Man's existence in society involves an inevitable and inescapable conflict-a conflict of his own desires. For every individual really wants two things: freedom to pursue his own interests and his own inclinations. At the same time he wants the freedoms which can be obtained only through life in society-freedom from fear of personal attack, freedom from the effects of natural dangers which from time to time hit every individual and which cannot be withstood without help, and freedom to gain rewards from nature for which his own unaided strength is insufficient. Yet as soon as an individual becomes a member of society he must sacrifice, in the interests of the society, certain of the private freedoms which he possesses outside society. For example, to gain personal safety a man must surrender his own power to attack others, to benefit from co­operative endeavour he must at times co­operate with others regardless of his own particular wishes. This kind of conflict is inherent in the existence of society-all societies. It becomes greater the more complicated man's relationship with his fellows, and the greater his consequent potential rewards from living in society.

This means that neither the good of the individual as such, nor the group as such, can always be the determining factor in society's decisions. Both have constantly to be served. Yet underlying everything must be a consciousness that the very purpose of society-its reason for existence-is and must be the individual man, his growth, his health, his security, his dignity and, therefore, his happiness. Men do not freely agree to participate in social relations for purposes of material wealth, for efficiency, or for the glory of the group, except in so far as these things serve them. Group wealth and group power are not themselves virtues for which men would sacrifice themselves or for which they should be sacrificed. They are virtues only in so far as they serve the object of society-which is man.

It is not any particular man who is the justification for society and all its problems. It is every man, equally with every other man. The equality of all members is fundamental to any social grouping to which an individual freely belongs. By joining a social group-by being a member of it-a man is surrendering certain freedoms. His gain is that others do likewise. If they do not he has not become a member of a society; he has become a slave or a servant of another individual or group of individuals. In such a case there is no hope of stability or harmony within the group; it will continue only as long as power-physical power-remains sufficiently strong to enforce it.

Thus the ideal society is based on human equality and on a combination of the freedom and unity of its members. There must be equality, because only on that basis will men work co­operatively. There must be freedom, because the individual is not served by society unless it is his. And there must be unity, because only when the society is united can its members live and work in peace, security, and well­being.

To ensure that any particular society adheres to its basic purposes two things are required. It must have institutions which safeguard and promote both unity and freedom, and it must be permeated by an attitude-a social ethic-which ensures that these institutions remain true to their purpose and are adapted as need arises. The essential nature of these requirements, and their implications, can be seen most easily in the smallest social unit and the one which was in its time perhaps the most satisfactory to its members-the traditional African family.

The traditional African family was an almost self­contained economic and social unit. Most of the necessities of birth, life, and death could be supplied within the unit on a level which was certainly low, but equally low for all members, and still higher than sub­groups of that family could obtain by themselves.

Despite all the variations, and some exceptions where the institution of domestic slavery existed, African family life was everywhere based on certain practices and attitudes which together meant basic equality, freedom and unity. It was these principles which virtually excluded the idea that one member of the extended family could kill another or steal from another-it was not any special African human virtue. And there were three vital factors to it. There was an attitude of mutual respect and obligation which bound the members together-an attitude which might be described as love, provided it is understood that this word does not imply romance, or even necessarily close personal affection. The property which is important to the family, and thus to the individual members of it, is held in common. And every member of the family accepts the obligation to work.

These three principles weld the family into a unit which is so obviously important to the individual members that each individual thinks of himself, and of others, in the framework of their membership of the unit. A man or woman knows that he or she is a unique person with private desires. But he also knows that his actions must, for his own good, be restricted to those which are consistent with the good of his social unit-his family. The institution of the family, and its procedures, then encourage that attitude of respect and mutual obligation, and through these means there is created a society which can be harmonious and beneficial for all members equally.

Within the family there is, of course, authority. And usually the authority is the head of the family. But although this authority enables the unit to surmount internal disputes of personality, and enables swift decisions to be taken in times of outside threat, it is not untrammelled. It has its "checks and balances", and is acceptable because it is allied with certain responsibilities. If these are not fulfilled then, over time, the "family" will break up; its members will separate and either join other "families" or set up in their own smaller units. The "authority" is basically the "first among equals"; his position is based upon the foundation of mutual respect between all members and their common expectation that the compromises which are necessary in all group life will be made by all-including the "authority" himself.

Such experiences presuppose the economic as well as the social integration of the society, and rest squarely on the group's joint ownership of basic property. It is, and must be, "our" house, "our" food, "our" land, for only under these conditions can equality exist among the members. Personal property does, of course, exist and is accepted. But it takes second place in the order of things. Certainly no member of the family goes short of food or shelter in order that personal property may be acquired by another member. It is family property which matters, both to the family as such and to the individuals in the family. And because it is family property all members have an equal right to a share in its use, and all have a right to participate in the process of sharing-in so far as time has not created its own acceptable divisions. Indeed, so strong is this concept of "sharing" that even in relation to private property there develops an expectation of use in case of need; the distinction, however, remains. In the case of family property each individual has a right; in the case of private property there may be an expectation but there is no automatic right.

This principle of sharing is basic to the harmonious family, and is a practical recognition of their equality. The members may not all get an equal share in the food available-this will be determined by need. But they all have an equal right to their share. There is no question of one taking what he wants, and the rest having anything which is left; everything is apportioned, though precedence in receiving or eating has given a false impression to many observers, and inequalities in the share have sometimes concealed the basic equality of all the participants.

But although the head of the family, and the hunters or warriors or some other group, may get larger portions of food or prior right in shelter, the inequalities between the family members will never be very great. There can be, by the nature of the common ownership, no question of one person being satiated or hoarding while another member of the society starves. Even in relation to things like cattle-where ownership rights are a complicated interplay of family and individual possession- individual members of the family who do not "own" cattle have the right to demand animals from their relations for certain specific purposes. The different shares of different members of the family unit can never get very unequal; all the customs operate to bring them constantly back towards equality. And it would certainly be a major social disgrace for one member of a family, however senior, to be acquiring, for example, personal property in the form of trade, clothes or anything else while another member was denied his basic rights.

It is for this reason that the impact of an individualistic money economy can be catastrophic as regards the African family social unit. The principles of the traditional African family all the time encourage men to think of themselves as members of a society. In contrast, the capitalist and money economy, as introduced into Africa by the trading and colonial powers, operates on the basis of individualism; it encourages individual acquisitiveness and economic competition. A wage­earning member of the family is therefore exposed to luxuries like radios and wrist­watches, and in the wider society his status depends on possession of these things. Yet his responsibilities to the other members of his family remain, and increase with every increase of his wages, because they are the responsibilities of sharing. At this point the traditional small society, and the new wide money­based society, come into direct conflict; and the effects are visible on individuals and on the society throughout Africa today.

This change is not just economic. By introducing the possibility of hoarding wealth through money, by encouraging the acquisitive instinct in man, and by basing social status on material wealth, the very basis of traditional social life is undermined. The economic inequalities between men become so great that man's basic equality is imperceptibly transformed into a merchant and client society. It is then impossible for all members of the society to discuss together as equals with a common interest in the maintenance and development of society. The common interest has been at least partially replaced by two interests, those of the "haves" and those of the "have­nots". The unity of society has been weakened because the equality of its members has been broken.

Yet, as it was the right of sharing which served to maintain and strengthen the social unit and make it worth­while to all its members, so there was a corresponding common duty. Every member of the social unit had the obligation to contribute to the pool of things which were to be shared-in other words, every member of the family was expected to work and accepted the responsibility of working. Some may work in the fields while others hunt or cook; the amount of work expected of an individual varies, and some will be recognized as lazy while others are praised for their energy. But the obligation to work is a recognized part of society, as unquestioned as the right of sharing. If one member appears to be doing less than is warranted by his size and strength, it will be made clear to him in no uncertain fashion that he is not doing enough. He may not agree or he may be discontented with the type of work demanded of him; but he will not question the right of his family to demand work. It does not occur to him that he has the right to eat and have shelter, and the protection of society without working for the society. Least of all will he claim to be exempt from work because his father or other ancestor was a successful worker. His equality with other members of the society, his interest in them and their interest in him-all these things he recognizes. And he will accept, at least in theory, that without this universal acceptance of an obligation to work the unit itself, and he as a member of it, will suffer.

It would be absurd to imply that, because of the application of the principles of love, sharing and work, pre­colonial Africa was an ideal place in which the "noble savage" of Rousseau lived his idyllic existence. The members of this unit were no more "noble" than other human beings and the principles were honoured as much in the breach as are other principles elsewhere in the world. And in any case there was, and is, nothing idyllic about the conditions in which the African family lived. It is poor, insecure, and frequently fear­ridden. But the insecurity and the fear are the consequences of the natural conditions in which the families exist. They arose because the family unit, though well adapted to its environment, was too small and in any case there were too few of them to overcome the environment. As nature could not be controlled, so the family created out of itself a social unit which was strong enough to withstand all but the worst disasters, and which accepted the necessity for social stability so that the struggle for food and shelter could go on under conditions tolerable to human beings. And social stability was achieved by the establishment of conditions which allowed for individual freedom in the context of social unity, and necessarily on the basis of fundamental equality of membership.

The principles which worked in this one case are equally valid for larger societies because, however large it is, men are always the purpose and justification of society. There are very great problems involved in adapting the principles to really large units where individual brotherhood and interdependence is not as immediately obvious as in the family unit. But they are still the only basis on which society can hope to operate harmoniously and in accordance with its purpose. Unless they are adopted there will always be an inherent, although sometimes concealed, danger of a breakdown in society- that is, a split in the family unit, a civil war within a nation, or a war between nations. Yet it is the principles themselves which are challenged, and few existing societies even claim to be trying to implement them or move towards them.

The principles are challenged first by those who maintain that the purpose of society is not man but a glorification of some abstract notion, such as "the nation", "the flag", or even God. This attitude is derived from the result of confusion between the means and the ends of society. Nations are social groups; in themselves they are either a stage in the development of human society or they are convenient administrative divisions. They are themselves a form of society; how can they be their own purpose? Yet to imagine society as existing to glorify a flag is even more absurd; a flag is nothing but a piece of cloth, and its importance lies only in the fact that it is used to symbolize and strengthen the unity of a particular society. And God-any God-has a relationship only with the individual who has faith in Him; no religion presupposes a God who has a relationship with an abstract noun or only with a collective unit. And certainly our worship of God is itself for the benefit of man, not for the benefit of God. For while worship can do some good for man, or can be believed to do some good for him, it obviously can do no good to perfection-that is to God. An individual's social living may, of course, be regulated to some extent by his religious beliefs, but these beliefs are not the purpose of his social living, even if a man regards them as the purpose of his life. The purpose of society is in all cases man, although in some cases the institutions of the society will be shaped according to some men's beliefs about the requirements of their spiritual development.

The other major challenge to the validity of the principles of love, sharing, and work as a basis for society is made on the grounds that they are too idealistic, particularly for large groups where the members cannot know each other. This criticism is nonsensical. Social principles are, by definition, ideals at which to strive and by which to exercise self­criticism. The question to ask is not whether they are capable of achievement, which is absurd, but whether a society of free men can do without them. Like democracy, they are easier to approximate to in smaller societies than in large ones. But like democracy, they remain equally valid for both small and large societies-for both traditional and modern Africa.

It was not innate goodness which promoted and maintained these principles in traditional Africa. They continued because the whole system of education taught them and supported them. They were, and mostly still are in relation to the family, the basic values which a child absorbs from his parents, his elder relations and the whole social organization. The child is indoctrinated with these concepts in practical terms; he is told "that is your share", "go to your brother" (when in European terms this man is a distant relative). And he is criticized and punished if he disregards the courtesies due to other members of the social group or fails to share the remaining food with a late­comer, or ignores the small duties entrusted to him. The young man and the young woman are taught these principles again in their tribal initiation. The principles, without being analyzed. Permeate and form the purpose of the whole educational system of the tribal society.

If these principles are to be preserved and adapted to serve the larger societies which have now grown up, the whole of the new modern educational system must also be directed towards inculcating them. They must underlie all the things taught in the schools, all the things broadcast on the radio, all the things written in the press. And if they are to form the basis on which society operates, then no advocacy of opposition to these principles can be allowed.

To say this is not a negation of the freedom which the principles claim to uphold. There can be-indeed must be in a changing situation-public discussion about whether particular measures which are proposed support or nullify the principles. But, for example, there can be no public advocacy of inequality between citizens, and no actions which degrade one law­abiding citizen in relation to another. In other words, we must put these principles in the same position as certain other universally accepted attitudes. We do not allow a man to preach in favour of private individual killing because we know that this would undermine the basis of society. We do allow discussion on the questions of abortion and euthanasia because these are particular applications of the principle "thou shalt not kill"; but we still do not allow anyone to anticipate society's decision on these matters. These are restrictions on individual freedom; we do not regard them as such because we are brought up to accept them as automatic human reactions. For this reason of educational background we do not regard ourselves as having become "unfree" because of them. In other words we recognize these rules about killing to be an inevitable part of the implications of living in society. Why then would it be a loss of freedom to refuse to allow attacks on the basic equality of all members of society or on the implications of that equality?

There is one very real difference between "thou shalt not kill" and the principles of equality. The former is an absolute-or can be. Further, it is a negative demand-thou shalt not. Equality, on the other hand, demands positive action; it requires differentiation between men because of their inequalities. To say, for example, that a one­armed old man and an active young man are equal if they each have ten acres of fertile land and a hoe would be to make a mockery of equality. There is, therefore, no absolute and simple rule which can be easily applied everywhere and to all aspects of life in relation to equality. Instead we are forced back to concepts of human dignity; every member of society must have safeguarded by society his basic humanity and the sacredness of his life­force. He must both be regarded, and be able to regard himself, as the human equal of all other members in relation to the society. It is this need which makes economic inequalities so dangerous, and which make so abhorrent and destructive "police state activities" where an individual's pattern of life is at the mercy of arbitrary decisions of another individual.

Yet even in this connection there can be a conflict. There is no human dignity in extreme poverty or debilitating disease-nor in the ignorance which buttresses these things. Neither is there very much virtue in sharing nothing when joint effort could provide, after a period, the goods which make life more comfortable. Further, man's progress needs that economic "surplus" which enables some members of society to desist from production for current consumption, in favour of those activities which ultimately lift the whole society into new satisfactions of an aesthetic or philosophical nature. The purpose of society is man; but in order to serve man there must be a social organization of economic activities which is conductive to the greater production of things useful for the material and spiritual welfare of man. This means that it may well be a function of society to organize and sustain efficient economic organization and production techniques, even when these are in themselves unpleasant or restrictive. For production is important. It is important to the extent that it serves man, and his interests as he currently sees them. But production is not the purpose of society; humanity's progress must be measured by the extent to which man is freed from the domination of the need to produce. When the demands of "efficiency" and "production" override man's need for a full and good life then society is no longer serving man, it is using him.

Because the requirements of these principles will inevitably vary from one society to another at any one time, and from time to time in any society, no "sacred book" is possible which can tell future generations how to attain the ideal. The ideal has never yet been attained; it may never be. But the fact that murders continue in every society does not prevent every society from trying to eliminate them, to reduce their causes and discourage the expression of man's violent instincts. Similarly, in regard to the wider purposes of society, we have to organize our institutions and build attitudes which promote universal human dignity and social equality. In other words we have to promote the growth, and encourage the expression, of the attitude which asks a particular kind of question when considering decisions. The question "What profit would I myself get?" must be socially discouraged; it must be replaced by the question ''What benefit, and what loss, will be obtained by the people who make up this society?"

If we are ever to reach this position many of our present societies have to change direction. Africa in particular is now moving away from such attitudes. We must therefore take positive action to re­inspire the acceptance of these principles, and to make their implementation possible in the larger societies which have developed out of the family and the tribe.

This is not going to be easy, for it means that Africa has to tackle at the same time the problems of increasing our production and rebuilding attitudes of equality. This is a difficult combination, particularly at a time when there is a desperately short supply of the special skills needed to secure an increase in our abysmally low productivity. For example, the wage differentials in Tanzania are now out of proportion to any conceivable concept of human equality. A few individuals can command incomes of up to 3,000 a year, while the minimum wage is 60 a year, and many farmers receive less. Yet we cannot at present greatly reduce this gap because of our shortage of skilled and qualified people, and the great demand which exists for their services from the Government, from the private investment organizations we need to encourage, and even from international or overseas institutions. This means that the few people with special skills get offered a larger and larger share of the resources of society in return for the application of their skills. This happens despite the fact that these skills were acquired as a result of the communal effort of society, when it provided scholarships or built and maintained our own secondary and technical schools and our university.

This is not happening because our skilled people are particularly evil or selfish; in fact the vast majority are remarkably dedicated to the task of building our country. But the social organization is at present such that these great personal rewards are available to individuals; it is asking for universal sainthood to demand that all of them should renounce these opportunities. Yet the danger to our society nonetheless exists. For such differentials in economic levels easily come to be taken for granted as correct; and they lead to social differentiation and attitudes supporting inequality. They encourage the attitude of mind where groups of specialized groups whose society they aspire to join. It does not seem to happen that anyone compares himself with those at the bottom economic level.

It is essential, therefore, that we in Tanzania, as a society, should recognize the need to take special steps to make our present situation a temporary one, and that we should deliberately fight the intensification of that attitude which would eventually nullify our social need for human dignity and rights in society-above the basic needs of every human being-must come second to the overriding need of human dignity for all; and we have to establish the kind of social organization which reduces personal temptations above that level to a minimum.

The spreading of such attitudes and the introduction of such institutions must be an important purpose of the policies of the Government of Tanzania. It is described as a socialist purpose, for the deliberate regulation of society for the purposes of equality and human well­being is a socialist doctrine. But we are "African Socialists"; we operate in Africa and the road to our goal will be determined in large part by the economic and social conditions which now exists in this continent. This is not to claim a special virtue in "African Socialism"; we adopt it because we have to move towards the socialist goal of human dignity along the road which is appropriate to us. It is simply a recognition that if two people are going to India, one from Africa and the other from Japan, the former will move southwest. The destination of all true socialists is probably the same, but the path will be largely determined by the starting point.

Excerpt from the introduction, pp. 7 ­ 18, Freedom and Unity- Uhuru na Umoja, Julius K. Nyerere, Oxford University Press, 1966, Dar Es Salaam. (Address of Oxford University Press: Ely House, Dover Street, London W 1.)