

Now, I would like to illustrate a bit the kind of impact our projects are having on the 15%. They had to do an audit in Malivada for the government of Maharashtra. We are not being co-opted for we are leading the way with that government, and they have got their planning department in there learning from us. They have set up an inter-disciplinary committee of prominent Indian citizens in order to have the plan ready for replication when the next five-year plan begins in 1979. Malivada was forced to estimate just how much they had spent, so they did their six-month report. Mind you that after three months they had everything going except stakes (and that was because no one was assigned there who knew what a stake was). Their cash outlay was some \$26,000 with the actual amount they had spent in Malivada. Now, obviously those budgets in the books are funding gimmicks, and they are getting too high here and there; we will look ridiculous on per capita expenditures. But those budgets in the back are not how you do it. It is \$26,000 because they also did their ITI's and their houses off of it and they raised in six months time some \$70,000. But the government services - like all the dams were done through a government program that was sitting there in Aurangabad for building eleven dams by hiring some 50-60 people. It was not a new outlay or a donation by the government. It was sitting there and all they had to do was to take the established clout they had with the chief minister and then go see the beaurocrats in Aurangabad who, with that letter from Chief Minister Chavan, were amazingly cordial. In-kind like that tractor, I do not know what they guessed that at; but they estimated that and just anything and everything that a person had sitting there. Patterson and Vinod on a plane seem to trap people. They know everybody who flies Indian Airlines and they go down the aisle asking for things. Patterson does not even know the word 'timidity.' They just go up and down the aisle of a plane making their contacts and they ask. It is hard to judge how much they got in-kind.

Loans are the local input because they are going to pay that money back. We had a shocking realization on the loan business. In Zambia, U.S. AID has this program where they are guaranteeing loans to the Zambian government for construction of low income housing. The lender will be Chase-Manhattan Bank. The U.S. Government guarantees Chase at two over prime, which is a market loan. All they have to worry about if it goes bad is the cost of collection (which could not be more than 1%, so they are still 1% over prime ahead) to the Zambian government. Now, the problem is that they do it like 15-20 years at 3½ or 2%. That's how we in the 15% treat each other. They guy in the 35% - he cannot afford it. You make a 20 year loan at 6%, after 20 years you end up paying exactly twice what you paid, anyway. Well, that's our line to the World Bank. They have got to give no-interest loans. What happens when they lend this money where the guy pays 30% of his income to pay the loan back for his house and then he defaults, they say, "We knew it! Local man wouldn't pay it back." But that's not our experience in Malivada. They have good loans and the people are paying it back and they are paying it back on time.

Then, these guys in Malivada, they have yet not to receive an extra-national grant. They have about ten submitted: the U.S. AID proposal; a proposal in to CIDA (the Canadian AID); a replication proposal; several church proposals in;

and then one for the Canadian Freedom from Hunger grant. If they all came through, they couldn't use that money. We are over-selling and one of the things we want to do is turn one of these grants back.

Anyway, secondly, one of the keys in terms of the in-kind, the government sources, raising money like mad locally, assaulting every corporation and prominent individual they run into - has been spending. If you don't know the value of a buffalo nickel you can raise all the money in the world and it won't help. And I think they've done well at spending only when they had to. And, it seems to me that the decision is to whip the economic. Now, the general says you have your finances ordered before you go to war. I'm sure Sun Tzu doesn't mean by that you have all the money in the bank. You know how you're going to make it, in other words. The greatest point of discernable slowness on a project probably comes in the economic and that's in our head. That doesn't have to do with our situation.

Now, there are other indices of the decision to fail that we've noticed around the world, and I'd just like to outline some of these. One has to do with routine. God, it's killing. Is it not the great thing about our corporateness that it is far easier when you come in from the outside to spot these things. The routine - and a great trap - is doing those programs and not tactics. Tactics, tactics - that is what we're doing, not programs. Programs are important for estimating amounts and forces, making sense to the establishment, and a fine imaginal, comprehensive picture of what you're doing; but you do your tactics.

You can see a meeting where you have 15 programs and you say, we've got to, therefore, have at least 15 staff and you sit around in a morning meeting and all 15 sing a song and they break and go their 15 different ways. Four working together more as a team doing 15 arenas would be far more effective than the 15 divided. That has to do with the cobra strike where a place has decided to reel back, get ready and then boom, strike; then they reel back, get ready and then boom strike again with this and that tactic as opposed to, "You're assigned to the preschool, you are assigned to commerce, and good luck."

Secondly, organization by programs is a killer. Whether it's by a prior's decision or a group's decision, where they say to the first among equals, "Well, you're the administrator. Therefore you're not to do anything, but you are to administrate us." You know any guy who wants to be in charge of something is not only a sinner, he's stupid. You get in charge of all that and you go nuts inside. It's a subtle form of beaurocracy that's built up that again has a retarding effect on a project.

Third, and I'm sure Sun Tzu would say, in many ways most important, is the failure mentality. It's easy to spot if people don't wear blue, or if they are making all sorts of qualified statements is a good clue... "Well, we hoped to do this," or, "If we could." What the guy on the other end of the table hears is that these guys don't intend. Walking slow where fate decides to seize you rather than deciding to go out and just do it.

And then, paranoia, and the funny thing on paranoia is that the people in the places where I think they have the best reasons to have paranoia aren't the most paranoid. But again, to be paranoid about a government is more in our head than it is the situation. Some assume when you broaden and deepen your clout, your framing, that for some reason, God placed most of the shit-asses in the world where you are. He didn't. The clout is there and it's a matter of finding them. Then they stand before you, be they churchmen or just people who care, as your defenders.

And then a killing one has to be time. Those of us who worked in 5th City, I believe, are most susceptible to this. I think I would take a bat to my head every morning and say, "Forget how long it took in 5th City," at least before Walters came. I think I'd say three months first, then I'd say six months, then I'd say nine months, then I'd say a year. Then I'd get worried and I'd say this whole maneuver is to get out in a year and three months. And, after two years, obviously your colleagues would pull you. But it presumes that we have a long time there. Why we all go so fast is, we have a little secret about foreshortening the future. We realize we have only one great life to live and one great, glorious death to die. That helps us foreshorten the future. Every day we have all of, not just the future coming before us, but the past compressed into the moment of the internal present. That's why we have no luxury of even two years in a project. People say, "Where do you get your understanding? Why do you guys move so fast?" It's obvious you couldn't explain it to some donkeys because it's theological.

Sixth, an amazing amnesia happens, I think, relative to what we know about our methods. And, you know we described the Marshallese as having social amnesia, forgetting their name.

Seventh, the propensity to be somebody is in us all; the question is: are we going to live out of it or not. I'm always surprised when I catch myself or notice my colleagues saying, "Let's go to this or that cocktail party so we can rub shoulders with them and not ask for something." That's assuming that we, as failures are on the peer of the guy who's made it in society, and somehow through osmosis we could vicariously make it. Why in the world would we want acknowledgement from the very thing that we are out to change? But, the interesting thing (and this is where clout comes in) is we go in our little nobody blue, and boy, there's power with that. We sit there with Mr. Clout - why, we can look MacNamara or Mrs. Ghandi straight in the eye, and yet she smells, "Why, these buggers are nobody."

And then, lastly and most importantly, and I believe this does have to do with development, is care for ourselves. We just came from Lagos and Pierce has the great one liner on that. One night the mosquitos got to us. Murray said that when we opened the windows because we were so hot, he heard the mosquitos fly in and say, "Let us Feast!" It makes being in India look like a cake walk, I'm kidding you not. We were in one 7-hour traffic jam going maybe 20 miles. Everybody saying let's go slow in life. It could brutalize your psyche more than any place I can ever dream of. Anyway, one night when the mosquitos were eating

us alive and we had gotten back late from this traffic jam, Pierce says, "Oh, I've died and gone to hell and it's Lagos!" Well, you can see, can you not, that these projects are rough physically. If you did not absolutely take care of yourself you could immediately and quickly succumb to the hard physicality of that situation. Of course, it's possible to do that in relatively easy physical situations, too. Anyway, Pierce kept making the point that we now had the opportunity to act out RS-I in a way that we never quite did before. It's been said the greatest failure that any of us could have is the failure to go to heaven. It's becoming more and more clear to me that what we said about deciding with our lives had to do with the decision of whether or not we were going to go to heaven.