenness in productivity among the various sectors; 2) development of the integration of the various sectors of the economy; and 3) alterations in the patterns of foreign trade and capital accumulation, breaking with the world market. An homogenous national economy will challenge "...the foundations of the international specialization on which the unequal economic relations of the world of today are based...." (1974:28). The development of deliberately created integrated industrial groups, with complementary operations, will engender the mutually supporting common development that Myrdal foresaw and labelled "cumulative causation". The break with the current patterns of trade will end the siphoning off of surpluses that now predominates and allow the accumulation of national capital

so that the economy may be self-financing and self-generating. This will obviously require firm governmental action and support.

Amin goes on to advocate detailed central planning to accomplish these strategies. While disparaging non-centrally planned economies for either stopping at too high a level with general policies, or a focus on a few strategic projects, and leaving free enterprise to work out the details, Amin proposes a tripartite planning process which is very similar to that proposed by Galbraith. In 1962 the U.S. Ambassador had acknowledged that the market alone would not accomplish rapid development and called for a planning process that included a strategy for economic advance, a prioritization of the most crucial projects and programs, and the choice of strategic steps to be taken(1962:33f). Amin's trilogy is similar: a strategic model for the country, coherent and effective sectoral objectives, and specific projects and policies as far down as micro-enterprises. Thus Amin embodies his own evaluation that when developmentalists start to plan concretely, because they forget their theory and deal with reality, "...they do enable development of an art of economic management...."(1974:10).

World-systems theory seems clearly to be a better vehicle for the analysis and understanding of the relations of the developed and underdeveloped worlds. Its choice of the globe as a unit of analysis is far preferable to seeing only isolated national economies. But the choice of a unit of analysis does not necessarily dictate the appropriate

choice of a unit of strategy. Wallerstein seems to forfeit the strategic option by over-attachment to the globe as the unit of all his thinking. Amin seems to have broader choices by selecting the nation/region as the strategic unit. He also seems to avoid getting trapped in a closed equilibrium system, which he criticizes developmentalists for, but which criticism might also be applied to Wallerstein, especially when he likens the world-system to an "organism" (1974:347).

But within nations, the urban-rural relations often take on the nature of core-periphery (or metropole-satellite, as Frank describes it, 1966:95). Thus, one wonders if the same model is not applicable within the national/regional context: the development of self-reliant micro-level economies. This cannot be an exclusive strategy, ignoring the national/regional one, for it requires political protection from the power of the world capitalist forces. But given the decision to exercise the national strategic option, a development plan that focuses on self-reliant, balanced micro-level economics may present the best possibility for rapid development. This option must be explored further at another point.

Chapter 3

The Third Way of Development

I. The Emergence of the Third World

Following World War II, the nation-states of the globe were divided into two major camps, the Western and Communist blocs. The Communist bloc was composed of those nations which had been liberated by the U.S.S.R. during the war, or were immediately contiguous to her and fell under her influence. Their economies and governments were reorganized on socialist models. The Western bloc was composed of the allied capitalist states, their colonies and the nations they liberated during the war, including the axis "enemies", Japan, Italy, and the three sectors of Germany administered by Britain, France, and the U.S.A. The years immediately following the war were spent in defining where the boundary between the two camps was to be located, and establishing within them the appropriate governmental regimes. Civil wars in Greece and China ended by adding one state to each camp. The invasion and subsequent counter-invasion on the Korean peninsula ended in a truce near the original line of partition. Political machinations and "suicides" established "socialist democracies" in Eastern Europe and "free democracies" in Western Europe and Japan. Germany's lines of partition, with the anomaly of the detached West Berlin, were tempered into the extension of the Churchillian "Iron Curtain". The major world powers had divided the world between them. "Containment" and "World Liberation" became their competing policies.

But there were some who resisted being trapped into the bipolar struggle. In newly independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed a policy of "Nonalignment" as a "...diplomatic philosophy that would

enable the newly independent countries to keep out of the apparent confrontation between the Western and the Communist blocs of nations" (Mazrui, 1977:197). Nonalignment was aimed at helping the newly independent states to resist the pressures and entanglements of the superpowers. It was also postulated as a moral alternative to competitive self-righteousness. It articulated a third perspective on the world scene. As other new nations became independent of their colonial masters, the East-West, Communist-Capitalist competition moved beyond boundary setting disputes on the Eurasian landmass. Other voices were added to Nehru's: Nasser of Egypt, Nkrumah of Ghana, and the Communist, but independent, Tito of Yugoslavia.

In 1961, the first formal meeting of the nonaligned nations was hosted by Tito in Belgrade. These nations began to exercise real force in the global political confrontation: encouraging smaller nations to stay out of the entangling alliances of the Warsaw Pact or NATO and its other regional subsidiaries, to refrain from providing sites for superpower military bases, and to oppose the testing and proliferation of nuclear arms. Mazrui (1977:198) suggests that "...the acceptance and popularity of the term 'Third World' was partly due to the presupposition of nonalignment....as a third force in what would otherwise be a bipolar world."

But the Third World also came to be seen as the technologically underdeveloped, less privileged, and exploited segment of the global society. If communism and capitalism divided the First and Second Worlds, they were united in being the technologically advanced worlds.

The new arena of international competition became the choice of the means of accomplishing development in Third World countries. Each newly independent nation had to decide whether to follow a capitalistic, free enterprise, or a socialistic, centrally planned, road to development. Political incorporation and allegiance was modified into aid dependency and model imitation. Johan Galtung (1976:154) suggests that for what the Chinese label "social imperialism", the "...confirmation of the validity of the Center model....", demonstrated by imitation in a peripheral state, is more important than economic exploitation through the exchange of commodities.

But political nonalignment also led to the refusal of a choice between economic and social bipolarities. Third World states accepted assistance from both blocs, copied models from both sides, felt free to reject advice from both sides, and combined central planning and capitalistic growth. As more and more new nations were emerging, the bipolar understanding began to crumble. China rejected Soviet leadership; France broke away from NATO. Colonial exploitation became a theme of political leaders and economic theorists. Mao and Nyerere began to articulate a different development strategy, rejecting the urbanized heavy industrialization orientation which was common to both socialistic and capitalistic developmentalists. Since Marxist developmentalism sees socialism as a stage beyond capitalism, the differences between the two approaches had more to do with state vs. private control of investment-consumption decision-making than with

what steps should be taken.* With the effective oil boycott instituted during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, Third World relationships with the developed nations took a radical turn.

In 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva gave birth to a coalition of nations seeking a more equitable set of relationships with the developed states. It has come to be known as the Group of 77, though it now includes more than 100 states. Gradually the focus of these two movements, the nonaligned states and the Group of 77--with many states holding membership in both--has converged upon the fundamental economic disparity which characterizes the global society. At the special session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1974, this concern came to be embodied in a call for a New International Economic Order.

II. Another Development

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation produced a "Report on Development and International Cooperation" which combined the various themes outlined thus far: the exploitative nature of the world economic system as described by Wallerstein and the dependency theorists, the resource depletion catastrophists and critiques of overdevelopment

* Marx(1969) applauded the imposition of British colonialism as a necessary step in bringing about a social revolution in India:

"England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution."

(such as the more recently published, The Overdeveloped Nations by Leopold Kohr, 1977), the rural development strategies of nations like Tanzania, the various conferences on ecological and developmental crises through which the concerns of the Group of 77 had been expressed, and the formation of an effective oil cartel. This report was entitled "Another Development"(1975).

Another Development was conceived as resting upon four fundamental principles: 1) that development should be oriented to meeting the basic needs of the world's poor rather than upon achieving particular statistical goals of growth or "catching up" with the more industrialized societies;* 2) that development requires guaranteeing the conditions of self-reliance for each society "...to ensure the humanization of man by the satisfaction of his needs for expression, creativity, conviviality, and for deciding his own destiny"(1975:7); 3) that development must be in harmony with the environment; and 4) that development requires structural transformations. Upon these four principles, three broad arenas of action emerged: the enhancement of Third World self-reliance; an agenda for negotiation between the Third World and the industrialized countries; and the reformation of the United Nations system.

While the schema of Another Development avoids specific suggestions of policies, under the aegis of the diversity of conditions

* Basic needs are defined as adequate food, a satisfactory habitat (housing, water, sanitation, transportation, and town planning "...designed to achieve the harmonious development of all the regions of a country and to ensure a decentralized urbanization" (1975:32), vital health(through both preventive and therapeutic services) and a relevant education.

existing across the Third World, it does point to broad strategic directions. The two primary and parallel strategies proposed are the reallocation of resources towards the meeting of basic needs and the elevation of the level of productive capacity. The report reiterates the four fallacious assumptions of conventional developmental thought:

- 1) that all interests of all countries can be pursued simultaneously....
- 2) that all countries because they are sovereign nations have equal effective rights....
- 3) that the existing international economic order reflects "natural" economic laws and principles which cannot be drastically changed....
- 4) that....allocating and distributing resources and economic activities among different countries is best performed by market mechanisms.(1975:65f).

These assumptions "...have pushed Third World countries into increasingly greater and unselective integration into the international economic system"(1975:67). Rejecting the "trickle down theory", Another Development advocates selective participation in the world economic system to minimize dependence and advance nationally determined development. We must return to examine how this selectivity might occur later in this chapter.

Self-reliance for Third World nations requires a new level of cooperation among themselves. There must be cooperation of industrial and agricultural development including the stimulation of import substitution production on a regional level, increased integration of the economies of Third World nations, and a broadening of goods and services available for intra-Third World trade. Autonomous financial institutions, uncontrolled by interests of the industrialized societies, must be established and reinforced in the Third World, with financial

backing from the OPEC nations. A Third World money system must be initiated with exclusive drawing rights and coordinated management of national reserves. An integrated system of Third World communications, freed of the oligopoly of UPI, AP, TASS, Agence France-Presse, and Reuters, is necessary to avoid the distortion and selectivity that these channels now impose. Cartels, import cooperatives and joint guidelines for hosting transnational corporations will enhance the bargaining capacity of the Third World. Another Development suggests that these elements of self-reliance are initiabile by the Third World itself.

Another Development recognizes that a New International Economic Order will not appear without dialogue and bargaining that leads to a restructuring of the relationships between Third World nations and the industrialized countries. It highlights six arenas for negotiation: the transfer of basic foreign-owned assets, including both natural resources and the whole productive sector, to national control; the development of new patterns of production and trade including, for example, agreements on indexing fifteen or twenty key commodities; the social control of technology including support for the promotion of appropriate technologies for labor intensive development; the transition towards a new industrial geography of the world not controlled by transnational corporations; financial transfer measures that would end the present draining of resources to the industrialized world; and ensuring an adequate access to food so that it is removed from being a "weapon" of negotiation, as U.S. Agriculture

Secretary Butz defined it in 1974(quoted, 1975:32).

A drastic reformation of the U.N. system is advocated to foster the "positive world political and economic environment" necessary for "need oriented, self-reliant, endogenous and innovative" development to take place. A series of specific technical reforms are proposed to enhance the four principal development functions of the U.N.: 1) fact-finding, data collection, and monitoring; 2) conceptualization and planning; 3) a forum for negotiation and its adequate preparation; and 4) the transfer of resources and technical assistance. Another Development recognizes that both organizational reform and renegotiated global economic relationships will take a prolonged effort, but call for the requisite resolve and adequate leadership to enact these proposals, particularly on the part of Third World states.

III. The Tanzanian Model

Another Development acknowledges that one of the earliest advocates of the third way towards development was Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania. In 1962 he articulated his notion of "Ujamaa", familihood, as the basis in African tradition for a communitarian socialism. Rejecting both "...capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man, and.... doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man"(1962:293), Nyerere claims an African, family-style socialism must now be extended to the community, nation, and even the continent.

This philosophy was embodied in the 1967 Arusha Declaration which asserted that development was accomplished by people, not money. Nyerere called for a program of rural development which congregated the largely rural and scattered population of 14 million Tanzanians into ujamaa villages averaging between 500 and 4,000 residents. Each village was to organize itself and set up its own communal farms, shops, mills, schools, dispensaries, and cultural activities, as appropriate. The objectives of these villages were to heighten ideological awareness, to create employment opportunities, to expand socialist economic activities, to cooperatively market village produce, to buy or construct common facilities and to provide essential services such as medicine, water, and education.

The intention of the ujamaa village program is to create self-reliance at the village level as the basis of national self-reliance. In this, Nyerere's vision is similar to Gandhi's. Communitarian socialism would allow development without exploitation, and the better utilization of rural labor through specialization and a division of labor not viable with a scattered citizenry. Economies of scale and technological innovations would result in rising socio-economic standards for the rural population and overcome the gap between their standards and those of urban people. Establishing these new "familihood" village patterns of human settlement would facilitate national planning and the mobilization of the masses, both for development and defense. Village establishment allowed government officials direct and easy access to the people to exercise governmental

functions which were decentralized in 1972. Education and various other support services were much more easily expanded where the people lived in villages. After 1973, it became compulsory for the populace to be settled in villages, whether organized under the principles of ujamaa or some other developmental pattern. Thus the village has become the economic base for rural development. Its projects are usually small in scale and directly responsive to local initiative. Although the villages require initial technical and material assistance, they are designed to be both materially self-reliant and ideologically self-liberatory.

An interim assessment by the authors of Another Development calls Tanzania's ujamaa experiment of village development a mixed success(1975:57-59). Compact communities have been created in which access of the populace to basic health, education, and communication facilities has obviously improved. Skills and productive knowledge have become more available among village residents. Food access has improved, for areas of need are more easily identified in the village settlement pattern, but food production is up only marginally. New communally established infrastructures, economic activities(stores, dairy herds and workshops) and crop patterns have emerged, though little change in traditional food and cash crop patterns was discerned. The ujamaa villages are more egalitarian in organization, with broader participation of residents and less rule by elites than in non-ujamaa villages. Peasant education and ideological awareness has increased. But village self-reliance has been unevenly developed, and technical planning and support functions have often been poor.

In 1979, Nyerere reaffirmed his commitment to Rural Development in a speech in Rome at an FAO sponsored conference. He emphasized that the attack upon poverty was a highly political issue, dealing with the distribution of wealth and the location of power within and between nations. He declared that urban slums and degradation were the result of masses being "...pushed out of the rural areas by landlessness, joblessness, and hopelessness. It is therefore in the rural areas that we can most effectively tackle the long term problems of urban poverty...."(1979:4).

Nyerere then set forth his agenda for rural development. First, land must be transferred to the peasants, for they will use it to meet their own needs rather than allowing an elite to use it to maximize profits. With ownership, whether individual or collective, must come access to credit, agricultural inputs, and technology. Second is a program of rural diversification. Agricultural productivity must be efficient enough to produce a surplus so that rural industries can be established and forestry and animal husbandry encouraged on marginal land. Water control, conservation, schools, dispensaries, etc., must be established in the rural areas, all using technology which is labor intensive and suited to the needs of the people.

Regressive taxation and comparative pricing policies which have traditionally drained off rural surpluses for urban consumption must be reversed so that rural surpluses are retained in rural areas. Import restrictions must be imposed to reduce luxury consumption. Services and utilities must be oriented to the rural areas rather than

focused on urban entities. Universal primary and technical education must be given preference over advanced studies. Similarly, a network of rural health dispensaries must have higher priority than sophisticated hospital services for the few. These are obviously very political policy reversals.

Nations which receive wealth from extractive enterprises and mass-produced manufactures, especially those intended for export, must funnel that wealth into the rural areas. Though wealth redistribution internationally is a matter of voluntary decision, it is politically possible to redirect it nationally. Finally, governments cannot do development, they can only facilitate it. Nyerere reaffirms his conviction that it is the people who must set the priorities, do the planning, and do the work, for it is they who know what their needs are. "And just as they will produce their own food if they have land, so if they have sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to determine their own priorities of development and then to work for them" (Nyerere, 1979:9).

Nyerere recognizes that industrial developments which are national in scope will be required: fertilizer plants, possibly a phosphate mine, agricultural implements factories, electrical power, roads, railways, ports. Export industries, either agricultural or industrial will also be needed to pay for essential imports. Not all of these activities can be labor intensive. But they all can be planned and oriented to be of service to the rural areas rather than subsisting on rural surpluses.

For Nyerere, rural development is national development. He recognizes the debilitating effects of the pricing mechanisms, transportation monopolies, currency and credit controls of the current world economic order, and the effect of the profit-seeking trans-national corporations upon it, but pleads for a world-wide adoption of the strategy of rural development. "The fundamental imbalance between the world's rural and urban nations--between the industrial and the primary producer areas--is not yet universally recognized as the root cause of world economic problems and world poverty"(1979:13). Thus invoking echoes of the Marxian "inherent contradiction" of capitalism, Nyerere acknowledges the two aspects of the strategy of rural development: the reorganization of internal national policies and the realignment of external relations between the rich and poor nations, a New International Economic Order.

IV. Other Agendas for Development

The joint focus on internal policies of rural development and international reorientation has been articulated by a number of other Third World thinkers. Rajni Kothari, an Indian political scientist and futurologist, has presented one such agenda in Footsteps into the Future, published just prior to the U.N. General Assembly's 1974 special session which proclaimed the need for a New International Economic Order. Kothari's book is dedicated to Nehru and his ideological heir, Nyerere.

Kothari's vision of Third World autonomy is perhaps more utopian than any examined thus far. It envisions the creation of 20-25 relatively equivalent regional states in which political domination of the large over the small would be mitigated and the destabilizing effects of dependency would be offset. He says that autonomy is the basis of promoting "...a sense of collective self-regard among (the nations of the Third World) so that we can realize the values of individual freedom and dignity, justice in the distribution of worldly goods, and opportunity for participation in decision-making structures at various levels"(Kothari, 1974:5).

Kothari's agenda for rural development, admittedly admiring Tanzania and China as the two states which had rejected the "techno-economic assumptions" of conventional development thought, is very similar to that articulated by Nyerere five years later. It requires a rethinking of basic assumptions:

Thus it is necessary to self-consciously admit the value of diversity in human aspirations and technological choices instead of suppressing it at the altar of universalism, to arrest the centralizing trends in modern technology that create growing disparities and cultural barriers within single societies, to shed the idea that cities are coterminous with civilization or large size with progress, or think of economic welfare in terms of achieving minimum conditions for all and not just in terms of aggregate growth targets, and finally, to appreciate that the issues of social and economic justice that now face the world cannot be handled by experts alone and call for an involvement of the people in shaping their own lives(1974:58).

Kothari proposes an agenda for the next twenty-five years, allowing that new problems then, and accomplishments on the basis of such an agenda, would likely require fresh thinking.

The first point of his agenda is that economic and social development must focus on man and his needs. Primarily that means focusing on providing employment for all. Agricultural transformation will be the major impetus for providing such employment. This transformation will come by introducing the new technologies associated with the Green Revolution, but adapted so as to be labor intensive, to discourage mechanization, and to be available to small farmers with the requisite land reform so as to not be "pre-empted by the well-to-do". In order to restrain large-scale migration to the cities, which employ machines more than they do men, non-farm employment in rural areas must be increased through massive public works programs and rural industrialization on a medium or small scale. This would require "a conscious policy of decentralized industrial development and location". While Kothari is advocating agricultural and rural development as the core of public policy, he believes a social continuum should be created which involves an employment-oriented industrial development in the cities and in intermediate sized towns. He sees a fusion of industry and agriculture in which rural social structures are encouraged in towns and urban amenities are made available to every village to produce a "composite and integrated culture". "Our preferred world is not one made of millions of self-contained villages (as was Gandhi's dream) but, rather, is one of thousands of small nucleating towns towards which the rural landscape gravitates, thus doing away with....the present duality of metropolitan and rural cultures...."(1974:61).

In order to alter the cultural underpinnings of the present urban-rural disparity, an educational policy is required that will be focused away from producing gentlemanly elites or overeducated unemployed while the masses remain illiterate. Kothari advocates universal basic education with technological training in programs of short duration located in institutions near the places where those skills are needed. Education for women must be universalized to overcome the cultural classism of educated, consumer-oriented elite females. This elitism leads naturally to the proposal of a countervailing ethic of consumption based on Gandhi's "limitation of wants". Kothari advocates high levels of savings among both the high-status groups and the peasantry to generate productivity to meet the minimal needs of all the populace. But his agenda is without implementing specifics such as import restrictions; it remains only a moral injunction. The nature of production must shift so that the economic system both produces for the masses and involves them as the producers, again following an admonition of Gandhi. This means replacing "effective demand" as the basis of production decisions by "need effectiveness". Though Kothari does not say how this might work, he is obviously suggesting a non-market determination of production decisions. The final element of his agenda is the achievement of a social minima in which every individual, especially among the young, is assured of basic health care and an adequate supply of protein and other nutrients. Kothari also rejects the aspiration to "catch up" with the levels of the advanced industrialized nations as both unrealizable and undesirable,

especially if it would be at the cost of social justice and equity among the people of the developing world.

Another agenda for "Development: The Third Way" is presented by Jimoh Omo-Fadaka (1975). He also advocates the detachment of non-industrialized nations from the network of international trading patterns in order to pursue an independent path to development. He suggests that because national self-interest is the rule in international relations, such nations will remain dependent and poor until they act, themselves. They must recognize that in most cases industrialization per se will only lead to deeper poverty. The condition of most Less Developed Countries is a severe limitation of capital, but an unlimited resource of manpower. Therefore development emphasis must be placed on me, not money.

Like Kothari, Omo-Fadaka proposes the development of rural industry which is agriculture oriented, small-scale, labor intensive, decentralized, and under local control. Agriculture is again seen as the key to development, requiring land reforms to give each family a piece of land, mobilizing its efforts as an economic as well as a social unit. Omo-Fadaka is more critical of the Green Revolution, especially of chemical inputs, and advocates intensified farming techniques using natural inputs and techniques as far as possible. Cash crops should be replaced by subsistence farming. Once again, resistance to mechanization is advocated in an attempt to heighten employment and reduce urban migration. Without explaining how it might be accomplished, he advocates cooperative farming. His vision

is of a national agriculture which is both small-scale and technically efficient, using locally invented appropriate technology, and avoiding the necessity of Western imports.

Omo-Fadaka envisions the establishment of self-help villages after the Tanzanian model which would be ethnically homogeneous, "...self-reliant, self-sufficient, self-regulating, and self-financing human communities"(1975:40). They would be communally run, would reinvest their agricultural surpluses in development projects which in part would be constructed by donated effort, "turning labor into capital". Bookish education must give way to technical education for self-help and self-reliance, with an agricultural or mechanical bias. Again, this policy is aimed at "limiting the exodus to cities" by village young people, and might follow the Cuban model of "part-work-part-study". Massive adult literacy programs must be emphasized, for education is to provide people with perspective and motivation for developing their communities; this is education with a social orientation. The villages should build their own health facilities, nursery schools, welfare relief units, and militia for self-defense.

Omo-Fadaka equates colonial impoverishment with current foreign investment and therefore advocates nationalization of foreign banks, insurance, import-export trade, and wholesale businesses. He foresees that national, rather than provincial or local, agencies will have to provide many services. He advocates the development of decentralized, labor intensive, communally controlled industries. Like the others cited above, and like Amin, as noted in the previous chapter,

his aim "...is to build a diversified and balanced economy, an integration of industry and agriculture, of light and heavy industries" (1975:49).

Omo-Fadaka specifically rejects both the Western pattern of free enterprise and the Soviet pattern of development with its highly authoritarian style, enforced austerity, stagnant agriculture, and materialistic orientation which has resulted in the emergence of new privileged classes. Instead, referring to Nyerere, he proposes a "communitarian ethos of democratic socialism" which is more endemic to African tradition. It is this African perspective which explains several unique emphases of Omo-Fadaka's approach(e.g., the emphasis on ethnic homogeneity in a village and its organization of a militia for self-defense). To achieve this third way to development, he suggests "a process of mental decolonization" will be needed for villagers. "Political change in the non-industrialized countries will prove of little long-term value unless it also includes cultural change. But cultural change becomes possible only when men and women fight out their mental battles themselves. Others cannot do it for them"(1975:52).

V. A Strategy of Selective Delinking

Each of these approaches to another development has advocated some form of national or regional autonomy, a detachment from international trading patterns, or, at least, a selectivity of linkages. We must now examine this issue more closely. Perhaps the most carefully

thought out perspective is that of Carlos Díaz-Alejandro(1978). He dismisses the debate between pure laissez-faire economics and pure delinking as a battle of straw men, since neither position has been significantly embodied in actual economic policy or relationships. In this he is echoing Another Development's advocacy of selective participation in the world economic order:

There is a minimum degree of links required to sustain the development process.

There is a maximum degree of links beyond which no effective sovereignty can be maintained.

There are affirmative links which reinforce self-reliance.

There are regressive links which weaken self-reliance.

(Another Development, 1975:69)

Díaz-Alejandro claims the delinking argument is primarily a political argument which is only later bolstered by economic arguments, that unregulated trade and finance links reduce the national autonomy of Southern nations(N.B., the First and Second Worlds are now coalesced into "The North" which is opposed to "The South"). This loss of autonomy is both relative to international actions and internal control. Economic linkage has often led to the development of a compradore and/or landed elite, now joined by a technocratic-bureaucratic, transnational corporation elite, who are more closely allied to the economy and elites of the core nations than to their own peoples, and who ape the North in conspicuous consumption. Thus, international economic links not only drain surpluses from dependent countries, they also deform the internal socio-political structures. It is not surprising that delinking strategies are often accompanied by calls for socialist revolutions. But Díaz-Alejandro maintains

that selective delinking is a promising strategy for both radical and conservative states.

Diáz-Alejandro reminds us that the so-called exemplary cases of delinking were more often cases of imposed blockades: especially with post-revolutionary U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba. He points out that Russia was large and in possession of an ancient, autonomous culture which gave her advantages of self-reliance that are not applicable to most developing nations. Further, China never did actually delink from international trade, despite U.S. embargoes. Diáz-Alejandro cites evidence that the absolute level of China's foreign trade did not decline, that foreign trade actually grew faster than the G.N.P. during the 1950's, and that she received extensive foreign aid from the U.S.S.R. What the author considers crucial is that trade was no longer on a laissez-faire basis, but was rigidly controlled on a "pay-as-you-go" basis which has resulted in a negligible foreign debt. Thus self-reliance does not require a closed-door policy and "...is much more rigorous regarding finance than regarding trade"(1978:107).

Selectivity is the key to a delinking strategy. Diáz-Alejandro outlined a nine-point program for effective delinking:

1. The nation must have the power and perspective to be selective; a colony or puppet government cannot be selective about its international links.
2. It must have an internal engine to generate development.
3. International links must often be cut entirely (as during a revolution) in order to establish internal political control, followed by a selective relinking, often by means of state trading monopolies.

4. Strict exchange controls are necessary; "concessional finance....is incompatible with self-reliance" (1978:111).
5. The key issue in delinking is who has political control of the use of gains secured from international trade; expertise in the use of markets, both selling and judicious buying, is necessary to maximize such gains.
6. The basic needs of the populace must be internally assured; they cannot be vulnerable to external markets or blockades; luxury consumables(e.g., Pepsi Cola and Alfa-Romeos) will be matters of unconcern.
7. Standardized staples sold on competitive markets are preferable to specialized commodities sold on limited markets(e.g., Cuban cigars) which are difficult to maintain as monopolies.
8. A diversification of sources of finance, technology, management, and market access is preferable to break the stranglehold of transnational corporations.
9. A preference should be given to other Less Developed Countries as trading partners to enhance collective self-reliance; a diversity of partners is preferable to reliance upon a single powerful society; trade locations should be limited to enclaves in remote areas, if possible, to diminish the consumption demonstration effect.

Diáz-Alejandro acknowledges that adopting such a strategy requires revolutionary change and a centralization of power; in this he is reaffirming the political nature of this strategy, for the primary question is who decides which links to retain and which to sever, if such decisions are not determined by market forces. The key decision is an alteration of imports in order to reorient a country's growth towards equitable and balanced development. Of course, export diversification is desirable over the long run, but it is secondary to import reallocation. The development of Third World transnational corporations would be a valuable contribution, along with L.D.C. customs

unions, towards collective self-reliance in the Third World. Because "...concessional aid and direct foreign investment have weakened local initiative, discouraged tax reform, and reduced savings coefficients...." foreign aid should be avoided; autarchy in finance is more important than in trade!(1978:121).

Diáz-Alejandro sees an erosion of the economic rules of the post-war Pax Americana set up in the Bretton Woods System. He suggests that the strengthening of market forces over political controls, the rise of commodity cartels, and the substitution of currency markets for political negotiation on exchange par values has created a fragility in the world economy that is crying out for a new set of rules. Thus it is an appropriate time to set out an agenda of negotiation toward a New International Economic Order. Diáz-Alejandro's agenda differs somewhat from the negotiations proposed by Another Development; it is considerably simpler to conceive: outlaw commercial blockades and embargoes; limit Northern protectionism and internal subsidies; encourage new rules for state-enterprise trading on world markets; collect and redistribute rents for the use of the world's commons(oceans, atmosphere, etc.); restructure international organizations to emphasize their service, rather than profit-securing, functions. Diáz-Alejandro does not indicate how this agenda might be accomplished, but suggests, like Chirot(1977:251), that the North would not be as greatly affected by delinking as would the South. He does acknowledge that it would be the transnational corporations who would oppose such a shifting of the rules, since they are the ones who

benefit from the current situation. The new rules should not be aimed to assure progressive change, but to accommodate it, to provide the option of selective delinking to nations which choose to do so. Realistically, he reminds us that Northern nations are not likely to base their policies on beneficence, even if individuals from these nations might advocate such a stance. Thus, once again, the action the Less Developed Countries can take on their own are clearer than those which are necessary to reorganize international relations.

VI. Advances on Dependency Theory

Andre Gunder Frank's articulation of "The Development of Underdevelopment" (1966) radically upset the development paradigm and spawned a great deal of rethinking, from a global perspective, about the sources and causes of underdevelopment. Frank's gross argument so obviously explained the current world situation, and was so amenable to revolutionary rhetoric, that it received wide support in the Third World. As with any such new thought, its oversimplifications have become more evident as it has been more extensively employed.

James Peoples criticizes earlier dependency theory formulations as not being discriminating enough, because they posit "...only a single relation between the developed and the poor countries" (1978:536). Peoples complains that dependency theorists tend to ignore cases in which economic exploitation is secondary. He details the welfare/employment dependency fostered in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands where American employment and welfare programs provide the bulk

of the territory's income and have resulted in an economy of declining production and import-oriented commercialization. The result is an unbalanced, dependent economy, supported by the U.S. government, with only miniscule returns to American export businesses, all for the sake of securing strategic defensive locations. While Peoples' case is exceptional in nature, and deals with a small population (about 100,000 people across three million square miles of ocean), it is similar to the dependency described by Galtung (1976, and above, page 96) which is the result of Russian social imperialism.

Peoples further complains that "...dependency theorists have confined their analyses to those areas....with a centuries-long history of colonial domination and exploitation, and with a present characterized by production for export and high levels of foreign investment" (1978:536). In a similar vein is Díaz-Alejandro's advocacy of the higher significance of import controls over export diversification, noting that the differences between Cuban development and that of the Dominican Republic are in differences in their imports, not in their common reliance upon sugar exports (1978:119). Peoples suggests this narrow analysis also misses the differing impacts of penetration by multinationals in search of cheap labor, as opposed to those seeking enlarged markets, or those exploiting natural resources.

Kothari, concerned to articulate alternatives to the present realities, rather than to ascribe responsibility (though he does not hesitate to do that), points out that in much of the Third World today, the problem is not "...the exploitation of labor by overexerting it

but, rather is one of simple non-participation in the productive process by millions of human beings who have no useful role to play in society" (1974:57f). It was out of this perspective, and rejecting the Soviet approach to the collectivization of agriculture, that the Chinese maintained that their "...revolution could not be based mainly on primary accumulation by exploiting the peasant and putting the surplus into heavy industry; some other form had to be found" (Galtung, 1976:159). The form turned out to be the kind of third way to development described above.

Carol Smith picks up another theme of Peoples, that dependency theorists tend to treat villages and villagers as passive, and therefore miss the internal dynamics of dependency. She accuses these theorists of not shifting their perspective far enough, that they should describe the condition not just from the core of the periphery, but from the periphery of the periphery. She notes the newer version of the theory advanced by Sunkel and Paz (1970), Roberts (1976), and Portes and Walton (1976) that goes beyond Frank's extension of the metropole-satellite relationship from international contacts to the internal structure of a nation and/or province. This newer version accounts for the shift from primary production to light manufacturing in many places, making provincial cities the ancillaries of urban centers. The shift away from labor intensive primary production has resulted in massive urban migration as rural economies are undermined. Thus economic growth takes place in urban centers, funded by foreign investors who also claim most of the profits. This results in an urban, consumption-

oriented development which leaves most of the populace at sub-peasant standards of living. Smith calls it, "The periphery-marginalization school of dependency theory" (1978:576). This marginalization theory seems to be similar to the conditions described by Kothari.

Smith prefers Wallerstein's conceptions of core and periphery, even though he never applied his analysis to the problems of dependency in peripheral areas. She acknowledges that where colonial administrative control of commerce existed, the metropole-satellite model is appropriate, and usually was maintained after independence. It can be identified by the spatial organization of commerce: the absence of intervening commercial centers located between administrative centers. However, she contends that there also exist external areas which were not directly related to core areas, which were outside the imposed division of labor, and which were economically independent of the core. She calls these "marginal areas". Peripheral areas are parts of a region which have a poorly developed economic infrastructure but high commercial exchange with the core. Marginal areas have both a poorly developed economic infrastructure and weak commercial exchange with the core; this results in a "more or less self-sufficient economy--poor as it may be. Thus," she says, "[I will consider only a periphery 'underdeveloped' and a marginal area simply 'undeveloped'" (1978:581). Smith then uses this "amendment" of dependency theory to analyze the Western region of Guatemala, showing that it was basically a marginal area, undeveloped--even developing--until the imposition of the capitalistic mode of production on coffee plantations in

the last one hundred years.

Dependency theory has been advanced to account for a diversity of conditions, originally swept together in describing the gross relationship of the developed world and the underdeveloped world. Its political orientation has been noted by Díaz-Alejandro. Its exceptions have been noted by Peoples and Galtung. Increased urbanization and rural marginalization have been noted by the "peripheral marginalization school". The distinction between over-exertion exploitation of labor and under utilization of labor has also been commented upon by Kothari and others. The distinction between underdeveloped and undeveloped areas has been recovered from the ashheap of earlier polemics by Smith. However, none of these critiques fatally flaws the basic theory. Each of the refinements facilitates planning for a third way of development.

VII. Summary

Development in the third way embraces two primary approaches: a national agenda for rural development and an agenda for restructuring international relations. The creation of a New International Economic Order involves three different emphases. Third World collective self-reliance can be fostered by new patterns of cooperation and interdependence in trade, finance, technological development and dispersion, and political action. The relationships of the developed and industrialized nations with the Less Developed Countries, currently shaped by agreements among, and imposed by, the core nations of the

North, must be renegotiated by the nations of the South. The United Nations and other major international organizations must be restructured to support the renegotiated relationships and to reflect the needs and preponderant populations of the Less Developed Countries.

The national agenda includes both the adoption of policies that encourage rural development at the village level and the radical reorientation of national practices which foster unbalanced and disarticulated national development. The central elements of a rural development agenda include the radical upgrading of agricultural productivity, the establishment and extension of a diversified and small-scale rural industrialization, and an emphasis upon universal availability of primary health and educational programs and facilities. The emphasis of Rural Development is upon meeting basic needs rather than upon aggregating growth statistics and therefore it focuses upon labor intensive approaches, the development and use of appropriate (intermediate) technologies, and participatory planning and control at the village level. A radical reorientation of national policies which tend to favor urban development at the expense of rural areas would include a reversal of traditional taxing and pricing policies, the redirection of infrastructure provision towards the rural areas, the regulation of international imports, exports, and financing so as to control consumption and direct surpluses towards further development, and the development of national basic industries oriented to supply the needs of rural development. These are the common themes of Development in the Third Way.

While advocates of this third way of development recognize that some policies must be enacted in their own countries and others must involve reordering relationships with other nations, not all of whom are receptive to this reordering, they realistically emphasize that the initiative for change must come from the Third World nations. The rich lands will not give away their advantages, even if they are led by beneficent leaders. Therefore, without denying the powerful external constraints, they emphasize the changes Third World leaders can accomplish, both in radically reorienting their internal policies and in altering their international relationships among themselves. These things can be done now. There is an optimism that, with the changing world economic conditions, the developed nations will find it in their own interests to be more amenable to the agenda for negotiations between the North and the South.

Chapter 4

The Liberational Role of Education

I. The Value of Education

Plato, in The Laws(1970:73), has his protagonist say:

...men with a correct education become good, and nowhere in the world should education be despised, for when combined with great virtue, it is an asset of incalculable value. If it ever becomes corrupt, but can be put right again, this is a life long task which everyone should undertake to the limit of his strength.

This assumption about the value of education and the glorification of the role of the educator underlies much Western, and particularly American, thinking about education and development. Americans have a general confidence that education can solve all problems. Dean Rusk, as Secretary of State under President Kennedy, suggested that Americans have "...what some people have called an inordinate national interest in education"(1962:29). This national interest has also manifested itself in concern for education in the underdeveloped nations, both in governmental planning and in personal voluntary service in teaching positions through Peace Corps, church, and other non-governmental organizations.

Pre-independence educational systems in most colonies and in many peripheral nations were very limited in scope. A very small percentage of the populace received schooling. Often, the focus of the schooling offered prepared persons only for clerical and low level administrative and supervisory roles. University education was virtually unavailable. Most "native" professionals received their advanced training in the metropolises where they were also incorporated into the cultural values and mores of Western Civilization. When universities were established in the colonies, they frequently were

exotic hothouse plants, modeled after the Universities of Paris or Cambridge or Oxford, with all the real and fancied privileges and protocol awarded to the student in Europe and England. They (were) outposts of Western traditionalism, designed to carry on the culture of literary intellectuals first, and only then the more pragmatic sciences, pure or applied(Apter, 1961:219).

The first post-World War II efforts for development, adapting the approach of the Marshall Plan of massive capital and direct technological transfers, virtually ignored education. Gunnar Myrdal (1957) articulated the necessity for a comprehensive approach to development. He particularly pointed out the necessity of technical training for those who were to operate the newly installed modern technological facilities. This position was quickly and generally accepted. Secretary Rusk articulated the official American position that "...education is not something which is a luxury which can be afforded after development has occurred; it is an integral part, an inescapable and essential part of the developmental process itself" (1962:29f). Rusk went on to express confidence that totalitarian systems were not the only means to rapid development, since the U.S.A. had experienced dramatic social transformation in the scope of one generation and that "...in that process education has played a most vital role"(1962:30). Rusk indicated that the surge in morale as the children of workers and peasants have the chance to become doctors, lawyers, scientists, professors and engineers is an important contribution to development.

Rusk listed five primary functions of education in the democratic perspective:

1. education is essential to democracy which requires an informed citizenry "thirsting for knowledge, and.... exchanging ideas."
2. education makes possible economic democracy which prevents self-perpetuating elites and frozen class lines by raising social mobility.
3. education creates a hopeful outlook by "...demonstrating that tomorrow need not be the same as yesterday."
4. education is a key to rapid economic growth by providing the base for research and the development of technological progress.
5. mass education is the vehicle for a general application of laboratory discoveries to the production processes.

He concludes with an affirmation to which we must shortly return, that "...education is an investment, and a good one. It yields a high rate of return"(1962:31).

Rusk was building on themes articulated a few years previously by his colleague in the Kennedy administration, W.W. Rostow. In The Stages of Economic Growth(1964:4f), Rostow had characterized traditional society, from which nations were assumed to be developing, as having a pre-Newtonian science and a long-run fatalism. Education was seen as the means of bringing those nations into the modern world and breaking the grip of fatalism. This belief in education was not the sole province of Western governments, it was also the faith of villagers, part of the "revolution of rising expectations." When John Hanson asked villagers why education was so important to them, when they lacked water distribution and electricity systems, the response came, "Sir, without an education, how can our children escape our fate?"(1966:2). Thus, both in national policy and in popular expectation, development

was directly linked to education.

Using education as a means to development and modernization is a value-laden strategy. It implies a conception of a better life for the people of a society. Hanson points to three values which are implicit in educational reconstruction efforts: that societies be modern, that they be free, that they encourage the human dignity and self-development of their citizens. Hanson argues that these values are not impositions upon these societies, but are the values regularly affirmed by the newly independent nations in their own pronouncements. Such are the affirmations of education and its role in development. We must shortly investigate the specific applications, programs, and arguments that gave form to educational strategies in development.

II. The Historic Function of Education

Don and Janet Adams wrote that evaluations of the role of education in Social Development were still very crude, in that distinctions were "...rarely made among education, socialization, enculturation, and communication"(1968:259). Every society creates roles for and trains its young in how to participate within it. It transmits its culture, its values, meanings and significances from generation to generation. It has an elaborate symbolic system of communication, not the least of which is its language, which all children must learn. It must train its young in skills necessary for survival, for reflection and problem-solving, and for proper relationships among the members of the society.

Yehudi Cohen(1970) suggests that formal educational systems emerged as civilizations did. They were originally focused towards training the elite to be boundary guardians, relating across the civilization's borders with those who were culturally different. Meanwhile, broad forces, in more recent times including mass education, acted to break down the interior boundaries within civilizations, to homogenize the culture from border to border. A lingua franca is required to facilitate communication across the civilization. These values have frequently been incorporated in the process of nation-building by new nations. In addition, the schools have been a vehicle for creating and intensifying national pride and patriotism as the history of the new nation is recounted and celebrated.

But new nations, in the midst of development, experience a more complex problem. They must not only socialize and enculturate the young into the patterns of the older generations, they must assist adults and youth alike to transist into a new society which they are in the process of creating. As Theodore Brameld wrote of education in Puerto Rico, "...education is not the mere transmitter of the cultural heritage, however important this obligation may be. It is also and even more crucially remaker of the heritage"(1959:110).

In this context, it is not surprising that many of the conceptions of education in the development literature echo John Dewey's progressivism:

In static societies....the education of the immature....fills them with the spirit of the social group to which they belong (and is) a sort of catching up of the child with the aptitudes

and resources of the adult group....But not in progressive communities. They endeavor to shape the experience of the young so that instead of reproducing current habits, better habits shall be formed, and thus the future adult society be an improvement on their own(1916:78f).

Dewey rejects "...the idea that the schools can be completely neutral" (1937:238). He declares that schools participate in the changing of society and should do so intentionally. He believed they should

...select the newer scientific, technological, and cultural forces that are producing change in the old order;....estimate the direction in which they are moving and their outcome.... and see what can be done to make the schools their ally.... to develop the insight and understanding that will enable the youth who go forth from the schools to take part in the great work of construction and organization....and to equip them with the attitudes and habits of action that will make their understanding and insight practically effective (1937:236f).

Thus, while Dewey did not address himself directly to the question of the developing nations, he laid the foundations for the conviction that education can be a means of social reconstruction. The next generation of educators would build great hopes upon these foundations.

Echoing both Dewey and Brameld, Cole Brembeck spoke of the difficult role modern education, as an agent of social change, faces. It must preserve the "good roots" of the cultural heritage, while planting the seeds of a rapidly changing society. It runs the risk of making its students bicultured, strangers among their own people. He suggests "...the teacher must be closely identified with his culture, know its content well, and then be prepared to give both shape and direction to its future"(1962:230). Its methods must teach students how to solve problems. Echoing Myrdal's call for comprehensive development planning that would result in "cumulative causation",

Brembeck calls for educational approaches that involve the whole community, adults as well as the young; "...real change can take place only when all of the human components of education--children, parents, and community--can be brought into an interlocking, circular, cumulative reinforcement of positive educational values....Education for change must be at all levels of society and especially among adults" (1962:232f). Brembeck points to the multiplicity of educational dynamics to be used in development, from pre-school through primary and secondary schools to university, but inclusive also of adult educational efforts, particularly in the world-wide drive for literacy, which he sees to be crucial for its cumulative value in other dimensions of development.

Plato disparaged training for petty trade and the productive skills as less than education, and postulated instead, "...what we have in mind is education from childhood in virtue, a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands" (1970:73). This affirmation of the function of education in shaping a nation's citizens is a necessary perspective for development. But it would seem that only an aristocrat, supported by a whole class of people unworthy of being educated, could so restrict the field to moral education. In the contemporary world, citizenship entails the capacity to participate in the society's economic development, release one's fellow citizens to full human dignity, and to solve the difficult practical and moral problems confronting the society. Developing societies cannot afford to

propound the alienation of "labor" from "work" and "action", but must combine them. It requires a comprehensive educational approach which trains persons in skills, teaches them the reflective capacity, and enjoins a minimal moral standard.

III. The Uses of Education in Development

It is evident from the apologetics found in the development literature of the early 1960's that not all were convinced education was worth focusing on in the developing nations. These apologies were most evident in the writing of economists. Theodore Schultz, current Nobel prize winner in economics, wrote in 1963 on The Economic Value of Education under "...the proposition that people enhance their capabilities as producers and as consumers by investing in themselves and that schooling is the largest investment in human capital"(1963:ix). Schultz goes on to indicate that the economic capabilities of people are not given at birth, but are acquired and radically affect the wage structures, the amount of savings and capital formation, and the amount of consumption these persons are involved in. He claims that education, if it increases future productivity and earnings, is a contribution to measured growth, and thus an investment in the future.

Schultz lists five specific ways education is a good investment for a society: 1) Research--half of all the basic research in the U.S.A. in 1961 was being done at universities and colleges, much of which directly resulted in economic growth, such as the development of hybrid corn which was returning about 700% in earnings on the original research.

investment; 2) the discovery and cultivation of potential human talent--the sifting, searching for, and selecting of students who will fill skilled roles in society; 3) work force flexibility--more schooling makes occupational shifts, occasioned by sectoral transformations within the economy, easier to accomplish; 4) teacher preparation--the internal function of reproducing and adding to the supply of teachers until every child can be educated; 5) the creation of a highly skilled work force (1963:33ff). It was the absence of a highly skilled work force capable of operating facilities employing sophisticated technology which led Myrdal to his critique of the technological transfer image of development.

John Kenneth Galbraith, as U.S. Ambassador to India, also championed the investment value of education. He acknowledged that education is both a form of consumption and an investment of present resources for increased future growth. He suggested that developing nations should cut back on consumption items. But then he referred to studies by Schultz and declared "...a dollar or a rupee invested in the intellectual improvement of human beings will often bring a greater increase in national income than a dollar or a rupee devoted to railways, dams, machine tools, or other tangible goods." Thus Galbraith counts education among the social overhead capital investments critical for a developing nation to expand. He continues that literacy for farmers is "...a first indispensable step to any form of agricultural progress. Nowhere in the world is there an illiterate peasantry that is progressive. Nowhere is there a literate peasantry

that is not. Education so viewed, becomes a highly productive form of investment"(1962:49). He then extends his example to include scientists, engineers, machinists, doctors and health specialists, and even the humanists: linguists, writers, and artists.

But Galbraith suggests that, if education is an investment, then in contrast to the consumer's right to pursue whatever curriculum he chooses, planning must focus the distribution of talent into the fields that need it. "The university must be responsive to development requirements and it must be so organized as to make this possible. This means strong and responsible leadership by the faculty...." He derides democratic experiments at universities in Latin America as "...a formula for deterioration, incoherence, and chaos. I believe the university is by nature an oligarchy of its faculty. This is especially so if education is regarded purposefully as an investment from which the most of what is needed must be obtained....Then the task of the teacher must be to mold and shape and guide and inspire his students to ensure that they are indeed a more productive property. If he fails to do so, he is squandering scarce public resources"(1962:54ff). Galbraith ends his essay by warning developing nations about being permissive with the students in whom it invests. He calls them a "...privileged group who must work to deserve their privileges"(1962:58), and reminds teachers that they are "custodians of scarce national resources"(1962:52). One would hope Galbraith was referring to the students, for the investment of human resources is one of the themes in this literature, but the context seems to indicate he

is referring to the rupees in the education budget.

A decade later, in much the same mode, Elliott Richardson, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, said of Americans, "...no society has ever put more faith in education as the means (of) creating a people....but also as a means for upward mobility....the acquisition of the insights, the skills, the capacities for enjoyment which could bring about self fulfillment." But in a reversal of Plato, he says that while education can provide knowledge and skills, the things which enhance worker productivity, "...it cannot supply values.... a sense of purpose and meaning" (1975:105). Philleo Nash, in response, reminded Mr. Richardson that the war on poverty thought to break the cycle of poverty by education--as though individuals were addicted to poverty, but if reached early enough in childhood, they could be "saved". But, he summarized, this was a premise that did not hold up very well in practice (1975:108).

IV. The Critiques of Conventional Educational Approaches

The problems of education in the underdeveloped nations have been fierce. Hard decisions have had to be made between lifting the general level of education and fostering an elite who could both expand the system and take over functions from post-colonial foreign functionaries. So Apter (1961:222) suggested the necessity of a "scientific by-pass" to train an elite who can compete on an equal basis with the scientific elite of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., so as to not be left behind by them (Cf., J.J. Servan-Schreiber who later

called upon France to respond to The American Challenge(1967) in a similar way). Typically, nations overdeveloped some dimensions of their systems. India is well-known to have produced an excess of engineers, many of whom remain unemployed. W.A. Lewis, co-winner of the 1979 Nobel prize with Schultz, noted in 1965 that Nigeria was producing more graduates, at only 3% of the student force, than could be fully employed. The expectation of receiving the "inflated colonial wage scales" meant graduates were unwilling to accept less, but Lewis' prescription was to simply allow the excess supply to continue until it lowered the wage scales and pushed graduates into lower-status jobs, thereby raising the general skill-level and, hence, the productivity of the whole society.

As Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, and Immanuel Wallerstein attacked conventional development theory, so Paulo Friere and Ivan Illich attacked the assumptions of traditional progressive (and sometimes not-so-progressive) education in development. The world-system theorists argued that underdevelopment was caused by the development of the core nations of the capitalist world-system. International specialization imposes uneven productivity and sectoral disarticulation which results in trade dependency. Similarly, Illich and Friere charge traditional educational approaches create dependence in students. It is significant that both Friere and Illich write out of the Latin American context, in which Frank developed his thesis. It is also to be remembered that these were not new nations, in the post-colonial Asian and African sense. These were old, settled societies,

with established educational hierarchies, experiencing a new drive for development.

Friere argues that the poor of these underdeveloped countries are not just entangled in the traditional culture and in poverty. Rather, they are oppressed, and kept oppressed by the dominant class. The educational structures are one of the ways that they are taught to be passive and dependent. Illich(1970:47) argues that people are taught the need to be taught, and thereby are robbed of their independent creativity. Friere accuses the schools of using a "banking concept" of education in which students are seen as receptacles to be filled with deposits. This system works to "...minimize or annul the students' creative power and to stimulate their credulity...." (Friere, 1970:60) which keeps the world from being revealed to them and thus from being transformed by them. Instead, they are led to "adapt" to their situation, and are thus more easily led and dominated.

Illich, analyzing the Latin American system, notes the effects of compulsory education when inadequately supported. He points out that one third of all poor children in Mexico never even get into first grade. Those who make it only have four chances in one hundred of finishing obligatory schooling at sixth grade. Thus, 96% of the poorest children are branded "criminals", "law-breakers". They have not fulfilled their legal obligations. Furthermore, Illich points out, by doubling the years of free, compulsory education, without providing a system capable of handling all the children covered by the legislation,

another country, Brazil, simply doubled the reproach for those who did not take advantage of these obligatory privileges(1971:60). They "...learn to feel guilty because of their underconsumption of schooling....all children know that they were given a chance, albeit an unequal one....and the presumed equality of the international standard now compounds their original poverty with the self-inflicted discrimination accepted by the drop out"(1970:44). Thus compulsory education brings a new justification of social stratification. The elite "deserve" their place because they have the schooling; the poor deserve their place for dropping out! Friere echoes the same sentiment, "Education as the exercise of domination stimulates the credulity of the students, with the ideological intent....of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of oppression"(1970:65).

Self-depreciation is another characteristic of the oppressed which derives from their internalization of the opinion the oppressors hold of them"(Friere, 1970:49). Closely allied to it is the sense of fatalism which Friere maintains is not an essential characteristic of peoples in "traditional" societies, as Rostow suggested, but is the imposed fruit of an historical and sociological situation. Submerged in conditions which offer no hope, the oppressed do not see that the present order "...serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they have internalized...."(1970:48) but instead blame God for their fate. Illich charges that schools, by increasing reliance on institutional care, thereby turning students into clients, add, to the social powerlessness of the poor, a psychological impotence.

Those without schooling discover that "Modernized poverty combines the lack of power over circumstances with a loss of personal potency. The modernization of poverty is a world-wide phenomenon, and lies at the root of contemporary underdevelopment"(1970:3). He points out that even in the U.S.A., attempts to change this in the schools have not succeeded. When three billion dollars were spent under Title I(1965-68) for compensatory education, the only changes recorded were that the number of children classified as disadvantaged rose from 6 million to 16 million! As Bernard O. Brown(1978) has shown, the very act of labelling persons as "disadvantaged" and thereby "deviant" reinforces their victimage. Friere, in an individualized restatement of Frank's dependency theory, responds to those who create such labels, "The truth is, however, that the oppressed are not 'marginals', are not men living 'outside' society. They have always been 'inside'--'inside' the structures which made them 'beings for others'"(1970:61).

Friere, whose middle-class Brazilian family experienced the economic dependence, in response to the 1929 depression in the U.S.A., which Frank was later to highlight, grew up in poverty. He charged that the lethargy and ignorance of the poor are the result of their oppression and the paternalism of which they were victims. These created what Richard Shaul, in the Introduction to Friere's work, calls a "culture of silence" which was maintained by the school system. Friere uses the image of anesthetization. Denied the means of critical analysis, the poor are subjected to a narrative methodology in which content becomes lifeless and petrified. Separating men from the world,

disjoining the cognitive from the narrative in the typical positivist-empiricist scientific approach, schools induce a passivity in their students. Mocking the pedagogy that focuses on such "vital questions" as whether "Roger gave green grass to his goat" of his "rabbit", Friere concludes, "The 'humanism' of the banking approach masks the effort to turn men into automatons...."(1970:61). Man becomes a spectator, not a re-creator. "Functionally, oppression is domesticating"(1970:36).

Schools are primary instruments in another aspect of domination: Cultural Invasion. Friere points out that this can be true even of those professionals who come to the oppressed with the best of intentions. Cultural invasion involves the penetration of the cultural context of one group by another, in disrespect of its world view and values. He calls it an act of violence which inhibits "...the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression"(1970:150). It forces a cultural inauthenticity in which the invaded are forced to respond to "...the values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders....they must....recognize the superiority of the invaders.... Alienated from the spirit of their own culture (they) want to be like the invaders: to walk like them, dress like them, talk like them" (1970:150f). In this issue, Friere is grappling with the problem of enculturation in a changing society as well as with the cultural imposition of the Castillian elite upon a mestizo, indian, and black oppressed class. His own program involves the awakenment of the oppressed class and an alteration of their world view and values, but

one that comes out of dialogue, by the decision of the people themselves, rather than being imposed by authoritarian structuring of society, including the class room. Friere is directly challenging the oligarchic, elitist, position expressed by Galbraith. But more importantly, he is raising the issue of the relativity of cultural contexts. Far from idealizing the culture of the oppressed, in an anthropological romanticism, he is suggesting that it is not the survival of traditional society at all, but the imposed product of the dependency created by the conquistadors and maintained by the capitalist world-system. This perspective creates a quite different problem for those concerned with culture transmission and the cross-cultural exchange involved in development, or as Friere would prefer, revolutionary liberation.

The last critique to be considered concerns "thingness". Friere and Illich, the one with his eyes primarily on Latin America, the other looking from that vantage point at the developed world, approach the subject slightly differently, but consonantly. Friere states the case most baldly, "The oppressors....cannot see that, in the egoistic pursuit of having as a possessing class, they suffocate in their own possessions and no longer are; they merely have....to be is to have, almost always at the expense of those who have nothing"(1970:45 & 51).

Illich focuses on the productivity images of education, such as those Galbraith and Schultz manifested. He suggests that schools have become the new neutral world religion, the repository of society's myths and the maintainer of the rituals that veil the disparity between

myth and reality(1970:37). Key among these is the Myth of Unending Consumption; that having things is what participating in the modern world is all about. Thus the revolution of rising expectations is converted into the revolution of rising wants. Schools train students to be good consumers, and are evaluated on the basis of their own productivity. The Myth of Measurement reinforces this process, and on the basis of success in the system or of arbitrary test measurements (e.g., I.Q.) assigns people to social slots. Students themselves come to look at schooling as an investment/return proposition: a business degree means \$5,000 more per year than a humanities degree!

Friere suggests that this focus upon "having" results in the attribution of "thingness" to others. "...the more the oppressors control the oppressed, the more they change them into apparently inanimate 'things'. This tendency of the oppressor consciousness (is) to 'in-animate' everything and everyone it encounters, in its eagerness to possess...."(1970:45). In a framework adopted from Martin Buber's I and Thou (1958), Friere says this attribution of thingness is the heart of oppression, and an attack upon it forms a central theme of his educational program. The tragedy Friere points to is the oppressed's acceptance of this understanding of themselves. Describing a peasant group he was working with, Friere reports, "They often insist that there is no difference between them and the animals; when they do admit a difference, it favors the animals. 'They are freer than we are.'....The oppressed feel like 'things' owned by the oppressor.... For the oppressed....to be is not to resemble the oppressor, but

to be under him, to depend on him"(1970:50f). If for the oppressor, "to be is to have", Friere might have said of the oppressed, "to be is to be had!"

V. Liberational Education

Richard Shaull introduces The Pedagogy of the Oppressed as a sign that, "Education is once again a subversive force." He says that Friere has developed a method to teach illiterates to read which allows them also to "...come to a new awareness of selfhood" just at the time when Latin America's disinherited masses are claiming the right "...to participate, as Subjects, in the development of their countries"(Shaull, 1970:9). Almost quoting Dewey, he concludes that "There is no such thing as a neutral educational process"(1970:15).

But Friere, and Illich, are far less optimistic about the systems of education than Dewey was. They reject what Paul Goodman (1962:23) called Dewey's naive hope, "...that the schools could be a community somewhat better than society and serve as a lever for social change." They agree with Goodman when he continues, "In fact, our schools reflect our society closely, except that they emphasize many of its worst features...."

Friere and Illich agree that education is a means to social transformation, but they distinguish "educational projects" from "...systematic education, which can only be changed by political power...."(Friere, 1970:40). Illich is particularly critical of school systems. They not only are not instruments for social change,

they do not even change as society does. Just the opposite of being subversive, they sift out all those seeking fundamental change and only promote to the universities the already safe dissenters who are already co-opted. Schools are "...the advertising agency which makes you believe that you need the society as it is"(Illich, 1970:113).

In a situation in which control of the educational system is firmly in the hands of those who wish to maintain the status quo, other approaches are necessary for social transformation. Schools are part of the modern technology transferred from the rich nations to the poor, which includes goods, the factories that make them, and the service institutions which train people to consume them. Illich's solution is a total attack on the educational institution. He charges that anyone who is not working for the total deschooling of society is not participating in revolutionary action. Schools should be replaced by less formal learning webs in which everyone is both educated and educator. This "...mobilization of the whole population can lead to a popular culture...." in which the alienation of work and leisure can be overcome. Illich is attacking both the dichotomizing of life into the academic and non-academic worlds, and the conception of man as homo faber, that humanity is realized in the making and consumption of things(1970:22 & 114).

Friere's approach is more focused. Less a prescription for social reconstruction, it is a strategy for creating a revolutionary movement. Once the oppressed have thrown off the yoke of the oppressors, and taken political control, then the reconstruction of the educational

system can be undertaken. But the first step is the formation and equipping of a revolutionary movement. To that end, educational projects are required. This is a strategy, set firmly in an historical context, aimed at creating a new social order. It requires the unity of theory and praxis and is based on "the power of thought to negate the accepted limits and open the way to a new future" (Shaul, 1970:12). It is a strategy that focuses upon the liberation of the oppressed, their awakening to selfhood, to a sense of themselves as Subjects rather than objects. It involves a dialogic method designed to enhance the critical perception of the oppressed which will lead directly to corporate action to transform the world.

Illich praises Friere's work in teaching illiterates to read in as little as 40 hours. The key to the process, he says, is in having the first words deciphered charged with crucial political meaning:

The letters continue to unlock reality and to make it manageable as a problem. I have frequently witnessed how discussants grow in social awareness and how they are impelled to take political action as fast as they learn to read. They seem to take reality into their hands as they write it down (Illich, 1970:18).

As has already been indicated, the theme of domination is the fundamental one for our epoch according to Friere (1970:93). Its manifestation in Latin America is in terms of underdevelopment. It is this fact that makes liberation the primary educational objective for our time. The opposition to dehumanizing oppression gives a distinctly anthropological character to our age. The constraining limits which

have previously defined "being human" must be surmounted. It is critical analysis of these themes which allows students to move beyond merely the epiphenomena into the underlying causes and limit-situations.

The awareness of being oppressed is the first condition of liberation. Until persons recognize that what they are experiencing is not merely their fate, but is something intentionally designed to benefit others, there can be no liberation. Once they recognize the causes of their oppression, then they will work to surmount them. Only thus can liberation be achieved, not just for themselves, but also for the oppressors, Friere(1970:28ff) maintains, in a passage drawn almost intact from Sartre(1970:251ff). And liberation must be achieved. Freedom can never be received as a gift. Friere quotes Hegel, "It is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained"(1970:20). Thus liberational education can never be done by the oppressors! Learning about the fact of oppression, its causes, and its overcoming in liberation is fulfilled in the praxis of direct action.

When the oppressed begin to grasp after their own liberation, their interior experience is like a great awakening. Richard Shaul records some of the reactions of peasants after only a few sessions: "We were blind, now our eyes have been opened." "I now realize I am a man, an educated man." "Before this, words meant nothing to me; now they speak to me and I can make them speak." Shaul summarizes, "When this happens in the process of learning to read, men discover that they are creators of culture, and that their work can be creative.... and as those who have been completely marginalized are so radically

transformed, they are no longer willing to be mere objects...."(Shaul, 1970:14). This sense of awakening is, in many ways, a fulfillment of the kind of program the Critical Theorists of Frankfurt proposed (Horkheimer, 1972 and Habermas, 1973).

Fundamental to this awakening is the grasp of oneself as a Subject, an actor. The oppressed must reject the image of "thinghood" which is projected upon them by the oppressors. They must cease being the objects of action, whether blatantly oppressive or idealistically paternalistic. They must rid themselves of the self-deprecatory images which reduce them to the state of animals. They must grasp after a whole new conception of themselves as men with "...the ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human" (Friere, 1970:52). At the heart of acquiring this new vocation is the assumption of the Subject role. It is to claim the "I" role, rather than the "It" role. Thus, liberational education is never content to simply engender reflection on one's situation, it also must require action, self-initiated efforts at transforming the social reality. The world is not just out there as the context for observation and analysis. It is there to be changed. The student gives up the role of spectator, and becomes the recreator of history. To be fully human is to be Subjects who "...intervene critically in the situation which surrounds them and whose mark they bear...." (1970:54).

This requires an educational methodology which differs diametrically from that of oppressor education. Friere criticizes

the revolutionary leader who thinks he can create a revolution by using the same educational methods employed by the oppressors. These methods treat students as Objects. They rely upon propaganda to convince. They create followers rather than fellow revolutionaries.

It is essential for the oppressed to realize that when they accept the struggle for humanization they also accept, from that moment, their total responsibility for the struggle....The oppressed, who have been shaped by the death-affirming climate of oppression, must find through their struggle the way to life-affirming humanization, which does not lie simply in having more to eat.... The oppressed have been destroyed precisely because their situation has reduced them to things. In order to regain their humanity they must cease to be things and fight as men.

In a humanizing pedagogy the method ceases to be an instrument by which the teachers....can manipulate the students...because it expresses the consciousness of the students themselves(1970:55f).

Friere is calling for a co-intentional education in which both students and teachers are co-intent on reality. In such an education, both are Subjects, commonly unveiling the way the world is, coming to a critical knowledge of reality, and commonly engaged in recreating it. It is an education that manifests Sartre's contention that, "It is in changing the world that we can come to know it"(1970:252).

At the heart of co-intentional education is the Dialogic Method. If liberation is more than an idea which can be deposited into students(as the "banking conception" of education would try to do) but "...is a praxis: the action and reflection of men upon their world in order to transform it"(1970:66), a different kind of education is required. The necessary approach is one that focuses upon the consciousness of men, as Subjects. It must enhance their consciousness -

of the world. It must respond to the essential element of the consciousness of a Subject, his intentionality. Thus it focuses upon man's consciousness of both his world and himself, which entails his "consciousness of consciousness". The educational method required is one which will allow a person to reflect upon his own reflection, to know what he knows, and thus to act upon it.

The method Friere proposed, and incorporated in his approach, is a problem-posing method, a method of dialogue between Subjects. "Liberating education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information"(1970:67). In problem-posing education, which is focused upon the world, rather than making the students the objects of education, men teach each other. "Dialogical relations--indispensable to the capacity of cognitive actors to cooperate in perceiving the same cognizable subject...." overcomes the teacher-student contradiction, the subject-object mode of education. The teachers--of-students and the students-of-teachers roles are transformed into teacher-student and student-teacher. "They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow"(1970:67).

Problem-posing takes every common situation in which men and women find themselves and makes it the focus of reflection. The situation of oppression becomes the focus of reflection; it is objectified and examined critically until its causes become apparent. Then action can be initiated to transform the reality as it currently exists. Dialogic education develops critical perception. Without a critical understanding of the world, men perceive only fragments of it,

the epiphenomena. They do not see how these fragments interact, and therefore they do not know the reality that actually exists. They are submerged in a world that is dense, impenetrable, and enveloping. As they begin to act upon that world, even without clearly understanding it, they are forced to rethink their assumptions. "Men emerge from their submersion and acquire the ability to intervene in reality as it is unveiled. Intervention in reality--historical awareness itself--thus represents a step forward from emergence, and results from the conscientização of the situation"(1970:100f). The curriculum for such a problem-posing approach is derived from the world view of the students themselves. It is as they emerge from the world and objectify their own critical perception of it that they come to understand the world that exists and can transform it with their labor. This cannot be taught to people. It can only be shared with them.

Friere was focusing upon teaching illiterates to read and thereby to create a revolutionary awareness in the oppressed. His method involved a careful study of, and with, the potential students of the educational project, to discover the elements of their world view. This perception was then codified into pictures of scenes from the students' life-situation. The educational method then involved a dialogue about those situations, restating the situations, as described by the students, into problems and associating them with written words that remained on the blackboard "after their sounds had died". The codifications are drawn from thematic investigations which discern the dominant themes in the students' world view. As has

already been mentioned, this is within the awareness that "domination" is the primary theme of this epoch, and its continental manifestation is in the dependency of underdevelopment. Within this conception, the investigators and students together search for the primary contradiction and its secondary aspects within their own limit-situation. When that becomes apparent, the themes which are related to it and the tasks necessary for its transformation can be identified. This is a process in which the empirical awareness of the students and the critical understanding of the teachers work together in dialogue to result in an appropriate praxis--significant action undergirded by foundational theory.

But adequate praxis depends upon the solidarity of those who act. It depends upon the bridging of the teacher-student contradiction so that both are simultaneously teachers and students. It is in dialogue that revolutionary leaders and followers are unified in action. It is this which distinguishes a revolution from a military coup, which finally is done for the people, not by them, and ultimately ends only in replacing one form of domination with another. Revolutionary action requires constant accountability. "Its very legitimacy lies in that dialogue"(1970:122). It rests upon communication, not communiques. "The oppressed and the leaders are equally the Subjects of revolutionary action, and reality serves as the medium for the transforming action of both groups"(1970:123). Denial of this communication, of this dialogue, shows a lack of faith in the people, a treatment of the people as objects, and thus a return to oppressor

tactics. If the revolutionary leaders do not think with the people, they will become devitalized. If they are not identified with the oppressed state of the people, if they simply think about the people, they have ceased being revolutionary. Revolutionary leaders, to achieve authenticity, "...must 'die', in order to be reborn through and with the oppressed"(1970:127). Praxis requires solidarity. When that solidarity is broken, praxis deteriorates into meaningless activism.

Liberational education is a strategy for attacking what Friere has identified as the primary contradiction in Latin America: the dependency which results from underdevelopment. One of the primary aspects of that contradiction is the institutionalism and bureaucratism of mega-structures which remove from individuals the decisions by which they can shape their own destiny. "It is when the majorities are denied their right to participate in history as Subjects that they become dominated and alienated"(Friere, 1970:125). The interiorization of that domination is victimization, the conviction that one's life is controlled by other forces and persons. It often appears as passivity and self-depreciation. Liberational education attacks both the objective and subjective dimensions of this contradiction. It liberates men and restores their sense of being Subjects who engage in praxis aimed at transforming the social context so that local people participate in social decision-making.

Such a contradictional attack hinges upon the ability of a revolutionary force to keep decision-making in the hands of the

local people who are affected by its consequences. Friere maintains that this Jeffersonian ideal (Cf., his letter to Dupont de Nemours in 1816, quoted in Simpson, 1979:8) is necessary to development. Unless decisions are in the hands of the people, the transformation will be superficial. If the revolutionary leadership should become separated from the people, but using non-dialogic methods, the revolution will falter. "To alienate men from their own decision-making is to change them into objects." It is to dehumanize the people and deny them their historical vocation. "The pursuit of full humanity, however, cannot be carried out in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity...." (1970:73).

Friere, echoing Sartre, points out that revolutionary leadership usually is drawn from the oppressor social strata; they renounce their own class and join with the oppressed in an act of commitment and love. The down-trodden and hopeless condition of the oppressed means there is little chance they will seek their own liberation alone. They need the assistance of those not trapped in the victimage of the oppressed. But the leaders need the oppressed just as much. What distinguishes the leaders of the revolution from the dominant class is not just their objectives, but also their procedures. Leaders and people must be cooperating and inter-communicating Subjects in order to transform the world. "The leaders.... do not own the people and have no right to steer the people blindly towards their salvation" (1970:167). The adherence of the people to their leaders happens in dialogue. "Authentic adherence is the free

coincidence of choices; it cannot occur apart from communication among men, mediated by reality"(1970:168). It is the trust of the people for their leaders and the trust and faith of the leaders in the people. It is this trust, this confidence in the people's ability to think, to want, to know, which is so difficult for the formerly dominant leaders to maintain. They are ever tempted to be the executors of transformation themselves. But revolutionary change happens only when the people are radically trusted. This does not mean merely acceding to their current vision or victimization. It does mean trusting the decisions which result from the dialogue of leaders and people together.

Friere's contention is that the revolution which results from liberational education is a cultural revolution. Necessarily, it is at first a revolution for, by, and among the oppressed. It requires a rejection of the culture imposed by the dominant class and a rejection of its sustaining myths. But then it must reach beyond the oppressed class. It reaches out to include the professionals who can come to recognize the dehumanizing structures of society. The professionals are necessary for the reorganization of the new society, but they must first die to their learned "understanding" of how society operates, the myths that have maintained those understandings, and their inbred cultural values. But then, the revolution must invite all to participate, for it is rooted in the conviction that every man's ontological vocation is to create his own full humanness. Thus, it is ultimately a revolution of universal scope. And it is a

perpetual revolution. "I interpret the revolutionary process as dialogical cultural action which is prolonged in 'cultural revolution' once power is taken"(1970:158).

Chapter 5
Development Policy in India

I. Context of Development at Independence

The gap between those who are abysmally caught in poverty and those who live in comfort and relative leisure has captured the imagination of the whole world. It can be generally postulated as the moral issue of the latter half of the twentieth century. It has dominated the concerns of politicians, academicians, the religious, humanists, businessmen, the youth, the minorities, and the disadvantaged. At one dimension, this issue has consumed men throughout the ages. However, at the level of the global economy, this issue is barely a generation old, in the consciousness of men. Only with the collapse of the colonial empires, starting with the independence of India just 30 years ago (1947), did the development of what is now known as the Third World begin to occupy the minds of men.

India has been in the forefront of concern for development since World War II. Her "starving masses" have characterized Third World poverty for two generations. Charitable organizations have focused programs to ameliorate their suffering, and exploited their pain to raise funds and secure volunteers in the developed lands. India's leaders have captured the imagination of common citizens and Nobel Prize committees by the nobility of their efforts in the face of such massive need. India's size and strength and leadership among the non-aligned nations have forced the political leaders of the developed nations to give her special attention. But, too often, the social sciences, and especially anthropology, have slighted this area of the world, or concentrated solely on the extreme case of its unique caste

stratification.

"It is a regrettable but undeniable fact that the social anthropology of South Asia, and of Southeast Asia as well, is thought of by many social anthropologists as peripheral to the mainstream of social anthropology" (Singer, 1969:vii). Singer goes on to remind the reader that India provided some of the earliest sources of the stream of social anthropology, from W.H.R. Rivers' The Tola and Radcliffe-Brown's The Andaman Islanders onwards. With India's early emergence as an independent nation and leader of what came to be known as the Third World, a new burst of anthropological study swelled and enriched the mainstream. Much of that work dealt with what has become the most significant question of the latter part of the twentieth century, "What is the effect on a culture of development and social change?"

The civilizational antiquity and cultural diversity that is India is extremely difficult to encompass. Perhaps that is part of the reason for earlier anthropological neglect; it was easier to study circumscribed, culturally unitary, simple, stateless societies. India, for as long as Western observers have had contact with her, did not fit this pattern (though some such social isolates could be found on the sub-continent). Since before Alexander's invasion (ca. 323 B.C.), India has fit Yehudi Cohen's (1970) definition of a civilization: the interdependence in social and economic institutions of autonomous states which, in comparison with other states beyond its borders, are interiorly homogenous. Cohen goes on to theorize that civilizations develop by diminishing the importance of interior boundaries and

emphasizing commonality across such divisions in both politico-military and social structures. By the latter, he specifically means a system of stratification, a lingua franca, and the legitimating ideology of a religion. These elements have been present in India since at least the Aryan invasion, more than seven hundred years before Alexander.

The largest consolidation of the Indian civilization, ironically, was accomplished by the British, who supplanted and far exceeded the earlier Moghul imperialists. The British inherited a dual system of law, installed by the Moghuls, with separate legal codes for Hindus and Muslims. The British attempted to "administer" India, first through the control of a private company (the British East India Company) and then by colonial government--after the mutiny of 1857. The British intended to simply maintain order and secure revenue to offset their expenses through vehicles such as the Oudh Code (Retzlaff, 1962:27). They intended to allow local customs and codes to persist, intervening only to maintain order. Quickly, they found themselves forced to settle disputes among those they sought to "administer". This led to the early establishment of British courts. But, as Stanley Diamond (1973:329ff) has pointed out, courts do not function, essentially, to establish order, for traditional methods of resolving conflicts already existed before the imposition of courts. The primary purpose of courts is to govern, and they are able to do this even in the absence of law. As Derrett (1963) describes at some length, decisions could be based on "Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience". Diamond goes on to indicate the distinctiveness of courts and law from tradi-

tional dispute settlement is that a breach of law is defined as a "crime" while traditional patterns deal with acts which require restitution. Thus, the British, by imposing courts, established themselves as the governors of India.

British courts attempted to administer, as appropriate, the Hindu and Muslim codes. At first they did this by using expert advisors on local Hindu and Muslim customs. These men would interpret the relevant traditions of a case for the judges (see Derrett, 1961, for a summary of British administration of the Hindu Code). Later, a written code was prepared to standardize judicial proceedings and judgments. This code was drawn from holy Hindu writings, and often differed from local traditional patterns. Galanter (1968b:76) calls this a "Displacement of Traditional Law" in which a "...sense of individual right independent of local usage or opinion and enforceable by reference to standards and agencies beyond the locality of the group...." created a new awareness of mobility and possible advancement. As a new manifestation of Cohen's civilizational dynamics, the emergence of an All-India legal system was a unifying element cutting across local boundaries. This trend was to culminate in Independence (though for a reduced geographical reality, and for only part of the population commonly administered by the British) with the constitutional creation of a strong central government committed to radical transformation of the society. "Since independence and even before that, the Indian government and Congress Party planners have been working towards a technologically modern democratic society which emphasizes 'social

justice' and cooperation, which is devoid of 'castism', a society grounded in the corporate village community but unified by loyalty to a single national entity"(Orenstein, 1963:83). As M.N. Srinivas summarized, "...when....Mahatma Gandhi assumed the leadership of the Indian National Congress, programs of social reform were woven into the freedom struggle. Gandhi stressed the need for the eradication of Untouchability, the uplift of women, communal harmony, revival of village industries, and in particular, Khadi, 'basic' and adult education, propagation of Hindi, and prohibition"(Srinivas, 1966:86f). Thus, in a second notable irony, the independence movement was committed to a far more radical social transformation than were the British colonialists. But it was a transformation which they were incapable of bringing about by the power of moral suasion. Moral force was capable of gaining India her independence. The force of law was required for social transformation.

I propose to look at development in India under three functional categories: 1) the reformation of social structures; 2) policy priorities; and 3) the use of Five Year Plans. The first category has to do with alterations of the institutional arrangements of a society. It affects the basic organization of the society. It was accomplished in India by the framers of the Constitution and later by the legislators who promulgated major code reforms such as the Panchayat Raj Act(U.P.--1947), the Zamindari Abolition Act(U.P.--1950), and the Hindu Code Acts(1955 & 1956). Policy priorities are more transitory strategies for development enacted into law to encourage

desired changes. Their origin is with the nations's planners and its bureaucrats. Their effect is usually more limited and focused towards certain targetted segments of the population, rather than upon altering the structural relationships that exist among the whole populace.

Community Development plans, industrialization schemes, and agricultural extension are prime examples of these priorities in India. The planning of policy priorities took on special intensity in the establishment of a Planning Commission after independence. This commission followed the Soviet example of centralized development by Five Year Plans. The First Five Year Plan was conducted from 1951 to 1956 and was followed by five other plans. Due to drastic drought conditions at the end of the Third Plan, the Fourth Plan was delayed two years in implementation, spanning 1958-1973. The Sixth Plan extends from 1973 until 1983.

II. The Reformation of Social Structures

As has already been suggested, the Indian Congress focused strongly upon the creation of a free, independent, egalitarian, social welfare state. It is in this light that Marc Galanter could begin an article on the "Changing Legal Conceptions of Caste"(1968a:299) with:

It is a commonplace that the Constitution of India envisages a new order as to both the place of caste in Indian life and the role of law in regulating it. There is a clear commitment to eliminate inequality of status and invidious treatment, and to have a society in which government takes minimal account of ascriptive ties.

The Preamble to the Constitution aims to "...secure to all of its citizens....Equality of status and opportunity...."(quoted in Galanter, 1968a:312). Thus, Galanter asserts that the Constitution presents a

general program for the reconstruction of Indian Society to secure this "equality of status and opportunity." It replaced ascribed status by official indifference to particularistic or ascriptive characteristics (caste, race, religion, place of birth, sex). It emphasized the integrity and autonomy of voluntary groups in society (thus indicating the direction of evolution of caste groups). It withdrew government recognition of any rank ordering of groups in society, especially castes. It specifically outlawed Untouchability: "'Untouchability' is abolished and its practice in any form forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'Untouchability' shall be an offense punishable in accordance with law" (Article 17, quoted in Galanter, 1968a:312). The constitutional pronouncements for a casteless society and the abolition of 'Untouchability' had been prepared for in a continent-wide drive as a part of the "Quit India" movement in 1942 (Cf. Retzlaff, 1962:45, for an account of the ceremony in one village in North India). Congress leaders had organized ceremonial occasions in most of the villages of the nation, in which leaders of the various castes and untouchables ate together from a common plate, thereby repudiating ritual caste pollution. While this movement did not gain unanimous approval, it paved the way for an egalitarian Constitution.

The Constitution further established a strong central government and a national judiciary. Its promotion of the restructuring of society released a flood of legislation aimed at economic development and social reform (Galanter, 1968b:78). Three key arenas of reform

were Personal Law, Panchayat Raj, and Land Reform.

1. The Reform of Personal Law

Article 44 of the Constitution of India called for the replacement of the separate Muslim and Hindu codes with a "uniform civil code." This was necessary because, "Muslim law never went deep enough; it was never applied to disputes among Hindus....Hindu law solved these problems by willingly accomodating almost unlimited localism...."

(Galanter, 1968b:81f). The Hindu Code Acts of 1955 and 1956 created the machinery and ideology for legislation which was enforceable across the whole society.

The British, in relying upon Hindu scriptures to formulate a uniform code, had solidified caste hierarchies, which until that time had manifested great local diversity and some variability over time. Further, it institutionalized the scriptural distinctions of "varna" (the four major groupings of the many individual caste groupings, or jatis), even though these were irrelevant abstractions for many parts of India at the time. Srinivas(1966) explains in detail the process of caste mobility under the image of Sanskritization(lower castes imitating the ways and customs of Brahmanic, or other higher castes, in order to move up in the caste heirarchy). The new Hindu Code abandoned varna distinctions completely, and with them, any rank-ordering of castes.

The new Hindu Code also made considerable alterations in family patterns--an arena which under the British had been determined by what were considered to be caste juridical entities. It gave

parliament legislative power over family and social life for the first time. The new code abandoned the notion of the indissoluble marriage; it ended the preferences given to the extended joint family. Further, it extended rights of inheritance beyond male offspring to widows, daughters, and the mother of the deceased.

The Constitution goes beyond indifference to ascribed status. While eliminating the ranking of castes by ritual or social status, it prescribes a corrective stance towards untouchables, tribals and the "backward classes" in an effort towards enhancing equality for all. It mandated reserved posts in government, seats in the legislatures, places in schools, and a number of other preferences, all aimed at creating equality for all in a "casteless society." However, the basis for determining who should benefit from such preferential treatment was now on comparative economic, social, and educational levels--what Galanter calls an "organic" rather than a "sacral" view of caste (1968b).

What has been the effect of Constitutional proscription and the reform of the Hindu Code? Has India become casteless? Obviously not, but neither has the traditional caste hierarchy of control and status remained intact. Something different has emerged. On the one hand, an open model of occupation is perhaps beginning to evolve, largely as a result of economic development, but partly attributable to the loosening of caste-occupational restrictions and the prohibition of sanctions against those who violate those traditional restrictions (see Kassebaum & Sagar, 1974, for a study of occupational spread across

jati lines in a small city). In another study, Karve(1965) found that occupation spread was also happening at the village level as the jajmani system broke down and the "retainer castes"(as Retzlaff, 1962:15, calls them) moved into the towns and cities.

On the other hand, as a result of constitutional guarantees as to the integrity of religious and linguistic groups and other voluntary associations, caste solidarity and inter-regional relatedness has been enhanced. A focus upon economic, occupational, and educational opportunities has replaced the conflicts over establishing higher ritual status which predominated under the British. Competition among the castes is now over economic and political perogatives. With the preferential discrimination mandated by the Constitution, many disputes were brought to the courts to determine whether particular castes fit the criteria for preference; other cases dealt with determining whether particular individuals could be considered members of a Scheduled Caste, Tribe, or Backward Class. Such litigation gave new form to caste associations by delineating the limits of membership of castes--an arena previously left entirely to caste adjudication or negotiation. Thus, Galanter summarizes the situation, "We can visualize the judiciary as mediating between the Constitution's commitment to a great social transformation and the actualities of Indian society." In so doing "...the judiciary have produced a picture of caste which no one proposed and no one anticipated"(1968a:332).

2. Panchayat Raj

At the same time that the Indian Congress was agitating for social transformation and a strong central government to accomplish it, a Gandhian concern for village level improvement led to an emphasis on democratic village self-government. While this emphasis was not structurally embodied in the Constitution, by 1953 (six years after independence) every state was "covered by panchayat legislation" (Retzlaff, 1962:2). The Panchayat Raj Act (Uttar Pradesh--1947) was a model of this legislation.

Before Independence, villages were organized in a hierarchy of castes with traditional service ("retainer") relationships in a feudalistic "jajmani" system. Headmen ordered the village's relationships beyond its borders. Within the village, affairs were more often regulated by four types of rather informal panchayats. These panchayats were gatherings of the relevant elders in order to settle disputes in the village. Their composition varied according to the issue to be resolved and the current ascendancy or regression of families and lineages. Caste panchayats settled disputes within a particular caste, or reprimanded members for ritual offenses. On some issues which affected large segments of the village and several castes, a general meeting of the elders of several castes might be held. A jajmani panchayat, consisting of land-holders, would be held to settle disputes between landholders, between a retainer and his farmer-landholder, or between retainers of several different landholders. For special situations, a single purpose panchayat might be convened.

The key commonality of these traditional panchayats, besides their flexibility of composition, was that "...all four were adjudicatory in nature"(Retzlaff, 1962:18). They were all oligarchic bodies, geared to maintain the good order of the village(the status quo).

The Panchayat Raj Act established a tripartite village government. The Gram Panchayat(Village Panchayat) was established for administrative purposes and was charged with responsibility for promoting the economic and social development of the village--a new function at the village level(see Luschinsky, 1963:72 for the size criteria for the Gram Panchayat which varies in size from 30 to 51 relative to the size of the village). The Gram Sabha is a village assembly of all men over 21. By a hand vote, it elects both the Gram Panchayat and the Adalat Panchayat. This latter group, the panchayat court, settles small disputes and can levy fines up to Rs 100. It usually covers three to five villages and consists of five members. It represents a formal attempt to restore to local control the settlement of small disputes which had been preempted by the British-run courts.

The Panchayat Raj was severely criticized in its early years by Jayaprakesh Narayan, a leader in the recent coalition which, in 1977, ousted Indira Gandhi's Congress Party government(the first time it had been out of power since Independence). At the time, the Panchayat Raj Act was passed, Narayan claimed that democratic processes at the village level fostered divisiveness and factionalism at the expense of the village unity produced by traditional reliance upon

consensus procedures aimed at finding resolutions satisfactory to all. Retzlaff points out, on the basis of his study of one village, that such divisiveness was already present in the village, and was only reflected by, not created by, the democratic procedures. He further suggests that for the first time, the majority had a way to make decisions contrary to the wishes of the powerful village elites. Thus, while he sums up his account of the first two panchayat elections in the village he was observing by saying, "...village elections create more problems than they solve...." he recognizes that "The importance of the village panchayat for village economic and social development is fundamental"(1962:114 & 121). While praising the development of self-reliance, he concluded that "What is required is a fundamental change in social orientation away from a satisfaction with the status quo to one in which change is not only accepted but desired"(1962:123).

T.S. Epstein, in her later study of two South Indian villages (1962 & 1973) found that divergent economic development can account for major differences in the development of village panchayats. In the one village which benefitted from government instituted irrigation, the jajmani system remained largely intact and the elected panchayat was simply a legal fiction. Meanwhile, in the "dry" village, which was thereby "forced" to economic diversification(especially in small scale industrialization and commercialization), the jajmani system broke down. There the elected panchayat became a significant factor in village development and experienced real representation for the various castes and factions of the village. Thus the establishment of

Panchayat Raj is another factor in shaking loose traditional restraints to change, and became an important part of the process of social transformation and economic development.

3. Land Reform

Land reform was a central concern of the independence movement. The British had institutionalized a feudal class of revenue collectors into absolute landlords, called Zamindars. With the fragmentation of tenancy holdings as the population increased, many levels of sub-letting of land intervened between the actual cultivator and the ultimate zamindar. The Zamindar Abolition Act(U.P.--1950) removed all the intermediaries between the cultivator and the state. Four classes of landholding were established: bhumidhars, who had absolute tenure and resale rights to their land; siddars, who could not sell, mortgage, or bequeath their land, but had occupancy and hereditary rights to it; asamis, who held short-lived tenancy on land; and adhvasis, who were tenants-at-will(by an amendment to the act in 1954, adhvasis were reclassified as siddars).

Former zamindars lost all land which they did not directly cultivate. They became bhumidhars on the unlet land they did cultivate (see Luschinsky, 1963, for an account of the political machinations which these zamindars manifested in one U.P. village prior to the effective date of the legislation). Siddars could become bhumidhars by deposit of 10 times the annual rent with the state; when they thus assumed ownership, their taxes were reduced to 50% of the former rent. If they continued to rent the land, the rate remained at the full

rental formerly paid. Asamis could do the same by paying 15 times the rent. The former zamindars were compensated for the loss of their land by payments from the rent on their former lands. Thus the poorest families paid for the land reform from which they supposedly were to benefit. However, since many were too poor to purchase their land, they continued as tenants at the higher rates, but without the credit provided by and the flexibility of rent collection tolerated in their relations with the zamindars. While land reform did alter the landholder-retainer pattern, as a redistributive scheme, it seems to have been less than successful.

Land reform did disrupt the traditional, rigid jajmani system of "feudal" social relations. It also had effect on the timing of nuclear family split-offs from joint family enterprises, in order to hold land in excess of single family acreage restrictions. However, Karve's study indicated that no significant alteration in the joint family living pattern had resulted; she did note the breaking down of the jajmani system, as did Epstein's study of the unirrigated village in South India.

Thus, in these three major arenas, Personal Law, Panchayat Raj, and Land Reform, the leaders of India used Constitutional and Code enactments to mandate reform of the structures of society. These were major alterations of the relations between segments of the nation's populace in their traditional institutional arrangements. However, these structural alterations alone would not have produced economic development. They did loosen the traditional restraints enough that

development policies could be effective. Further, they would have been meaningless if not enforced in the actual settlement of disputes which arose as a result of their enactment.

III. Policy Priorities

Maxwell Owusu(1975) suggests there are four kinds of policy decisions: crisis policy(re: coup d'etat), budgeting policy, development planning on the large scale(which he points out is often dependent on external technological and economic assistance), and local development projects policy. It is the last three of these areas that concerns us here.

India created a Planning Commission shortly after Independence. Six Five Year Plans have been created, the fourth delayed in implementation due to agricultural/weather reverses. The Planning Commission continues to function, giving form and direction to the developmental thrusts of the government. The policies which emanate from the Commission and the various bureaucratic departments of the government, and which are translated into legally constituted programs and budget items are a second, and more direct, legal instrument for effecting social transformation and economic development.


In the next section, the specific five year plans of the nation will be more comprehensively evaluated. Three major developmental thrusts have been consistently present in all of the plans: Community Development, Industrialization, and Agricultural Extension.

1. Community Development

Community Development has been a parallel thrust to the establishment of Panchayat Raj. Due to early ineffectiveness in the program, a three-tier arrangement of local self-governing bodies was proposed by the Mehta Committee in 1958, consisting of the village panchayat, the Community Development Block, and the District. Each had an elected, representational panchayat with oversight and control responsibilities. In the opposite direction was a corresponding administrative bureaucracy that extended downwards from the state government (see Table 1 on the next page for a diagrammatic representation of the intersection of these two systems). The key figure for Community Development was the Village Level Worker (VLW). Unfortunately, these were usually young, relatively untrained and inexperienced men who were largely ineffective under the first several plans (for a more extensive critique, Cf., Hunter, 1969; Mellor, 1968, Retzlaff, 1962; and Berreman, 1963). Berreman concludes that, "undoubtedly if democratic community development, as conceived in the Community Development Program of India, is to succeed in the long run, social justice must be achieved. For this, effective agrarian reform is critical. Also crucial is serious attention to means to benefit non-agriculturalists both in their village economic functions and in centralized and dispersed industry" (1963:94). Some fifteen years later, a project of state-wide village development across Maharashtra is now fulfilling these requirements (see Chapter 10).

STATUS, POWER, POLITICS AT VILLAGE LEVEL

Table 1

Agricultural Administration in Indian States

Taken from Hunter, 1969:57.

2. Industrialization

The two greatest leaders of the Independence movement in India, Gandhi and Nehru, though generally of one mind, differed at several important points. Nehru was a secularist, Gandhi a devout religious, committed to the revitalization of Hinduism with tolerance and respect for other faiths. Nehru was committed to mandated social change at the national level, while Gandhi was convinced of the need for self-government at the village level. Nehru envisioned rapid industrialization, making India a world power, while Gandhi was concerned for the development of self-reliant and self-sufficient villages. As a result of Gandhi's assassination only months after Independence, Nehru was left as the guiding figure for the nation, and directed its development through its first 15 years. High on his list of priorities was heavy industrialization.

With assistance from a large number of developed nations, primarily Canada, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R., major industrialization was accomplished with an accompanying significant development of the infrastructures to sustain it. Steel, oil, automobiles, trucks, heavy machinery, electricity, roads, etc., were all extensively developed. However, the focus on industrialization has been widely criticized, in that government mandated policy directed the expansion of the economy in one sphere, with no percentage increase in employment and no general increases in the standards of living, while restricting potential investment in the sphere in which 80% of the population lives. In addition, exports declined, due to the capital goods orientation of

the industrialization policy, creating a major foreign aid dependency.

3. Agricultural Expansion

More extensively felt has been the agricultural expansion policy. While secondary in importance in the first two Five Year Plans, bad crops forced this arena to the fore in the Third and Fourth Plans. Retzlaff, writing a decade after Independence, said there were two significant structural changes to be considered in India: the establishment of Panchayat Raj, and the cooperative movement, which was central to agricultural development. Indeed, by 1957, some 200,000 agricultural co-ops were in existence in India, with an average membership of 75 (Mellor, 1968). Retzlaff points to the importance of the establishment of the cooperative in Khalapur, the village he studied, but admitted that the first cooperative there had failed, due to the refusal of the wealthy to repay loans. Owens (1972), with the advantage of a longer period of evaluation, points out that this record of failure is pervasive amidst Indian cooperatives, and attributes it to favoritism in securing loans and the inability to collect outstanding loans.

Governmental emphasis upon the formation of cooperatives, instrumental in shaping the daily lives of large numbers of India's citizens, finally proved ineffective. The emphasis on other aspects of agricultural expansion has begun to have a favorable effect. India is once again self-sufficient in food. Local farmers are benefitting from increased agricultural inputs, improved techniques, and better land-use rationales--all effects of a more sophisticated policy

of agricultural expansion begun in the Third Plan. Again, space does not permit the evaluation of the social transformations which have accompanied agricultural success, but one might be mentioned: it appears there is the beginning of a reversal of the rural-to-urban migration pattern, which would be a relief for India's over-burdened cities.

IV. The Five Year Plans

India's early development emphasis was upon industrialization. Rejecting Gandhi's emphasis upon cottage industry, Nehru, as quickly as he dared turn his attention from nation-building (the focus of the First Five Year Plan) poured large resources into the development of extensive heavy industry and the necessary social overhead capital investments in infrastructure to sustain it. What was envisioned was the emergence of a mixed economy of public and private effort. It would involve capitalism and central planning--concepts which until the Great Depression were thought to be antithetical. (The genuine marriage of the two is still suspect to many, for example, A.R. Desai, 1960, argues that India's approach is wholly capitalistic, only disguised as socialist.) Agriculture, except for initial steps towards land reform, the expansion of cultivated land, and a few eye-catching irrigation projects, was relegated to a subordinate role.

The neglect of agriculture was not total, but reflects relative emphasis, and followed the developmentalist thinking of the 1950's. It was thought that the developing nations could leapfrog over many of the intervening stages of development that countries in

the West had experienced. Thus the focus was upon shifting the industrial-agricultural employment profile. The First Five Year Plan necessarily focused upon nation-building, which required major efforts in the rural areas where 80% of the population lived. The major feature of this plan was the Community Development Program which organized the nation into Community Development Blocks of 100 villages, brought together the various Center functions for coordinated service to the villages, and made them available through Village Level Workers (VLW), one for every 10 villages. In addition, land and Zamindari reform turned much land over to those who cultivated it, increasing the owner-cultivated farms from 40% to 75%. Three large irrigation projects were under construction. However, only the already available resources would be directed to agricultural development during this plan. Building the nation would take precedence. The Community Development personnel, and especially the VLWs, proved to be inexperienced and untrained for agricultural innovation (only one of their many responsibilities), but proved exceedingly valuable in communicating the concern of the Union government for the rural people. Mellor (1968) lists six major accomplishments of nation-building which were accomplished by the end of the First Five Year Plan, accomplishments which confounded the British who were convinced that India was not, and could never be, a nation:

1. General election held with 160,000,000 voters, 80% of whom were illiterate
2. Overcame revolt at the establishment of the Indian Union (Cf. the Nizam of Hyderabad)
3. Voted to remain a part of the British Commonwealth

4. Wrote and adopted a constitution
5. Integrated the princely states into the Indian Union
6. Absorbed eight million refugees as a result of partition

Good weather during the First Five Year Plan(1951-56), combined with expanded irrigation and land reform, resulted in major increases in agricultural production, although no significant attempt to develop agriculture had been made. This success lulled planners into continued neglect of agricultural development in the Second Plan. In fact, the proportion of funds designated for agriculture declined, though because the resources committed to the plan were larger, the actual rupees committed represented a 50% increase, almost all of the increase focused in expanding the Community Development Program from its initial phase to cover every village in the nation. In an effort to overcome exploitation of local farmers by traders and moneylenders, the massive cooperative movement was launched, but these cooperatives proved to be too inflexible to meet the local adaptability and the low margins of the traders and moneylenders. In a farm structure of family cultivation in which total labor, equipment, and stock were in close balance with plot size and fully utilized, cooperative farming did not prove economical.

A major extension of local government at the village level was accomplished with a pattern of elected panchayats. Three values developed from this extension of local government: an improvement in the quality of local leadership as elected officials gradually replaced traditional leaders; the raising of local taxes for local improvements; and the direction of local development by local authorities meant more

appropriate efforts emerged. However, two major oversights continued throughout this plan. The Community Development Program was a Center effort, while agricultural extension services were delegated to the states. These two efforts operated largely without coordination. Secondly, there was little fundamental agricultural research being done, and virtually none on the necessary local adaptation to the particular conditions under which the farmers labored.

As agricultural short-falls began to develop during the Second Plan(which had projected a further 38% increase in output), a Ford Foundation Commission study and recommendation resulted in the adoption of an agriculturally oriented Package Program in the Third Plan(1961-66). Four innovations were incorporated in the plan:

1. Focus on immediate agricultural production increases instead of on changing farmer attitudes toward modernization (the aim of the Community Development Program)
2. Set up trial districts, one in each of 7 states(later expanded to 17 districts in 8 states) on the basis of easily demonstrable success(thus choosing those already most developed)
3. Focus on profitability at the farm level, demonstrating economic incentives for altering traditional patterns
4. Focus on inputs, especially inorganic fertilizers to multiply the effectiveness of under-utilized irrigation facilities already provided in many places

This package plan represents a major shift in emphasis in agricultural development. The focus of the VLWs was shifted away from diversity of concern to solely agricultural innovation for local profitability. The incompetence of many VLWs for this task was a continuing problem, but where effective personnel were in use, change began to accelerate. The shift in perception of what peasant farmers would respond to was a major breakthrough. It was now perceived that

where technical availability opened new opportunities, villagers would respond. This alteration of perceptions is now widely proclaimed as an essential factor in launching agricultural development anywhere in the world(Hunter 1969, Mellor 1968, Weitz 1971). However, once again, research on the adaptation of technology and water management(both proper use of irrigation and drainage in flood areas) was neglected.

The Fourth Plan, initiated in the wake of the worst drought in a century, the 1965-66 and 1966-67 crop years, was actually delayed in implementation to respond to the apparent failure of agriculture during the Third Plan. It placed a greater emphasis on rural development. Inorganic fertilizer use expansion was the key element in the plan. Fertilizer use had been expanding at a rate of 20% per year through the three preceding plans, so that nitrogen use had expanded from 58,000 metric tons in 1951 to 492,000 tons in 1965, with corresponding increases in phosphoric acid and potash(Mellor, 1968). Supply and distribution problems had largely been solved by 1965, but the interconnection of the use of inorganic fertilizers and water management had not been solved.

The organization of research was a second aspect of the Fourth Plan. In the first fifty years of its existence, the Indian Agricultural Research Institute in Bihar had produced only one significant improvement, a disease resistant strain of wheat which was widely adopted across India during the 1930's. The I.A.R.I. had unsuccessfully focused its research upon discovering high yield crops which could be raised in low fertility conditions. In 1956, the

Rockefeller Foundation was invited to establish an Indian Agricultural Program which focused first upon adapting new strains of corn which it had developed in its program in Mexico, and later also had successful breakthroughs in wheat and significantly in a strain of sorghum(jowar) which required little irrigation(only 3% of India's sorghum acreage is irrigated). Water management and more effective farmer education were also aspects of the Fourth Plan.

Investigation into government intervention into market pricing indicated that, except for drought years, market forces kept prices lower than intervention. During a drought, effective action was taken by restricting the movement of grains across state lines, Union purchases of surpluses where these then occurred at normal prices, and resale through rationing in food-short areas. Assuring low food prices while maintaining high enough agricultural profits to encourage farmers to shift from subsistence to cash farming is a key issue, especially since nearly 70% of the urban worker's wages are spent on food purchases.

The Fifth and Sixth Plans returned the development emphasis to industrialization. The results of capital-intensive industrialization as the key to development have been widely criticized(Lewis 1953, Desai 1960 & 1976, Mellor 1968 & 1976, Hunter 1969, Weitz 1971, Owens 1972, Sovani 1976, Mukherjee 1977). In India, heavy industry development strained the capital resources and foreign exchange of the nation without significantly altering the occupational profile of the populace. While 1,800,000 workers were added to the industrial work force from

1951 to 1961, the total of non-household industrial workers represented only 4.2% of the work force at the end of that decade(Bose, 1973).

What did result was concentration in the nation's 142 largest cities of the services and infrastructures which would nurture such industrialization and minimally provide for the rapidly expanding population of these large cities.

Urbanization in India, in terms of the shifting proportion of the population living in urban areas(since 1961, basically towns or cities with population of more than 5,000) has not been as rapid as in other parts of the Third World. In the first seventy years of this century, it only increased from 11% to 20%(Bose, 1973). However, the sheer scale involved is of crucial significance, for it means that 108 million people live in India's towns and cities. Further, the growth in urbanization has centered on the 142 largest cities(the Class I cities of 100,000 plus population) while the smaller cities and towns have remained stagnant. This issue of population scale makes India, and other similar Asian nations, distinct from the issues faced by the nations of Africa or Latin America(whose combined population is less than that of this single nation). Further, this population scale has itself been a significant development as the population of India began to increase dramatically shortly after Independence(the decennial growth rates nearly doubled in the first decades after Independence: 1941-51: 13.3%, 1951-61: 21.5% and 1961-71: 24.7%;Bose, 1973).

The growth of the largest cities was far more from natural growth than from rural-urban migration. Yet there was significant urban migration. This migration has been identified as primarily the result of the squeeze on the rural economy of a fixed land base (though significant acreages were added to cultivation during the first three plans), a rapid increase in population (in excess of 200 million people nationally since Independence--an increase nearly equivalent to the current populations of either the United States or Russia), and the neglect of rural development. The 1971 census indicates that 2½ times as many migrants came to the cities searching for any job as did those seeking better jobs (Bose, 1973). Similarly, surveys among the pavement dwellers in Calcutta discovered that these were persons who had come to the city as the result of the agrarian crisis or natural/social disasters which uprooted them from the land (Mukherjee, 1977).

The explosive growth of the nation's largest cities has resulted in an urban crisis which includes overpopulation, inadequate housing, and unemployment in a classic example of an urban-rural dual economy. The dramatic increases in urban population have severely strained the system of urban services. Bustees and hutments have sprung up in every available space in every major city. Calcutta, alone, includes a refugee population of 2.4 million in what one U.N. official, Robert J. Crooks, Director of the U.N.'s Center for Housing, Building, and Planning, calls "Transitional Urban Settlements" (Sovani, 1976), and S. Mukherjee (1977), the Deputy Director of Planning for the Calcutta

Metropolitan Development Authority estimates there are 50,000 "houseless people" living on the streets, under viaducts, and in the railroad stations of that city.

This overcrowding means that the services of urban life cannot possibly keep pace with the population increases. Water, sewerage, and electricity simply do not extend to such "transitional settlements". When such services are available, they are widely spaced, often servicing 100 or more families out of a single spigot of clean water. Rural areas, surrounded by urban growth, often are left without new services, turning public parks into communal outdoor toilets, as Bose(1973) reported in the Kotla-Mubarakpur area of Delhi. When the services are available, they often function only part of the day. Vast areas of Bombay receive water only once a day, for an hour or two. Electrical "brown-outs" are a daily occurrence in many urban areas where demand is larger than available supplies, so that selected sectors of the city are rotationally turned off to reduce demand to supply capacity levels. Urban transportation, while extensive and relatively cheap, is overcrowded at any time and impossible at peak commuter hours; its efficiency hampered by competition for the streets with rickshas, pedicabs, hand-pushed freight trolleys, and animals. Still, it is often easier to go across the city to see another businessman than it is to make a phone connection with him.

Unemployment in the urban areas is massive although undeterminable quantitatively. Bose(1973) records the rate as higher among urban born residents(8.17% for males only) than among migrants(6.43%),

but goes on to indicate that another 10% are underemployed. Still one wonders how inclusive the statistical gathering was in light of the extensive transitional settlements of the cities. The temporary migrant population, what Eames and Goode(1973:139) call "circular migration", is predominantly composed of single males(urban male--female ratios stand near 118:100, Eose 1973). The distribution of income is seriously polarized. Dandakar and Path(quoted in Desai, 1976) have found that 40% of urban residents live in destitution, below the poverty line which they set at Rs 20 per capita per month(about \$2.50). Desai asserts that another 45% live just at the line or slightly above it. This is in contrast to the small percent who live comfortably, in Western style, in isolated sections of the cities, on housing estates, or in cantonments. Thus every major city of India experiences the dualism of a modern, Westernized cash sector and a (usually larger) vending, hawking, informal "bazaar" sector, often characterized by extensive unauthorized earnings in the form of illicit distilling, begging, prostitution, etc.(Desai, 1976).

While it must be said that India has grown extensively in the thirty years since Independence, when considered from the perspective of per capita increases, she has developed only minimally. Samir Amin (1973) asserts that such "Growth is not Development". Still, one must stand in awe of what has been accomplished. In the years between 1950 and 1965, food grain production was increased by 70%(Mallor, 1968). The foundations of extensive industrialization were created by the establishment of heavy industry in such developments as that located

in the Panchi-Rourkela-Jamshedpur area. Over the same 15 year period, steel tonnage produced quadrupled to 6,000,000 tons per year. Oil has been explored, discovered, and exploited. Nuclear technology, in addition to the high visibility of an atomic explosion, has been employed in electricity production and many other arenas. An extensive infrastructure of utilities, communications, roads, railroads, commerce, and credit has been spread across the whole country. In 15 years, kilowatt hours of electricity produced quintupled to 36,000,000 hours per year (Mellor, 1968). In addition, an extensive network of health, education, and welfare services has permeated to the most remote areas.

Still it is now widely acknowledged that reliance upon the traditional route of industrial development will not be successful. As Ashish Bose (1973:105) has put it, "...industrialization cannot be the solution of the problem of surplus labor in India." It is to deal with the problems outlined above, largely the result of policy priorities towards industrialization in the face of a massive population growth that an expanding circle of development analysts are suggesting that priorities must be oriented towards rural development (Mellor 1968 and 1976, Hunter 1969, Owens 1972, Weitz 1973, Sovani 1976, and Mukherjee 1977).

V. Village Level Development

The attempt to shortcut the development process through instant industrialization proved inadequate. The expectation that the Third World must develop in exactly the same pattern that the West followed

has also proven inadequate, for Third World nations are not in the midst of a non-technological world, even if their technology is minimal; their excess population cannot emigrate to (relatively) virgin areas of the world; and their external trade does not dominate the world system (all options exercised by the West during its development). It must compete with that of the highly developed systems of the West (Kuznets, 1954). A third way of development is necessary for India, as for the rest of the Third World. It is a path towards development which will require a restructuring of international relationships, as she has already been engaged in doing. Like China, India is large enough to follow a primary strategy of internal self-reliance, but not while focusing upon capital-intensive industrialization which requires heavy machinery imports. Rural development is the crucial element in a design of self-reliant development. What are the benefits of putting a priority on rural development?

The first, and most obvious expectation, is an expansion of the available food supply. Much of the technology of expanded production is now available to Indian agriculture, and with the proper research for local adaptation and the proper managerial training in making the best uses of this technology, food outputs can not only meet the demands of an expanding population, but exceed them (Mellor, 1968).

Further, the intensification of farming thus envisioned would increase the number of persons employed in agriculture. Even without intensification, agriculture in India absorbed 3/4ths of the population growth during the time of the first three plans--half on existing

acreage and half on newly cultivated land(Mellor, 1968). One in-depth study of intensified agriculture in South India discovered an eightfold increase in agricultural labor following conversion to irrigated cash crops(Epstein, 1962). Perhaps in this fashion, the rural-urban migration can be diminished.

Third, an expansion of agricultural productivity will increase the commercialization of the Indian economy and increase the capital available for investment. It will be as a result of human expenditure, the most plentiful resource available in India, and other such Asian nations, that cash earnings are realized. The increased earnings and expenditures in the rural sector will increase the demand for industrial products, both by allowing the formerly subsistence farmer to enter into the cash economy, and by increasing the demand for industrial products which are the inputs of agricultural development. Further, excess agricultural production can help to ease the foreign exchange constraints through exports(Lewis, 1953 and Mellor, 1976). The issues here have to do with the fact that with increasing total agricultural income, higher taxation is possible(rural taxes in 1961 were only about half the rate per capita of those of urban people, and less than a quarter of realized rupees per capita--Mellor, 1968), out of which to finance the social overhead capital investments in roads, electrification, irrigation, agricultural research which are necessary to sustain continuing development.

The fourth benefit of an agricultural development emphasis is to diminish the disparity between rural peasants and urban elites as

modernization is brought to the whole population. It has been noted that when agricultural development has occurred at the village level, it has been consistently accompanied by a high degree of modernization in the political and cultural arenas. In fact, development is a complicated and integral happening in the whole life of a village.*

But development at the village level is a difficult task. It requires a social and economic transformation at the local level as well as a restructuring of international relationships and national priorities. Simon Kuznets(1954) and the prominent Indian sociologist-anthropologist M.N. Srinivas(1966) have indicated the scope of the problem when they pointed out that the Western nations had already experienced Intellectual, Religious, Geographic, and Political Revolutions before the advent of the Industrial Revolution. In villages which have been isolated, marginalized, de-industrialized, or otherwise suffered the effects of underdevelopment, often all of these revolutions must happen at once. In Hunter's terms(1969), modernization entails a shift from a society in which reliance upon "traditional" ways and social patterns guaranteed subsistence in all but the most horrendous of circumstances, to a society geared to growth, to meet more adequately basic needs, but also subject to the risks of unsuccessful innovations.

While Hunter's staged developmental model for villages(Traditional, Transitional, and Modern Commercial) seems naively dependent

* See the interesting study of Adelman and Dalton, 1971, of 108 Indian villages, using factor analysis of data taken from the 1961 census.

upon Rostovian thinking, he accurately asserts that village development involves sets of sequences of change which include structural changes in the patterns of occupations and in the social relations, both those within the village and those with other villages and the larger society. The sequences are unique to each locale, but involve all sectors of the village life and are cumulative, building upon one another (see also Myrdal, 1957; Owens, 1972; and Weitz, 1973). Thus, development is a process of change that must be initiated and encouraged. It is not a miraculous, all at once accomplishment. It is an expansion, in many places, of the economic and social fabric of the whole society, not the isolated development of a specialized sector which results in sudden leaps in national statistics. A strategy of rural development is not focused on the manipulation of such statistics (such as increasing the rate of urbanization or industrialization) as much as it is focused on occasioning a broad base of real change for the 80% of India's population that live in rural places.

The process of village development is the process of comprehensive cumulative change, as already spelled out by Myrdal and now applied to the village. Similarly, it is the process of differentiation of activity and effort, of increasing division of labor, as articulated by Smelser (1963), but a differentiation within each village, rather than between rural and urban sectors. This requires increased functions of integration to replace with social mechanisms the tight-knit bonds of traditional family and caste support. Such development will bring the benefits of modernization to the villages of India. It is the

urbanizing of rural villages which will take the migratory pressure off the overburdened urban places. To demonstrate how this can be done is the purpose of this dissertation.