[Oe List ...] Fwd: Geopolitical Weekly : Obama’s Challenge

[George Holcombe]

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George Holcombe
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Begin forwarded message:

> From: Stratfor <noreply at stratfor.com>
> Date: November 5, 2008 4:22:39 PM CST
> To: geowanda at earthlink.net
> Subject: Geopolitical Weekly : Obama’s Challenge
>
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> Obama’s Challenge
> November 5, 2008
>
>
>
>
> By George Friedman
>
> RELATED SPECIAL TOPIC PAGE
> The 2008 U.S. Presidential Race
> Barack Obama has been elected president of the United States by a  
> large majority in the Electoral College. The Democrats have  
> dramatically increased their control of Congress, increasing the  
> number of seats they hold in the House of Representatives and moving  
> close to the point where — with a few Republican defections — they  
> can have veto-proof control of the Senate. Given the age of some  
> Supreme Court justices, Obama might well have the opportunity to  
> appoint at least one and possibly two new justices. He will begin as  
> one of the most powerful presidents in a long while.
>
> Truly extraordinary were the celebrations held around the world upon  
> Obama’s victory. They affirm the global expectations Obama has  
> raised — and reveal that the United States must be more important to  
> Europeans than the latter like to admit. (We can’t imagine late- 
> night vigils in the United States over a French election.)
>
> Obama is an extraordinary rhetorician, and as Aristotle pointed out,  
> rhetoric is one of the foundations of political power. Rhetoric has  
> raised him to the presidency, along with the tremendous unpopularity  
> of his predecessor and a financial crisis that took a tied campaign  
> and gave Obama a lead he carefully nurtured to victory. So, as with  
> all politicians, his victory was a matter of rhetoric and, according  
> to Machiavelli, luck. Obama had both, but now the question is  
> whether he has Machiavelli’s virtue in full by possessing the  
> ability to exercise power. This last element is what governing is  
> about, and it is what will determine if his presidency succeeds.
>
> Embedded in his tremendous victory is a single weakness: Obama won  
> the popular vote by a fairly narrow margin, about 52 percent of the  
> vote. That means that almost as many people voted against him as  
> voted for him.
>
> Obama’s Agenda vs. Expanding His Base
> U.S. President George W. Bush demonstrated that the inability to  
> understand the uses and limits of power can crush a presidency very  
> quickly. The enormous enthusiasm of Obama’s followers could conceal  
> how he — like Bush — is governing a deeply, and nearly evenly,  
> divided country. Obama’s first test will be simple: Can he maintain  
> the devotion of his followers while increasing his political base?  
> Or will he believe, as Bush and Cheney did, that he can govern  
> without concern for the other half of the country because he  
> controls the presidency and Congress, as Bush and Cheney did in  
> 2001? Presidents are elected by electoral votes, but they govern  
> through public support.
>
> Obama and his supporters will say there is no danger of a repeat of  
> Bush — who believed he could carry out his agenda and build his  
> political base at the same time, but couldn’t. Building a political  
> base requires modifying one’s agenda. But when you start modifying  
> your agenda, when you become pragmatic, you start to lose your  
> supporters. If Obama had won with 60 percent of the popular vote,  
> this would not be as pressing a question. But he barely won by more  
> than Bush in 2004. Now, we will find out if Obama is as skillful a  
> president as he was a candidate.
>
> Obama will soon face the problem of beginning to disappoint people  
> all over the world, a problem built into his job. The first  
> disappointments will be minor. There are thousands of people hoping  
> for appointments, some to Cabinet positions, others to the White  
> House, others to federal agencies. Many will get something, but few  
> will get as much as they hoped for. Some will feel betrayed and  
> become bitter. During the transition process, the disappointed  
> office seeker — an institution in American politics — will start  
> leaking on background to whatever reporters are available. This will  
> strike a small, discordant note; creating no serious problems, but  
> serving as a harbinger of things to come.
>
> Later, Obama will be sworn in. He will give a memorable, perhaps  
> historic speech at his inauguration. There will be great  
> expectations about him in the country and around the world. He will  
> enjoy the traditional presidential honeymoon, during which all but  
> his bitterest enemies will give him the benefit of the doubt. The  
> press initially will adore him, but will begin writing stories about  
> all the positions he hasn’t filled, the mistakes he made in the  
> vetting process and so on. And then, sometime in March or April,  
> things will get interesting.
>
> Iran and a U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq
> Obama has promised to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, where he does  
> not intend to leave any residual force. If he follows that course,  
> he will open the door for the Iranians. Iran’s primary national  
> security interest is containing or dominating Iraq, with which Iran  
> fought a long war. If the United States remains in Iraq, the  
> Iranians will be forced to accept a neutral government in Iraq. A  
> U.S. withdrawal will pave the way for the Iranians to use Iraqi  
> proxies to create, at a minimum, an Iraqi government more heavily  
> influenced by Iran.
>
> Apart from upsetting Sunni and Kurdish allies of the United States  
> in Iraq, the Iranian ascendancy in Iraq will disturb some major  
> American allies — particularly the Saudis, who fear Iranian power.  
> The United States can’t afford a scenario under which Iranian power  
> is projected into the Saudi oil fields. While that might be an  
> unlikely scenario, it carries catastrophic consequences. The  
> Jordanians and possibly the Turks, also American allies, will  
> pressure Obama not simply to withdraw. And, of course, the Israelis  
> will want the United States to remain in place to block Iranian  
> expansion. Resisting a coalition of Saudis and Israelis will not be  
> easy.
>
> This will be the point where Obama’s pledge to talk to the Iranians  
> will become crucial. If he simply withdraws from Iraq without a  
> solid understanding with Iran, the entire American coalition in the  
> region will come apart. Obama has pledged to build coalitions,  
> something that will be difficult in the Middle East if he withdraws  
> from Iraq without ironclad Iranian guarantees. He therefore will  
> talk to the Iranians. But what can Obama offer the Iranians that  
> would induce them to forego their primary national security  
> interest? It is difficult to imagine a U.S.-Iranian deal that is  
> both mutually beneficial and enforceable.
>
> Obama will then be forced to make a decision. He can withdraw from  
> Iraq and suffer the geopolitical consequences while coming under  
> fire from the substantial political right in the United States that  
> he needs at least in part to bring into his coalition. Or, he can  
> retain some force in Iraq, thereby disappointing his supporters. If  
> he is clumsy, he could wind up under attack from the right for  
> negotiating with the Iranians and from his own supporters for not  
> withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraq. His skills in foreign policy  
> and domestic politics will be tested on this core question, and he  
> undoubtedly will disappoint many.
>
> The Afghan Dilemma
> Obama will need to address Afghanistan next. He has said that this  
> is the real war, and that he will ask U.S. allies to join him in the  
> effort. This means he will go to the Europeans and NATO, as he has  
> said he will do. The Europeans are delighted with Obama’s victory  
> because they feel Obama will consult them and stop making demands of  
> them. But demands are precisely what he will bring the Europeans. In  
> particular, he will want the Europeans to provide more forces for  
> Afghanistan.
>
> Many European countries will be inclined to provide some support, if  
> for no other reason than to show that they are prepared to work with  
> Obama. But European public opinion is not about to support a major  
> deployment in Afghanistan, and the Europeans don’t have the force to  
> deploy there anyway. In fact, as the global financial crisis begins  
> to have a more dire impact in Europe than in the United States, many  
> European countries are actively reducing their deployments in  
> Afghanistan to save money. Expanding operations is the last thing on  
> European minds.
>
> Obama’s Afghan solution of building a coalition centered on the  
> Europeans will thus meet a divided Europe with little inclination to  
> send troops and with few troops to send in any event. That will  
> force him into a confrontation with the Europeans in spring 2009,  
> and then into a decision. The United States and its allies  
> collectively lack the force to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat the  
> Taliban. They certainly lack the force to make a significant move  
> into Pakistan — something Obama has floated on several occasions  
> that might be a good idea if force were in fact available.
>
> He will have to make a hard decision on Afghanistan. Obama can  
> continue the war as it is currently being fought, without hope of  
> anything but a long holding action, but this risks defining his  
> presidency around a hopeless war. He can choose to withdraw, in  
> effect reinstating the Taliban, going back on his commitment and  
> drawing heavy fire from the right. Or he can do what we have  
> suggested is the inevitable outcome, namely, negotiate — and reach a  
> political accord — with the Taliban. Unlike Bush, however,  
> withdrawal or negotiation with the Taliban will increase the  
> pressure on Obama from the right. And if this is coupled with a  
> decision to delay withdrawal from Iraq, Obama’s own supporters will  
> become restive. His 52 percent Election Day support could  
> deteriorate with remarkable speed.
>
> The Russian Question
> At the same time, Obama will face the Russian question. The morning  
> after Obama’s election, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev announced  
> that Russia was deploying missiles in its European exclave of  
> Kaliningrad in response to the U.S. deployment of ballistic missile  
> defense systems in Poland. Obama opposed the Russians on their  
> August intervention in Georgia, but he has never enunciated a clear  
> Russia policy. We expect Ukraine will have shifted its political  
> alignment toward Russia, and Moscow will be rapidly moving to create  
> a sphere of influence before Obama can bring his attention — and  
> U.S. power — to bear.
>
> Obama will again turn to the Europeans to create a coalition to  
> resist the Russians. But the Europeans will again be divided. The  
> Germans can’t afford to alienate the Russians because of German  
> energy dependence on Russia and because Germany does not want to  
> fight another Cold War. The British and French may be more inclined  
> to address the question, but certainly not to the point of  
> resurrecting NATO as a major military force. The Russians will be  
> prepared to talk, and will want to talk a great deal, all the while  
> pursuing their own national interest of increasing their power in  
> what they call their “near abroad.”
>
> Obama will have many options on domestic policy given his majorities  
> in Congress. But his Achilles’ heel, as it was for Bush and for many  
> presidents, will be foreign policy. He has made what appear to be  
> three guarantees. First, he will withdraw from Iraq. Second, he will  
> focus on Afghanistan. Third, he will oppose Russian expansionism. To  
> deliver on the first promise, he must deal with the Iranians. To  
> deliver on the second, he must deal with the Taliban. To deliver on  
> the third, he must deal with the Europeans.
>
> Global Finance and the European Problem
> The Europeans will pose another critical problem, as they want a  
> second Bretton Woods agreement. Some European states appear to  
> desire a set of international regulations for the financial system.  
> There are three problems with this.
>
> First, unless Obama wants to change course dramatically, the U.S.  
> and European positions differ over the degree to which governments  
> will regulate interbank transactions. The Europeans want much more  
> intrusion than the Americans. They are far less averse to direct  
> government controls than the Americans have been. Obama has the  
> power to shift American policy, but doing that will make it harder  
> to expand his base.
>
> Second, the creation of an international regulatory body that has  
> authority over American banks would create a system where U.S.  
> financial management was subordinated to European financial  
> management.
>
> And third, the Europeans themselves have no common understanding of  
> things. Obama could thus quickly be drawn into complex EU policy  
> issues that could tie his hands in the United States. These could  
> quickly turn into painful negotiations, in which Obama’s allure to  
> the Europeans will evaporate.
>
> One of the foundations of Obama’s foreign policy — and one of the  
> reasons the Europeans have celebrated his election — was the  
> perception that Obama is prepared to work closely with the  
> Europeans. He is in fact prepared to do so, but his problem will be  
> the same one Bush had: The Europeans are in no position to give the  
> things that Obama will need from them — namely, troops, a revived  
> NATO to confront the Russians and a global financial system that  
> doesn’t subordinate American financial authority to an international  
> bureaucracy.
>
> The Hard Road Ahead
> Like any politician, Obama will face the challenge of having made a  
> set of promises that are not mutually supportive. Much of his  
> challenge boils down to problems that he needs to solve and that he  
> wants European help on, but the Europeans are not prepared to  
> provide the type and amount of help he needs. This, plus the fact  
> that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq requires an agreement with Iran —  
> something hard to imagine without a continued U.S. presence in Iraq  
> — gives Obama a difficult road to move on.
>
> As with all American presidents (who face midterm elections with  
> astonishing speed), Obama’s foreign policy moves will be framed by  
> his political support. Institutionally, he will be powerful. In  
> terms of popular support, he begins knowing that almost half the  
> country voted against him, and that he must increase his base. He  
> must exploit the honeymoon period, when his support will expand, to  
> bring another 5 percent or 10 percent of the public into his  
> coalition. These people voted against him; now he needs to convince  
> them to support him. But these are precisely the people who would  
> regard talks with the Taliban or Iran with deep distrust. And if  
> negotiations with the Iranians cause him to keep forces in Iraq, he  
> will alienate his base without necessarily winning over his opponents.
>
> And there is always the unknown. There could be a terrorist attack,  
> the Russians could start pressuring the Baltic states, the Mexican  
> situation could deteriorate. The unknown by definition cannot be  
> anticipated. And many foreign leaders know it takes an  
> administration months to settle in, something some will try to take  
> advantage of. On top of that, there is now nearly a three-month  
> window in which the old president is not yet out and the new  
> president not yet in.
>
> Obama must deal with extraordinarily difficult foreign policy issues  
> in the context of an alliance failing not because of rough behavior  
> among friends but because the allies’ interests have diverged. He  
> must deal with this in the context of foreign policy positions  
> difficult to sustain and reconcile, all against the backdrop of  
> almost half an electorate that voted against him versus supporters  
> who have enormous hopes vested in him. Obama knows all of this, of  
> course, as he indicated in his victory speech.
>
> We will now find out if Obama understands the exercise of political  
> power as well as he understands the pursuit of that power. You  
> really can’t know that until after the fact. There is no reason to  
> think he can’t finesse these problems. Doing so will take cunning,  
> trickery and the ability to make his supporters forget the promises  
> he made while keeping their support. It will also require the  
> ability to make some of his opponents embrace him despite the path  
> he will have to take. In other words, he will have to be cunning and  
> ruthless without appearing to be cunning and ruthless. That’s what  
> successful presidents do.
>
> In the meantime, he should enjoy the transition. It’s frequently the  
> best part of a presidency.
>
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