In the discussion of our general subject, "Christianity
and the Encounter of the World Religions," we gave in our
first chapter a view of the present situation, a view which was
centered in the encounter of the quasireligions with the
religions proper. We discussed the encounter of nationalism (and
its Fascist radicalization), of socialism (and its Communist radicalization),
of liberal humanism (and its precarious situation), with the primitive
sacramental religions, with the mystical religions of Indian origin,
and with the ethical religions born of Israel. And we asked the
question of the future of all religions in the face of the victory
of secularism all over the world. We presented a panorama within
which we did not give an elevated place to Christianity, but we
now intend to look at the panorama from the point of view of Christianity.
First I want to ask the question: what has Christianity,
in the course of its history, thought about other religions in
general and certain religions in particular? How did it meet them?
To what degree will this determine the encounter of Christianity
with the world religions today? And above all: what has been and
what will be the attitude of Christianity to the powerful quasireligions
which are, in their modern form, something new for Christianity?
Before going into this problem empirically I want
to introduce a rather general consideration concerning all religions
and, even more generally, all social groups. If a group
like an individual is convinced that it possesses a truth,
it implicitly denies those claims to truth which conflict with
that truth. I would call this the natural selfaffirmation
in the realm of knowledge; it is only another word for personal
certainty. This is so natural and so inescapable that I have never
found even a skeptic who did not affirm his skepticism while contradicting
everybody who denied its validity. If even the skeptic claims
the right to affirm his skepticism (if he makes a statement at
all), and to contradict those who doubt it, why should the member
of a religious group be deprived of his "civil right,"
so to speak, of affirming the fundamental assertion of his group
and of contradicting those who deny this assertion? It is natural
and unavoidable that Christians affirm the fundamental assertion
of Christianity that Jesus is the Christ and reject what denies
this assertion. What is permitted to the skeptic cannot be forbidden
to the Christian or, for that matter, to the adherent of
any other religion.
Consequently the encounter of Christianity with other
religions, as well as with quasireligions, implies the rejection
of their claims insofar as they contradict the Christian principle,
implicitly or explicitly. But the problem is not the right of
rejecting that which rejects us; rather it is the nature of this
rejection. It can be the rejection of everything for which the
opposite group stands; it can be a partial rejection together
with a partial acceptance of assertions of the opposite group;
or it can be a dialectical union of rejection and acceptance in
the relation of the two groups. In the first case the rejected
religion is considered false, so that no communication between
the two contradictory positions is possible. The negation is complete
and under certain circumstances deadly for the one or the other
side. In the second case some assertions and actions of the one
or the other side are considered false, others true. This is more
tolerant than the attitude of total negation, and it is certainly
an adequate response to a statement of facts or ideas some of
which may be true, some false, but it is not possible to judge
works of art or philosophy or the complex reality of religions
in this way. The third way of rejecting other religions is a dialectical
union of acceptance and rejection, with all the tensions, uncertainties,
and changes which such dialectics implies. If we look at the history
of Christianity as a whole, we can point to a decisive predominance
to this latter response in the attitude of Christian thinking
and acting towards the nonChristian religions. But it is
almost impossible to discover a consistent line of thought about
this problem. And even lest consistent is the attitude of Christianity
to the contemporary quasireligions. This observation contradicts
the popular assumption that Christianity had exclusively negative
attitude toward other faiths. Indeed, nothing is farther from
the truth. In this assumption a confusion frequently takes place
between the attitude of the Christian churches toward Christian
heretics, especially in the late Middle Ages, and their attitude
toward members of other religions. The demonic cruelty of the
former is in contrast with the comparitive mildness of the latter.
The indefiniteness of the attitude toward strange
religions starts in the Old Testament. In the earlier prophets,
the pagan gods are treated as powers inferior to the power of
Jahweh, particularly in foreseeing and determining the future,
in hearing prayers, and in executing justice, but they are regarded
as competing realities. Of course, in the long run, their loss
of being; a god without ultimate power is a "nothing,"
as they were later called. Jahweh has superior power because he
is the God of justice. Since Amos, prophecy threatened Israel,
the nation of Jahweh, with destruction Jahweh because of its injustice.
The covenant between Jahweh and the nation does not give the nation
a claim to Jahweh's championship; he will turn against them if
they violate justice. The exclusive monotheism of the prophetic
religion is not due to the absoluteness of one particular god
as against others, but it is the universal validity of justice
which produces the exclusive monotheism of the God of justice.
This, of course, implies that justice is a principle which transcends
every particular religion and makes the elusiveness of any particular
religion conditional. It is this principle of conditional exclusiveness
which will guide our further inquiry into the Christian principles
for judging nonchristian religions.
Jesus' words are the basic confirmation of this principle.
In the grand scheme of the ultimate judgment (Matt. 25: 3ff) the
Christ puts on his right the people from all nations who have
acted with righteousness and with that agape love which
is the substance of every moral law. Elsewhere Jesus illustrates
this principle by the story of the Good Samaritan, the representative
of a rejected religion who practices love, while the representatives
of the accepted religion pass by. And when the disciples complain
about people who perform works similar to theirs, but outside
their circle, he defends them against the disciples. Although
the Fourth Gospel speaks more clearly than the others of the uniqueness
of the Christ, it interprets him at the same time in the light
of the most universal of all concepts used in this period, the
concept of the Logos, the universal principle of the divine selfmanifestation,
thus freeing the interpretation of Jesus from a particularism
through which he would become the property of a particular religious
group. Further, in the talk with the Samaritan woman, Jesus denies
the significance of any particular place of adoration and demands
an adoration 'in Spirit and in Truth."
Paul is in a situation which is typical of all later
developments. He has to fight on two fronts against the
legalism of Christianized Jews and against the libertinism of
Christianized pagans. He has to defend the new principle revealed
in the appearance of the Christ. But, as always, defense narrows
down. So his first condemnations are uttered against Christian
distorters of his message; anathemas are always directed against
Christians, not against other religions or their members. With
respect to other religions he makes the assertion, unheard of
for a Jew, that Jews and pagans are equally in need of salvation
a salvation which comes not from a new religion, the Christian,
but from an event in history which judges all religions, including
Christianity.
In early Christianity the judgment of other religions
was determined by the idea of the Logos. The Church Fathers emphasized
the universal presence of the Logos, the Word, the principle of
divine selfmanifestation, in all religions and cultures.
The Logos is present everywhere, like the seed on the land, and
this presence is a preparation for the central appearance of the
Logos in a historical person, the Christ. In the light of these
ideas Augustine could say that the true religion had existed always
and was called Christian only after the appearance of the Christ.
Accordingly, his dealing with other religions was dialectical,
as was that of his predecessors. They did not reject them unambiguously
and, of course, they did not accept them unambiguously. But in
the apologetic writings they acknowledged the preparatory character
of these religions and tried to show how their inner dynamics
drives them toward questions whose answer is given in the central
event on which Christianity is based. They tried to show the convergent
lines between the Christian message and the intrinsic quests of
the pagan religions. In doing so they used not only the large
body of literature in which the pagans had criticized their own
religions (for example, the Greek philosophers), but also made
free use of the positive creations from the soil of the pagan
religions. On the level of theological thought they took into
Christianity some of the highest conceptualizations of the Hellenistic
and, more indirectly, of the classical Greek feeling toward life
terms like physis (nature), hypostasis (substance), ousia
(power of being), prosopon (persona, not person in our sense),
and above all logos (word and rational structure in the later
Stoic sense). They were not afraid to call the God to whom they
prayed as the Father of Jesus, the Christ, the unchangeable One.
All these are wellknown facts, but it is important
to see them in the new light of the present encounter of the world
religions, for then they show that early Christianity did not
consider itself as a radicalexclusive, but as the allinclusive
religion in the sense of the saying: "All that is true anywhere
in the world belongs to us, the Christians." And it is significant
that the famous words of Jesus, "You, therefore, must be
perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," (Which was always
an exegetic riddle) would, according to recent research, be better
translated, "You must be allinclusive as your heavenly
Father is allinclusive."
Besides the reception of basic concepts from pagan
metaphysical thought, which always means implicitly religious
thought, early Christianity adopted moral principles from the
Stoics, who represented both a philosophy and a way of life
a process which is already present in the Paulinian letters. The
early Church shaped its ritual structure in analogy with that
of the mystery religions, some of which were its serious competitors,
and used the Roman legal and the Germanic feudal forms for its
social and political selfrealization, while on the more
popular, but officially accepted, level it has, through the veneration
of saints, appropriated and transformed many genuine pagan motifs
and symbols.
This astonishing universalism, however, was always
balanced by a criterion which was never questioned, either by
the orthodox or by the heretical groups: the image of Jesus as
the Christ, as documented in the New, and prepared for in the
Old Testament. Christian universalism was not syncretistic --
it did not mix, but rather subjected whatever it received to an
ultimate criterion. In the power of this polarity between universality
and concreteness it entered the Medieval period, having to compete
with no religion equal to it in either of these respects. In both
the Mediterranean and the northern half of Western civilization
the one allembracing religion and the one allembracing culture
were amalgamated into a unity of life and thought. All conflicts,
however severe, occurred within this unity. No external encounters
disturbed it.
But in the seventh century something happened which
slowly changed the whole situation. The first outside encounter
took place with the rise of Islam, a new and passionate faith,
fanatically carried over the known world, invading, subjecting,
and reducing Eastern Christianity and threatening all Christendom.
Based on Old Testament, pagan, and Christian sources, and created
by a prophetic personality, it was not only adapted to the needs
of primitive tribes, but also capable of absorbing large elements
of the ancient culture, and soon surpassed Western Christianity
in culture and civilization. The shock produced by these events
can be compared only with the shock produced by the establishment
of the Communist quasireligion in Eastern Europe, Russia,
and China, threatening Western Christianity and its liberal humanist
quasireligious transformation.
The victorious wars of the Islamic tribes and nations
forced Christianity to become aware of itself as one religion
confronted with another against which it had to defend itself.
According to the law that defense narrows dlown the defender,
Christianity became at this point radically exclusive. The Crusades
were the expression of this new selfconsciousness. They
were the result of the first encounter of Christianity with a
new world religion. (This analogy, to leap to the present for
a moment, makes understandable the crusading spirit of this country
against the two radicalized types of quasi-religions Fascism
on the one hand, Communism on the other. The often irrational
and almost obsessive character of this crusading spirit shows
that here expressions of ultimate concern are at work, though
deeply ambiguous ones. Their ambiguity shows itself also in the
fact that, just as in the period of the Crusades, they conflict
with sober political judgment and profounder religious insight.)
The irrational character of the crusading spirit
was confirmed by the fact that the narrowed selfconsciousness,
created by the encounter of Christianity with Islam, produced
also a changed selfconsciousness with respect to the Jews,
since the period of the New Testament, and expressed most clearly
in the Johannine literature, a Christian antiJudaism has
existed, based, of course, on the rejection of Jesus as the Messiah
by the vast majority of the Jews. Nevertheless, they were tolerated
and often welcomed in the earlier period; the Church waited for
their conversion. But after the shock of the encounter with Islam
the Church became conscious of Judaism as another religion and
antiJudaism became fanatical. Only after this was it possible
for governments to use the Jews as political scapegoats to cover
up their own political and economic failures, and only since the
end of the nineteenth century did religious antiJudaism
become racial antiSemitism, which was and still is
one of the many ingredients in the radicalized nationalistic
quasireligion.
But the encounter of Christianity with a new and
an old world religion in the period of the Crusades worked not
only for a fanatical exclusiveness; it also worked slowly in the
direction of a tolerant relativism. In the same early thirteenth
century in which Pope Innocent III gave the model for Hitler's
Nurnberg laws against the Jews, there was created by Christian,
Islamic, and Jewish forces the nearmiracle of a tolerant
humanism on the basis of current traditions at the court of Emperor
Frederick II in Sicily. It took one to two centuries for similar
ideas to come again to the surface, changing the Christian judgment
of nonChristian religions in a radical way.
The great Cardinal and member of the Papal Court,
Nicholas Cusanus, was able in the middle of the fifteenth century,
in spite of his being an acknowledged pillar of the Roman Church,
to write his book, De Pace Fidei (The Peace between the Different
Forms of Faith). He tells how representatives of the great religions
had a sacred conversation in heaven. The divine Logos explained
their unity by saying: "There is only one religion, only
one cult of all who are living according to the principles of
Reason (the Logos Reason), which underlies the different rites....
The cult of the gods everywhere witnesses to Divinity.... So in
the heaven of (Logos) Reason the concord of the religions was
established."
The vision of Cusanus was an anticipation of later
developments. Ideas appeared which renewed and even transcended
the early Christian universalism, but without falling into relativism.
People like Erasmus, the Christian humanist, or Zwingli, the Protestant
Reformer, acknowledged the work of the Divine Spirit beyond the
boundaries of the Christian Church. The Socinians predecessors
of the Unitarians and of much liberal Protestant theology, taught
a universal revelation in all periods. The leaders of the Enlightenment,
Locke, Hume, and Kant, measured Christianity by its reasonableness
and judged all other religions by the same criterion. They wanted
to remain Christians, but on a universalist, allinclusive
basis. These ideas inspired a large group of Protestant theologians
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A symptom of
this situation is the rise of philosophies of religion, the very
term implying that Christianity has been subsumed under the universal
concept of religion. This seems harmless enough, but it is not.
In the periods in which the concrete element dominated and repressed
the universalist element, the theologians were aware of this danger
and they maintained a unique claim for Christianity by contrasting
revelation restricted to Christianity with religion
as designating every nonChristian religion. Or they called
Christianity the true religion, all other religions "false
religions." With the disappearance of this distinction, however,
Christianity~ while still claiming some superiority, stepped down
from the throne of exclusiveness to which these theologians had
raised it and became no more than the exemplar of the species
religion. Thus Christian universalism was transformed into humanist
relativism.
This situation is reflected in the way in which both
philosophers and Logicians, in the philosophies of religion, dealt
with Christianity in relation to other religions. Kant, in his
book on Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason, gives Christianity
an exalted standing by interpreting its symbols in terms of his
Critique of Practical Reason. Fichte uses the Fourth Gospel to
exalt Christianity as a representative of mysticism; Schelling
and Hegel consider it, in spite of Islam, as the fulfillment of
all that is positive in the other religions and cultures; Schleiermacher
gives a construction of the history of religions in which Christianity
takes the highest place in the highest type of religion. My own
teacher, Ernst Troeltsch, in his famous essay, "The Absoluteness
of Christianity," asks most radically the question of the
standing of Christianity among the world religions. He, like all
the other Christian theologians and philosophers, who subsume
Christianity under the concept of religion, construes Christianity
as the most adequate realization of the potentialities implied
in that concept. But since the concept of religion is itself derived
from the Christianhumanist tradition, the procedure is circular.
Troeltsch was aware of this situation and drew the consequences
in his interpretation of history, in which he states no universal
aim of history, but restricts himself to his own tradition, of
which Christianity is an element. He callsit "Europeism;"
today we would probably call it "The West." A consequence
of this withdrawal was his advocation of the replacement of missionary
attacks on the other world religions by "crossfertilization,"
which was meant more as cultural exchange than as interreligious
unity of acceptance and rejection. The resignation implied in
this solution followed a general trend of nineteenth century thought,
positivism in the orignnal sense of the word, as acceptance of
the empirically given without a superior criterion.
There was, however, always a majority of theologians
and church people who interpreted Christianity in a particularistic
and absolutistic way. They emphasized the exclusiveness of the
salvation through Christ, following the main line of the theology
of the Reformers, their orthodox systematizers and the pietistic
transformers. In several waves the antiuniversalist movements
attacked the universalist trends which had become powerful in
the last centuries. Every relativistic attitude towards the world
religions was denounced as a negation of the absolute truth of
Christianity. Out of this tradition (which is not necessarily
fundamentalist in the ordinary sense) a strong particularistic
turn of theology has grown. It was called in Europe crisistheology;
in America it is being called neoorthodoxy. Its founder
and outstanding representative is Karl Barth. This theology can
be summed up from the point of view of our problem as the rejection
of the concept of religion if applied to Christianity. According
to him, the Christian Church, the embodiment of Christianity,
is based on the only revelation that has ever occurred, namely,
that in Jesus Christ. All human religions are fascinating, but
futile attempts of man to reach God, and the relation to them,
therefore, is no problem; the Christian judgment of them is unambiguous
rejection of their claim to be based on revelation. Consequently,
the problem which is the subject of this book the encounter
of Christianity with the world religions may be an interesting
historical problem, but is not a theological one. Yet history
itself forced the problem on Barth, not through an encounter with
a nonChristian religion in the proper sense, but through
a highly dramatic encounter with one of the radicalized and demoniacal
quasireligions Nazism. Under Barth's leadership the
European Christian churches were able to resist its onslaught;
the radical selfaffirmation of Christianity in his theology
made any compromise with Nazism impossible. But, according to
the law mentioned above, the price paid for this successful defense
was a theological and ecclesiastical narrowness which blinded
the majority of Protestant leaders in Europe to the new situation
arising out of the encounters of religions and quasireligions
all over the world. The missionary question was treated in a way
which contradicted not only Troeltsch's ideas of a crossfertilization
of the high religions, but also early Christain universalism,
and it deserves mention that Barth and his whole school gave up
the classical doctrine of the Logos in which this universalism
was most clearly expressed.
The present attitude of Christianity to the world
religions is as indefinite as that in most of its history. The
extreme contrast between men like Barth and the theologian of
missions, Kraemer, on the one side, and Troeltsch and the Philosophical
historian Toynbee, with his program of a synthesis of the world
religions, on the other, is symbolic for the intrinsic dialectics
of the relation of Christianity to the religions proper. Implications
of this dialectics for the relation of Christianity to particular
religions, especially those originating in India, will be discussed
in a later chapter.
We must still ask the question, at least in general
terms, of what the attitude of Christianity to the quasireligions
is. The answer presupposes a discussion of the attitude of Christianity
to the secular realm in general. I do not say to secularism, for
there is no problem in this. Secularism, i.e. the affirmation
of secular culture in contrast to, and to the exclusion of, religion
can only be rejected by Christianity as well as by every other
religion. But the secular realm does not necessarily affirm itself
in the form of secularism; it can affirm itself as an element
within an overarching religious system as was the case in the
Middle Ages. Under such conditions Christianity has used the creations
of the secular reakn wherever found in Egypt or Greece
or Rome for the building of its own life. In our own period
Christianity has been able to accept the different technical and
economic revolutions and, after some brief reactions, the scientific
affirmations which underlie these transformations of our historical
existence. The relation of Protestantism to the secular realm
is the most positive, due to the Protestant principle that the
sacred sphere is not nearer to the Ultimate than the secular sphere.
It denies that either of them has a greater claim to grace than
the other; both are infinitely distant from and infinitely near
to the Divine. This stems from the fact that Protestantism was
largely a lay movement, like the Renaissance, and that in its
later development a synthesis between the Enlightenment and Protestantism
was possible, while in Catholic countries, even today, Christianity
and the Enlightenment are still struggling with each other. The
danger of the Protestant idea, of course, is that the acceptance
of secularism can lead to a slow elimination of the religious
dimension altogether, even within the Protestant churches. The
general attitude of the Christian churches to the secular realm
determines their judgment about the quasireligions which
have arisen on the basis of secularism.
First of all, it is obvious that Protestantism is
more open to and, consequently, a more easy prey of the quasireligions.
The Roman Church has denied to all three types of quasireligion
the nationalist, the socialist, and the liberalhumanist
any religious significance. It did not reject the nationalist
or socialist ideas as such; the social ethics of the Catholic
Church could deal positively with both ideas under the criterion
of the church tradition. More complex, and on the whole negative,
is the Catholic attitude to the liberalhumanist quasireligion,
for it is hardly possible to purge this movement of its religious
implications. Totally opposed, however, is the Catholic Church
to the quasireligious radicalizations of nationalism and
socialism, namely Fascism and Communism. The religious element
of neither can be denied even if this element is a dogmatic
"atheism?" This leads to the uncompromising rejection
of Communism, and to the less passionate, but equally unambiguous,
rejection of Fascism by the Catholic Church.
Its positive valuation of the secular makes the reaction
of Protestantism to the quasireligions much more dialectical
and even ambiguous. Protestantism can receive and transform the
religious elements of the quasireligions. It has done so
in different ways with all three of them, but it has also partly
though never totally succumbed to their radicalized
forms. The Catholic Church has not been open to such reception
of and subjection to the quasi-religions.
A few facts may show the ambiguous character of Protestantism
in relation to the quasireligions. The national idea was,
since the reform councils of the fifteenth and the Reformation
of the sixteenth centuries, a decisive tool in the fight of Christian
groups against Rome. This was seen more clearly in England than
anywhere else; Holland followed later, while in Germany Luther
used national protests against Rome in defense of the Reformation
without having a German nation behind him. Only in the late nineteenth
century did the nationalism of the newly founded German Empire
come into conflict with the Roman Church. When Nazism radicalized
the nationalistic faith, certain Protestant groups succumbed to
it, while the majority repulsed the demonic attack of the nationalistic
quasireligion. In the United States there is a kind of conservative
Protestantism (religiously as well as politically) which supports,
often fanatically, the nationalist quasireligion. It is
a symptom of the openness of Protestantism to the danger of what
one could call nationalist apostasy.
Protestantism had, in its earlier stages, less affinity
to movements for social justice than Catholicism. Its negative
judgment about the human predicament made it conservative and
authoritarian. Nevertheless, there were the spiritually strong
(though politically weak) movements of Social Gospel and Christian
Socialism, which tried to discuss and transform the religious
element in the Socialist faith and to use it for Protestant social
ethics. Against the communist radicalization and demonization
of Socialism, the Protestant churches were as uncompromising as
the Catholic church, but there is a strong desire in many Protestant
groups not only to reject, but also to understand, what is going
on in onehalf of the inhabited world.
Protestantism has its most intimate relation with
the liberalhumanist religion. In many cases, as in all forms
of liberal Protestantism, a full amalgamation has taken place.
In the first chapter I called both Protestantism and liberal humanism
spiritual but fragile; in the last chapter we will deal more fully
with their relation.
One thing should have become clear through the preceding descriptions and analyses: that Christianity is not based on a simple negation of the religions or quasireligions it encounters. The relation is profoundly dialectical, and that is not a weakness, but the greatness of Christianity, especially in its selfcritical, Protestant form.